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Th is project began in earnest in the summer of 1997 when I, a painfully 
earnest undergraduate who had just discovered ideas, began reading Rous-
seau’s Discourse on Inequality at a coff ee shop after an especially trying shift 
in the kitchen at a local restaurant. My wonderful undergraduate adviser, 
Larry Hall, had made me aware of Rousseau’s work but, as an avowed and 
unapologetic critic of his, had done nothing to encourage me to seek it out. 
But teachers truck almost exclusively in unanticipated consequences, and 
Dr. Hall’s passionate dislike for pauvre Jean- Jacques had only spurred my 
curiosity. So, when my shift ended, I—in no mood either to go home to my 
parents or to go out with my coworkers—decided to browse a few titles at a 
bookshop. I fell upon the Discourse on Inequality and was compelled by the 
back cover’s confi dent proclamation that it was “the most important and 
incisive” of Rousseau’s works. Who was I to disagree with such impressive 
alliteration? Th e Discourse it was. I was off  to search for what Dr. Hall had 
found so objectionable. I did not, however, succeed in fi nding it. In fact, I was 
absolutely rapt by Rousseau’s reinterpretation of why people did what they 
did, and read the whole work that night. It goes without saying that I was 
utterly unable to follow the argument, and saw none of its genius—aside 
from a few scraps about language and some good digs at Hobbes, I under-
stood nothing at all. But I did see that Rousseau had something new to tell 
me about myself, that he was challenging my self- understanding in a serious 
and radical way. I knew that I had to come to terms with that challenge and, 
indeed, with the author who had put it to me. Th is book is the latest and, I 
hope, best attempt to do that.
a c k n ow l e d g m e n t s
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Th is is a study of human relations as they are treated in the 
work of Jean- Jacques Rousseau. It is animated by two very 
basic, but very important, questions: (1) what do we want out 
of our relationships? and (2) can we get what we are after? I 
think that if we can fi nd good answers to these questions, we 
will have made some progress in understanding both ourselves 
and the social and political worlds we inhabit. And though I 
will leave to others the somewhat distasteful business of plead-
ing for Rousseau’s relevance to this or that contemporary 
problem, I think that his answers to these questions are well 
worth considering. In fact, I am increasingly persuaded that 
much of his considerable value as a thinker consists in the way 
he confronts, enriches, and problematizes these central mat-
ters: fi guring out what it is we want when we turn to other 
people is no simple matter, and it is, in some sense, even less 
so after reading Rousseau. But his writings illuminate the hid-
den dimensions of these mysteries with an unsurpassed power 
and penetration, and have resonated so strongly with so many 
readers for so many years that it is diffi  cult to dismiss Rous-
seau’s analysis of social phenomena as the romantic fancy of 
an overheated imagination.
Given the importance of the questions guiding this 
book, it may be fairly wondered whether there is much left to 
say about them. Few authors are interrogated as frequently as 
Prologue
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Rousseau is, and many, if perhaps not all, of the component parts of the 
argument presented here have been subjected to close, and repeated, scrutiny 
by other scholars. Th ere are, for instance, many treatments of Rousseau’s 
understanding of romantic love (e.g., Bloom 1993; Wingrove 2000), and 
many, many more on his theory of politics (too many, in fact, to cite here). 
Th ere are some very fi ne books, and piles of articles, on amour- propre (e.g., 
Dent 1988; O’Hagan 1999; Rawls 2007; Neuhouser 2008), and even a bit of 
research on his conception of friendship (e.g., Reisert 2003). Yet this is, to my 
knowledge, the fi rst comprehensive treatment of Rousseau’s theory of human 
relations. Th at is to say, I know of no other study that presents a reasonably 
complete survey of the major forms of human association as they recur in 
Rousseau’s work, along with a theory that explains both how they are con-
nected and the extent to which they can satisfy the desires to which they give 
rise. Th is, then, is what the present volume proposes to do.
I happily grant that it was both a pleasure and a relief to fi nd that this 
particular set of questions needed more attention, for after a long graduate 
career spent combing through vast archives of books and articles—pausing 
only to convince myself that there must be something more to say about 
Rousseau, and then pausing again to worry that there wasn’t—it was a 
delight not only to fi nd some space in the literature but also to fi nd it pre-
cisely where I wanted it to be. Th e very questions I most wanted to ask of 
Rousseau, those that his oeuvre seemed to me to be so well- designed to 
illumine, had still not been put to him, or at least not in quite the way I 
thought appropriate. Eureka! My fi rst real idea. Maybe I was right not to go 
to law school.
One other feature of the argument off ered here deserves mention: its 
skeptical or “tragic” character. In my survey of romantic love, friendship, 
and the political or civil association, I shall be at pains to show how each 
form of association, whether considered individually or in sum, systemati-
cally fails to solve the problem of “dividedness” that I take to be located at 
the center of Rousseau’s thought (Starobinski 1988). Rousseau’s moral uni-
verse is a fragmented and unforgiving place—it is full of costly trade- off s, 
diffi  cult choices, and frustrated expectations. Th e margin for error is razor 
thin, and people pay dearly for the mistakes they inevitably make. Consid-
erations like these lead Rousseau, on my view, to conclude that social life 
necessarily prevents us from enjoying even a decent approximation of the 
unity—the feelings of oneness both within ourselves and with our environ-
ment—that we have by nature and that full satisfaction requires. Th is initial 
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characterization of the argument is very broad, and perhaps too much so, 
but it is intended merely as a way of fi xing ideas.
In emphasizing the skeptical tenor of Rousseau’s social theory, I fi nd 
myself both in and indebted to very distinguished company. I shall build in 
various ways on Judith Shklar’s (1969) claim that Rousseau provides two 
incommensurable and unrealizable utopian visions, on Arthur Melzer’s 
(1990, 151; 1983) belief that the coherence of Rousseau’s thought cannot be 
comprehended unless its pessimistic and “hardheaded” character is under-
stood, on Cliff ord Orwin’s (1997a; 1997b) and Richard Boyd’s (2004) con-
cerns about the ethical limits of compassion, and on Scott Yenor’s (2011) and 
Allan Bloom’s (1993, 138) worries about the stability of romantic love. Th e 
“skeptical” dimension of the interpretation developed here is thus not sui 
generis. It is, however, far from orthodox and may be viewed as a corrective 
to any number of infl uential accounts of Rousseau that paint him, alterna-
tively, as an illiberal Pollyanna (Talmon 1952; Nisbet 1943; Berlin 1990; 
Crocker 1995), a reasonable optimist looking to eff ect practical political 
reform (Rawls 2007; Cohen 2010), or a compatibilist whose domestic and 
political theories are interdependent aspects of a unifi ed vision of the good 
life rather than separate, and incommensurable, alternatives (Strong 1994; 
Fermon 1997; Neuhouser 2008).
A brief word on the structure of argument may clarify its central claims. 
Chapter 1 is introductory: it explains the problematic at the center of the 
book, articulates the broad contours of Rousseau’s solution to it, and more 
thoroughly situates my argument in the relevant literatures. Chapters 2 and 
3 make up the fi rst part of the argument proper. Th ey are theoretical and 
psychological: in them I examine the psychic foundations of Rousseau’s 
project, with the broad aim of showing both the possibility and indeed the 
necessity of the more ambitious social and political possibilities that Rous-
seau sought to establish. To this end I analyze the natural bases of human 
relations—sexual desire and pity—and show how they (1) enable and delimit 
specifi c forms of association like romantic love and friendship, (2) perform 
assignably diff erent functions within the psychic economies of human 
beings, and (3) interact in such a way to help correct for each other’s excesses 
and defi ciencies. While sexual passion is the foundation for expansive moral 
longings, pity helps counteract the forms of antisocial anger that these long-
ings can inspire by reminding us of our own limitations and imperfections. 
Likewise, we shall see that a moralized psychosexual energy constantly 
infuses human life with new meaning and fresh purposes, and thereby helps 
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to off set the resignation and indiff erence to which an overactive sense of pity 
can lead. Th us our natural unity is preserved through the proper management 
of a dynamic tension between the developed forms of our social passions.
With this psychological model in tow, I go on to derive from it the 
specifi c forms of association—sexual love, friendship, and political associa-
tion—that Rousseau treats in his oeuvre and to show how each of these 
associational forms fails to satisfy the requirements of wholeness and are 
therefore most properly seen as tragic. In chapter 4 my examination of 
human association proper begins with an analysis of Emile and how it dis-
closes the tragic dynamics of sexual love. Chapter 5 pursues the same theme 
and shows the same dynamics at work in Rousseau’s epistolary novel La 
Nouvelle Heloise. In chapter 6 I move on to consider the role of friendship in 
Rousseau’s social theory and show it to be too anemic to satisfy our deepest 
social longings. Th e fi nal two chapters turn to the political association and 
argue that Rousseau sought, through the creation of a “moral ecology,” to 
re- create between citizen and state the same harmonious relation that obtains 
between natural man and his environment. Th ey also argue that even this 
comprehensive reconstruction of the citizen- subject’s surroundings cannot 
establish a stable harmony between man and his environment, for it cannot 
reconcile the demands of the private realm with those of the citizenship. Th e 
underlying problem in the just polity—as elsewhere—is the intransigence of 
natural, individuating self- love, which resists with overwhelming strength 
all eff orts to recruit it for social and political purposes. Indeed, I take the 
insolubility of the problems posed by the stubborness of self- love to be per-
haps the central theme of this book as a whole. Rousseau, for all his strong 
and persuasive criticisms of reductive modern materialism, was ultimately 
unable to overcome its limitations. But his ambitious failure—if it can be 
called a failure—is worth more to us than a modest success would have 
been, for his analysis of our condition both undermines our comfortable 
certainties while pointing to the limits of Rousseau’s own critical act.
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Margaret greeted her lord with peculiar tenderness on the morrow. 
Mature as he was, she might yet be able to help him to the building 
of the rainbow bridge that should connect the prose in us with the 
passion. Without it we are meaningless fragments, half monks, half 
beasts, half connected arches that have never joined into a man. With 
it, love is born and alights on the highest curve, glowing against the 
grey, sober against the fi re. . . . Only connect! Th at was the whole of 
her sermon. Only connect the prose and the passion, and both will be 
exalted, and human love will be seen at its height. Live in fragments 
no longer. Only connect, and the beast and the monk, robbed of the 
isolation that is life to either, will die.
—e. m. forster, Howards End
Humans are divided beings, and Margaret Schlegel knew it 
well. Every day she futilely sought to mend the cracks in her 
husband’s brittle soul, to unite the poles that hemmed in his 
cramped existence, to harmonize those elements of life—
reason and emotion, obligation and appetite, autonomy and 
attachment, self and society, “prose” and “passion”—that 
stubbornly resist harmonization. So long as polarities are 
experienced as polarities, so long as uncertainty and moral 
tension are not brought in the service of a unifi ed purpose, 
human life is fated to be undefi ned, empty, fl accid, purposeless. 
Rousseau’s Th eory of Human Relations1
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To be divided, then, is not to be confused about what to do in a moment, nor 
is it simply to struggle against one’s desires in the quest for self- command. It 
is, rather, to be truncated. It is to lack the principles necessary for resolving 
internal turmoil and to have no understanding of why it would be necessary 
to struggle against oneself in the fi rst place.
We can, perhaps, begin to better understand the longing for unity and 
where to look for its most complete satisfaction by noting that it was through 
her social relations that Margaret sought to “connect” the disparate parts of 
her personality. Her “sermon” makes the desire for reconciliation the most 
fundamental in the human soul, claiming that it is most fully realized not in 
disengaged contemplation or the continual satisfaction of vulgar bodily 
desire but rather in the social sentiment of “love.” Indeed, for Margaret the 
surest sign of an integrated and thus fully human existence is the presence of 
a desire for meaningful social relations. In thinking thus she diff ers from 
both “the beast” and “the monk,” not only because she craves reconciliation 
and they do not but also because she is able to enjoy meaningful social inter-
course and they cannot. Both fl ee intimacy and seek refuge in “isolation,” 
the latter because he hates his appetites and the former because he hates 
everything but his appetites. In so doing, however, they foreclose on the 
forms of self- development that are only available through social develop-
ment; they truncate their own being in the quest to preserve it.
In bringing the themes of individual wholeness and social connected-
ness together, Forster gives fresh voice to a series of psychological and social 
concerns previously articulated by Jean- Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau, like 
Forster, held that the complex and mediated form of life ushered in by 
modernity had alienated man from his nature and diminished his capacity 
for social aff ection. It had stifl ed the natural movements of sympathy, 
rewarded domineering selfi shness, punished good faith, and crushed up in 
its iron gears all delicacy of feeling and elevation of soul. Intimacy had been 
sacrifi ced to regularization, fi neness to mediocrity, spontaneity and sincere 
aff ection to effi  ciency and a superfi cial, mechanized politeness. Th e torch of 
progress so confi dently borne by the partisans of Enlightenment had broken 
into a destructive wildfi re that had incinerated rather than illumined the 
hidden springs of virtue and social feeling.
It is worth emphasizing that Rousseau’s critique is not merely a condem-
nation of this or that form of social organization, but is, rather, a root- and- 
branch attack on the idea of social organization per se. It holds that the very 
conditions under which moral personality emerges are those under which it 
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becomes divided against itself. Socialization itself had done profound vio-
lence to human nature by upsetting the natural harmony between desire and 
power, by punishing authenticity and rewarding dishonesty, by generating 
relationships of personal dependence and their attendant feelings of jealousy 
and hatred, and by introducing arbitrary forms of inequality. Love, friend-
ship, and virtue—the consolations of sociability—are overwhelmed by the 
very conditions that bring them into existence. Th us civil society and its 
complex of destructive and alienating institutions look to be a garish facade 
tacked thoughtlessly up on “piles of quicksand” (DI 97), a constellation of 
alluring disappointments that bring the self into being only in order to cor-
rupt it. Insofar, then, as the divisions within the self are a necessary conse-
quence of man’s introduction into society, the social problem is insoluble 
and it becomes necessary to return to the forests and live with the bears.
Rousseau himself, however, dismisses this fatalistic conclusion as a deep 
misunderstanding of his intention for at least two reasons. First, he rejects the 
possibility of a return to the state of nature, strictly speaking. Human devel-
opment is not retrograde; neither the individual nor the species can simply 
“go back” and recover the spontaneous and prediscursive unity of the state of 
nature. Second, even if such a return were possible it would be undesirable. It 
is important to remember Rousseau’s claim that the pinnacle of human hap-
piness was reached not in the asocial state of nature but rather in the primitive 
sociability of the “Golden Age,” where the establishment of the nuclear family 
and the introduction of “conjugal and paternal love” were adequate compen-
sations for the psychological disturbances introduced by the birth of amour- 
propre (DI 146–48). Consistent with this, Rousseau remarks in a diff erent 
context that human being is so “elevated” and “ennobled” by the experience 
of settled social relations that, were abuses of social power not so likely, we 
should “bless . . . the moment” we exchanged the stupid animal contentment 
of the state of nature for the rich satisfactions and challenges of moral and 
social life (SC I.8, 56). Such remarks point toward a more constructive under-
standing of the social problem than the one initially sketched, for they sug-
gest that though Rousseau believes the problem of human dividedness to 
have been introduced by social relations he also believes dividedness is not a 
necessary consequence of social relations. In fact, to the degree we wish to 
preserve our natural wholeness, the disease must become the cure; human 
association must heal the wounds it infl icts.
To this end, Rousseau sought to resolve the internal and external con-
fl icts that beset us by revitalizing the associational context in which we come 
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to understand ourselves. He did so by imbuing with new life relations grown 
arid, unrewarding, and exploitative. Modern political thought believed it 
could solve the social problem by appealing to the rational self- interest each 
individual had in respecting the interests and claims of others, but Rousseau 
argued that this appeal taught us to view one another not as beings possessed 
of moral dignity but rather as instruments of, or obstacles to, private desire. 
Modern men, grazing for a century on the antisocial fustian of Hobbes and 
Locke, had come to view their relations with one another in almost comi-
cally narrow terms and were increasingly eager to explain their social moti-
vations in the reductive language of modern materialism. Rousseau viewed 
all this with great alarm and sought to remind readers of the deep and 
enduring satisfaction that might be attained through social intercourse. To 
this end, he wrote extensively of romance and friendship and their relation-
ship to a good life. He painted vivid portraits of primitive peoples dancing 
under a tree, of lovers in the throes of a turbulent passion, of an omnipotent 
tutor’s unceasing devotion, of friends sharing a morning in sublime silence, 
of citizens celebrating their solidarity in the public square, of a cuckolded 
husband’s desperate rage.
Th e diversity of these images, to say nothing of the brilliant colors in 
which they are painted, provides a clue about the nature of Rousseau’s 
social theory and about what he sought to accomplish through it. Th ey 
point up a depth of longing and help bring into view a new and richer 
conception of human association that makes that depth comprehensible. 
Rousseau does not conceive of human relations merely as instruments of 
private purposes or as means to exogenously determined ends, for to do so 
presupposes we know what others are for us and what we want from them. 
He argues, to the contrary, that sociability is a cause rather than a conse-
quence of desire—it does not merely satisfy preexisting needs but rather 
brings new needs into being. Social relations are therefore ends rather than 
means; they instantiate the very good they seek, satisfying the desires 
they bring into existence. To think of human association in instrumental 
terms is thus a mistake of the crudest and most life- denying kind, for it 
cannot explain the intrinsic benefi ts of social connectedness or the way in 
which the desire for such connectedness actually comes to be. In order to 
talk sensibly about the human good and its realization, it is necessary to 
understand how sociability aff ects both the substance and structure of 
human ends.
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It is in light of the foregoing considerations that I put to Rousseau the 
following question: what may we hope for from our associations? Th ough 
such a question has clear perennial relevance and implicates a host of ques-
tions at the center of Rousseau’s enterprise, it has never been directly asked 
of him. In quest of an answer I analyze the most prominent forms of human 
relations in Rousseau’s oeuvre—romantic love, friendship, and civil or politi-
cal connectedness—and seek to uncover the function of each in his broader 
project of preserving human beings in (some workable approximation of) 
their natural wholeness. Th e theme of human association provides, I think, 
an especially productive lens through which to view Rousseau’s philosophi-
cal enterprise because it allows us to glimpse the radically critical as well as 
the radically redemptive elements of his social theory. He consistently por-
trays human relations as deeply problematic but also as deeply rewarding—
as the source of our greatest disappointments and our highest joys. Insofar 
as getting our relationships “right” is a necessary condition for the restora-
tion of psychic integrity, the question of what we may—indeed must—expect 
from our social life sits at the heart of Rousseau’s writing.
Our focus on human relations, however, proves useful as a unifying 
theme for at least three additional reasons. First, it allows us to more clearly 
view the variety of ways the desire for recognition—what Rousseau called 
amour- propre—expresses itself. Th ere are, of course, already a number of very 
fi ne treatments of this central passion (e.g., Dent 1988; Rawls 2007; Neu-
houser 2008), but a surprisingly neglected feature of perhaps the most stud-
ied term in Rousseau’s lexicon is that its demand for approval is necessarily 
situated in specifi c associational contexts. Th is neglect is unfortunate, for if 
the degree and kind of recognition we seek from others depends in large 
measure on the kind of relationship we have with them, then we cannot 
understand precisely what amour- propre wants until we understand the par-
ticular association in which it is embedded. Using discrete associational 
forms as units of analysis thus helps uncover meaningful variance that the 
aforementioned studies of amour- propre do not explore.
Second, it keeps us from following the common and, I think, somewhat 
misleading practice of privileging the political association over other forms 
of human connectedness. Th is kind of privileging, as I shall argue toward 
the end of this chapter, lacks a sound justifi cation in Rousseau’s own 
texts; in fact, it is driven more by the needs of interpreters than by the 
intentions of the author. Focusing on human relations provides greater traction 
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in understanding where and how Rousseau’s political philosophy fi ts into his 
thought as a whole by encouraging us to understand politics in terms of the 
broader problem of human association rather than vice versa. Th e approach 
taken here, far from attempting to bring Rousseau’s teachings on love and 
friendship into the service of his political thought, instead views them as 
direct instantiations of the human good and, thus, at some remove from—
and sitting in some tension with—the demands of political life.
Th ird, our focus on human relations helps clarify the specifi c function 
that each form of association has in the more general human quest to recover 
wholeness through connectedness. In so doing, it allows us to approach 
more productively the all- important question of realizability: to what extent 
can we actually achieve through our relations the wholeness we so crave? On 
this score, I argue that each associational type suff ers from specifi c kinds of 
limitations that make that realization all but impossible. Rousseau writes 
about human relationships not only to show how they give rise to new and 
interesting psychic possibilities but also to show how such possibilities are 
ultimately frustrated. His fi nal teaching on the question of human connect-
edness thus has a tragic character: even under the best possible circumstances, 
social relations—in whatever form—ultimately fail to satisfy the desires to 
which they give rise. Th ough consolations, even meaningful ones, do emerge 
from the process of socialization, the salient and even defi ning characteristic 
of man’s life in society is his congenital weakness.
Th e arguments I shall make concerning both the relationship of the politi-
cal association to its domestic counterparts and the pessimistic character of 
Rousseau’s social theory owe much to Judith Shklar’s pioneering Men and 
Citizens (1969), which powerfully evokes the pessimistic or tragic dimensions 
of Rousseau’s thinking. Yet Shklar’s portrayal itself relies on a somewhat 
reductive understanding of Rousseau’s social vision, one that neglects the 
aspirational or perfectionistic drives that Rousseau fi nds in human nature 
and emphasizes, instead, the role of pity in order to highlight man’s status as 
a victim. I, on the other hand, shall seek to understand Rousseau’s pessimism 
about human relations in light of his ambitious and possibility- enhancing 
account of human desire—for to the degree that Rousseau is especially con-
cerned to depict the sort of suff ering that occurs when our highest and best 
aspirations are frustrated, we must move beyond Shklar’s oversimple accounts 
of human desire and moral motivation and look more carefully at the expan-
sive impulses that so intransigently resist satisfaction.
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| Th e Integrative Impulse: Wholeness and Connectedness
Rousseau is on some level an unlikely subject for a study of human associa-
tion. As a man, he was hardly a model of generosity or kindly social feeling, 
and even those who defended him conceded that he was irascible, unpredict-
able, and diffi  cult. Accordingly, his social life was marked by acrimonious 
confl icts with fi gures as infl uential as Voltaire and as aff able as David Hume 
(Zaretsky and Scott 2009). As a philosopher, he is commonly and not unrea-
sonably seen as an apostle of solitude and a champion of individual freedom, 
but not as a theorist of human relations. His theoretical works exalt emo-
tional independence and self- suffi  ciency, deny that human beings are natu-
rally social, and insist the defi ning characteristic of good collective life is the 
absence of personal dependence. His autobiographical works tell the story of 
a social outcast who ultimately had to abandon society in order to recapture 
his natural goodness. What could such a seemingly unsocial person and indi-
vidualistic philosopher possibly tell us about human connectedness?
Without denying Rousseau’s personal peculiarities or his philosophical 
emphasis on themes of solitude and individual freedom, I submit not only 
that he has a theory of human relations but also that it deserves our serious 
attention and that its articulation was among his most important philosophi-
cal intentions. Indeed, it has such importance for Rousseau that we fi nd him 
singing the glories of human connectedness not only in his political and 
novelistic works but also in the place where we might least expect to him to 
do so—an autobiographical work called Th e Reveries of the Solitary Walker. 
Written at the end of Rousseau’s life and seemingly intended to reveal the 
happiness he found outside society, the Reveries wistfully evokes the shade of 
a now- absent social aff ection. Even when engaged in reverie—the most pri-
vate of acts—Rousseau’s mind inevitably turned toward his associational 
life, so much so, in fact, that the work’s fi rst and the fi nal walks frame the 
entire text in terms of social relationships. He begins the Reveries by claim-
ing his decision to quit society was not his own but rather was forced on him 
by others: “Th e most sociable and the most loving of humans has been pro-
scribed from society by a unanimous agreement” (RSW 3). Rousseau would 
have happily remained with his fellows if they had allowed it. Th at he was 
forced to live at the margins of society indicates something about its choice-
worthiness, as does his somewhat generous self- description (the “most socia-
ble” and “most loving” of his species). For all civil society’s corruption and 
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hypocrisy, Rousseau never ceased to value the commitment to the activity of 
mutual perfection and the sentiments of love and sociability that it embod-
ies. To give up on that commitment, as Rousseau did only after he was forced 
to do so by his fellows, is to give up on something important indeed.
Th ough the fi rst walk concludes with Rousseau claiming to have found 
a tranquility in solitude that eluded him in society, the fi nal walk gives us 
some reason to wonder about the truth of this claim. Th ere, we fi nd Rous-
seau confessing an ongoing need for social aff ection as well as revealing 
something about of the kind of aff ection he sought. His promenade dernière 
leads him back to Les Charmettes and his time with Mme de Warens, which 
he recalls with almost unqualifi ed fondness. Only at this Edenic site, in the 
Oedipal embrace of his chère maman, could he “genuinely say that [he] had 
lived” and that he had done so “fully, without admixture and without obsta-
cle” (RSW 89). Rousseau felt no opposition within or without: the lack of a 
need for pretenses with Mme de Warens or anyone else meant he could be 
his true self, and the lack of resistance from his environment meant he 
could show his natural benevolence “without obstacle.” Life at Les Charmettes 
glided eff ortlessly along, as on a frictionless plane; the young Rousseau 
enjoyed fullness of social feeling without the trappings of social obligation. 
Th is was an existential limit point that may have never been surpassed, for 
Rousseau goes on to portray his philosophic life and the exile that followed 
it not as choiceworthy in its own right but rather as a kind of martyrdom he 
suff ered for love of his mistress and maternal stand- in: he began his literary 
and philosophic career to fi nd neither fame nor truth, but rather as a way of 
recompensing Mme de Warens for her generosity. It was, then, his love of 
others that ultimately forced him from their midst. Philosophy itself was 
undertaken for non- philosophic reasons.
Th e disintegration of the boundaries between self and other that Rous-
seau ecstatically evokes at his maison maternelle is presented again in a 
revealing personal disclosure from the Confessions: “I am repeating myself. I 
know it; it is necessary. Th e fi rst of my needs, the greatest, the strongest, the 
most inextinguishable, was entirely in my heart: it was the need for an inti-
mate society and as intimate as it could be; it was above all for this that I 
needed a woman rather than a man, a lover rather than a friend. Th is pecu-
liar need was such that the closest of union of two bodies could not even be 
enough for it: I would have needed two souls in the same body” (C 348; empha-
sis added). Rousseau again brings together the themes of unity and sociabil-
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ity, disclosing that his quest for comprehensive fulfi llment—for a complete 
oneness with his surroundings—is felt most strongly as a social (and quasi- 
sexual) desire. Th e erotic longing for wholeness through connectedness that 
Rousseau evokes through the image of two souls inhabiting the same body 
is the fi rst and most fundamental of his desires. It is not a compound passion 
that can be reduced into simpler or more fundamental elements, nor is it 
wanted because it might be useful in attaining some other and more basic 
good. Rousseau’s characterization of his own desire is, rather, a clear and 
compelling statement about the character of the human good and how it 
is best realized. Th at which he sought was indivisible and intrinsic: self- 
transcendence is achieved via social interdependence, and social interdepen-
dence is achieved via self- transcendence. Th e themes of wholeness and 
connectedness are thus of a piece and must be understood together to be 
understood at all.
Th e desire to recapture natural unity through associational life is not 
restricted to Rousseau’s autobiographical works and is poorly understood if 
it is thought to be the idiosyncratic private desire of a unique man. Indeed, 
Rousseau’s diagnosis of alienation in Emile discloses that the entire species—
humanity tout court—shares his need for deep emotional connection and 
suff ers from its absence nearly as much as he does. We, Rousseau explains, 
are only halfway social: we are unable to rid ourselves of the lingering want 
of social connection but are equally unable to commit to its rigorous require-
ments. Our lives are therefore defi ned by a disproportion between what is 
good for us and what is expected of us: always “appearing to relate every-
thing to others and never relating anything except to themselves alone,” 
always “fl oating between his inclinations and his duties,” always following a 
“composite impulse” that only reinforces our dissatisfaction, we die “without 
having been able to put ourselves in harmony with ourselves and without 
having been good either for ourselves or for others” (E 40–41). As in the 
Reveries and the Confessions, Rousseau links social interdependence to the 
restoration of psychological unity. However, this time he does so in a way 
that makes this reconciliation the aim of a broader social and political 
agenda rather than a personal desire. In order to restore ourselves to our 
original “harmony” we must fi nd a way to remove the contradictions built 
into society’s basic institutions, to neutralize the major sources of interper-
sonal division and social confl ict. So long as we subsist in civil society, unity 
without is the essential condition of unity within.
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| Rational Performances: Bourgeois Dividedness and the 
Crisis of Meaning
Rousseau’s concern with halfway sociability and the dividedness that attends 
it is an extension of his critique of modern political thought and its restrictive 
conception of human relations. Rousseau’s most important, though far from 
his only, interlocutors in this context were Th omas Hobbes and John Locke, 
both of whom sought to ameliorate the religious and political confl ict that 
defi ned their century by restricting the aims of human community. Th e clas-
sical conception of political community handed down from Aristotle and his 
Christian heirs and assigns held that society was a partnership in virtue and a 
constitutive component of the human good. However, this conception had 
proven philosophically unsatisfactory as well as destructive in its practical 
eff ects. Th e religious persecution that had destabilized England and Europe 
as a whole revealed how unsuitable the traditional notion of political com-
munity was for modern times: far from inspiring feelings of fraternity or 
creating a brotherhood in Christ, it had instead loosed wild and sanguinary 
enthusiasms that undermined the sound functioning of society’s basic insti-
tutions and turned God’s children into enraged and bitter enemies.
Both Hobbes and Locke held that many of the disputes that had had 
such serious practical consequences were actually absurd on their face. Th e 
new science had exposed serious fl aws in the teleological conceptions on 
which traditional notions of cosmos and society were based. Th e “good” at 
which political society was presumptively aimed was in fact an Aristotelian 
illusion with no ground in fact or nature. Human ends were expressive of 
subjective attractions and aversions but could not be justifi ed by their cor-
respondence to an objectively determined authoritative good—for there was 
no such good—and to argue over the nature of something that did not exist 
was the height of Peripatetic absurdity. Since the teleological conceptions of 
person and society could not make sense of political life, it was necessary to 
identify a more workable foundation for both concepts.
Both Hobbes and Locke found one in rational self- interest. A properly 
scientifi c account of human nature showed that it was necessary to begin 
from the premise of human selfi shness, not the principle of sociability, to 
produce a more stable and more just political society. Human association 
was best understood not as an expression of our nature or as a constituent 
part of the good at which it naturally aims, but rather as an instrument to be 
utilized in the service of an essentially private felicity. Th ough this reconcep-
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   14 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Rousseau’s Th eory of Human Relations 15
tualization of human association and public life restricted the scope of politi-
cal possibility and narrowed the motivational fi eld of political subjects, it 
was claimed that this more scientifi c understanding of human nature and 
society could secure social stability and justice more eff ectively than could 
traditional notions. It so happened that the aim of political society was not 
the joint realization of the human good or the thick moral community that 
made that pursuit possible, but rather the protection of private holdings 
through the rule of law and the maintenance of social conditions that were 
favorable to mutually benefi cial exchange. Such a system did not make inac-
curate or heroic assumptions about human beings and their capacity for or 
disposition toward civic virtue, but instead claimed that, under the appropri-
ate institutional conditions, directed rational selfi shness could motivate the 
political agent to honor his covenants and obey the law. Modern political and 
social institutions thus sought to make men calculable by making them cal-
culating, by tamping down the moral enthusiasm that had proven so unpre-
dictable and destabilizing.
Hobbes was especially adamant in his attempt to reduce political life, 
and human association more generally, down to egoistic calculations. He 
rigorously rejected the classical principle of natural sociability, treating man’s 
“aptness to society” as a function of his desire for self- preservation (Lev. XV, 
95; XVII, 106). He also fl atly denied the classical belief in the existence of 
an authoritative human good: “Th ere is no such Finis Ultimus nor Summum 
Bonum as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers” (XI, 57). 
Eschewing the language of mutual perfection and adopting the patois of 
economics, Hobbes interprets love and friendship as essentially private phe-
nomena, understood only by their eff ects on an agent’s utility function. Th e 
desire for deep and serious communion is either reduced to instrumental 
considerations or viewed as a form of fanaticism—an illusory and dangerous 
longing to be purged rather than educated.
Following the “justly decried” Hobbes on this score, John Locke adopts 
a restrictive understanding of human community in the Second Treatise of 
Civil Government. While acknowledging that human beings have an “incli-
nation” for society, he nonetheless explicates an asocial and utilitarian psy-
chology and emphasizes the motives of “necessity and convenience” in his 
account of the formation of civil society (2Tr. 7, 42). He also provides a 
depoetized and unsentimental account of conjugal society. Husbands and 
wives, Locke says, have no obligation to each other beyond what is necessary 
for rearing children, and once children reach the age of reason the conjugal 
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bond “dissolves of itself” and both husband and wife are “at liberty” (7, 44). 
Underneath this restrictive and instrumental conception of human relations 
is a narrow conception of the human good. Indeed, Locke follows Hobbes 
in relegating the Summum Bonum to the philosophical junk pile: “Th e mind 
as well as the palate has a diff erent relish; and you will as fruitlessly endeav-
our to delight all men with Riches or Glory . . . [as with] cheese or lobster. . . . 
Hence it was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, 
whether Summum bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, 
or Contemplation” (ECHU 269). Locke’s denial of the existence of a con-
summate human good undermines the possibility of a political commu-
nity—indeed any community—founded on its pursuit. Like Hobbes, then, 
he believed the path to justice and stability required a more modest concep-
tion of social relations.
Enter Rousseau, who found in the work of his predecessors a cure worse 
than the disease. Hobbes and Locke argued that rational self- interest fash-
ioned an adequate ground for political community, but Rousseau countered 
that narrow selfi shness—far from teaching us our duties—instead taught us 
the dishonesty necessary to evade them. Th e belief that egoism could serve 
as its own cure did not motivate citizens to become lawful, industrious, and 
tolerant; to the contrary, it had only succeeded in introducing another con-
tradiction into the soul—that between speech and deed. Th e Discourse on the 
Sciences and Arts and Th e Discourse on Inequality are united by a concern to 
show that the model of human community advanced by Hobbes and Locke 
fails even on its own modest terms. In the former, Rousseau complains that 
the loss of “sincere friendships,” “real esteem,” and “well- founded trust” is 
due in part to the “suspicions, fears, coldness, reserve, hate, [and] betrayal” 
that hide underneath the “false veil of politeness” required by enlightened 
society (DSA 38). No one acts as he speaks or speaks as he feels, and such 
widespread dishonesty contributes to a social atmosphere characterized by 
division, distrust, and bad faith.
Th e Discourse on Inequality develops and radicalizes this line of argu-
ment, arguing that rational self- interest is unable to solve the social confl icts 
it creates. “If,” Rousseau thunders, “I am told that society is so constituted 
that each man gains by serving others, I shall reply that this would be very 
well, if he did not gain still more by harming them” (DI 194–95). Civil soci-
ety introduces a zero- sum dynamic in which one person’s gain always comes 
at another’s expense and thus “necessarily brings men to hate each other in 
proportion to the confl ict of their interests” (193). Th ose who follow the 
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advice of Hobbes and Locke inevitably fi nd that their interests are best 
served not by following the law but rather by “fi nding ways to be assured of 
impunity” (195). Because honest gains are always surpassed by dishonest 
ones, reason itself recommends criminality: there “is no profi t, however 
legitimate, that is not surpassed by one that can be made illegitimately” (195). 
So long as private and particularistic considerations are harnessed to narrow 
instrumental rationality, they will mediate man’s relation to the other and 
make his social life unstable and antagonistic. Association premised simply 
on the prospect of mutual advantage—friendship subject to Pareto optimal-
ity constraints—not only had failed to deliver the piddling felicity it had 
promised but had subjected us to debasing forms of personal dependence 
and made us miserable.
Rousseau was, of course, neither the fi rst nor the last to argue against 
instrumental rationalism, and his novelty consists less in his insistence that 
egoism cannot solve its own problems than in his diagnosis of egoism’s fi nal 
eff ect on the psyche. He uses the language of dividedness to sum up these 
eff ects, arguing that the root cause of modern man’s trouble is that he is at 
all times directed by two opposed masters—by interest and obligation, by 
desire and duty, by passion and reason, by self and society. Th ese divisions 
force him to deploy his powers in opposite directions and to undo with one 
hand what was done with the other. All his exertions thus cancel each other 
out, and all his striving for power after power is simply so much sound and 
fury, signifying less than nothing.
I shall, however, be at pains to emphasize that to be divided in the Rous-
seauan sense is not simply to experience internal turmoil or to be of “two 
minds” at any given moment. Such experiences are inevitable and even char-
acteristic of lives Rousseau himself considered exemplary. Dividedness is the 
condition of being defi ned by indecisiveness; it is to lack a principle of identity 
that provides a way of reconciling inner confl icts when they do occur. Th us, 
when Rousseau contrasts the divided bourgeois with those who are “some-
thing” and “one,” he emphasizes that where the former spends his life “in 
confl ict and fl oating” between unrealized possibilities, the latter follows a set 
of coherent impulses that give his life continuity and direction. Unifi ed beings 
make decisions “in a lofty style” and stick to them, but the bourgeois—who 
delusively believes in the proposition that the human good is realized through 
the successful pursuit of narrow self- interest—operates under the false 
assumption that diffi  cult choices do not need to be made (E 41). Acting on the 
basis of this false belief had left him in a kind of developmental purgatory 
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where no particular vision of the good can be realized because all visions of 
the good are being simultaneously pursued. Like the democratic man of Pla-
to’s Republic, Rousseau’s bourgeois is relegated to a haphazard and halfhearted 
pursuit of free- fl oating, disjointed, and unrewarding pleasures.
To be divided in the precise sense, then, is not simply to be uncertain 
about what to do in a moment. It is, rather, to be truncated, for to the degree 
that we lack the moral courage to confront and resolve the diffi  cult dilemmas 
that life imposes, our lives will lack unifying purpose. Th us we fi nd Rousseau 
complaining of the deeply impoverished character of modern man’s moral 
experience in the context of his discussion of dividedness: he characterizes the 
life of the divided bourgeois as fundamentally meaningless and unpurposive, 
going so far as to call him a “nothing” (rien) (E 40). To be a bourgeois is to be 
a nonentity, a site of undeveloped possibility: this is why he “breathes” but 
does not “live,” for he cannot give organized expression to his capacities for 
moral and social feeling. His obsession with self- preservation and his blithe 
disregard for love and virtue operate as a kind of aff ective anesthesia, dimin-
ishing the vitality of his passions and preventing genuine engagement with 
the human good. To follow the promptings of narrow self- interest, then, is 
not only to foment antisocial desires; it is to undermine the vitality of desire 
itself. Passional enthusiasm, and with it moral potential, are dried up at the 
source. All sentiment and social aff ection are reduced to a “secret egoism” 
that “prevents [men] from being born by . . . detaching them from their spe-
cies” (E 312n). Th e condition of dividedness, then, does not simply reduce our 
stock of utiles so much as it lowers our threshold for experiencing pleasure.
Rousseau’s critique of bourgeois society has met with considerable resis-
tance in the twentieth century, with critics like Robert Nisbet (1943), J. L. 
Talmon (1952), and Isaiah Berlin (1990) viewing his alternative vision of human 
relations as illiberal Pollyannaism. Less distinguished commentators too 
numerous to count have scolded Rousseau for his utopian fl ights, arguing that 
his quest for wholeness through connectedness is at best futile and, at worst, 
more destructive of human happiness than the dividedness he blames. And it 
is indeed tempting to listen when we are told that there is no fi nal harmony to 
be had, that the contradictions we face are built into the structure of the world 
and thus do not admit of fi nal resolution, that confl ict and division are coex-
tensive with life itself, and that our experiences of reconciliation are momen-
tary and misleading fl ashes rather than poetic intimations of the great unity of 
being. Th e prudent course, it is urged, is to accept our dividedness and attempt 
to manage its eff ects rather than eliminate its causes. Adopting this stratagem 
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will ultimately maximize net satisfaction by inuring us to the false and danger-
ous charms of an unreasonable erotic enthusiasm.
But we can already see how misplaced this objection is, for though 
Rousseau’s social theory is more ambitious in its aims than is the instrumen-
talism of Hobbes and Locke, it is motivated not by an optimistic belief in the 
infi nite goodness and perfectibility of man but rather by a comprehensive 
critique of the crypto- utopian proposition that narrow self- interest can solve 
the problems that it creates (Melzer 1983). Rousseau denies that the fragmen-
tation caused by the halfway sociability of modern life admits of the partial 
resolution sought by his critics, because he claims that fragmentation is itself 
the product of an attempted partial resolution. Unity is the essential precon-
dition for healthy and productive human life, and a social theory that seeks 
anything less will be attended by all the frightful psychological and political 
consequences Rousseau diagnoses. What is more, Rousseau’s conception of 
unity is not as utopian as it is made out to be: as will become clear, Rousseau 
was a long way indeed from believing that all the sources of suff ering could 
be eliminated or that all confl icts could be neutralized. Even the best and 
happiest lives are full of travail; episodic frustration and discontent are part 
of the human estate and must be borne with that in mind. What he denies, 
rather, is that the causes of dissatisfaction in modern life can be accepted as 
the sunk cost of living in the best of all possible worlds.
Rousseau’s very way of framing the problem of social and political order 
is thus a comprehensive response and challenge to the bourgeois alternative 
of Hobbes and Locke. Th e hope of creating a stable and just political society 
on the basis of narrow self- interest is a soul- shrinking and self- destructive 
dogma masquerading as a science of politics. It had succeeded only in mul-
tiplying the sources of human confl ict, narrowing the scope of human desire, 
and undermining the psychological sources of virtue and social aff ection. 
Legitimate social institutions must off er deeper compensations than the 
empty felicity of Hobbes and Locke, and a satisfactory account of human 
relations must comprehend more than the impoverished and arid associa-
tions to which that anemic conception of happiness had given rise.
| Rousseau’s Th ird Way: Reimagining Self- Love and Human Relations
If Rousseau criticizes modern thinkers like Hobbes and Locke for failing to 
take the social passions seriously enough, he does so as a practitioner of and 
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believer in modern science. Rousseau’s own modernity is refl ected in his 
strong rejection of the classical premise that man is naturally social and 
political (DI 95–96) and in his steadfast refusal to interpret man’s sociability 
as evidence of its naturalness. To the contrary, Rousseau follows and even 
radicalizes the reductive, asocial, and materialistic tendencies of Hobbes and 
Locke. He argues that man in the state of nature is distinguished from other 
animals only in potentiality, claims that this man is a solitary and aconcep-
tual brute whose natural needs are limited to “nourishment, a female, and 
repose” (116), rejects natural teleology, and founds his own social and politi-
cal teaching on (properly understood) self- love. Th us, though Rousseau 
seeks to develop a more ambitious and more satisfying conception of human 
connectedness than do his modern predecessors, he does so by utilizing the 
conceptual tools and resources provided by modern science (Strauss 1953; 
Melzer 1983; Hulliung 1994).
Nowhere is Rousseau’s eff ort to reinvigorate social life through a reinter-
pretation of broadly modern political principles more evident than in his 
revolutionary account of self- love. Th ough very pessimistic about the social 
utility of narrow self- interest, Rousseau insisted no less strongly than did 
Hobbes on the strength of human self- regard. Indeed, self- love defi nes and 
determines human life like no other passion and is thus the theoretical key 
to any eff ort to understand political and social life aright. It is therefore 
unsurprising to read in Emile that self- love (amour de soi- même) is a “primi-
tive, innate passion, which is anterior to every other” and “the origin and 
principle” of all other desires. He goes on to say that “love of oneself is always 
good and always in conformity with order” and that we are perfectly justi-
fi ed in ignoring the well- being of others if our own is materially threatened 
(E 212–13). However, Rousseauan self- love has a dynamic and expansive 
character that allows for a far closer kind of social identifi cation than Hobbes’s 
static and restrictive conception would appear to allow. Whereas Hobbes, as 
we have seen, posits a very defi nite and ineliminable distinction between self 
and other, Rousseau holds that the boundaries of the self are elastic and 
hence can be stretched to incorporate another or many others. Self- love is 
itself malleable and susceptible to transformation and generalization. Th e 
capacity to extend and generalize self- love to include other beings—either 
individual persons or abstract entities like the state—is the psychological 
premise that enables the kind of intimate social connectedness Rousseau saw 
as a necessary condition of social as well as psychological unity. Th rough the 
lens of expansive self- love others may be viewed not as discrete from but 
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rather as extensions of the self and its purposes; to deliberately harm the 
incorporated other would, in the limiting case, be as absurd and incompre-
hensible as deliberately harming oneself.
Th ere is a second facet of Rousseauan self- love that both diff erentiates 
his conception from that of Hobbes and increases the emotional stakes of 
social relations: the emergence of amour- propre. Rousseau distinguishes this 
(much- debated) passion from what he calls amour de soi- même on the 
grounds that (1) it is artifi cial, or inactive in the native constitution of man, 
and that (2) it requires for its satisfaction some measure of social recognition 
and validation. Th e relativistic features of amour- propre make it both a 
uniquely powerful and uniquely dangerous spring of moral motivation in 
the context of Rousseau’s psychological theory and open up social possibili-
ties on which the more restrictive bourgeois conception of self- love would 
appear to foreclose. Indeed, Rousseau posits that amour- propre grows out of 
a non- Hobbesian developmental process through which we learn to recog-
nize others as important sources of validation rather than as competitors or 
instruments of our will. Consciousness of the other begins not with an 
attempt to bend them to our preexisting purposes but, alternatively, with a 
desire to bend to theirs. What amour- propre wants above all is to obtain the 
recognition of others. Th us the source of good (and evil) is the desire for 
love and approval.
Properly trained, amour- propre has an expansive eff ect on the soul and 
suff uses the wellsprings of human vitality and power. It alters the human 
personality so fundamentally, and activates so many capacities relevant to the 
process of moral and social development, that Rousseau likens its awakening 
to a “second birth” (E 212). All meaningful social possibility—love, friend-
ship, paternal and fraternal relations, and so on—requires the activation of 
amour- propre, for only after its birth can we begin to understand agency and 
intentionality, engage in the process of mutual esteem- seeking, and enter into 
emotionally rewarding social relations. Th e awareness of such possibilities gives 
us access to the consolations and hopes of the social world and serves as an 
invitation to “man’s estate” (E 213). And yet this invitation is fraught with 
danger, for malignant amour- propre threatens to corrupt human character at 
its source and undermine the use of the very capacities to which it gives rise. 
Indeed, Rousseau claims that the desire for social approval and distinction is 
the cause of “all the evil that men do to each other”; further, he claims that its 
operations have transformed society from a cooperative venture into a site of 
vicious and underhanded contestation (DI 222).
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It is, as an extensive and combative secondary literature will attest, very 
diffi  cult to pin down precisely what amour- propre is and to isolate its eff ects 
on the human soul. Part of this is due to Rousseau’s elusive and seemingly 
evolving presentation of the concept, but much of the diffi  culty we have in 
nailing down the impact of amour- propre is due to its intrinsic embedded-
ness in specifi c associational contexts. We rarely, if ever, observe amour- propre 
acting in isolation or hear it speaking its own language; it is always nested 
within particular forms of association and assuming their voices and tones. 
To put it a bit diff erently, the kind of recognition we expect or hope for from 
other people depends in large part on what kind of association we have or 
seek to have with them. In order to understand amour- propre correctly, then, 
it is necessary to understand how its demand for distinction changes as it 
interacts with other social passions and as it is embedded in diff erent associa-
tional contexts.
Rousseau’s expansive and relativized conception of self- love allows him 
to explore rather ambitious social and existential possibilities without having 
to deny the psychological salience of self- love. Th us he is attempting to uti-
lize the conceptual resources of modernity in order to generate a conception 
of social life more rewarding than his predecessors had envisaged. Th e com-
plex relationship Rousseau has with his modern forebears is captured per-
fectly in the fi rst few pages of Emile, which both attacks and subtly confi rms 
the largely materialistic bases of modern political thought: “One only thinks 
of preserving one’s child. Th at is not enough. . . . It is less a question of 
keeping him from dying than of making him live. To live is not to breathe; 
it is to act; it is to make use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the 
parts of ourselves which give us the sentiment of our existence. Th e man who 
has lived the most is not he who has counted the most years but he who has 
most felt life” (E 42). On the one hand, Rousseau is clearly critical of the 
crudely reductive and possibility- destroying tendency to boil everything 
down to the animal imperative of self- preservation. Because this narrow 
focus kills men before they are even born, he seeks to expand the scope of his 
own inquiry beyond these meager existential provisions. It is not enough for 
civilized man to use his “organs” and “senses” in the same mechanical way a 
beast does, for—as Rousseau makes clear in another context (DI 113–16)—
human ends and human being are undetermined in a way that animal desire 
is not. Animals are moved by mechanical “instincts” which are peculiar to 
them and which admirably, if imperfectly, guide them toward their own 
good. Human beings, however, lack instincts in the strict sense. We are not, 
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at least in the civilized state, passive conduits for alien forces; rather, we are 
self- conscious and self- determining agents who create the sources of our own 
desires and aid in the creation of our own moral identities. Th ese identities 
serve us in much the same way that instinct serves the nonhuman animal: 
they provide coherence to thought and action and, if properly constructed, 
tend to guide us toward our own good. Because human being is by nature 
open- ended and malleable, the development of moral identity demands con-
tinued refl ection on the character of our desires and their correspondence (or 
lack thereof) to our self- conception. Th e distinctively human power of iden-
tity creation is therefore taxing and dangerous (DI 115), but it is also exciting 
and generative of tremendous moral possibility. We develop and deploy our 
“faculties” and powers in the service of the “sentiment of existence,” a diff use 
and distinctively human pleasure that one takes in the conscious apprehen-
sion of his own life and being. It is the feeling of this “sentiment,” the quotient 
of felt life, which a human being should aim to maximize; he should care less 
about living long than about living well, and the good life involves the activa-
tion and coherent direction of our capacities for rational thought and—most 
especially—for social feeling.
On the other hand, however, if Rousseau reopens a set of moral and 
social possibilities about which previous modern thinkers had expressed seri-
ous doubt, then he does so by redeploying the philosophical tools of moder-
nity itself. If learning to feel the “sentiment of existence” is supposed to 
enrich human life in ways that Hobbes and previous modern thinkers had 
failed to take seriously, it is nonetheless the simple operations of our bio-
logical equipment—our “senses” and “organs”—that make that enrichment 
possible. No rational soul or divine essence is posited; no Natural Laws are 
invoked; no world of forms is apprehended; no noumenal realm is postu-
lated; no immaterial substance is conjured (cf. Williams 2007). Feeling the 
“sentiment of existence” is surely a complex existential phenomenon that 
should not be squeezed into the cramped categories of crude materialism, 
but it still obtains in the sensible world and is susceptible to empirical analy-
sis and rational explanation. For all its complexity and elevation, the senti-
ment of existence is still just a “sentiment” that does not transcend sensory 
experience so much as enrich it and channel it upward. Rousseau thus 
affi  rms Hobbes’s tough- minded empiricism while claiming that Hobbes’s 
failure to grasp the malleable nature of human being had led to an impover-
ished understanding of the sources of moral personhood. Hobbes was right 
to say that we learn using the senses, but he failed to teach us how to feel.
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| Th e Natural Bases for Human Relations
Th e broad and exciting social possibilities that promise to gratify the senti-
ment of existence are not created by expansive self- love alone. Rousseau 
posits that two other forces in the soul connect us to others: sexual desire 
and pity. Like self- love, which undergoes an important transformation once 
it is placed in a social context, both sexual desire and pity diff er greatly in 
their primitive and developed forms. In what follows, I briefl y explain how 
these two natural passions develop, how they serve as the ground for love 
and friendship, and how they fail to realize the comprehensive satisfaction to 
which they point.
In the state of nature, the sexual passion is a direct expression of self- love 
and is shorn of intersubjective meaning. Sex carries no social or emotional 
signifi cance because partners see each other—to the extent that they do so 
at all—as instruments of private pleasure rather than as sources of love and 
approval. Only when “physical” desire transforms into “moral” love does the 
sexual drive become an important spring of moral and social motivation (DI 
134–45). Indeed, as we shall see in more detail in chapters 4 and 5, this trans-
formation eff ects two important changes in the structure of sexual desire. 
First, in conjunction with the development of other cognitive capacities, it 
refi nes taste: whereas natural man does not distinguish between fi t and unfi t 
sexual partners, moral lovers do make distinctions like this on the basis of 
ethical and aesthetic criteria. It is by way of such distinctions that romantic 
love moves toward exclusivity, for once we have learned to esteem one person 
more than another our desire “gains a greater degree of energy” for our “pre-
ferred object” (DI 134). Second, the emergence of moral love greatly intensi-
fi es the desire for sexual communion. Th is intensifi cation is due to the 
interaction of sexual desire and amour- propre: once we begin to view each 
other not as instruments of private satisfaction but rather as important 
sources of recognition and validation, the sexual act acquires profound and 
even revolutionary signifi cance. In fact, Rousseau goes so far as to call the 
experience of exclusive romantic attachment the human good—it determines 
“the fi nal form” of moral character and makes a person “as happy as he can 
be” (E 416, 419).
It is, of course, not simply the recognition of the beloved that one seeks 
when he selects a partner. Few human choices are subjected to as much 
scrutiny as the choice of a mate, and the assessments of others inevitably 
infl uence our decisions in this regard. When a couple marries, they make a 
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public affi  rmation about who and what has fi nal value in life; it is an announce-
ment about what qualities of body and soul one most admires. Th us it is an 
announcement both about what kind of person one believes himself to be as 
well as about where he stands in the social order. Our mates are refl ections of 
us in part because they are refl ections on us, and part of why we seek out the 
specifi c persons we do is because they possess the physical and moral virtues 
deemed to be desirable by others. Th us do our liaisons take on even greater 
signifi cance once they are embedded in and receive (or do not receive) vali-
dation from society’s basic institutions. It is important, then, to recognize 
that love is both a private and public act; it involves the incorporation of two 
lovers as well as the incorporation of the newly formed marital unit into civil 
society’s primary institutions.
Unhappily, both of these incorporative processes are beset by diffi  culties 
that ultimately overwhelm even the happiest and best- educated couples. 
Th e fusion of “two into one” that romantic love seeks (E 479) is ultimately 
undone by the disproportion between the idealized imaginary love object 
and the imperfect beloved. As husband and wife are forced by the very inti-
macy that they so desired to confront each other’s fl aws, they grow disillu-
sioned with and alienated from each other. What is worse, the attempt to live 
together after love’s passing proves as impossible as maintaining love forever: 
the feelings of resentment and distaste that set in make the transition from 
love to friendship very diffi  cult. Th e fragile psychology of romantic love is 
not the only complication with which young lovers must deal. Th ey must 
also cope with the process of integrating themselves into a larger society that 
is all- too- often corrupt and corrupting. Th e threats to happy marriage come 
from within and without: husband and wife must sustain the fragile illu-
sions they have about each other in the face of social forces that threaten 
their collective happiness at every turn.
Th e sexual passion, though an especially powerful source of social con-
nection, is not the only natural basis for human relations. Indeed, in Th e 
Discourse on Inequality Rousseau argues that we are also connected to other 
members of our species through pity (pitié). Th is sentiment, which like 
self- love exists “anterior to reason,” inspires in human beings “a natural 
repugnance to see any sensitive being perish or suff er” (DI 95). Pity, how-
ever, is not simply an internal or emotional response to the sights and 
sounds of suff ering. After suffi  cient development it can motivate a range of 
virtuous actions and generate sympathetic associations: pity, Rousseau 
claims, is the psychic basis for social virtues like “generosity, clemency, and 
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humanity,” adding that “benevolence and even friendship are, rightly under-
stood, the products of a constant pity fi xed on a particular object” (131–32; 
emphasis added).
If pity is the ground of friendship, then what type of friendship does it 
ground? In chapter 6 I shall emphasize two primary points. Th e fi rst is to 
show that friendship lacks the psychological power to restore human beings 
to wholeness. On this point I shall be at pains to show that friendship oper-
ates somewhat at the margins of our psychic and social lives, and that it does 
more to relieve our sadness than to restore our happiness. Th e sentiments to 
which friendship gives rise—and the range of action it inspires—are circum-
scribed by the very circumstances that make it necessary. Friendship, thus 
conceived, provides a very real kind of comfort for divided beings, but the 
comfort it provides does not make us happy but rather makes our sadness a 
bit more bearable. It is, in fact, our ineliminable dividedness that makes 
friendship relevant and even important: fallen man needs friends, but much 
of the reason he needs them is because he is fallen. Th e second, related to the 
fi rst, is to show that Rousseauan friendship is not a catalyst of virtue or moral 
perfection in the way that Joseph Reisert (2003) has persuasively argued. It is, 
rather, a palliative, a way of coping with life’s inevitable disappointments and 
hardships. We need our friends not because they show us our good—for this 
we are needful of intellectual and moral superiors—but because they can 
sympathize with and console us in our failings, moral and otherwise.
| To Nature or to Denature? Th e Moral Ecology of the Just Regime
For the most part Rousseau chooses to paint his portraits of love and friend-
ship in a domestic or private context, remote from the disruptions and dis-
turbances of large- scale social institutions. Indeed, it often seems that 
considerable distance from large- scale social institutions and their corrupt-
ing tendencies is necessary in order to preserve sympathetic association, for 
when we incorporate fully into civil and political life we subject ourselves to 
the arbitrary private wills of others and to an overwhelmingly complex and 
chaotic system of social forces. Yet because these social forces are of our own 
making—because, however alien and hostile they may seem, they are them-
selves products of human agency—they may be restructured in a way that is 
conducive rather than injurious to human happiness. Indeed, it may seem 
that this restructuring is not only possible but necessary, for the household—
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the site of domestic happiness—is not an independent entity free of social 
control; rather, it is itself a social institution that must be incorporated into 
civil society and exist in accordance with its laws and customs. Unless the 
society of which the household is a part is tolerably just, then it is only a 
matter of time before our domestic relations are corrupted by the sinister 
social forces around it.
Recently, a number of scholars have sought in various ways to show the 
compatibility of Rousseau’s domestic and political visions. Most do so by 
reading the pedagogy of Emile into the political program of the Social Con-
tract. Tracy Strong (1994, 138), for instance, claims that Emile’s education 
“requires and will generate, come what may, a political society” because “that 
which makes him human requires that he be a citizen.” Frederick Neuhouser 
(2008, 23) has also emphasized the politicizing functions of the work, saying 
that Emile’s education “produces individuals who in the end can assume the 
role of citizen . . . in a manner consistent with . . . being a man.” John Rawls 
(2007) and Joshua Cohen (2010) are at one with Neuhouser in pointing to the 
complementarity of Emile and the Social Contract. Still other scholars view 
Rousseau’s novel Julie as providing an alternative, and perhaps more promis-
ing, bridge between the domestic and the political spheres. Nicole Fermon 
(1997, 119), for instance, claims that Julie presents a “vision of the ‘private 
worlds’ of citizens” that “fl eshes out human aspects of the common life left 
out of Th e Social Contract”; she argues further that the household as depicted 
in Julie cultivates “sound moral habits” necessary to good citizenship.
Th ough I shall ultimately be critical of these interpretations for seeking 
a continuity between Rousseau’s domestic and political visions that I do not 
think he provides, I also think that, in pointing to the irreducible multiplic-
ity of man’s social obligations and, hence, to the need to order them in some 
coherent way, they do help to recast Rousseau’s understanding of the politi-
cal problem in a more helpful light. Th at is to say, these various interpreta-
tions are right to point out that our diff erent relationships—far from existing 
in vacuums—must instead be lived out at the same time and that we must 
fi nd ways to reconcile the diff erent, and often competing, obligations they 
impose on us. Political societies are complex and confusing places that nec-
essarily place us under cross-pressures: the things we owe to ourselves, our 
parents, our children, our friends, our beloveds, and our fellow citizens are 
not always compatible, and the tensions that arise within our associational 
lives can have destructively decentering eff ects on our identities. Th is pres-
ence of such cross- pressures is especially problematic in the context of a 
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political project like Rousseau’s, which emphasizes both the need for and 
fragility of psychological and social harmony.
With this background problem in mind, I characterize Rousseau’s politi-
cal thought as an eff ort to balance the diff erent and seemingly incompatible 
forces and obligations that constitute social life. I thus conceive of Rous-
seauan political society as a kind of “moral ecology” in which citizens, due 
to their embeddedness in a balanced and harmonious social environment, 
may approximate the psychological wholeness they would have enjoyed in 
the pure state of nature. On this conception, each citizen is an ordered whole 
existing within the larger ordered whole of the just society, attending to a 
coherent and jointly realizable set of socially defi ned obligations and, in so 
doing, discovering the internal unity that has eluded social man for so long.
Ultimately, however, the cross- cutting pressures that constitute social 
life overwhelm all eff orts at comprehensive resolution, and the hybrid char-
acter of political life ends up producing the very dividedness it was set up to 
prevent. Citizens have a dual existence as both private selves and as public 
beings, and therefore they have attachments and obligations in both the 
political and the private spheres. Th e tensions that exist between these pri-
vate and public obligations are never reconciled and are ultimately repro-
duced in the psyche, thus leading to the alienated self- centeredness Rousseau 
identifi es in the Social Contract as both the cause and consequence of political 
corruption. Th e individuated self brought into being by social institutions is 
also torn asunder by the incommensurable obligations they impose on him. 
Rousseau temporizes brilliantly with this problem but cannot resolve it. It is 
important to add, though, that Rousseau’s inability to resolve the problems 
his own thought creates is not, as has so often been claimed, evidence of his 
intellectual incoherence. It is, rather, the source of a rich and deeply coherent 
account of the sources of human fragmentation, dislocation, and disappoint-
ment. Rousseau gives us a way to reinterpret the very social experiences he so 
deeply problematizes.
| Men, Citizens, and Scholars: A Politic Digression
In arguing that Rousseau’s solution to the political problem is “ecological” in 
nature I stake out a controversial position in the scholarly debate over the 
character of civic education, which is perhaps the central controversy in 
contemporary Rousseau scholarship. In Emile, Rousseau plots a course of 
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education intended to reconcile self and society and claims that the “double 
object” of making a human being good, both for himself and others, might 
be achieved through one of two diff erent educations. Th e fi rst is civic or 
political education: it is “public and common” in character and creates “citi-
zens” who are defi ned by their relation to and aff ection for their homeland. 
Citizens are “denature[d]” by their education, which “transports the I into 
the common unity” and makes “each individual . . . no longer one but a part 
of the unity.” Such an education, though lauded by Rousseau, is nonetheless 
rejected on the grounds of impracticability. “Public instruction,” he avers, 
“no longer exists and can no longer exist, because where there is no father-
land there can no longer be citizens. Th ese two words, fatherland and citizen, 
should be eff aced from modern languages” (E 40; see also Shklar 1969).
Because genuine civic education is unavailable in modern times, we are 
left with “the domestic education or the education of nature,” which seeks to 
reconcile the tensions between self and society through the development of 
individuality and the establishment of intimate sexual connectedness. Th e 
result of this form of education is not a “citizen” who fi nds wholeness only 
by discovering his place in the polis, but a “man” who is “an absolute whole” 
unto himself (E 39). Th e attempt to make a man and a citizen out of the same 
person is doomed to fail: “One must choose between making a man and a 
citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time” (39). Rousseau, then, 
does not present the educations of “citizens” and “men” as interdependent 
parts of one pedagogic program but rather as discrete and incommensurable 
alternatives. Th ey are diff erent and uncombinable answers to the same ques-
tion, not separate steps in a unifi ed solution (41).
Despite Rousseau’s insistence to the contrary, we have already seen that 
many contemporary scholars argue that the education given to the epony-
mous hero of Emile is best understood as an eff ort to reconcile the individu-
alistic and broadly modern characteristics of “man” with the civic- minded 
virtues of the classical “citizen.” In the introduction to his excellent transla-
tion of the Social Contract, Victor Gourevitch summarizes this increasingly 
popular position concerning the character of both Emile’s education and 
Rousseau’s intention as an author. “One important reason for regarding 
Rousseau as preeminently a political thinker,” he holds, is “that we are moral 
agents by virtue of being citizens, or at least members of political societies; 
we are not moral agents fi rst who then may or may not become political 
agents” (Rousseau 1997c, xiv–xv). Th is is a plausible statement of the view 
taken by Rousseau scholars of many diff erent interpretive persuasions, and it 
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suggests that Emile’s full completion as a human being is contingent on his 
full incorporation into a political society and his becoming a “citizen.” At 
one level this claim is quite correct: Emile’s social consciousness could not 
properly develop were it not for some semblance of broader social order and 
decency; upon marrying his beloved Sophie, he must choose a country in 
which to settle and a set of laws to which he and his family are to be subject. 
Th e political is ubiquitous, and the impossibility of escaping it requires that 
Emile himself become political.
But does it require him to become a citizen? Th e necessity of social 
incorporation does not necessarily enjoin the necessity of incorporating after 
the specifi c manner of a “citizen” as Rousseau understands the term. Th e 
Rousseauan citizen is defi ned by his devotion to the common good and is 
exemplifi ed by the Spartan Pedaretus, who consoled himself after losing an 
election on the grounds that there were three hundred other citizens even 
more worthy than he. “Th is,” Rousseau exclaims with relish, “is the citizen” 
(E 40). Th e diff erence between Pedaretus—whose identity is defi ned by the 
political institutions of his fatherland—and Emile—who has no fatherland 
and is told by his tutor not to run for political offi  ce unless he is forced to do 
so—could not be clearer (40, 473–75). I shall develop this line of argument 
further in chapter 4, where I show that the way Emile and his family inte-
grate into and understand their role within political society is indeed at odds 
with Rousseau’s thick notion of citizenship.
Th e attempt to turn Emile into a “citizen” leads not only to an inaccu-
rate interpretation of Emile but also to an unduly restrictive account of 
Rousseau’s intention as an author. Th e direct textual evidence most com-
monly cited in support of this view comes from the Geneva Manuscript and 
the Confessions. In the former Rousseau remarks that “we do not really 
begin to become men until after we have been citizens,” and in the latter he 
reports that he had come to understand that “everything depends radically 
on politics” and that “no people would ever be anything other than what it 
was made into by the nature of its Government” (GM I.2, 161–62; C 340). 
Th ese passages make the point that political institutions are among the 
important determinants of moral character. But they do not say that they are 
the only or even the most important determinants of moral character, or that 
political institutions are exogenous and freestanding causes of subpolitical 
life. To arrive at this conclusion we are obliged to forget Rousseau’s claims 
that the modern men were intellectually and morally incapable of authentic 
republican politics (E 39–41), that true civic education is no longer possible 
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(E 39–41), and that political institutions—far from determining the shape of 
the identity of a people in some simple, unidirectional way—should them-
selves be adapted to the preexisting cultural and climatological circum-
stances (SC III.8). It is one thing to say, with Rousseau, that everything 
depends on politics and quite another to say, as many interpreters of Rous-
seau seem to, that everything depends only or even principally on politics and 
that such dependence is nonreciprocal.
An important feature of the present interpretation is that the political 
association is treated as an important organizing force in social life without 
being made its primum movens and fi nal justifi cation. Rousseau himself 
turned his attention to politics because it grows out of social life and repre-
sents a systematic eff ort to resolve the complications to which social life gives 
rise. If politics is meant to solve or at least ameliorate the problems that inevi-
tably arise in the course of shared life, then our fi rst eff orts must be directed 
to understanding the character of the “social problem” (Charvet 1973) which 
exists prior to politics and which brings it into being. It is, then, the anteced-
ent problem of human association that leads Rousseau to theorize the politi-
cal; far from looking to understand social relations in terms of politics, he 
sought instead to understand politics in terms of social relations. In so 
extensively treating the wide array of human relationships he does, and in 
treating the vast majority of them outside the agora and in relative isolation 
from the demands of political life, Rousseau asks his reader to consider not 
only what relation our private associations have to the polis but also what 
relation they have to one another and, indeed, to living a good life.
I believe that the attempt made here to comprehend political phenom-
ena within the broader problem of human association allows not only for a 
more authentically Rousseauan understanding of politics, but also for 
increased explanatory leverage in understanding the character and conse-
quences of amour- propre. N. J. H. Dent’s (1988) pathbreaking work, devel-
oped in diff erent directions by O’Hagan (1999), Rawls (2007), and Neuhouser 
(2008), distinguished amour- propre’s “healthy” and “malignant” forms in an 
eff ort to correct the older, and erroneous, idea that amour- propre is necessar-
ily corrupt and corrupting. Th is characterization of amour- propre, though 
helpful in many regards, often makes us feel that the desire for social recog-
nition is something monolithic and undiff erentiated, that its eff ects are 
insensitive to context and felt uniformly across the entire social domain. Th e 
analysis here, however, points to the context- dependent character of amour- 
propre: the varied and complex responses that the desire for social distinction 
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elicits show both that our associational life is itself varied and complex and 
that the kind of recognition we seek from others depends greatly on the asso-
ciational context in which that relationship is embedded. We act and interact 
not just as equals and unequals but also as husbands and wives, citizens and 
subjects, parents and children, friends and enemies, and so on. Th e variety of 
our associational lives gives rise to variation in the ways in which amour- 
propre expresses itself, variation that is often concealed by conventional treat-
ments but which nonetheless deserves our serious attention.
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When we turn to others, what is it that we want from them? It 
is not easy to see how to answer such a question, for the social 
motivations of human beings are mixed and manifold. Th ere 
are all sorts of reasons why we invite other people into our lives, 
but the complexity of human desire—that fact that we want 
both diff erent things at diff erent times and diff erent things at 
the same time—makes it diffi  cult to know exactly what those 
reasons are or how much weight each one carries individually. 
Th e diffi  culty of determining what we want from others is in 
part attributable to the irreducible complexity of social life, for 
we associate with one another in many diff erent ways—as 
friends, lovers, competitors, and the like—and fi nd corre-
spondingly diff erent forms of satisfaction and frustration in 
these diff erent forms of association. It is, however, also true 
because our social motives are themselves often obscure and 
indeterminate. We do not always know what we want from 
others when we enter into relationships with them. Sometimes 
this is because we do not know enough about our new associ-
ate to determine what needs an association with him will sat-
isfy, but other times it is because we are ignorant of what our 
own needs actually are. It is, in fact, tempting to say that we 
cannot have such information. Indeed, since our needs them-
selves are at least partially a product of the associational envi-
ronment in which we are embedded, such ignorance may well 
Social Longing and Moral Perfection2
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be a permanent condition. At the very least, it means that knowledge of self 
and of other are necessarily related phenomena: we must understand ourselves 
reasonably well in order to understand others and how they fi t into our lives, 
and if we lack knowledge then we shall also lack a clear understanding of what 
it is we hope to accomplish in and through social relations. So long as we 
knowers remain unknown to ourselves, so, too, will the life of the other remain 
a mystery.
No less an authority than Th omas Hobbes invites his readers to recon-
sider the sources of their behavior and presents his own Leviathan as a sus-
tained meditation on what he fi nds when he explores his own motivational 
fi eld: “When I shall have set down my own reading [of human nature] 
orderly and perspicuously,” he tells his reader, “the pains left another will be 
only to consider, if he also fi nd not the same in himself. Th is doctrine,” he 
rather importantly adds, “admitteth no other kind of demonstration” (Lev. 
Pr, 5). Hobbes’s theories of human nature and political life are the results of 
rational introspection into his own motives, and the proper way for readers 
to test their soundness is to systematically interrogate their own social moti-
vations and to compare the results to those of Hobbes. Learning how to look 
within and “read thyself” (Nosce teipsum) is thus the best—nay, the only—
way to understand human nature, and anyone who wishes to challenge 
Hobbes’s own reading of the passions must do more than engage in idle 
gainsaying or quibble with insignifi cant particulars (Lev. Pr, 4). He must 
present a more elegant theoretical alternative.
At least one reader took up Hobbes’s challenge and believed that he had 
indeed developed a superior account of human nature and social motivation. 
Th at reader was Jean- Jacques Rousseau, who left aside “all scientifi c books” 
that “teach us to see men only as they have made themselves” and meditated 
“upon the fi rst and simplest operations of the human soul” (DI 95). What he 
found there was a remarkably limited set of social motivations, one far more 
restrictive than the relatively exhaustive list provided by Hobbes, who in his 
haste to characterize human relations as naturally antagonistic had assumed 
the existence of human relations themselves (Lev. VI, 28–33). On Rousseau’s 
accounting, however, the fi rst human beings lacked both the inclination and 
the incentive to seek one another out. Drawing freely from nature’s bounty 
and unable to conceive of anyone else taking an interest in his activities, 
natural man sought no emotional gratifi cation from others and found the 
means of his physical subsistence without their help. Confl icts motivated by 
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scarcity were brief and relatively infrequent, since nature provides plenty and 
men without pride ultimately have very little over which to fi ght. Lacking 
moral needs and possessing the power to satisfy his physical desires inde-
pendently, natural man had no conceivable reason for social intercourse of 
any kind.
Because the utility- based motives of necessity and convenience cannot 
on Rousseau’s view adequately explain the phenomenon of settled social rela-
tions, other factors must be at work. For Rousseau, the awakening of social 
sentiment eff ects a fundamental change in the structure of desire itself; the 
newly social subject is confused about what he wants because the desire for 
recognition—a new and powerful motivational force that will take much 
time and refl ection to understand—has been loosed within him. Emerging 
with and from this desire to be viewed as valuable by others is a moral desire 
to merit such recognition. Whereas Hobbes and, following him, Locke 
account for social life and development in largely utilitarian terms, Rousseau 
argues that social desiring is in its fi rst phases something indeterminate, 
vague, and highly confusing. When we turn to one another for the fi rst time, 
it is not in order to satisfy some predetermined and exogenously given end. To 
the contrary, we have only the foggiest ideas about what purposes other 
human beings might serve or what needs they will help us satisfy. Amour- 
propre is both a cause and consequence of this confusion.
Rousseau’s emphasis on the uncertainty out of which our desire for love 
and esteem arises has at least four important and somewhat neglected con-
sequences for how human relations are theorized. First, his account affi  rms 
the intrinsic value of human relations, for if we enter associations without 
knowing what ends they can secure then we must have other and noninstru-
mental motives for seeking the company of others. Second, it highlights the 
fundamental albeit subterranean role that sexuality plays in motivating 
human connection more generally. As it turns out, the sexual passion informs 
moral and social development at virtually every stage—including and espe-
cially the earliest ones. Th ird, it provides a more expansive and possibility- 
enhancing conception of social relations than those provided by Hobbes and 
Locke, for attaching to the (well- governed) desire to be esteemed by others is 
the desire to be estimable. Amour- propre, that is, gives rise to a powerful 
perfectionistic imperative that leads healthy beings to develop and extend 
their being in ways that qualitatively enrich their lives. Rousseau’s account of 
the psyche and his understanding of the emergence of social attachment 
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are designed to reveal a richer and fuller set of human possibilities than are 
the more reductive models of Hobbes and Locke, whose theories had not 
explained human nature so much as explained it away. To the degree, then, 
that we wish not only to gain the good opinion of others but also to deserve 
it, the desire for recognition grounds a desire for moral perfection that proves 
crucially important to Rousseau’s moral psychology. Finally, it allows us to 
see that the development of the social passions is at one with their disaggrega-
tion. To mature socially is to grow into the understanding that there are 
diff erent forms of association—love, friendship, and so on—that satisfy 
diff erent needs and create diff erent expectations. Th is realization ultimately 
proves more important than it initially seems, for our ability to fi nd compre-
hensive satisfaction hinges on the extent to which we are able to harmonize 
our various social roles and eff ectively negotiate with the irreducible com-
plexity of living with others.
Th ough the novelty of Rousseau’s noninstrumental account of social 
attachment is best glimpsed by contrasting it with the narrowly instrumen-
talist conceptions of Hobbes and Locke, we cannot forget that Rousseau is 
radicalizing the materialistic intuitions developed by his English forebears in 
the very act of questioning them. In his quest to provide a naturalistic expla-
nation of human behavior that accounts for the full range of human drives 
and capacities Rousseau is careful not to assign a grounding function to 
obscure or rarefi ed psychic forces like eros or the desire for “extended being” 
(E 168; cf. Cooper 2004). Without denying the existence or indeed the impor-
tance of such forces, he nonetheless thinks them epiphenomenal products of 
still more fundamental psychological drives and seeks to account for their 
emergence in terms that are broadly congenial to modern materialism.
| Instruments and Obstacles: Hobbes, Locke, and Bourgeois 
Motivation
In his eff ort to reground moral and social behavior on less narrowly instru-
mental motives, Rousseau is forced to rethink the structure of human desire 
itself. His primary target is the rationalistic hedonism of Hobbes and Locke, 
which turns on the hinges of pleasure and pain and models human decision- 
making as egoistic computations of expected marginal utilities. Th eir respec-
tive moral- psychological theories each treat desire as the principal spring of 
action and conceive of it as something omnipresent, highly specifi c, and 
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rigidly infl exible. Th is understanding of the human mind generates an 
instrumental understanding of human association, for it presumes—incor-
rectly on Rousseau’s view—that human subjects enter into social relations 
with fully determined ends and purposes. Th e moral and social results of 
such a conception are as unacceptable as the conception itself, for it encour-
ages us to view others as means to private ends, thus leading to the arid, 
unrewarding, and highly exploitative social practices Rousseau so memora-
bly characterizes as destructive of city and soul alike.
Hobbes gives especially strong statement to the view that human beings 
are psychologically unequipped for sustained social intercourse. Without 
denying that men are susceptible to feelings of love and aff ection, he nonethe-
less affi  rms that such passions are unstable and hence insuffi  cient to serve as a 
ground for civil society. “It is true,” he avers in Th e Citizen, “that perpetual 
solitude is hard for a man to bear by nature as a man. . . . I am not therefore 
denying that we seek each other’s company at the prompting of nature. But 
civil societies are not mere gatherings, they are Alliances, which essentially 
require good faith and agreement for their making” (I.2.n24). Th e “good 
faith” and “agreement” that make civil society possible are the results of a 
foresighted and careful coordination of selfi sh interests, not the spontaneous 
expressions of natural sociability or the passionate eff usions of aff ectionate 
hearts. People do not honor their covenants made from a motive of love. 
Th us, while “mere gatherings” may well be animated by sympathetic fellow 
feeling, stable and eff ective associations are founded on the shared apprehen-
sion of common interests and are dedicated to the realization of some prede-
termined purpose discoverable by reason. Associational life thus conceived is 
an instrument of private felicity—a tool for achieving exogenously given 
ends—not a force capable of reconfi guring the structure of desire itself.
But it is not just the natural egoism of human beings that leads us to 
conceive of our associations in instrumental terms. Th e particular way in 
which human beings desire reinforces these selfi sh tendencies and further 
circumscribes our motivational fi eld. Human desire is on Hobbes’s account-
ing something infi nite and defi nite, ubiquitous and precise. Desires, whether 
of attraction or aversion, are caused by encounters with specifi c and identifi -
able phenomena out in the world and always arise with respect to those same 
phenomena. To desire is necessarily to desire some thing, and to speak of a 
want without also mentioning its corresponding object is to speak of an 
eff ect without a cause. Hobbes’s defi nition of felicity—“a continual progress 
of the desire, from one object to the other, the attaining of the former being 
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still but the way to the latter”—underscores the insatiability of and lack of 
ambiguity in human desire (Lev. XI, 57; emphasis added). Desiring, then, is 
a process in which the want of one thing is replaced by the want of another; 
one’s wish for some good X is satisfi ed (or frustrated) and instantaneously 
replaced by a desire for some other good Y. Our desires change if and when 
their “objects” change. Even the generalized anxiety lurking behind our 
specifi c attractions and aversions—that “restless desire for power after 
power” Hobbes puts in all men—is not itself felt as a generalized desire for 
something infi nite and unrealizable in the world, but rather is experienced 
in a piecemeal, incremental fashion. To the degree that it is felt obscurely, it 
is to be disregarded as a dangerous and illusory longing for we know not 
what. We do not want something infi nite—infi nity, after all, is uncog-
nizable—so much as we infi nitely want fi nite things. Hobbes’s phenomenol-
ogy of desire thus presumes not only that men are always desiring but also 
that their discrete desires have a fairly clear and determinate character. Th e 
passions speak to human beings with extraordinary precision and irresistible 
persuasiveness.
Th ough Locke softens Hobbes’s insistence on man’s natural asociability 
and more openly acknowledges the necessity of traditional social virtues, his 
hedonistic moral- psychological outlook and instrumental conception of 
human association are Hobbesian in important and even essential respects. 
He, too, insists on man’s natural selfi shness, rejects the existence of a natural 
good (ECHU 269), holds that opinions concerning good and evil are state-
ments of subjective preference rather than reports about the character of 
moral reality (259), acknowledges that hope of pleasure and fear of pain are 
the “hinges on which our Passions turn” (229), and claims that the fulfi llment 
of desire—what he calls “Happiness”—is the fundamental aim of human 
action (258). Hobbes, it seems, may be more justly decried than dismissed.
Locke also follows Hobbes in giving to human desire a high degree of 
specifi city and exactness. He understands desire as a felt absence, a “state of 
uneasiness” caused by the lack of some valued good (ECHU 251), and char-
acterizes the anxiety of desiring beings not as an indeterminate longing for 
something comprehensive and all- encompassing but rather as a set of specifi c 
anxieties, a complex of discrete and distinguishable impulses: “We being in 
this World beset with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with diff erent desires, 
the next enquiry will be, which of them has the precedency in determining 
the will to the next action?” (257). Th e practical problem posed by desire is 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   38 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Social Longing and Moral Perfection 39
one of prioritization rather than precise identifi cation; we are not ignorant of 
what we want so much as of how to order our pursuits in a way that best suits 
our fundamental interest in happiness. Locke reiterates this point a few 
paragraphs later: “Th ere being a great many uneasinesses always solliciting, 
and ready to determine the Will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest, 
and most pressing should determine the Will to the next action” (263). Th ese 
passages reveal that Locke views human desire in much the same way as 
Hobbes, for we see in human being not a generalized anxiety or uneasiness 
but rather a series of specifi c and identifi able uneasinesses. Indeed, Locke’s 
Hobbesian conception of desire as something infi nite and defi nite is refl ected 
in his very framing of the problem it poses: the diffi  culty with “Happiness,” 
for Locke, is that we lack sound rules for determining which of our specifi c 
desires deserve priority over others, not that we want something indetermi-
nate and enigmatic (e.g., wholeness or erotic transcendence). Th ere is, then, 
nothing mysterious or vague about human ends themselves, for we are at all 
times beset by any number of discrete desires that make clear and distinct 
claims on our attention. We make mistakes not about the things we want 
but about the order in which we pursue them.
Hobbes’s and Locke’s disenchanting conceptions of desiring generate 
unsurprisingly and unapologetically instrumental conceptions of human 
association. For both thinkers, when we enter social life we do so with a 
full complement of predetermined interests, and when we seek others out 
it is in order to realize those interests. Th us conceived associations are prod-
ucts rather than sources—consequences rather than causes—of human 
desire. Because men are not doubtful about their ends, it is natural and 
even benefi cial for them to employ one another as instruments in the ser-
vice of their predetermined wants and needs. Of course these wants and 
needs are not necessarily sinister and need not entail the brutal exploita-
tion of others (though for Rousseau that was their likely consequence), but 
the crucial point is that socialization thus conceived does not problematize 
the process of end- construction or ask us to rethink or revise our funda-
mental interests in any serious way. We shall see that Rousseau, without 
departing from the hedonistic essentials of Hobbes’s and Locke’s respec-
tive moral- psychological theories, seeks to rethink both what it means to 
desire and what it is that is desired, and in so doing to reconceive human 
relations as catalysts and creators of human desire rather than as simple 
instruments of its satisfaction.
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| “Nature’s Ignorance”: Indeterminacy and Social Feeling
Hobbes and Locke turned to reason in order to solve the social problem both 
because they believed in the primacy of self- love and because they thought 
human passions too unstable and unpredictable a basis on which to build a 
political society. Rousseau, though as convinced as his predecessors of the 
centrality of self- love, nonetheless turns their pessimism about the human 
passions on its head. Indeed, Rousseau believes the passions must govern 
reason as often as reason governs the passions, for it is reason that teaches us 
to isolate ourselves from others and to think of them as instruments of our 
private purposes. Our natural passions, appropriately directed and devel-
oped, connect us to others in a very diff erent and more sympathetic way: far 
from inspiring a taste for dominion, we instead learn to regard one another 
as beings entitled to moral respect, as sources of dignity who deserve fair 
treatment and whose well- being is a part of our own.
It is clear Rousseau regards Hobbes and Locke as sources of the errone-
ous doctrine that rational self- interest can solve the social problem, for he 
explicitly engages both thinkers on precisely this point at diff erent places in 
his writing. A most interesting example occurs in Emile (103), where Rous-
seau criticizes Locke for misunderstanding the psychological mechanics of 
an important other- regarding virtue: liberality. Locke advises tutors to edu-
cate their pupils in the way of generosity by showing them that the liberal 
man always comes off  better in the end. “As to the having and possessing of 
things,” he tells us in Some Th oughts concerning Education, “teach [children] 
to part with what they have easily and freely . . . and let them fi nd by experi-
ence that the most liberal has always most plenty” (81). Locke appears to be 
relying on something like the principle of operant conditioning: the child, 
rewarded repeatedly for generosity, will eventually develop a taste for giving 
to others. However, it would seem that there is in Locke’s account a certain 
confusion of cause and eff ect, for it is not due to his liberality that the rich 
man “has always most plenty.” It is wealth that makes a man liberal, not vice 
versa. Rousseau notes Locke’s deliberate gloss and claims that it is only a 
matter of time before a child trained in a Lockean mode will discover it for 
himself and come to dismiss liberality as spurious. Th e lesson he will learn is 
not that it is good to be generous but rather that he should only give when 
he expects to be compensated with interest. Far, then, from inspiring genu-
ine liberality, the self- regarding generosity Locke recommends instead creates 
a “miser” who practices a paltry and usurious liberality that “gives an egg to 
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have a cow” (E 103). As a bon mot this can hardly be bettered, but Rousseau’s 
clever parry is more than a witticism. Indeed, his retort is based on an 
instrumental understanding of reason that Locke himself accepted. Rous-
seau adds, however, that reason thus conceived does not and cannot solve the 
social problem because it inevitably subordinates the dignity of others to 
private purposes and destabilizes the social bond by making it contingent on 
considerations of narrow self- interest (DI 195–97). Th e calculations Locke 
commends to his tutor will produce only a mercenary virtue and will never 
serve as a stable foundation for human community.
Rousseau bypasses the coldness of instrumental reason and seeks instead 
to instill sociable virtue through a restructuring of the aff ective fi eld. He 
turns to “the habit of the soul” rather than to rational calculation in order to 
teach the virtues essential to the maintenance of civil society and premises 
his account on the assumption that our initial social impulses are highly 
indeterminate (E 104). Th is indeterminacy puts our ends in doubt, thereby 
making it virtually impossible for us to use others as means to them. Rous-
seau takes up this argument at the start of Book IV of Emile, which marks 
the awakening of social sentiment and the revolution in self- understanding 
that it initiates. Before Emile’s social desires are aroused, he embodies every-
thing good and solid in the moral- psychological models of Hobbes and 
Locke. He cognizes the world in terms of pure usefulness—he knows the 
“what’s it good for” in everything he does—and disregards everything whose 
utility cannot be shown. His ideas, however limited, are clear and distinct as 
far as they reach, and his mind is wholly devoid of prejudice (207). Emile has 
at age fi fteen all “the virtue that relates to himself” and a moral disposition 
perfectly suited to his limited purposes: he “considers himself without regard 
to others and fi nds it good that others do not think of him. He demands 
nothing of anyone and believes he owes nothing to anyone” (208). Unaware 
of human will and the threat it poses to his self- suffi  ciency, Emile does what 
he wants but wants only what he himself can do. He is deliberate, industrious, 
prudent, resolute, courageous, patient, and moderate. He is, in short, a model 
bourgeois.
He is, of course, also profoundly unsocial. Th e instrumental psychology 
that allowed Emile to so eff ectively cognize the physical, depersonalized 
world of “dependence on things” will not suffi  ce in the social realm, because 
consciousness of human agency introduces complications into the process of 
desiring that overwhelm the tidy cognitions of childhood. Th ese complica-
tions are embodied in Rousseau’s description of our fi rst social desires, which 
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he characterizes as highly indefi nite: “A long restlessness precedes the fi rst 
desires; a long ignorance puts them off  the track. One desires without know-
ing what. Th e blood ferments and is agitated; a superabundance of life seeks 
to extend itself outward. Th e eye becomes animated and looks over other 
beings. One begins to take an interest in those surrounding us; one begins 
to feel that one is not made to live alone. It is thus that the human heart 
is opened to the human aff ections and becomes capable of attachment” 
(E 220). Th e fi rst social impulse we sense within ourselves is subjectively 
experienced as all encompassing but utterly directionless. It is a compound 
passion, one that contains within itself a complex of distinct desires for dif-
ferent kinds of attachment. Of course, these desires can and ultimately must 
be distinguished in order to be developed in an “ordered” way (235), but a 
properly educated adolescent does not know the diff erence between love and 
friendship. He hence has little idea of how to give concrete expression to the 
“superabundance of life” within him that “seeks to extend itself outward.” 
His fi rst desire for communion with others is an undiff erentiated and inde-
terminate want of connectedness; he has “an interest in those surrounding 
[him]” and he “looks over other beings” with a new intensity and feeling of 
recognition, but this recognition is limited by the ambiguity of the passion 
that actuates it. It is therefore the source of considerable confusion. He senses 
that others are good for something, but if pressed he could not explain the 
“what’s it good for” in his new desire (207). He does not yet know exactly 
what he wants from others and is needful of much instruction if he is learn 
how to go about getting it. Th is newfound desire to be with and seen by 
others is thus not experienced as a precise and identifi able want or need—
like a craving for a hot dog or a wish to take a nap—but as a generalized 
longing to project oneself into the world, to reach out beyond the narrow 
and narrowing restrictions of selfhood and connect with other beings.
Rousseau emphasizes the ambiguity in rather than the specifi city of our 
initial social impulses and, in so doing, argues contra Hobbes and Locke 
that when we turn to others for the fi rst time we lack a developed sense of 
what purposes they might serve in our lives. To treat others instrumentally 
presupposes that we already know what they are to us and what we want 
from them, but if we “desire without knowing what” it is we want from them, 
then we cannot say in advance what ends they might serve as a means to, 
what goods they can help us obtain, or how exactly we wish to be connected 
to them. We do not, in short, know what they are for, and yet they are still 
wanted, and deeply. Th e company of others has a value beyond its utility; we 
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want nothing from them but them. It will take time to learn to distinguish 
the diff erent forms of recognition and the various needs to which they give 
rise, but this occurs at a later stage of moral development. For now it is 
enough to see that Rousseau’s genesis of social attachment begins out of a 
salutary indeterminacy that shows how we can want others without want-
ing anything in particular from them. Human relations are desired by a 
healthy adolescent soul for their own sake rather than for their benefi cial 
consequences.
Th e confusion into which we are thrown by our new and perplexing 
social longing raises the issue of self- knowledge and its relationship to socia-
bility. Rousseau calls attention to the presence of identity confusion very 
early in Book IV, noting the physical and emotional changes that come with 
puberty: in addition to his “desiring without knowing what,” we also fi nd 
that Emile’s “voice breaks, or, rather, he loses it; he is neither child nor man 
and can take the tone of neither” (E 212). Emile no longer knows what he is, 
what he wants, or how to explain his needs to others. He must adapt to the 
cruel irony of life as an adolescent—he has lost the ability to express himself 
at the very moment he most urgently needs it. Th e birth of the social pas-
sions has thus not only made Emile desire the company and recognition of 
others; it has also introduced the question of self- knowledge as a question, 
raising it in a way that makes necessary the assistance, care, and company of 
others. What he is from now on is social; he can no longer do anything—or 
at any rate anything interesting or important—without considering the 
interests and views of others. Human relations, then, are not instrumental 
but identity- constitutive; they give rise to the very desires they seek to satisfy, 
and do not help us get what we want so much as give shape and substance to 
desire itself. Th ey infl uence our political views, our moral characters, our 
aesthetic orientations, even our physiognomies. Th ey count fundamentally 
for who we are and how we think of ourselves. Th e structure of human being 
is altered profoundly and irreversibly once the desire for the recognition and 
esteem of others is aroused.
| Amour- Propre and Moral Ambition
Rousseau connects the dawning of social sentiment and the development of 
moral personhood to reveal not only the indeterminacy but also the intensity 
of our fi rst social desires. When we become social we not only want a new 
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thing but also want it with a new depth and fervency, for as we are initiated 
into the mysteries of moral and social life we are gripped by a peculiar mix-
ture of pride and shame—pride at our fuller participation in the human 
estate, and shame at our new needfulness and insuffi  ciency. We begin to 
view ourselves as works in progress, as perfectible but imperfect beings in 
need of we know not what. Rousseau intimates something of this profound 
but enigmatic longing for perfection in his Moral Letters, which are addressed 
to his onetime and, it would seem, ongoing love interest, Sophie d’Houdetot. 
“Have you,” he asks his belle amie, “never felt that secret uneasiness that 
torments us at the sight of our misery and that becomes indignant about our 
weaknesses as about an insult to the faculties that exalt us?” He goes on to 
characterize the eff ects of this powerful psychic force, arguing that it 
“enfl ame[s] the heart with love of the celestial virtues” and “carries us into 
the empyrean next to God himself.” Th is feeling, this “sublime going astray 
that raises us above our being,” exalts the soul and “forbids us to have con-
tempt for ourselves” or anyone else who is “a friend of justice and sensitive to 
the virtues” (ML 88–89). To be human is in some sense to wish to transcend 
humanity.
Th ough Rousseau sympathetically depicts this impulse in the Moral 
Letters and suggests that its development is necessarily tied to a full realiza-
tion of the human good, he is more famous for calling attention to its dan-
gers. Indeed, ever since Voltaire famously quipped that his perusal of the 
Second Discourse made him want to walk on all fours like an animal, Rous-
seau has been thought to counsel against the extension of this distinctively 
human desire. Th e more recent work of Laurence Cooper (1999) and N. J. H. 
Dent (1988) has, however, decisively undermined interpretations like this 
and suggests rather that Rousseau’s depictions of amour- propre’s destructive-
ness are not to be viewed as claims about the essential malignancy of the 
passion itself but rather as evidence of its incredible force, one that can cata-
lyze either the corruption or perfection of human nature. In order to see 
amour- propre’s moralizing force, then, it is necessary to examine its genesis, 
for in so doing we can glimpse both the destructive danger and the construc-
tive potential to which it gives rise as well as begin to see how it might solve 
some of the problems its own emergence presents.
Rousseau begins his account on this score from the postulate of self- 
love, holding that “we have to love ourselves to preserve ourselves; and it 
follows immediately from this same sentiment that we love what preserves 
us.” Our very fi rst attachments to others are purely instinctual and instru-
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mental: “Every child is attached to his nurse. . . . What fosters the well- being 
of an individual attracts him; what harms him repels him. Th is is merely 
blind instinct.” Hobbes himself could not have said it better. However, dur-
ing puberty the mechanical promptings of pure self- regard are complicated 
by the new and powerful realization that others exist and that they have 
intentions with respect to our well- being. Th e apprehension that other sub-
jects exist and that they mean to do us good or ill looses the passions of hate 
and love, or rather creates passion proper: “What transforms . . . instinct into 
sentiment, attachment into love, aversion into hate, is the intention mani-
fested to harm us or to be useful to us. . . . We seek what serves us, but we 
love what wants to serve us. We fl ee what harms us, but we hate what wants 
to harm us. One is never passionate about insensible beings which merely 
follow the impulsion given to them. But those from whom one expects good 
or ill from their inner disposition, by their will . . . inspire in us sentiments 
similar to those they manifest toward us” (E 213). One does not hate the tree 
branch that strikes his head, but he immediately despises the person who 
does the same with a baseball bat. Th e diff erence, of course, is that the lat-
ter’s behavior is invested with malign intentions while the former is bereft 
of motive. Th e awareness of human intentionality thus transports us from a 
mechanical world moved by impersonal forces to a moral world governed 
by human will. Th e impact of this realization is diffi  cult to overstate, but we 
can begin to understand something of its importance by noting that it is 
impossible for us to continue depending simply on things—on “insensible 
beings”—in order to subsist, for now we understand that our environment 
is structured not just by the uniform and harmonious laws of nature but 
also by the capricious and confl icting motives of other human beings. Our 
continued preservation and happiness now depend on our ability to dis-
cern the often- obscure intentions of others and gain favorable standing in 
their eyes.
Awareness of the existence of human will, of the fact that others have 
intentions toward other people and wish to do them good or harm, greatly 
raises the emotional stakes of social interaction and gives birth to perhaps 
the most dangerous passion in the human soul—anger. Th e importance of 
this emotion for Rousseau’s psychological theory is suggested rather clearly 
by the fact that the epigraph to Emile—“We are sick with evils that can be 
cured; and nature, having brought us forth sound, itself helps us if we wish 
to be improved”—is culled from Seneca’s treatise Of Anger. Th e frontispiece 
to the work also indicates anger’s thematic importance: it depicts the solicitous 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   45 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations46
Th etis dipping her infant son Achilles—who would develop quite the tem-
per—into the River Styx and thereby rendering him invulnerable. Th ough 
Rousseau appears to laud Th etis’s care for her son and advises wise preceptors 
to emulate her salutary example by steeping their own pupils “in the River 
Styx,” he subtly chastises her, along with the “cruel mothers” of modern 
times, for worrying too much about the mortality of their children (E 47; see 
also Scott 2012).
Obsessed with protecting her son from so many external dangers, Th etis 
failed to tend to his internal life and, in so doing, cultivated unawares the 
very passion which would prove his undoing. Her approach to education 
thus fails by its own standard. But such a failure was inevitable, since the 
standard it applies is the incorrect one: because mortality is a defi ning fea-
ture of the human condition, education is “less a question of keeping [a 
child] from dying than of making him live” (E 42). Th etis’s well- intentioned 
eff orts were therefore motivated by a misunderstanding of her child’s true 
needs: in futilely trying to protect her Achilles from dying she prevented him 
from making productive use of the time he had, and in failing to understand 
how to educate his anger she made him its unwitting dupe. Jean- Jacques, far 
from seeking to render his Emile invulnerable and knowing how susceptible 
his nascent passions are to corruption, does not follow Th etis’s fl awed 
example but rather charts a new course directed by the theory of natural 
goodness. Th is theory puts the education of anger at the center of its peda-
gogy and, rather than seek to inure men to the troublesome eff ects of amour- 
propre by preventing its birth, elects instead to subject them to all its power 
and force (cf. E 235). Th is new path is the only one that can be trod, but it is 
rife with obstacles and dangers.
Anger and all its self- destructive consequences materialize when amour- 
propre’s wish to be recognized is thwarted by the will of another, and it 
expresses itself with particular intensity when recognition- seeking behaviors 
go ignored or aff ectionate feelings go unreciprocated. Rousseau claimed that 
the disposition to anger in children “requires extreme attentiveness,” and the 
disciplining of this dangerous passion would appear to be one of Jean- 
Jacques’s most important and most diffi  cult tasks. Th is is because we are, on 
Rousseau’s view, acutely sensitive to the refusals of others and disposed to 
interpret them as personal aff ronts, as hateful insults and denials of our 
worth. It is therefore not uncommon for us to attribute malevolent inten-
tions to those who withhold their aff ection or otherwise frustrate our wishes. 
Our tendency to rashly attribute malicious intentionality to an intransigent 
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other, even and perhaps especially when there is no clear reason to do so, is 
a form of demonization through which we administer punishment to him; 
it is how we rebuke him for refusing to love us as he is loved by us. It is also 
self- deception on the cheap: having been refused the recognition so earnestly 
sought, we discredit the motives of the other in order to convince ourselves 
that such love was not worth having in the fi rst place.
Yet another danger that emerges with amour- propre is that our desire for 
social distinction leads us to seek recognition from the wrong sources. Just 
as governors make mistakes about how to eff ect their pupils’ good, so, too, 
do human beings make mistakes about who and what is deserving of their 
aff ection. Th ese mistakes have important consequences, for when the objects 
of our esteem are themselves inestimable we are inevitably led to think and 
act in unsociable ways. Indeed, domineering and antisocial behaviors (e.g., 
schoolyard bullying) are often motivated not by anger or malevolence per se 
but rather by a desire to be accepted by one’s peers. In such cases it is not the 
wish to do harm but rather the desire to be loved that moves us to behave in 
aggressive and unsociable ways. Th us, unlike anger, which motivates us to 
harm others simply for the sake of harming them, misguided recognition- 
seeking might lead us to injure some for the purpose of impressing others. 
Like anger, the unguided or misguided desire for social distinction is a per-
vasive source of mischief in Rousseau’s moral universe: we constantly seek 
false goods—wealth and titles of various kinds—in part because we believe 
that through their possession we will gain the aff ection of others (whose 
aff ection is in most cases not worth having), but in the pursuit of such things 
we are inevitably forced to undermine the interests of the very persons whose 
esteem we so desire. Th us does injudicious recognition- seeking help create 
the zero- sum power dynamics discussed in the previous chapter.
Th ese two dangers hardly exhaust the problems that malignant amour- 
propre can cause, but they are highlighted here both because of their gravity 
and because they point up the depth and intensity of the desire for social 
recognition that is awakened with the birth of amour- propre. Th e antisocial 
tendencies that develop in their wake are, however, clearly perversions of 
amour- propre rather than fulfi llments of its basic internal logic. Confronting 
the willfulness of others need not lead to anger overtaking the soul. Indeed, 
amour- propre—while the source of much evil—is not in itself evil. It is, to 
the contrary, a “useful but dangerous instrument” in the creation of moral 
identity, a passion that is susceptible to corruption without being corrupt in 
itself (E 244, cf. 252). Rousseau argues that the normal trajectory of healthy 
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self- love is “toward benevolence” and that we are by nature disposed favorably 
toward the other members of our species (213). Th ese natural sympathetic 
feelings are in principle reinforced rather than undermined by amour- propre 
because, once we understand that others recognize and have intentions 
toward us, it is immediately obvious that we should want that recognition to 
be positive and those intentions to be favorable. All things being equal, we 
would prefer to be remembered for the happiness we inspire rather than the 
threat we pose, and when we seek to dominate others we do so either 
because we are responding childishly to their intransigence or because our 
impoverished moral tastes have led us to look for love in all the wrong 
places. Th ese problems emerge because we are exposed to human intention-
ality before we are in a condition to appropriately cognize it (214). Th us, 
when the healthy adolescent turns to others for the fi rst time—when he is 
able to process the willfulness of others—he views them as important 
sources of recognition and validation. As an immediate consequence of 
the view he takes, he is disposed to desire their good opinion, even as he 
himself does not fully understand what it is he seeks. Th e desire for approval 
thus arises concomitantly with and necessarily attaches to the awakening of 
social sentiment.
Th e key to solving the twin dangers of anger and indiscriminate 
recognition- seeking is to forge a link between the desire for social approval 
and the desire to merit that approval. Th e crucial importance of this link 
emerges early in Book IV: “One wants to obtain the preference one grants. 
To be loved, one must make oneself lovable. To be preferred, one has to 
make oneself more lovable than another, more lovable than every other, at 
least in the eyes of the beloved object. Th is is the source of the fi rst glances 
at one’s fellows; this is the source of the fi rst comparisons with them; this is 
the source of emulation, rivalries, jealousy. . . . With love and friendship are 
born dissensions, enmity, and hate” (E 214–15). With characteristic forebod-
ing, Rousseau calls attention to the specifi cally comparative dimension of 
amour- propre and all the trouble it causes. Men want recognition for its own 
sake, and since the forms of recognition attaching to “love and friendship” 
are granted preferentially, not everyone attains the aff ection they so crave. 
Suff ering feelings of exclusion, the malcontent may angrily lash out against 
or basely imitate those who won the love they were denied. Th e eff ects are 
uniformly destructive: competition becomes the basis for exclusion, which 
in its turn becomes the basis for great psychological and social confl ict.
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However, such dangers can be obviated to the degree that our compara-
tive life is carefully developed, and our wish to be loved can be transformed 
into a wish to be lovable. Th is transformation, as it is explained in Emile, 
occurs in two stages: the fi rst is to stabilize the sense of self- worth by subtly 
gratifying nascent amour- propre, and the second is to cultivate a passion for 
virtue by sublimating his sexual desire. With respect to the former, we may 
begin by noting that the sorts of interpersonal comparisons made by newly 
social subjects need not simply be the source of emotional turmoil but rather 
can actually strengthen their moral identities. Because it is not just “dissen-
sions, enmity, and hate”—but also “love and friendship”—that grow out of 
amour- propre’s need to be recognized and respected, Emile’s fi rst compari-
sons are designed to stimulate his sympathetic impulses and thereby connect 
him to his species. He is exposed to the sights and sounds of poverty, and 
these early experiences inspire two kinds of comparisons that serve to stabi-
lize his emerging moral identity as well. Th e fi rst and most obvious compari-
son Emile makes is between himself and the person he is helping, and from 
this comparison he derives heartening reminders of his own puissance as 
well as the satisfaction that comes with providing a social service of indisput-
able worth (E 223, 229). Th is comparison solidifi es a sense of self- respect that 
is still unsettled and hence susceptible to corruption because it helps Emile to 
see that, no matter how well- off  some are, there are still others who require 
his assistance and care. With this in mind, it is worth emphasizing that the 
way in which comparative activity is introduced is of the fi rst importance for 
the ultimate eff ect on the soul. It is essential to Rousseau that Emile be the 
victor in the fi rst comparisons he makes with others, for if he were to think of 
himself as inferior it is very likely he would—just like the conventional pupil 
who is shown the magnifi cence of the rich rather than the destitution of the 
poor—become overwhelmed by envy and, ultimately, by anger (220). “Some 
are better- off ,” he would think, “and someone is responsible.” Th us it is only 
after Emile’s education in pity has established a reasonably stable sense of 
self- worth that it is safe for him to associate with the rich and magnifi cent.
Emile compares himself not only to the person who requires his assis-
tance but also to those who could join him in helping the unfortunate but 
elect not to do so, whether out of laziness or contempt (E 224, 244–45). Here, 
too, Emile compares favorably to his fellows, but for a diff erent reason: he 
prefers his position to that of others because he better exemplifi es the stan-
dards of personal and moral excellence he shares with them. Refl ecting on 
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common standards of right and goodness and measuring his own eff orts 
against those who occupy a social position similar to his own, Emile fi nds 
new reasons to love and cherish both himself as well as those who need his 
help. Comparative activity, properly structured, actually helps Emile clarify 
who he is to others and to himself: his moral identity, his sense of himself as 
a benevolent person, is stabilized by the contrast he observes between him-
self and those who share his social advantages. To be sure, this contrast will 
cultivate a sense of moral superiority, but it does so in a way that encourages 
him to think of himself as the kind of person whose own dignity is expressed 
by and conditioned on affi  rming the dignity of others.
While the kinds of comparison embodied by pity help Emile cultivate 
habits of thought and action that are favorable to the species, this fi rst step in 
the development of moral identity is only provisional and preparatory. Th e 
next and all- important stage is the sublimation of sexual desire. Indeed, the 
desire to gain the esteem of others and the desire to be estimable manifests 
itself with particular clarity and intensity in Rousseau’s treatment of the sexual 
passion, which he conceives as an intrinsically moralistic and moralizing force 
in the human soul. Sexuality is a prodigious source of social energy and our 
sexual experiences have a decisive infl uence on the fi nal shape of our entire 
personality; its education is therefore of the fi rst moment. In the Discourse on 
Inequality, Rousseau genufl ects fearfully before the “unrestrained and brutal” 
impulse that “makes one sex necessary to the other,” noting that the sexual 
passion is so central to civilized man that it can override even his desire for 
self- preservation (DI 134).
Th ough the Discourse’s discussion emphasizes the dangers of the sexual 
passion, of special relevance here is the way Rousseau’s distinction between 
“physical” and “moral” love helps us understand how sexuality builds the 
bridge between the desire for esteem and the desire to be estimable. “Physi-
cal” sexual desire is for Rousseau a direct expression of primitive amour de 
soi- même and, as such, a purely mechanical function of innate self- regard. 
Men and women in the state of nature engage without emotion or aff ection, 
seeing one another as instruments of private satisfaction. Considerations of 
compatibility, physical attractiveness, and moral character do not govern 
their relations. However, the desire for physical love is peaceable precisely 
because it is uninformed by complex, deeply felt desire. Natural man “waits 
for the impulsion of nature, yields to it without choice [and] with more 
pleasure than frenzy; and the need satisfi ed, all desire is extinguished” (DI 
135). “Physical” sexuality is the psychic equivalent of scratching an itch.
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All this changes, however, when “moral” love emerges and eff ects two 
related transformations in the structure of sexual desiring. Th e fi rst involves 
the development of discriminatory capacities that sharpen aesthetic and 
moral taste. Whereas natural man does not distinguish between fi t and unfi t 
sexual partners, those under the spell of moral love consider questions of 
appearance as well as character when seeking an appropriate romantic object. 
Th e criteria we use to help us separate wheat from chaff —what Rousseau 
calls notions of “merit and beauty” (DI 135)—allow us to assess the physical 
and moral virtues of potential mates and to form preferences on their basis. 
It is by way of forming such preferences that romantic love moves toward 
exclusivity, for once we have learned to esteem one person more than another 
our desire “gains a greater degree of energy” for our “preferred object” (DI 
134). It is important to note that both aesthetic and moral criteria—beauty 
and merit—are relevant to the selection of a partner.
Th e emergence of “moral love” not only refi nes but also intensifi es sexual 
desire, and this intensifi cation is due to its interaction with amour- propre. 
Once moved by the desire to be loved, men and women begin to view one 
another not as accessories to orgasm but rather as sources of personal valida-
tion. Th at is, as we become aware that others are observing us and as aes-
thetic and moral considerations begin to complicate the experience of sexual 
attraction, we start to view both our partners and the sexual act itself in a 
very diff erent light. Coupling is no longer about the simple gratifi cation of a 
purely physiological impulse, but rather about the acquisition of a unique 
and uniquely intoxicating form of recognition. To the moral lover, giving 
one’s body to another is not simply or even a primarily physical act; it is, 
rather, the defi nitive way of sharing what is most deeply and fundamentally 
one’s own. Th ere is something paradoxical and, as Rousseau so often reminds 
us, potentially troubling about this kind of giving, for while it suggests 
something fi nal and ultimate—that there is nothing beyond it that can be 
given—so, too, does it point beyond itself and toward something still more 
fundamental. Th e human good instantiated in the sexual passion is one at 
which sex only hints but at which only sex can hint, for the enchanting aspi-
rations within and beyond moral love have—as we shall see below—a largely 
physical basis and must fi nd fi nal expression through the articulacy of 
action.
Because “moral love” utilizes aesthetic and ethical criteria in order to fi x its 
aff ection on a particular object, so, too, does it indicate a strong connection—
however attenuated in specifi c cases—between sexual and moral aspiration. 
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Indeed, Rousseau believes true love “will always be honored among men” 
because embedded in it are “estimable qualities without which one would not 
be in a condition to feel it” (E 215). Not even the most despicable Parisian dandy 
can entirely decouple the desire to be esteemed from the desire to be estimable. 
And though Rousseau does nothing to hide the dangers involved in the specifi -
cally sexual form of recognition- seeking—love “does not exclude odious quali-
ties” and “even produces them”—he also argues such dangers are coextensive 
with the social enterprise and that they must be run in order for human beings 
to fulfi ll their moral potential (215). “How many great things,” he exclaims in a 
discussion of moralized sexuality, “could be done by means of this motive if one 
knew how to set it in motion!” (390). So long as love facilitates consciousness of 
the “estimable qualities” qualities of body and soul—so long as there is a plau-
sible connection between what is loved and what is lovable—sexual desire off ers 
new and delicious inducements to virtue and thus can serve as a powerful cata-
lyst of moral perfection.
| Grounding the Divine Heights: Sexuality and Sociability
In characterizing the fi rst stirrings of sociability as both obscure and intense, 
Rousseau not only deviates from Hobbes’s and Locke’s moral psychology but 
also does much to recall Platonic eros (Cooper 2008). Indeed, the desire for 
moral perfection described above is a particular expression of a more general 
longing for perfection of a more fundamental, albeit more enigmatic, kind. 
For Rousseau as for Plato, the good that human beings seek through their 
relations is all- encompassing; furthermore, as Rousseau tells his Sophie, 
encounters with this good in its fullness carry us beyond our being and into 
the empyrean. Far, however, from following Plato in understanding human 
relations as the product of erotic desire, Rousseau instead views erotic desire 
as the product of human relations. And because he departs from Plato in 
denying the naturalness of eros he must therefore explain how it emerges 
from sources that are authentically natural. What, then, lurks underneath 
the indeterminate longings of the newly social adolescent?
A careful reading of the initial pages of Book IV of Emile shows how 
nascent sexuality plays an especially important role in grounding our fi rst 
social impulses and lends them an intensity that is characteristic of eros. 
Th ese pages describe the birth of the social passions, and Rousseau begins 
his analysis of this question with a dramatic pronouncement about the 
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importance of love and sex. “How rapid is our journey on this earth! Th e 
fi rst quarter of life has been lived before one knows the use of it. Th e last 
quarter is lived when one has ceased to enjoy it.” He quickly clarifi es what 
the interval between these two “useless extremities” is actually “good” for: 
“We are, so to speak, born twice: once to exist and once to live; once for our 
species and once for our sex” (211). Th e awakening of sexual desire is so cru-
cial for Rousseau that it constitutes nothing less than a “second birth” in 
which man is “truly born to life . . . and nothing human is foreign to him” 
(212). Sexuality is essential to the ongoing process of self- understanding, for 
only through it can one access distinctively human pleasures, pains, and 
obligations. In short, sexuality makes us human.
Rousseau’s decision to frame his treatment of the birth of social senti-
ment in terms of sexual development indicates that the two processes are 
closely related. Indeed, Rousseau comes to the point of arguing that the 
birth of amour- propre and all its peculiar longings is really the birth of 
inchoate sexual desire. “As soon,” he explains, “as a man has need of a com-
panion, he is no longer an isolated being. . . . All his relations with his spe-
cies, all the aff ections of his soul are born with this one. His fi rst passion 
soon makes the others ferment” (E 214). Th e following paragraph, which 
elaborates specifi cally and at length on the nature of romantic love, shows 
clearly that the “companion” now sought after is a lover rather than a friend: 
“Th e inclination of nature is indeterminate. One sex is attracted to the other; 
that is the movement of nature.” Sexuality is crucial to social development 
not only because it is a powerful source of moral motivation but also because 
it sharpens the powers of moral and aesthetic discrimination we use in all the 
domains of social life. Love both presupposes and improves our ability to 
locate in others certain “estimable qualities”—considerations of merit and 
beauty—that would otherwise go unperceived or misperceived. Diff used, 
undirected sexual desire helps ground moral and social impulse; its opera-
tions and infl uence are not restricted to sexual life specifi cally but are rather 
felt in all the dimensions of moral life.
We, of course, know that the adolescent Emile does not know any of this 
and is in a state of constant perplexity both about what he is for others and 
what they are for him. On this point, we should recall how essential it is that 
he experience his fi rst social longings in all their indeterminacy, for it is this 
indeterminacy that allows him to cognize his relations as intrinsic rather than 
instrumental goods. But there are still other reasons to delay the onset of spe-
cifi cally sexual desire, whose premature emergence is identifi ed by Rousseau as 
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the danger to be avoided in early adolescence. To this end, he undertakes an 
extended excursus on conventional sex education in order to show that it actu-
ally worsens the ill it was designed to resolve. It does so fi rst by carelessly 
exciting the child’s curiosity and second by refusing to satisfy it. Off ended by 
the refusals of adults and enticed by their knowing grins, children search in 
secret for the knowledge their elders will not give them: “Th e lessons of decency 
given to [children], the veil of mystery that is supposed to be drawn over their 
eyes, are only so many spurs to their curiosity” (E 215). Eff orts to conceal the 
great mystery of generation only sharpen the sight of prying eyes.
Th e eff ects of precocious sexuality are wide- ranging and destructive. For 
instance, premature gratifi cation whitewashes other important social feel-
ings, overwhelming with its wild force the still- developing system of social 
impulses and short- circuiting basic social sentiments like pity. Th is prevents 
us from understanding or entertaining—and thus from respecting—the 
interests of anyone but the love object. On this score Rousseau reports that 
young people who are “given over to women” too early are always “inhuman 
and cruel.” Th e “heat of their temperaments made them impatient, vindic-
tive, and wild. Th eir imaginations, fi lled with a single object, rejected all the 
rest. Th ey knew neither pity nor mercy” (E 220). Th e sexual drive is so pow-
erful that, if expressed too early, it crowds out other social sentiments that 
are also expressive of human nature and that are needed to enjoy a full and 
rich social life. Lovers who see and feel nothing but each other at too early 
an age never develop a full complement of social feelings and are unable to 
identify sympathetically with others. Th ey are, in fact, often disposed to 
view the outside world and its impositions as so many threats to their bond 
and to either lash out against or attempt a complete retreat from “society.” 
Even if well motivated, the strategy of escape would appear to be futile, for 
lovers do not and cannot exist in a social or political vacuum. Th ey are, to the 
contrary, situated in a complex of social institutions with which they must 
come to terms in order to sustain their union. Th us it would seem that, to the 
degree that lovers wish to maintain their relation, they must develop the sys-
tem of social impulses necessary for their healthy social incorporation.
Rousseau goes still further, arguing not only that precipitate sexuality 
short- circuits other important social feelings but also that it ultimately com-
promises the experience of love itself. Premature sexual activity is a prime 
cause of the moral and existential truncation of modern man. Th e sexual 
passion is simply too intense, too complex, and too overwhelming for young 
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people, who remain “small, weak, and ill- formed” if they become sexually 
active at too young an age. It is particularly pernicious in cities, where young 
people “age instead of growing, as the vine that has been made to bear fruit 
in the spring languishes and dies before autumn” (E 216). Early initiation 
into the mysteries of sex exhausts man’s vitality before it can truly express 
itself, stripping sex of its enchantment and robbing us of one of the greatest 
sources of happiness available to us. Th is loss is all the more serious when 
we consider that the passion of love—as we shall see in chapters 4 and 
5—is highly unstable and must be supplemented by gentler social feelings 
(e.g., “pity and mercy”) if the romantic association is to endure at all. If these 
feelings never fully develop, then resentment and even disgust are likely to 
follow upon the (inevitable) death of passion and undermine the union. It 
is in the face of such grave dangers that Jean- Jacques leaves Emile to dwell 
in aporetic confusion about the source of his desire. It is the fi rst of many 
assists he will give to nature in the course of his pupil’s moral and social 
development.
| Distinguishing Love and Friendship: Th e Many Faces of 
Amour- Propre
Because amour- propre’s need for social recognition expresses itself with par-
ticular intensity in the sexual situation, Rousseau seeks to delay for as long 
as possible the arousal of specifi cally sexual impulses. Indeed, one of the 
more puzzling aspects of Rousseau’s treatment of the dawning of social sen-
timent is that he insists on the genetic priority of the sexual passion only to 
delay its expression until the last possible moment. Far from claiming that 
the fi rst concrete manifestation of the social- sexual impulse should itself be 
sexual, he instead encourages the tutor to suppress his pupil’s consciousness 
of sexual identity and to redirect his newfound need for companionship 
toward friendship rather than love: the “fi rst sentiment of which a carefully 
raised young man is capable is not love; it is friendship. Th e fi rst act of his 
nascent imagination is to teach him he has fellows; and the species aff ects 
him before the female sex” (E 220). A sentiment favorable to the species, and 
to all sentient creatures, must emerge before love even though such a senti-
ment is itself grounded at least in part in protean sexuality. Is this another of 
Rousseau’s contradictions?
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I submit that it is not, and for two reasons. First, Rousseau’s claim that 
adolescents are capable of friendship before they are capable of love is not 
incompatible with his genetic claim that the desire for “friendship” emerges 
in part from inchoate sexuality. Because the set of responses and sentiments 
evoked by friendship are more tractable than the highly complex emotions 
associated with romantic love, Rousseau gives pedagogic priority to the for-
mer even though the latter has genetic priority. One must crawl before walk-
ing. Th ough it would appear that, in acting thus, Jean- Jacques works against 
rather than with the natural order, we shall see below that such appearances 
are somewhat deceiving. Second, it is clear that friendship and love are on 
Rousseau’s accounting quite distinct associational phenomena that create dif-
ferent emotional needs and satisfy diff erent kinds of human desire. Th ough 
want of both these forms of association share a common source, they become 
increasingly distinct as they develop and mature. Th e emergence of discrete 
social passions is more important than it may seem, for it helps explain a 
highly signifi cant fact of social life, namely, that amour- propre’s demands are 
not uniform but rather vary according to associational context.
In privileging friendship over love it seems that Jean- Jacques is now 
working against rather than with natural developmental processes, for it 
appears that the indeterminate sexuality underwriting many of adolescent 
Emile’s social impulses is now being actively suppressed by the tutor. How-
ever, by allowing his pupil to remain in aporetic confusion about the sources 
of his desires, Jean- Jacques claims that, far from violating nature, he is in fact 
its midwife and agent. On this score, Rousseau notes that nature itself only 
partially determines the specifi c moment for sexual awakening and thus 
allows for the infl uence of mores and education. A degree of indeterminacy 
is built into the natural structure of the sexual passion: the moment of its 
arousal and the character of its development are contingent on social and 
climatological factors which are being carefully controlled in Emile’s educa-
tion. Given that nature has left some room for environmental infl uence, 
Jean- Jacques claims that in exercising some discretion on his pupil’s behalf 
he is actually nature’s agent rather than its opponent: redirecting an inchoate 
sexual drive toward nonsexual objects “is not an artful untruth” but rather 
the best way to allow “nature’s ignorance” to enlighten itself (E 219). We are 
reminded that “the time” of sexual maturity “is coming” but are told that to 
inform one’s pupil too early is far worse than to inform him too late (if such 
is possible): “Nature’s instruction is late and slow; men’s is almost always 
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premature. In the former case the senses awake the imagination; in the latter 
the imagination wakes the senses” (219, 215). Given space and time, our 
highly indeterminate want of social companionship unpacks itself and 
becomes discrete desires for specifi c kinds of companionship. Th e adolescent, 
then, is confused because nature wants it that way, not because his tutor is 
misleading him. In his redirection of diff used sexual energy Jean- Jacques is 
perhaps not in perfect accord with nature, but for Rousseau’s argument to 
work it is enough that he not be in disaccord with it.
If the ordered development of the social passions leads us to friendship 
before romantic love, then it also requires us to distinguish between friend-
ship and love. In so doing, it forces us to recognize that associational life is 
varied and complex. Th ough our initial social longing is itself highly indeter-
minate, there are immanent within it several discrete desires for diff erent 
kinds of association that have their own particular requirements and are 
directed toward the fulfi llment of distinct psychological needs. Human 
beings identify with one another in all manner of ways—as lovers and 
beloveds, parents and children, friends and siblings, superiors and subordi-
nates, citizens and subjects, competitors and fellows—and the kinds of rec-
ognition and fulfi llment we seek from these various forms of identifi cation 
are diff erent and distinguishable. What the confused adolescent lacks—and 
what he gains through the process of social development—is a sense of 
exactly how others fi gure into his life and of what kinds of expectations are 
appropriate to particular interpersonal contexts. Much of what social devel-
opment is, then, is the gradual disaggregation of the undiff erentiated desire 
for recognition into several discrete desires for distinct kinds of love and 
recognition. At the very heart of socialization is the realization that diff erent 
kinds of relationships off er diff erent kinds of satisfaction. Th e development 
of sociability, on Rousseau’s account, is then quite literally the transforma-
tion of the original social passion—the as yet undiff erentiated want of com-
panionship—into discrete, identifi able, and educable social passions. Th ough 
this fi rst and highly indeterminate social passion has a largely sexual basis it 
nonetheless contains within it a whole host of discrete social desires that can 
be meaningfully distinguished from the specifi cally sexual desire.
Th e capacity to distinguish between love and friendship has important 
implications for how we think about amour- propre. Because social attach-
ment is not a monolithic or undiff erentiated psychic phenomenon—because 
there are distinguishable and discrete forms of connectedness with diff erent 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   57 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations58
psychic bases—neither is the desire for social distinction something that 
assumes the same form or behaves in the same way. Diff erent kinds of rela-
tionships serve diff erent purposes and speak to diff erent needs in the psychic 
economies of healthy human beings. Th us the degree and kind of recogni-
tion that we seek is in many ways contingent on the specifi c associational 
context in which it is embedded. Th is fi nding, it must be admitted, is hardly 
counterintuitive. In arguing as he does, Rousseau is in accord—for him, 
perhaps, a rare accord—with what might be called common sense, for no 
special genius is needed to see that human beings fi nd themselves in diff er-
ent sorts of relationships, that such relationships have diff erent psychological 
sources and eff ects, and that these relationships help to structure the behav-
iors and desires of those who are embedded in them.
Curiously, the very feature of amour- propre that is evident to virtually 
anyone who has refl ected even momentarily on his own associational life 
remains undertheorized in Rousseau scholarship. Most scholarly treatments 
characterize the emergence and development of amour- propre as a unidi-
mensional transformation from a self- love that has its origin in natural needs 
into one that has its origin in arbitrary opinion. In seeking to explain this 
transformation, the focus has been on the fact of social observation—the 
realization that others, whoever they may be, are watching us. Judith Shklar, 
N. J. H. Dent, and Frederick Neuhouser have all provided very sophisticated 
and helpful statements of this broad problematic and have gone on to adduce 
many of the psychological possibilities and pathologies that attend the ever- 
increasing awareness of others and an ever- increasing desire to gain their 
esteem. What is important in such cases is to know that we are being 
observed, not who is doing the observing. As a general characterization of 
amour- propre this is correct and even useful as a way of fi xing ideas about the 
kinds of psychic dislocations that can result from the phenomenon of social 
observation. But to focus simply on the fact of observation in the abstract is 
to assume that the eff ects of amour- propre are felt uniformly across the entire 
fi eld of social interaction. It is to assume that we would like to know whether 
we are being observed but are uninterested in knowing who, exactly, is doing 
the observing.
It will be a guiding concern in the following chapters to show that this 
assumption conceals meaningful variation in the way amour- propre expresses 
itself, that it in fact matters a great deal who exactly is watching us. Th e way 
in which we identify the observer—whether we are under the gaze of a lover 
(or prospective lover), a friend, a parent, a teacher (or student), a fellow citizen, 
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a stranger, or a child—is of the fi rst importance for what we do and how we 
go about doing it. Not all social anxieties are created equal. Because the dif-
ferentiation of the social passions is at one with their development, it becomes 
necessary to look more closely at the various forms of social recognition that 
recur in Rousseau’s oeuvre, and to look specifi cally at their respective psycho-
logical consequences. In so doing, we shall see that the various forms of con-
nectedness have diff erent psychological statuses, are felt more or less intensely, 
and in consequence are more or less useful in their contribution to the pres-
ervation of human wholeness.
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“Th ere is, besides, another principle which Hobbes did not 
notice, and which—having been given to man in order to 
soften his vanity or the desire for self- preservation before the 
birth of vanity [amour- propre]—tempers the ardor he has for 
his own well- being by an innate repugnance to see his fellow- 
man suff er” (DI 130). In his fi rst sustained criticism of 
Hobbes, Rousseau charges the great systematist with a serious 
error of omission. In his eff ort to reduce all human behavior 
to the mechanical promptings of rational self- interest, Hobbes 
had failed to notice a psychological principle that encourages 
human beings not to harm one another. Th e failure to account 
for this mysterious tendency had led Hobbes and his acolytes 
to an unduly restrictive understanding of human nature and 
of the social situation; by naming it Rousseau believes he can 
not only improve on Hobbes’s theory but also reveal the true 
origin of “all the rules of natural right” (96). Rousseau speaks, 
of course, of pity, a sentiment that produces a natural aversion 
to the spectacle of suff ering and that is “appropriate to beings 
as weak and subject to as many ills as we are” (130). On Rous-
seau’s accounting it is neither Hobbes’s hedonistic calculus 
nor Aristotle’s principle of natural sociability, but rather a 
native sensitivity to the distress of other living beings, that lies 
at the basis of moral and social life. Indeed, he claims that 
from pity “alone fl ow all the social virtues” and that “benevo-
Pity and Human Weakness3
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lence and even friendship” are best understood as “the products of a con-
stant pity fi xed on a particular object” (131–32; emphasis added). Th us pity, 
understood aright, is not only a restraint on the uglier expressions of 
unadulterated self- love; it is also the foundation of sympathetic social iden-
tifi cation, a more or less comprehensive list of social virtues (“generosity, 
“clemency, [and] humanity” are the ones given by Rousseau), and a particu-
lar—and particularly important—form of association in which such virtues 
fi nd expression.
Th ough Rousseau was hardly the only moral philosopher of the eigh-
teenth century to insist on the importance of sympathy, his account of this 
central passion is distinctive for both its ambitiousness as well as its ambigu-
ity. In the Second Discourse he invokes pity as a kind of moral- psychological 
panacea, arguing that it is operative in the earliest stages of human develop-
ment and that it serves a series of important socializing functions. However, 
his actual argument on these points is at best suggestive and often borders on 
complete collapse. Th e sentiment itself appears more or less out of nowhere—
it emerges not as the product of reasoned argument or plausible empirical 
observation but rather from the black box of Rousseau’s private meditations 
on “the fi rst and simplest principles of the human soul”—and the account of 
its importance to human life falls far short of substantiating the remarkably 
strong claim that it alone is the source of all the social virtues (DI 95). What 
is more, the premise that pity is especially important to and appropriate for 
beings “subject to as many ills” as humans are appears to be in tension with 
what is perhaps the central argument of the entire work—that man is natu-
rally strong and independent and that the majority of his “ills” are his own 
creations. If the theoretical usefulness of pity is grounded in the postulate of 
man’s essential frailty, then Rousseau’s famously idyllic characterization of 
life in the state of nature would appear to be misleadingly simple. One is 
hard- pressed to see how the operations of pity could be at all useful for a 
being as indolent and cognitively simple as Rousseau’s natural man (e.g., DI 
105). Even by the end of the Discourse on Inequality it is not entirely clear how 
the unique situation of the human being—the environment in which he is 
embedded and the specifi c complex of capacities that express and confi ne his 
nature—creates the especial need for a sentiment like pity. It is then Rous-
seau’s own characterization of the natural human condition that seems to 
delimit the utility of pity.
Rousseau’s paradoxical characterization of the human condition as being 
one of both weakness and strength has important consequences for how we 
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understand human relations. We saw in the previous chapter that Rousseau 
was concerned about the self- serving sociability and lack of moral energy he 
believed to be characteristic of his age; we also saw that one of his principal 
aims as an author was to reinvigorate his readers’ sense of moral and social 
possibility. Th is aim is especially evident in the Discourse on Inequality, 
which he imagined being performed in front of the entire “human race” 
rather than perused by pedants in the cold isolation of the ivory tower (DI 
103). Yet remaining mindful of both the moral transformation Rousseau 
sought to eff ect in his readers as well as the performative or public character 
of the Discourse makes the invocation of pity doubly paradoxical, for a con-
tinued emphasis on the weakness and vulnerability of human nature could 
have the perverse practical eff ect of creating in his audience a deadly moral 
fatalism rather than a more expansive sense of possibility. Rousseau himself 
indicates an awareness of this problem in the Preface to Narcisse, observing 
that “so many refl ections on the weakness of our nature often serve only to 
turn us away from generous undertakings” and that incessant harping on 
“the miseries of humanity” ultimately results in moral passivity (25). Rous-
seau’s own utterances thus beg an important motivational question: how can 
we be expected to energetically pursue our own perfectionistic impulses 
when the very author encouraging us to do so is also constantly reminding 
us of our own basic and ineliminable weakness?
Th is question has recently been put rather forcefully to Rousseau by 
Cliff ord Orwin (1997a, 1997b) and Richard Boyd (2004), who both worry 
that Rousseau’s insistence on the importance of pity diminishes human 
possibility in politically destructive ways. Boyd (2004, 525, 529) is espe-
cially concerned about pity’s tendency to induce moral passivity, arguing 
that it turns us into “voyeurs” who not only fi nd ourselves unable to 
actively assist the needy but also take positive delight in their suff ering. 
Orwin (1997a, 10–11) blames pity for lowering moral horizons and inaugu-
rating a politics of class warfare which valorizes the blameless poor at the 
expense of the hard- hearted rich. Both accounts charge that pity cannot 
generate the moral energy necessary to inspire citizens to take action 
against injustice.
Such objections are not without face plausibility, but a more compre-
hensive look at Rousseau’s understanding of the human condition, and of 
pity’s place within it, helps to show that Rousseau never intended for pity to 
perform the kinds of functions that Boyd and Orwin assign to it. Indeed, 
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since—as we have already seen—Rousseau turns to moralized amour- 
propre, grounded in protean sexuality, in order to generate the moral energy 
and ambition that both critics fi nd absent in pity, he has already addressed 
the motivational problems that they charge him with ignoring. In order to 
understand the role of pity in moral life, then, it is important to see how it 
works in conjunction with other social and ethical impulses. Th at is the task 
of this chapter. In particular, I am interested in how the “low” and more 
egalitarian features of pity supplement and, in certain instances, even serve 
to correct the “high” ambitions created by moralized amour- propre.
Because Rousseau is especially concerned to diagnose and depict the 
kinds of suff ering that occur when our highest and best desires are frus-
trated, much of pity’s usefulness as a moral sentiment is not in contradiction 
with, but rather depends decisively on, the existence and activity of our most 
ambitious moral and social aspirations. It is, after all, most especially in the 
wake of failure that we are in need of consolation and care. Commiseration 
takes some of the sting out of failing to live up to the expectations we have 
for ourselves and others, and it is in the act of lamenting our shared imper-
fections that the hope of our “frail happiness” arises (E 221). Far, then, from 
conceiving of pity and the perfectionistic drives of moralized amour- propre 
as polar opposites or uncombinable forces, Rousseau views them as dialecti-
cally interdependent and interlocking impulses which address themselves to 
diff erent, though related, psychological and social needs. Pity is therefore 
especially appropriate for human beings not simply because we are by nature 
weak and frail, but also because the logic of human development requires 
that we learn to boldly—if sometimes unsuccessfully—aspire to large and 
great things. To be human is for Rousseau a diffi  cult and frustrating thing; 
our grandest ambitions point to a horizon in constant retreat. Th e disap-
pointments that attach to this dynamic cannot be overcome by means of 
historical progress or erotic transcendence; they are, rather, constituent fea-
tures of our social and moral lives that we must learn to manage. It is against 
this backdrop that Rousseau’s insistence on pity’s especial importance must 
be understood.
Provided that Rousseau can appeal to the moral force of pity without 
undermining his commitment to elevating man’s moral and social aspira-
tions, to what functions can he assign it in the context of his broader theory 
of human relations? I shall develop two major arguments on this score. First, 
I shall be at pains throughout to emphasize the negative character of pity. In 
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both the state of nature and the state of society, one of pity’s primary func-
tions is to soften the harsher expressions of self- love. Th us, in rounding out 
Rousseau’s account of moral and social motivation, pity helps to ameliorate 
some of the dangers—most notably false pride and fanaticism—to which 
moralized amour- propre exposes us. We already know Rousseau believes it 
necessary to develop rather than stifl e our perfectionistic moral drives because 
they are the source of “the most sublime virtues,” but below we shall see he is 
also aware that such drives require softening because they, left to their own 
devices, cause socially destabilizing forms of intolerance and even sanguinary 
violence. Pity and the set of virtues that grow out of it remind us that we 
share the imperfection of the affl  icted (or, in many cases, the guilty) party; 
in so doing, it serves to moderate the harshness that often attaches to our 
moral assessments.
Second, pity is a positive catalyst of social togetherness, but it catalyzes 
associations of a necessarily attenuated kind. Th e form of identifi cation 
embodied by pity has peculiar dynamics that simultaneously enable and 
limit human community: one who pities another apprehends that he is both 
like and unlike the suff ering other—alike insofar as he realizes that he, too, 
is in principle subject to whatever misfortune the aggrieved party suff ers, 
but diff erent insofar as he also realizes that he does not suff er in fact. Th e 
dual presence of likeness and diff erence, of equality and superiority, charac-
terize the psychic experience of pity and put limits on the forms of associa-
tion that are actuated by it. We are forced by the apprehension of diff erence 
that is implicit in pity to recognize the discrete, individuated existence of 
the other being—we must recognize the other’s otherness. Th is kind of 
recognition, though it can provide a genuine source of comfort and com-
munity, nonetheless cannot satisfy our need for unity with and through one 
another.
In arguing thus I understand pity as playing a coequal role with the 
sexual passion in structuring man’s moral and associational life, and I seek 
to show how it both supplements the moral and social motivations that grow 
out of sublimated sexual desire as well as how it ameliorates some of the 
dangers to which those motivations give rise. If the sexualized morality of 
perfection speaks to the aspiring, bold, and “high” expressions of our nature, 
then pity keeps us connected to the vulnerable, imperfect, and “low” sides of 
ourselves. Th e extent to which we can integrate the dynamic tensions created 
by these two distinct but interdependent impulses is an important determi-
nant of our ultimate happiness. In the chapters following this one, we shall 
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see how and why we fail at this task as well as the dislocations that result 
from those failures.
| Th e State of Nature: A State of Weakness?
Th ough Rousseau insists on pity’s especial utility for the human species, a 
fi rst glance at his picture of man in the state of nature hardly bears that 
insistence out. If anyone is to be pitied it is the troubled and restless “civil” 
man, whose self- defeating way of life is contrasted with natural man’s inde-
pendent and peaceable existence. Indeed, the autarchic contentment of natu-
ral man’s life is consistently contrasted with the hyperactive mischievousness 
of the Second Discourse’s reprehensible villain. Rousseau thematizes the styl-
ized contrast between “natural man” and “civil man” to the advantage of the 
former and, in so doing, forces the reader to view himself in a new and less 
fl attering light. Natural man is strong and free while civil man is weak and 
dependent; natural man is content with little while civil man is unhappy 
with much; natural man assists those he pities while civil man retreats to 
safety; natural man does not care what others think while civil man lives 
only in the eyes of others; natural man “hardly has need of remedies” while 
civil man needs the constant attention of doctors; natural man is at harmony 
with himself and his environment while civil man is at war with both; natu-
ral man naps peacefully under the same tree that provided his meal and sips 
water from a babbling brook while civil man rushes futilely toward a retreat-
ing horizon (DI 110, 105).
Such comparisons are a rhetorically eff ective way to expose the absurdity 
of the social situation and to inspire in readers a moralized indignance at their 
own condition, but they problematize Rousseau’s insistence on the especial 
importance of pity. To the degree that human beings are naturally strong and 
independent in the way Rousseau’s portraits of life in the state of nature sug-
gest, it becomes very easy to wonder about the utility that a sentiment like 
pity could have for him: pity, as Rousseau himself notes, is appropriate for 
“weak” beings that are subject to “many ills,” not for free and capable indi-
viduals who successfully satisfy their own needs (DI 130). In order to recon-
cile this tension it is necessary to consult both the Second Discourse’s depiction 
of the state of nature and its account of pity, for they reveal that Rousseau 
understates the diffi  culties of life in the former and overstates the activity of 
the latter. Th ese exaggerations are part of an anti- Hobbesian rhetorical strategy 
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intended to inspire in less attentive readers a moralized indignance at their 
own condition. More “attentive readers”—those with “the courage to begin 
again”—will not fail to discover that the forms of weakness and vulnerability 
that beset natural man, though diff erent than those that are experienced in civil 
society, are nonetheless no less defi nitive of his basic condition (98). So, too, 
will they discover a conception of pity that, far from inspiring active benevo-
lence, instead serves to restrain the uglier manifestations of pure self- love.
Close attention to the argument of the Discourse on Inequality shows 
that vulnerability and weakness are conditions of life in the state of nature 
as well as in civil society. Men are constantly subjected to the harsh and 
unrelenting necessities imposed by “infancy, old age, and illnesses of all 
kinds” (DI 108). Th ese conditions are “sad signs” of his basic weakness: put-
ting aside the problems posed by the “inclemencies of the weather and the 
rigor of the seasons” with which all animals must deal, Rousseau notes that 
humans have unusually long periods of gestation and infancy, thus leaving 
mothers and children more vulnerable to prey than other animal species 
(106, 108, 112). Th ough he attempts to lighten the weight of this specifi cally 
human burden by adding that “if infancy is longer among us, then so is life 
[and] everything remains approximately equal in this respect,” this qualifi -
cation is transparently and even suspiciously unconvincing: because the 
likelihood of dying during infancy is a function of the absolute rather than 
the relative length of the period of dependence on the mother, and because 
the period of such dependence is longer for humans than for other animals, 
it follows that human infants are more likely to perish than are their animal 
counterparts (109). We are beset by still more limitations. For instance, our 
bipedalism, touted by Rousseau to be one of our chief advantages over other 
species, proves far less benefi cial than initial appearances suggest. Indeed, 
the primary benefi t of having two legs is that we can carry our children as 
we fl ee from quadrupedal predators who—precisely because they are quad-
rupeds—run more swiftly than we do. In addition, we do not have fur and 
thus are more susceptible to the ill eff ects of cold weather (112).
Th e question of disease deserves special attention in this context, for 
Rousseau’s claim that illness “belongs principally to man living in civil soci-
ety” must be understood as part of his broader rhetorical strategy to high-
light the way in which civil man creates many of his own problems. He 
begins his discussion of sickness by posing a seemingly rhetorical question 
whose answer is in fact anything but obvious: “I shall ask whether there is any 
solid observation from which one might conclude that in Countries where 
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this art [of medicine] is most neglected, the average life of man is shorter 
than in those where it is cultivated with the greatest care” (DI 109). Note that 
Rousseau proposes a testable hypothesis to settle the matter; what is needed 
is a scientifi c investigation into the utility of a particular branch of applied 
science. He thus appeals to the authority of science in the very act of inter-
rogating its usefulness. Note also that the hypothesis he advances is a null: 
he expects medicine to have no eff ect on life expectancy, not a negative eff ect 
as his rhetoric implies. Rousseau’s critique of medicine is thus more qualifi ed 
than it fi rst appears.
But what evidence does Rousseau provide in support of this (qualifi ed) 
claim? Th e “observations” made on this score are off ered as provisional rather 
than defi nitive explanations, and they are known by Rousseau himself to be 
far from solid. For instance, while suggesting that natural man is generally 
healthy, Rousseau is in fact very careful not to deny that sickness exists in the 
state of nature or that the illnesses suff ered there are often fatal. He claims 
instead that natural man has fewer sources of illness than does civilized 
man—far diff erent from claiming that he is sick less frequently—and that he 
“hardly has need of remedies” (DI 110; emphasis added). Th ese hedges suggest 
Rousseau’s own awareness that life in his state of nature, far from being easy, 
is in fact full of hardship.
Indeed, the more Rousseau appears to deny such hardships the more 
evident he makes them. Seeking some empirical basis for his claims regarding 
natural man’s health, Rousseau appeals to the experience of wild animals: he 
says the testimonies of hunters show that it is common to fi nd animals that 
“have received extensive but very well- healed wounds,” but that it is extremely 
rare to discover sick ones. Th e implied conclusion is that humans, like ani-
mals, may be injured in nature but rarely, if ever, fall ill. Yet the empirical 
evidence on which this reductio ad animalia is based is once again curi-
ously—indeed, almost perfectly—shoddy. Th e reports Rousseau cites, even if 
they are true, certainly do not show that illnesses are not prevalent in the state 
of nature, for hunters might fail to fi nd sick animals not because there are 
none to fi nd but rather because sick animals go into hiding in order to (among 
other reasons) protect themselves from predators. Th e testimonies of “hunt-
ers” would thus appear to be especially untrustworthy on this question. One 
might also explain the apparent absence of sick animals by hypothesizing that 
ill animals are less likely to be seen because they, without the aid of modern 
medicine, are simply quicker to die. Both explanations are compatible with 
the facts Rousseau reports and, far from suggesting the general health and 
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robustness of natural fauna, instead point up their essential vulnerability and 
susceptibility to nature’s many dangers. Th us the conclusion that a “sick sav-
age” has “nothing to fear except for his illness” is manifestly unwarranted, for 
he is at the mercy of indiff erent natural forces and has “hunters” of his own 
from which he must protect himself (DI 111).
Just as Rousseau understates the diffi  culties of the state of nature in 
order to illustrate its advantages, so he overstates the activity of pity in order 
to show its naturalness. We can begin to see his exaggerations on this head 
by noting that the argument for natural goodness does not require expres-
sions of active benevolence. In contrast to the Golden Rule, which imposes 
positive duties by obligating us to “do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you,” Rousseau’s careful formulation of the principle of natural good-
ness—“do what is good for you with the least possible harm to others”—makes 
clear that pity modifi es behavior only by restraining the way in which we 
pursue our good. Th e only “duties” goodness imposes are those of forbear-
ance, and even these do not bind absolutely: pity bids us not to harm others 
unless we deem it necessary to do so. Th us a healthy savage refrains from 
“robbing a weak child or an infi rm old man” only where he believes he can 
fi nd his subsistence elsewhere (DI 133). Rousseau also emphasizes pity’s nega-
tive character when he introduces the concept in the context of a critique of 
Hobbes, whom he chastises for “failing to notice” sentiments that—“under 
certain circumstances”—“restrain the ferocity” and “temper the ardor” of 
natural self- love (130). Having failed to notice that “salutary restraint” which 
prevents the expression of self- love’s uglier and more callous manifestations, 
Hobbes had falsely concluded that men, left to their own devices, would 
savage one another over the most insignifi cant aff airs (133; emphasis added). 
Th e role of pity in the state of nature, then, is to minimize the damage men 
would otherwise do to one another.
Th ough the argument for natural goodness requires only an economy of 
violence, Rousseau’s rhetoric of pity provides for a seemingly limitless 
benevolence. He takes it to be “very certain that pity is a natural sentiment” 
that carries us “without refl ection to the aid of those whom we see suff er,” 
and he claims it is evident that savage man “is always seen heedlessly yielding 
to the fi rst sentiment of humanity.” Th ough pity would now seem to be 
inspiring men in the state of nature to actively assist one another, the evi-
dence adduced on this score is, as with the discussion of medicine, far short 
of convincing. Th ough claiming that savage man is “always seen” following 
the impulses of pity with no thought of his own good, the only example of 
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anything like positive benevolence that Rousseau provides occurs outside 
the state of nature. He tells us that in “riots or street fi ghts . . . the prudent 
man moves away; it is the rabble, the marketwoman, who separate the com-
batants and prevent honest people from murdering each other” (DI 132). At 
best, this illustration is evidence of the mediating eff ect of calculative rea-
son—for the crude marketgoer who risks life and limb is contrasted with 
“the philosopher” who is able to ignore the sounds of murder by “argu[ing] 
with himself a bit”—but it pretty clearly cannot prove that natural pity 
moves men to actively assist one another.
I emphasize the defectiveness of Rousseau’s characterizations of the state 
of nature and the sentiment of pity not because he was unaware of them but 
precisely because he was. Both arguments are predicated on a “natural 
man”/“civil man” polarity, a hyper- stylized rhetorical construct intended to 
make readers see with new eyes the moral and social world that they them-
selves have built. Th e function of these rather bad arguments in the text, 
which we must remember is being performed in front of the entire human 
race, is almost entirely rhetorical: they exaggerate certain contrasts between 
natural and civil life in order to make those contrasts evident to the less 
discriminating members of Rousseau’s audience, who may lack the philo-
sophic acumen of Plato or Xenocrates but who nonetheless require salutary 
moral instruction and an account of their nature that is compatible with the 
truth. With this in mind it should be clear that Rousseau’s illustrations are 
detachable from the actual theory of natural goodness—which stands or 
falls independently of provisional empirical hypotheses. Indeed, insofar as 
the theory of natural goodness requires the activity of pity so, too, does it 
demand an awareness of human vulnerability that, while not inconsistent 
with the arguments of the Discourse on Inequality, is nonetheless not fully 
accounted for within it. For this account we must turn to Emile.
| Pitying the Fool: Sympathy, Society, and the Human Condition
Unlike the Discourse on Inequality, which invokes the importance of pity 
while concealing the conditions of life that would make it useful, Emile puts 
the human struggle front and center. Again, rhetorical considerations help 
explain this shift in emphasis: given that the eponymous hero of the work—
unlike the asocial protagonist of the Second Discourse—is to become fully 
social and hence must assume all the diffi  culties socialization entails, Rous-
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seau’s choice to emphasize the challenges of being fully human is hardly 
surprising. For we see that even when all the problems human beings have 
created for themselves are assumed away, as they are in the pure state of 
nature or in Emile’s education, Rousseau both characterizes the human 
condition as one of weakness and travail and holds that pity is an especially 
appropriate socializing sentiment for beings constituted as we are: “Men are 
not naturally kings, or lords, or courtiers, or rich men. All are born naked 
and poor; all are subject to the miseries of life, to sorrows, ills, needs, and 
pains of every kind. Finally, all are condemned to death. Th is is what truly 
belongs to man. Th is is what no mortal is exempt from. Begin, therefore, by 
studying in human nature what is most inseparable from it, what best char-
acterizes humanity” (E 222). Here, as in the Discourse on Inequality, the 
contrast between natural man and civil man grabs the reader. Th e inequali-
ties we experience and accept as natural—that some are kings and others are 
subjects—are in fact not natural at all. Yet the substance of the contrast 
might surprise the reader of the Discourse, for what is genuinely natural—
what truly defi nes us as a species—is no longer our independence but rather 
our shared fragility and vulnerability to injury. It is in our common need of 
assistance that we are best able to see “the identity of our natures with theirs” 
(E 221). Human life and contentment are fragile things, and it is in the not 
uncommon circumstance that our best- laid plans go awry that we most 
acutely feel our weakness as well as a sense of connection with those beings 
who are compromised in the way we are.
If weakness is in some way defi nitive of the human condition tout court, 
then it is especially so for men in civil society, whose hearts have been sensi-
tized by settled social relations. Th us, while the specifi c challenges faced by 
Emile and savage man are very diff erent—the former does not have to forage 
for food or fi ght off  bears, but the latter does not have to win the heart of a 
woman or cultivate the good opinion of others—both lives are defi ned by 
their respective challenges in ways that point up the usefulness of pity. Th e 
primary diffi  culties that Emile will face have more to do with his emotional 
and interpersonal life than with his physical subsistence or basic safety, for 
as we have seen his turning- toward- others is motivated primarily by a desire 
to love and be loved rather than an inability to meet his basic needs. Emile’s 
“weakness,” then, consists largely in his newfound need for interpersonal 
validation. Th is need, as Rousseau makes clear earlier in his analysis of the 
birth of social sentiment, is not perverse or destructive but rather natural to 
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and coextensive with social life proper: “It is man’s weakness which makes 
him sociable; it is our common miseries which turn our hearts to human-
ity; we would owe humanity nothing if we were not men. Every attach-
ment is a sign of insuffi  ciency. If each of us had no need of others, he would 
hardly think of uniting himself with them. Th us from our very infi rmity is 
born our frail happiness” (E 221; emphasis added). To enter society is to 
understand and accept one’s own physical and emotional weakness. It is 
also to recognize and love that same weakness in others, and to draw from 
the disconcerting realization of shared vulnerability the chance of a “frail 
happiness.” Our weakness is thus a consequence and a cause of the social 
situation.
Such claims go a long way toward suggesting the importance of a sen-
timent like pity, which allows us to enter into sympathetic community 
with our more unfortunate fellows (and we are all unfortunate) and to 
view the weakness of others not with hostility or contempt but rather as a 
refl ection of our own fragility. In fact, the apprehension of one’s own per-
sonal susceptibility to misfortune is essential to the proper development of 
pity, as Rousseau makes clear in his fi rst “maxim” of sympathetic associa-
tion: “One pities in others only those ills from which one does not feel oneself 
exempt.” Th e hardness of the privileged toward the poor is often a product 
of their failure to recognize the fragility and arbitrariness of their own 
good fortune. Th ey feel secure in their social positions and regard “abase-
ment and poverty as a condition alien” to them. Lacking an experiential or 
imaginative foothold in a lived reality characterized by privation, the rich 
are unable to enter into sympathetic association with the unfortunate. 
“Why,” Rousseau asks, “are kings without pity for their subjects? Because 
they count on never being mere men. Why are the rich so hard toward the 
poor? It is because they have no fear of becoming poor.” Emile, however, 
will be “exposed to the vicissitudes of fortune” and will “understand well 
that the fate of . . . unhappy men can be his, that all their ills are there in 
the ground beneath their feet” (E 224). Able to imaginatively transport 
himself outside himself and know that there are “beings like him who 
suff er what he has suff ered,” Emile will expand the circumference of his 
own understanding and fi nd meaning in the sympathetic identifi cation he 
is able to achieve with them. It is, then, through the mechanism of pity 
and the related awareness of our own personal vulnerability that we are 
softened to the plight of the unfortunate.
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Th e strength of our identifi cation with the least fortunate of our species 
also reinforces our awareness of the limits of human nature. Rousseau fre-
quently reminds his reader that human being, for all its expansiveness, 
nonetheless has boundaries that must be respected. Jean- Jacques, for exam-
ple, tells his pupil to “restrain your heart within the limits of your condi-
tion,” to “study and know these limits,” and that man is “unhappy only 
when he forgets his human estate” (E 445). Th ese limits are most commonly 
neglected when considerations of pride or malignant amour- propre compro-
mise the honesty of our self- assessments and lead to an infl ated estimate of 
our own importance, or when they interfere with our moral judgment and 
cause us to treat others disrespectfully. However, an active sense of pity 
counteracts these antisocial tendencies by revealing the fragility of our own 
happiness, by keeping us in touch with our essential vulnerability, and by 
reminding us that we have done less to deserve our good fortune than we are 
prone to believe (244–45).
Pity for the unfortunate can, however, activate false pride and thereby 
degenerate into contempt and hatred. Th e tendency to glorify oneself at the 
expense of others is so pervasive that even the impeccably educated Emile is 
not immune to it: having been shown by his tutor the madness of civil soci-
ety, Jean- Jacques worries that his pupil may draw the self- congratulatory 
conclusion that he is “ ‘wise, and men are mad.’” Th e distortion that pride 
introduces into social cognition is “the error most to be feared” because it 
short- circuits healthy associative impulses and replaces them with false, self- 
serving, and hateful delusions. In order to prevent this self- destructive error 
from setting in, Jean- Jacques arranges for his pupil to be publicly humiliated 
(E 244–45, cf. 172–75). From such experiences Emile learns not only worldli-
ness but also that not even he is exempt from the vicissitudes of fortune. 
Because the madness of the world can touch him, too, he learns to judge the 
unfortunate less harshly—fate may have been still crueler to others than it 
has to him.
| Growing the Self: Pity and the Ordered Development of Amour- Propre
Th ough cultivating the sense of pity creates certain dangers with respect to 
amour- propre and how one views himself vis- à- vis the other, Rousseau is 
clear that these risks can and must be run. In order to persuade the reader of 
his account of the soul’s development Rousseau employs a stylized rhetorical 
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device quite similar to the “natural man”/“civil man” distinction of the Dis-
course on Inequality, namely, an ongoing comparison between Emile and a 
conventionally raised boy—between “my pupil” and “your pupil” (Scott 
2012, 448–49). Th is comparison is especially important at the beginning of 
Book IV, which marks the birth of amour- propre and all its attendant com-
plications. In fact, it is at this point in the text when Rousseau invokes the 
specter of “your pupil” by inviting the reader to imagine “two young men, 
emerging from their fi rst education and entering into society by directly 
opposite paths” (E 228). Rousseau claims that the apparent advantages 
enjoyed by the conventionally raised pupil are in fact the catalysts of his own 
corruption: “Does he wander through a palace? All his questions tell you 
that he is ceaselessly comparing himself with the master of the house; and 
that all that he fi nds mortifying for himself in this parallel makes his vanity 
rebel and thus sharpens it” (228). Exposure to pomp and magnifi cence rein-
forces rather than resolves the problem of amour- propre, for, far from putting 
us in a position to extend our self- love in healthy and productive ways, it 
instead inspires resentment toward the more fortunate as well as a distaste for 
one’s own social position. In fact, malignant amour- propre requires absolute 
validation and cannot tolerate disapproval of any kind. “Your pupil,” once 
exposed to “the disturbing glances of a serious man” or “the scoffi  ng words of 
a caustic man,” is unable to abide their slights: “Were he despised by only a 
single man, that man’s contempt instantly poisons the others’ applause” (228). 
Th e way in which we compare ourselves to others leads us to resent them and 
to despise ourselves. Th is is a recipe for failure.
Th ough it is necessary to restrain amour- propre’s tendency to seek an 
unreasonable degree of validation, the provision of appropriate restraints is 
by itself insuffi  cient to educate this naturally expansive passion. By now it 
should be clear that Rousseau does not wish to prevent amour- propre from 
being born but rather to allow for its healthy development and extension (E 
214). He must therefore fi nd a way to accommodate its demand for recogni-
tion. When he reminds us that “as soon as amour- propre has developed and 
the relative I is constantly in play, and the young man never observes others 
without returning to himself and comparing himself with them,” he does 
not mean to criticize but rather to simply acknowledge its relativizing ten-
dency (243). Th is “useful but dangerous” instrument thus needs to be grati-
fi ed as well as restrained, for it is not at all diffi  cult to imagine those who are 
systematically denied the social affi  rmation they so crave—those, for exam-
ple, who are economically and socially disadvantaged—would be at least as 
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susceptible to feelings of envy as the petulant young fop described above. 
Negotiating amour- propre’s demand for distinction thus requires maintain-
ing a fragile balance between too much and too little recognition. Having 
been placed at the tiller, Jean- Jacques now must steer between the Charybdis 
of false pride and the Scylla of diffi  dence. Ever aware of the fragility of 
human things, Rousseau gravely intones that if the tutor loses sight of his 
course for even a moment “all is lost” (212).
How, then, to chart the rocky course between two intolerable extremes? 
Th e pedagogic trick is to stabilize the emergent moral personality by way of 
comparative activity, and pity aids in this task by accommodating the need 
for high relative standing while discouraging us from tyrannizing others or 
demanding what they are unable to give. It is for precisely this reason that 
Rousseau gives pride of place to pity in the context of Emile’s education: he 
claims it is “the fi rst relative sentiment which touches the human heart 
according to the order of nature,” and on that basis he makes it the fi rst 
passion in which Emile will receive an education (E 222). Pity gratifi es our 
nascent amour- propre by teaching us to prefer our own station to those occu-
pied by others. Th e experience of inequality is not so bitter when it works out 
in our favor, and the experience of pity gives us fresh reasons to focus not on 
the advantages we have been denied but rather on the good fortune we enjoy:
Imagination puts us in the places of the miserable man rather than in that of the 
happy man. We feel that one of these conditions touches us more closely than 
the other. Pity is sweet because, in putting ourselves in the place of the one who 
suff ers, we nevertheless feel the pleasure of not suff ering as he does. Envy is 
bitter because the sight of a happy man, far from putting the envious man in his 
place, makes the envious man regret not being there. It seems that the one 
exempts us from the ills he suff ers, and the other takes from us the goods he 
enjoys. (221)
Th e sweetness of commiseration comes in part from the understanding that 
we do not suff er as severely as does the person we pity; in pitying another, we 
remind ourselves of our superiority over them. Th ese pleasing confi rmations 
of our own puissance reinforce our sense of self- worth and moral compe-
tence. Th is feeling of power and strength thus has a stabilizing eff ect on our 
amour- propre. We now enjoy both an absolute and a relative sense of our own 
self- worth—absolute because it is intrinsically pleasant to care for others, 
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and relative because we see clearly that the object of our pity is less well- off  
than we are. Confi dent in our own moral standing vis- à- vis others, we can 
tend to their good without worrying that our own is compromised.
Rousseau is very candid, perhaps surprisingly so, about what would seem 
to be a kind of perversity in the experience of pity. His candor on this score 
opens him to a serious objection: if pity presupposes and even fi nds pleasure 
in the suff ering of others, is it not itself a subtle kind of antisociability 
whose internal logic, like that of malignant amour- propre, requires for its 
satisfaction the subjection of others? On this account pity is cunningly 
predatory, a veiled form of ressentiment that reinforces one’s sense of supe-
riority at the expense of others’ well- being. So thought Nietzsche, who saw 
pity as the impulse of a soul at war with its own tyrannical drives: “ ‘Pity for 
all’—would be harshness and tyranny for you, my dear neighbor!” (BGE 
60). I take Nietzsche to mean not only that pity is a form of self- tyranny 
because it unreasonably represses the self ’s instinctual drives, but also that 
it is a form of tyranny over others because it consigns them to a position of 
inferiority and dependence. Pity is thus nothing but war by other means, 
the will to power’s expressing itself despite itself.
Such an objection, however, fails at the very least to meet Rousseau on 
his own ground, for it does not take into account that pity requires not just 
feelings of diff erence but also feelings of sameness or unity with the suff ering 
being. We are far less likely to be cavalier in disregarding the feelings of 
others when those feelings are recognizable to us or when we have an expe-
riential foothold in the lived reality of the suff ering other. It also fails to see, 
as Jonathan Marks (2007, 730–31) has noted, that the perversity built into 
pity—and there is some perversity—is self- limiting and thus will not give 
rise to socially destructive attitudes and behaviors in the way that malignant 
amour- propre does. As a way of seeing this, let us recall from note I to the 
Discourse on Inequality that amour- propre in its corrupt form conceptualizes 
happiness in terms of social status and a zero- sum game: because all status 
gains are relative, an increase for one is necessarily a detriment to those 
around him (DI 195–96). We thus fi nd ourselves locked in a never- ending 
struggle for distinction that fi nally issues in a tyrannical demand to be “sole 
master of the universe” (195). What is critical about unmoored amour- propre 
is its unsatisfi ed and unsatisfi able character: it stops at nothing to attain the 
recognition it so demands and, as a condition of its fulfi llment, is even will-
ing to destroy the very persons whose recognition it desires.
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Rousseauan pity, however, is repelled by the sight of suff ering and even 
more so by the idea of causing it. Emile’s example helps to show how amour- 
propre informed by pity becomes benefi cent and magnanimous rather than 
destructive and tyrannical, and how the psychological perversity is—unlike 
the tyrannical drive for total mastery—self- limiting. In the early part of his 
social education Emile is exposed not to the rich and powerful but rather to 
the poor and unfortunate (E 229). Th ese spectacles pluck his heartstrings 
and inspire him to engage in charitable activity. Th e comparisons he is led to 
make are certainly fl attering to pride, but they also teach him to feel the 
satisfaction that comes with providing a social service of indisputable worth 
(223, 229). Unlike Locke’s self- serving little gentleman and Nietzsche’s weepy 
Christian hypocrite, Emile neither insists on profi ting from acts of charity 
nor defi nes his own happiness with reference to the suff ering of others. He 
shows respect both for himself and for others by giving active expression to 
his sympathetic impulses. In Rousseau’s moral universe, only compassion—
whatever its other limitations—is capable of producing this psychological 
result.
| Pity and Perfectionism: Compassion, Fanaticism, and Moral Disgust
By charting a course between the twin dangers of diffi  dence and false pride, 
Rousseau seeks to show how pity serves to correct the erroneous internal 
logic of corrupt amour- propre. But it must be remembered that even healthy 
expressions of this problematic passion are prone to excess and thus are in 
need of regulation. We saw in the previous chapter that the moralized pas-
sions loosed by the drive for recognition generate a perfectionistic impulse 
that is essential to human life. And yet we must follow Rousseau in recogniz-
ing that this sentiment, too, can inspire unsociable feelings and behaviors: 
morally serious persons—seeing the grotesque imperfections of their fellows 
and interpreting social life as a vulgar charade—are prone to become disdain-
ful, haughty, and unsociable. Th ere is, of course, more than a note of disdain 
in Rousseau’s own work, and his own example surely suffi  ces to show how 
love of one’s species can lead to moral disgust with one’s contemporaries. Th e 
Letter to D’Alembert’s sympathetic treatment of Moliere’s famous misan-
thrope Alceste points to precisely the same problem. Even the exemplary 
Emile may look with antipathy at the failings of his brethren after “consider-
ing his rank in the human species and seeing himself so happily placed there” 
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(E 245). Of course, the dissociative and antisocial tendencies to which all 
morally serious persons are susceptible need not be any more severe than the 
rebarbative crankiness of a Mr. Darcy, but in Rousseau they take on Swift-
ian tenacity and depth. In his investigation of the phenomenon of moral 
disgust, he commonly reasons from a most extreme and most diffi  cult case: 
that of the religious fanatic (see Trachtenberg 2009).
It is on some level not surprising that Rousseau would fi nd it necessary 
to address himself to the question of fanaticism, for the questions of religious 
toleration and persecution were never far from the eighteenth- century mind. 
Virtually all of Rousseau’s philosophical contemporaries had weighed—or 
in Voltaire’s case, cashed—in on the matter, with all emerging as champions 
of religious toleration and freedom of thought. Th e distinctiveness of Rous-
seau’s account on this head is thus best glimpsed by comparing it to the entry 
in Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopedia on “Fanaticism,” which was com-
posed by Rousseau’s friend Alexandre Deleyre and which appears to articu-
late the collective opinion of the philosophes as a group. Like Rousseau, 
Deleyre sees fanaticism as a dangerous social force with roots in superstition: 
it is a “blind and passionate zeal” that undermines compassion and causes 
people “to commit absurd, unjust, and cruel acts” without “shame or 
remorse” (Diderot 1967, 393). He notes that “truth makes no fanatics,” punc-
tuating his entry with a mocking prayer in which he beseeches an unnamed 
deity to “enlighten your zealots, so they might at least take care not to con-
fuse holocaust with homicide” (401). If superstition is the disease, then 
enlightenment is the cure: fanatics attack their enemies “with a kind of joy 
and comfort” not because they are naturally cruel but rather because they 
have been blinded by absurd dogmas (393). More rational and tolerant atti-
tudes would reduce sanguinary violence and give to men the kindly disposi-
tions and the “tender and compassionate hearts” that enlightened social 
commerce requires (401).
Rousseau’s complex response to Deleyre and “the philosophist party” 
that he viewed as an agent of intolerance itself reveals a hope of disciplin-
ing—and hence of capitalizing—on the wild enthousiasmes of the fanatics as 
well as an acknowledgment of their real social danger. He recognizes with 
Deleyre and the philosophes that the roots of moral anger are in social institu-
tions rather than nature, agrees with Bayle that “fanaticism is more perni-
cious than atheism,” and holds it is unsociable so far as it is “sanguinary and 
cruel” (E 312n). So, too, does he insist on the necessity of religious toleration 
in his treatment of civil religion in the Social Contract, arguing that citizens 
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who follow the “sentiments of sociability” prescribed by state religion cannot 
be punished for the private beliefs they hold about questions of doctrine (SC 
IV.8, 130). Th rough the intolerance of bizarre cults, religion, which ought to 
be a catalyst of sociability, had become quite the opposite. Rousseau, then, is 
in at least qualifi ed sympathy with his colleagues about the dangers of fanati-
cal moral energy and the intolerant attitudes it engenders.
Yet Rousseau is distinguished among his contemporaries for his willing-
ness to subject the partisans of toleration and enlightenment—“the philoso-
phist party”—to the same level of critical scrutiny that he applies to the 
Christian sect. Th us he can say that Bayle was correct as far as he went, but 
that he did not go far enough:
What he did not take care to say, and which is no less true, is that fanaticism, 
although sanguinary and cruel, is nevertheless a grand and strong passion 
which elevates the heart of man, makes him despise death, and gives him a 
prodigious energy that need only be better directed in order to produce the 
most sublime virtues. On the other hand, irreligion—and the reasoning and 
philosophic spirit in general—causes attachment to life, makes souls eff eminate 
and degraded, concentrates all the passions in the baseness of private interest, 
in the abjectness of the human I, and thus quietly saps the true foundations of 
every society. (E 312n)
“Truth does not make any fanatics,” says Deleyre. Rousseau heartily agrees. 
But this, he adds, is precisely the problem with the “philosophic spirit” in its 
soul- shrinking modern form. Th e rationalizing—which is not to say ratio-
nal—temper of the philosophes actually magnifi es rather than ameliorates 
the problem posed by intolerance, for it replaces a misplaced but correctable 
hatred of evil with a stubborn indiff erence to the good. Th is moral indif-
ference, motivated by the restrictive conception of self- love developed by 
Hobbes and Locke and endorsed by the philosophes, destroys human rela-
tions by counseling the pursuit of narrow private interest and weakening the 
aff ective bonds that would otherwise unite us. Th us, though Rousseau 
understood that the social and political costs of loosing strong moral pas-
sions could be high, he nonetheless held that the costs of neutralizing those 
same passions are higher still: moralized amour- propre is a “useful but dan-
gerous instrument” that can be “sanguinary and cruel” but is also the source 
of “prodigious energy” that produces “the most sublime virtues” (E 244, 
312n). To diff use that energy is to destroy all higher human possibility and 
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to create an intolerably unstable social situation: reasoning from a narrow 
idea of their own interests, human beings inevitably see they have more to 
gain by taking advantage of others than they do by sacrifi cing for them and 
they act accordingly. To the degree this is true, instrumental rationality can-
not solve its own problem and society cannot subsist without a concern for 
virtue: a nation of devils, however ingeniously designed, is fated to be unjust 
because of reason’s tendency to fi nd loopholes in its own solutions. Th us it 
is one thing to say, with Rousseau, that fanatical moral desiring can be 
injurious to society and quite another to say with Deleyre and the philos-
ophes that society would be better off  without fanaticism. Faced with two 
options he knows to be imperfect, Rousseau prudently chooses the one he 
thinks better.
If the costs of short- circuiting man’s ethical impulses are prohibitively 
high, how does Rousseau propose to discipline moral disgust and prevent 
it from turning violent? In addition to more specifi c institutional solutions 
(e.g., proposing a civil religion with fewer and more sensible articles of 
faith), Rousseau turns to pity in order to strengthen our identifi cation with 
the misguided and unfortunate and so to soften the harshness of moral-
ized amour- propre. Th e intolerance motivated by fanaticism relies in many 
respects on the demonization of the other, on a visceral hatred of his 
 grotesque and incomprehensible way of life. We should not, however, say 
“incomprehensible,” for something unrecognizable does not register a 
strong emotional reaction precisely because it is not recognized. Th e 
demonized other, on the other hand, is seen as something malignant and 
disgusting, as not only undeserving of respect but as deserving of disre-
spect. And our hatred is only magnifi ed when that other intransigently 
refuses to adopt the way of life or the manner of thinking that would 
enable us to view them as being like us, for now they are not simply diff er-
ent but disobedient.
Pity combats the demonization of the other that fanaticism inspires, for 
embedded in it is a mechanism of sympathetic identifi cation that allows us 
to view the imperfections of others with greater gentleness. In searching for 
commonality with those who think diff erently we are reminded of how dif-
fi cult it is to discover the truth concerning religious matters—indeed, any 
matter—and of the shortcomings of our own understanding. We, of course, 
know that we ourselves have erred in the past but are disposed to believe the 
best about our own intentions and view our past mistakes as motivated by 
good faith eff orts to discover the truth. More than any other sentiment, pity 
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allows us to extend to others the generosity that we naturally give to our-
selves; through its operations we are able to “extend amour- propre to other 
beings” and “transform it into a virtue” instead of allowing its unsociable 
forms to take root (E 252). Far from blaming or hating those who see things 
diff erently, we see our own errors—our own fallibility and intellectual 
weakness—refl ected in theirs, and we experience feelings not of frustration 
but rather of solidarity and togetherness. Th ese feelings of sameness may not 
and often should not overcome the urge to persuade the other of the mistak-
enness of his view—friends can and do disagree—but it will make it almost 
impossible to hate or to seek to punish him for that mistakenness.
Th e way in which pity blunts the prickly exterior of virtue is best seen in 
Rousseau’s wildly popular novel Julie, and most especially in the personality 
of the work’s heroine. Julie takes virtue seriously and seeks to share her 
enthusiasm with her entire circle of associates, who aff ectionately tease her 
for her bombast and eventually take to calling her a “charming preacher” ( J 
332). Her case is instructive in this context because, were it not for her all- 
too- active sense of compassion, she would for at least three reasons seem to 
be especially susceptible to fanatical and evangelical excess. First, she is a 
woman and therefore (says Rousseau) generally prone to emotional excess (E 
377–82). Second, she is distinguished even among her gender for her passion-
ate enthusiasm and is thus extremely susceptible to very strong emotions, 
both positive and negative. Finally, she is highly moralistic and, as such, is 
disposed to feelings of ethical disgust. Taking all this into view, we might 
plausibly wonder why Julie is not more prone to evangelical excesses than she 
already is. However, we see she is able to restrict her tiresome homiletics to a 
small circle of intimates and to express her moral zeal through charitable and 
humane action rather than through useless and self- righteous speechifying 
or, worse still, through violent and hateful denunciations.
Appropriately enough, Julie’s moralistic temperament and ability to 
govern her own fanatical desires show up most clearly in the context of her 
description of her own religious awakening, which occurs during her nup-
tials. Recounting her illumination to her former lover St. Preux in order to 
discourage his hope of carrying on an adulterous aff air with her, Julie claims 
that when she entered the church she was “seized” by a “never before experi-
enced” emotion that was akin to “terror.” Moved by the gravity and serious-
ness of the marital bond, she experienced a “sudden revolution” that 
reminded her of her moral obligations and gave her fresh energy to discharge 
them. Her divination and the new self- understanding inspired by it leads 
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Julie to feel “scorn and indignation” for the “vain sophisms” of the “philoso-
phers” who, through their moral laxness and encouragement of adultery, 
seek to “obliterate human society.” Drawing the letter to a close, Julie assumes 
moral authority over her former tutor and, in a fi t of evangelical zeal, exhorts 
St. Preux to rededicate himself to Christian morality: the “best way to dis-
cover what is good is to seek it sincerely, and one cannot thus seek it for long 
without going back to the author of all good. It seems to me I have been 
doing this . . . and you will do it better than I once you decide to follow the 
same road.” It is diffi  cult not to hear the tones of moral disgust in Julie’s 
letter. She is full of self- loathing for having failed in her duties but has 
plenty of spare sanctimony for the philosophers, who destabilize society in 
order to glorify themselves and whose specious arguments only serve to 
undermine sound morality. She even momentarily exalts in the penalty 
awaiting these vain scribblers, saying—in the heat of an angry moment—
that they and their disciples will be punished “before the author of all jus-
tice” ( J 295, 296, 298).
And yet these notes of antipathy, jarring in isolation, only serve to add 
necessary tension to the touching and consonant (if perhaps belabored) 
melody that the whole letter sounds. Julie’s address to her former lover, 
though steadfast in asserting the sad conclusion that “Julie de Wolmar is no 
longer your former Julie,” is nonetheless full of sympathy and eff orts to ease 
the suff ering the letter is sure to cause the weepy St. Preux. While she sternly 
lectures her former lover for his moral failures, she also shares directly in that 
sense of failure. She participates in his sense of loss so as to diff use it and, 
while confi dently reporting the results of her illumination, nonetheless inti-
mates a subtle awareness that the improvements owing to it may prove 
unstable: “Yesterday one was abject and weak; today one is strong and mag-
nanimous. By observing oneself in two such diff erent conditions, one better 
appreciates the value of the condition that has been recovered, and in conse-
quence one becomes more attentive to maintaining it” ( J 300). In admitting 
that she shares—or at least shared—St. Preux’s weakness, she remains 
mindful of her essential likeness with him and thus of her own ongoing 
vulnerability. Her temporal presentation—her noting the diff erence between 
“yesterday” and “today”—further underscores this point by raising an unan-
swered question about tomorrow. If drastic transformations like Julie’s illu-
mination can be eff ected so quickly, how certain can she be that she will not 
sink back into her former condition and again become the object of pity 
herself? Far, then, from viewing her old fl ame as worthy of contempt for his 
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having morally strayed, Julie creates a community of consolation with him 
because her active sense of compassion shows her that she is not immune 
from the ills St. Preux suff ers.
| Attenuated Sympathies: Pity and the Mediation of Diff erence
Th e sympathetic communion Julie attempts to establish with St. Preux beto-
kens a signal shift in the character of their relationship. Informing her old 
tutor that “all is changed between us” and that “Julie de Wolmar is no longer 
your former Julie,” Julie tries to soften the blow by telling him that all is not 
lost: “If you are losing a tender lover then you are gaining a faithful friend, 
and, whatever we may have said during our illusions, I doubt that this 
change is to your disadvantage” ( J 300). Th e transition from love to friend-
ship—if it is ever completed entirely—promises to be diffi  cult, for it involves 
a fundamental change in the dynamics of social recognition. Shared under-
standings about the boundaries of relationships must be renegotiated, but 
such negotiations take place against a backdrop of previously established 
expectations and hopes that prove very diffi  cult, perhaps impossible, to 
eff ace. It is a social manifestation of a problem Wittgenstein would later call 
“the dawning of an aspect,” and which he would represent with the famous 
“duck- rabbit” image.
Th e “duck- rabbit” is puzzling because, depending simply on how it is 
viewed by the subject, it can be plausibly described as either a duck or a 
rabbit. Wittgenstein, interested to understand the diff erent ways we utilize 
the concept “see,” sums up the problem thus: “Th e expression of a change of 
aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the 
perception’s being unchanged.” Th e change in the report of what the subject 
sees is due to a change in the understanding; it involves a combination of 
perception and cognition, a mixture of “seeing and thinking” (Wittgenstein 
1958, 196–97). Th e image, though utterly unchanged, has for the perceiver a 
set of associations and meanings that it did not before.
I raise the “duck- rabbit” problem not to resolve it so much as to show 
its relevance for Julie and St. Preux, who are seeking to transition from love 
to friendship and as such must learn to “see” each other very diff erently 
despite the fact that they are not especially diff erent. While age and smallpox 
do eff ect changes in the lovers’ physical appearance, their basic moral dis-
positions—Julie’s mysterious “conversion” notwithstanding—remain largely 
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the same throughout the novel. Th ey must confront that continuity, which 
served as the source of their romantic union, and learn to re- cognize each 
other despite it; the same people must come to view each other diff erently. 
Th is can be, as the novel’s narrative makes clear, a very diffi  cult transition 
to undertake. Part of the reason for this extreme diffi  culty is that love and 
friendship are for Rousseau two very diff erent things and, as such, awaken 
very diff erent kinds of moral and social impulses. Julie signals her aware-
ness of the great distance between these two forms of association in a letter 
to her “inseparable” cousin Claire, where she avers that the distinct offi  ce of 
friendship—as opposed to that of love—is to console others in their suff er-
ing. “Are you not aware,” she asks her cousin, “that the communion of 
hearts imbues sadness with a sweet and touching something that content-
ment does not know? And was friendship not specially given to the unhappy to 
relieve their woes and comfort their sorrows?” ( J 332). What lovers do as 
lovers creates a high, aspirational moral energy that arouses the hope of 
mutual perfection. If, or perhaps when, this hope is frustrated, lovers are 
often far less able to console each other in their disappointment than are 
their friends, for because lovers are commonly the source of each other’s 
deepest frustrations they often prove to be poor shoulders on which to cry. 
Th ere are, of course, a great many exceptions to this rule, but the general 
inability of lovers to console each other in many cases shows up most read-
ily in the tense and resentful exchange between Julie and St. Preux imme-
diately following their forced separation. Suicidally depressed and bitter, St. 
Preux lashes out angrily at his beloved: “Answer me, now, deceived or 
deceitful lover: what has become of those plans contrived in such secrecy? 
Where are those vain expectations with which you so often baited my naïve 
credulity? Where is that holy and desired union, the sweet object so ardently 
wished for, with which your pen and your mouth fl attered my wishes? . . . 
Give me an account, ingrate, of the charge I have entrusted to you: give me 
an account of myself after leading my heart astray into that supreme felicity 
you have shown me and are now taking away” (157). Julie responds to these 
vehemently expressed (and not entirely unfair) charges not with sympathy 
but rather by accusing her lover of cruelty and lamenting her own misery. 
St. Preux and Julie view each other as responsible for the unhappiness they 
share and thus are unable to eff ectively sympathize with the plight of 
the other. Again, this is a not uncommon phenomenon among lovers, who 
have more occasions for confl ict precisely because they seek to share 
everything.
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Th e activity characteristic of friendship, on the other hand, is gentler, 
sweeter, and less generative of confl ict because its aims are more modest. 
Friends qua friends do not seek wholeness through each other so much as 
comfort in their condition of dividedness; their special offi  ce is to “relieve 
[the] woes and comfort [the] sorrows” of their unfortunate fellows, to create 
community through the mutual apprehension of their respective imperfec-
tions. Th e experience of friendship and the capacity for pity are thus clearly 
and even intimately bound up with each other, for friendship is predicated 
specifi cally on the desire to ameliorate another’s suff ering. Julie’s letter to her 
inseparable cousin gives us an intimation—one which will be explored in 
depth in chapter 6—of the meaning of Rousseau’s rather odd- sounding 
claim that friendship, rightly understood, is the product of pity fi xed on a 
particular object (DI 130).
However, because the feelings of commonality that enable pity are also 
necessarily limited by it, the relation of friend to friend would also seem to be 
attenuated in ways that romantic associations may not be. Indeed, Rousseau’s 
analysis of pity in Emile discloses that when one pities another he does so with 
the recognition that the other suff ers in a way that he does not. More reveal-
ing still, the disproportion between the condition of he who pities and he who 
is pitied is in fact a source of pleasure for the former: “If the fi rst sight that 
strikes [Emile] is an object of sadness, the fi rst return to himself is a sentiment 
of pleasure. In seeing how many ills he is exempt from, he feels himself to be 
happier than he thought he was” (E 229). And again: “Pity is sweet because, 
in putting ourselves in the place of the one who suff ers, we nevertheless feel 
the pleasure of not suff ering as he does” (221). To pity another is thus to 
simultaneously claim an equality with and a superiority over him: while one 
recognizes that he could in principle be subjected to the same affl  ictions as the 
aggrieved party, he nonetheless feels considerable satisfaction in the realiza-
tion that he does not suff er in fact or reality (223–24).
Pity, then, is as much a consolation for he who off ers as for he who 
receives it. It is a “resource for a rainy day” because it recognizes a de facto 
inequality between he who pities and he who suff ers (E 223). One feels a 
sense of superiority over suff ering beings, and if he has the strength to deliver 
them from their disappointments, he delights doubly in the heartening 
reminder of his power and potency. If pity is the “fi rst relative sentiment that 
enters the human heart,” as Rousseau claims, then it follows from this that 
the idea of mutual attachment is formed in the context of relationships in 
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which we are the stronger rather than the weaker party. Our aff ection for 
others is a function of their misfortune as well as an edifying aide- mémoire 
of our own strength and moral competence. Th e pleasures that attach to 
sympathetic communion are motivated not only by the delight one takes in 
the feeling of oneness with others but also by the heartening reminders of 
one’s own puissance. We pity because we know we are not exempt from the 
suff erer’s ills and because we delight in the fact that we do not suff er as he 
does. Again, these are only intimations and are intended to anticipate argu-
ments to come. Th e peculiar dynamics of pity and their associational conse-
quences will be explored more thoroughly in chapter 6.
| Becoming Social: Conclusions
Having now surveyed the psychological ground on which Rousseau seeks to 
build social sentiment, we are now in a position to draw some preliminary 
conclusions about Rousseau’s moral- psychological theory and the kind of 
relationships that grow out of it. I have been at special pains to show how 
amour- propre, the sexual passion, and pity develop and interact with one 
another and, in so doing, give rise to a complex of desires for various kinds of 
recognition. In arguing thus, I have perhaps more than most emphasized the 
role of sexual desire specifi cally, which, properly developed, is the chief source 
of man’s social and moral energy. Indeed, it was shown that social desiring as 
such emerges from a largely sexual basis and that moralized sexuality cata-
lyzes a perfectionistic impulse that draws out man’s highest and best aspira-
tions. Yet this same impulse, even developed aright, can easily degenerate into 
moral disgust and antisocial forms of intolerance; its sharp edges must thus 
be rounded off  by pity, which counteracts the excesses of moralized anger by 
establishing a sense of connection between the judger and the judged. As pity 
supplements and in some ways counteracts the harmful excesses of man’s 
perfectionistic impulse, so, too, does that perfectionistic impulse combat the 
moral complacency and resignation that can result from a too- active sense of 
pity. Th ough Rousseau himself took a rather circumspect view of the human 
condition and did not shy away from characterizing it as one of weakness 
and vulnerability, he was nonetheless acutely sensitive to the fact that an 
overemphasis on such characteristics can lead to ethical fatalism and a pos-
ture of indiff erence toward one’s own moral growth. Th us there exists in the 
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properly educated mind a kind of dynamic tension between sexual passion 
and pity, between a belief in our capacity for growth and an awareness of our 
limitations.
Th ough Emile shows that the desire for recognition from and association 
with other human beings issues from a largely sexual source, it also shows 
how the development of the social passions is at one with their disaggrega-
tion. Th us, to develop socially is to understand what one wants from particu-
lar individuals in particular associational contexts. In the next chapter, I 
begin my survey of the various forms of association that Rousseau treats in his 
oeuvre and show how, whether considered individually or together, they fail 
to satisfy the desires to which they give rise. In making this argument I will 
build on what has been established and will seek to show (1) the moralized 
and moralizing character of sexuality as it manifests itself in Emile and Julie, 
and (2) that the attenuations built into pity have important and underappreci-
ated consequences for how Rousseau theorizes friendship.
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I adore myself in what I have made.
—rousseau, Pygmalion
Nowhere is Rousseau’s eff ort to expand human possibility 
through social relations more evident than in his account of 
romantic love, and nowhere in his oeuvre is this account bet-
ter worked out than in Emile. In this wildly successful 
treatise- cum- novel Rousseau not only articulates the most 
comprehensive statement of his intellectual system but also 
provides a vision of domestic life so attractive that even one 
of his most codgerly critics has conceded that it “represents a 
profound understanding of the conditions of a happy mar-
riage” (Orwin 1997a, 6). Th at “marriage,” of course, is the 
one between the eponymous hero and his beloved Sophie, 
who after an extended and very carefully managed courtship 
are united at the conclusion of the work. In leaving his audi-
ence to ponder the ultimate fate of his beaux amants, however, 
there is a signifi cant sense in which Rousseau ends the work 
precisely where things get interesting, for it is well- known 
that falling in love is far easier than staying that way. Th is 
would seem to be especially true in the context of Rousseau’s 
own moral universe, where the traps and snares are many and 
the consequences of falling into them are ruinous.
Romantic Love in Emile4
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In order, however, to understand the extent to which we may consider 
Emile and Sophie’s marriage successful, we must be able to answer a still- 
more- fundamental question: what would count as a success? We need to 
know what ends the marital relation is supposed to realize before we can 
know how eff ectively it realizes them. With this in mind, I propose that 
Rousseauan marriage is designed to directly instantiate the human good 
through the limit experience of romantic love and the creation of a compre-
hensive form of social incorporation. Th e nature of moral love is such that 
the union created in and through marriage is and must be an erotic fusion of 
souls, a joining of “two into one” (E 479). Any romantic relation that 
demands less disrespects the expansive character of human being by truncat-
ing the healthy growth of the passions and, thereby, compromising the 
experience of the human good. Th is argument will build in particular on the 
conception of moralized sexuality articulated in chapter 2 and show its peda-
gogic relevance in the context of Emile’s education, but it will also reintro-
duce and further develop the account of wholeness that was introduced in 
chapter 1.
In developing this account, a more detailed engagement with secondary 
scholarship concerning both the function of the marital relation and its role 
in Emile’s education is unavoidable, for though Emile has (after long neglect) 
become central to Rousseau interpretation there remain serious questions 
regarding both its basic meaning and broader signifi cance. Judith Shklar 
(1969) structured what is now the most important controversy among read-
ers of Emile by calling attention to Rousseau’s distinction between “men” 
and “citizens” and by arguing that the eponymous hero’s education was 
intended primarily to preserve his natural independence and, thereby, to 
create a “man.” Scholars as diverse as Okin (1979), Cassirer (1989), Melzer 
(1990), Todorov (2001), and Gauthier (2006) have articulated some variant 
of this hypothesis and consequently tend to view Emile as a detached cosmo-
politan rather than a fully incorporated social subject. A second wave of 
research, however, has noted the deeply social character of Emile’s education, 
and has attended to the ways in which it prepares him for incorporation into 
a political community (Bloom 1979; Strong 1994; Wingrove 2000; Neu-
houser 2008). Whatever their disagreements, these scholars are unanimous 
in their rejection of Shklar’s claim that the educations of “men” and “citi-
zens” are incommensurable alternatives and in their insistence that Emile’s 
education is successful only to the degree that his experiences as human 
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being and political subject are compatible. In arguing thus many scholars 
have emphasized the political functions of marriage, holding that its signifi -
cance is in its creation of an autarchic household that catalyzes allegiance to 
the regime. Th e important fact about the family is its role as an agent—
the agent—of political socialization. Th is understanding of Emile has pro-
vided cause both for celebrating Rousseau’s teaching (e.g., Schwartz 1984) 
and for censuring it (e.g., Fermon 1997), but what unites these approaches is 
their viewing sexual union as preparation for what it is really important: 
citizenship.
Th ough such claims improve on independence- focused interpretations 
by calling attention to the social- sexual character of Emile’s education, they 
also obscure much of what is interesting in Rousseau’s treatment of marriage 
by viewing it as a tool of political socialization rather than a direct instantia-
tion of the human good. My more “domestic” reading is amply substanti-
ated by Rousseau’s strong and continued emphasis on the sexual passion, 
and what we will see below is that it is also confi rmed by the specifi c way in 
which Jean- Jacques directs Emile and his beloved Sophie to incorporate into 
political society. Th e regime Emile chooses for his family is not and would 
not be the one outlined in the Social Contract, but rather one that makes far 
less stringent demands on his time and attention. Emile does not have the 
specifi cally civic virtue of the citizen, but the acquisition of virtue in a diff er-
ent and more universal form is of the fi rst moment for his education. Th e 
development of the sexual passion, it is important to add, is central to this 
education in virtue: the moralization of this passion facilitates Emile’s uni-
versal benevolence and moral taste by facilitating consciousness of the 
beloved’s moral character. In arguing thus, I depart from Bloom (1993, 108), 
who neglects the moralizing dimension of love, and Reisert (2003, 80), who 
views sexuality as a “threat” to virtue.
It is in light of the foregoing that we may return to the question of 
whether the pedagogic plan laid out for Emile actually works. Does love- 
through- marriage obtain for Emile the comprehensive satisfaction—the 
natural wholeness and the social connectedness—that he so desires? Unfor-
tunately, I believe we must answer this question in the negative. Perhaps 
more troublingly, we must do so because of Rousseau’s own understanding 
of love: he makes love a creature of the imagination, but the necessary dis-
proportion between Emile’s imagination of Sophie and the girl herself ulti-
mately serves to undermine their love. So, too, does the sexual act pale in 
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comparison with the imagination of it, with the result that the very consum-
mation of a romantic relationship initiates its decay. Th us Emile, which 
works through a marriage’s “best case,” nonetheless enacts a tragic concep-
tion of romantic love whose ultimate consequences are spelled out in Emile 
and Sophie, an unfi nished and posthumously published sequel to Emile.
Th ough this tragic interpretation of Emile is signifi cant in its own right, 
it can be wondered what implications it has for Rousseau’s more general 
political theory. Th ough I will delay full consideration of this question until 
chapter 8, I shall conclude this chapter by making some suggestions about 
how the failure of Emile’s education might be reproduced in the political 
realm, and why the limits exposed within Emile may have consequences for 
the political world outside of it.
| Men, Citizens, and Rousseau’s “Double Object”
At the beginning of Emile (41), Rousseau posits a “double object” which is to 
serve as the end or purpose of his pupil’s education: “What will a man raised 
uniquely for himself be for others? If per chance the double object we set for 
ourselves could be joined in a single one by removing the contradictions of 
man, a great obstacle to his happiness would be removed.” In order for 
Emile’s education to be a success, he must learn to be both good for himself 
and for others. Th is means he must be (1) civilized, which is to say that he 
has social relations and all the moral and intellectual capacities these rela-
tions imply, and (2) natural, which is to say that his social relations have not 
corrupted his native goodness. Rousseau, however, stacks the deck against 
the realization of this dual objective by assuming a contradiction between 
civilization and nature. On his account, we are “swept along in contrary 
routes by nature and by men” and our educations reinforce rather than 
resolve our divided state. Th e consequence is that we live “in confl ict and 
fl oating during the whole course of our lives” and die “without having been 
good for ourselves or for others” (41). Resolving the contradictions between 
self and other, between nature and society, is no easy task. To this end we 
must make an important choice: we must create a “man” or a “citizen,” 
because it is impossible to simultaneously create both (39, 41).
Th ough it is clear up front that Emile must be a man or a citizen, there 
is some ambiguity about which he ultimately becomes. Secondary scholar-
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ship is divided on this score, with scholars interpreting Rousseau’s equivoca-
tion in two primary, but only partially adequate, ways. One interpretation 
pioneered by Shklar (1969) tends to make Emile a “man” whose education is 
designed to protect him from the scourge of personal dependence. Gauthier 
(2006, 33) succinctly summarizes this view: “Emile is to be raised for inde-
pendence.” Okin (1979, 407) articulates a similar interpretation in the con-
text of a feminist critique of Emile: “Rousseau’s prescribed education for 
Sophie is in total contrast with that prescribed for Emile, who is to be as 
independent . . . as possible.” Arthur Melzer joins the chorus, claiming per-
sonal dependence is the “true villain of Rousseau’s analysis” and arguing on 
Rousseau’s behalf that “all personal dependence, all social power . . . is self- 
contradictory and enslaving” (1990, 70n, 74). He goes on to explain that, 
once ensconced in rustic repose, the happy lovers are “protected . . . from the 
need to depend on others” (93). Melzer fails, however, to note not only that 
Emile and Sophie must incorporate into political society and are therefore not 
free of “the need to depend on others,” but also that they must still depend on 
each other in a profoundly personal way. Th us, to emphasize the dangers of 
personal dependence is also to obscure a very important aspect of Emile, 
namely, that Jean- Jacques turns to a specifi cally personal form of depen-
dence—sexual or romantic love—in order to realize his double object. If this 
task is to be completed, Emile’s intellectual and aff ective capacities must fi nd 
expression in a meaningful and lasting form of association.
If escaping the perils of deep interdependence were truly the aim of 
Emile, Rousseau would not have needed to write Books IV and V of the 
work. At age fi fteen Emile knows how to “live free and depend little on 
human things,” and he possesses all the “virtue . . . that relates to himself” 
(E 208). Yet such independence is merely a prelude to a larger and more 
complex pedagogic task: “Th is [the onset of amour- propre] is the second 
birth of which I have spoken. It is now that man is truly born to life and now 
that nothing human in foreign to him. Up to now our care has only been a 
child’s game. It takes on true importance at present. Th is period, where 
ordinary education ends, is properly the one where ours ought to begin” 
(212). Emile’s tutelage thus does not take on “true importance” until it is 
time to make him part of a larger social whole. In order to call his education 
a success, he must be connected to others in some meaningful way.
But what form should that connectedness ultimately take? A diverse 
group of scholars more sensitive to both prongs of the “double object” claim 
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that Emile’s political relationships are the ones of ultimate importance. On 
this view, Emile’s highest and best capacities fi nd expression in the experience 
of citizenship. Strong (1994, 138) explains that Emile’s fi nal perfection “requires 
and will generate, come what may, a political society . . . that which makes him 
human requires that he be a citizen.” Frederick Neuhouser (2008, 23) echoes 
this sentiment, arguing that Emile’s education “produces individuals who in 
the end can assume the role of citizen . . . in a manner consistent with . . . 
being a man.” Bloom, too, emphasizes the political character of Emile by 
noting that its pedagogy serves as “the outline for a possible bridge between 
the particular and the general will” and thereby prepares human beings for 
“the most comprehensive human order, political society” (Bloom 1979, 27). 
Jean- Jacques’s task is thus not an eff ort to make a man or a citizen but a man 
and a citizen. Th e most infl uential—and the most compelling—attempts to 
build this “bridge” use sexuality as the primary means of doing so. On this 
view, the sexual relationship is signifi cant because it prepares individuals for 
full incorporation into political society. Th us we are led to view Emile’s 
romantic relation to Sophie as preparatory for the higher calling of politics. 
On this score, Schwartz (1984, 97, 70) observes that because “men are sexual, 
they must as a consequence be political” and concludes that “romantic love is 
less exalted than . . . patriotism.” Wingrove (2000, 61) makes a similar claim, 
arguing that Emile’s and Sophie’s relationship discloses the endogeneity of 
politics and sexuality: “Emile and Sophie enact a political relationship that is 
not just like (or even not much like) Rousseau’s democratic republicanism, 
but that is continuous with it.” In these accounts and others, the political is 
the axis on which Emile’s world turns.
Th ese “political” interpretations of Emile improve on their predecessors 
by acknowledging the importance of the social and political dimensions of 
Emile’s education and pointing to the importance of the sexual passion as a 
catalyst of sociability. Yet in order to read the sexual teaching of Emile into 
the republican political program of the Social Contract, it is necessary to 
attribute to Rousseau understandings of politics and citizenship that he 
actively resists. He holds that true civic education is neither available to nor 
appropriate for his young charge, arguing that “public instruction” requires 
the exchange of one’s “absolute existence” for “a relative one . . . with the 
result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the 
unity and no longer feels except within the whole” (E 40; cf. SC II.7). Rous-
seau’s desubjectivized citizen is defi ned by his social position and his rela-
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tionship to political society. If he abandons his role as a citizen then “he is no 
longer fi t for anything” (E 41).
Emile, in contrast to the citizen, has neither a particular social station 
nor a fatherland (E 40, 466, 473). Even at the end of his formal political 
education he makes cosmopolitan pronouncements that would confuse and 
infuriate any decent Spartan or Roman: “Rich or poor, I shall be free. I shall 
not be free in this or that land, in this or that region. I shall be free every-
where on earth . . . wherever there are men, I am at the home of my brothers; 
wherever there are no men, I am in my own home” (472). Unlike the citizen, 
who is rudderless without his patrie, Emile has the intellectual and moral 
dexterity to occupy any number of social positions. “Let,” writes Rousseau, 
“my student be destined for the sword, the church, the bar. I do not care. 
Prior to the calling of his parents is nature’s call to human life. Living is the 
job I want to teach him” (41). Th is is not to deny that Emile could fi nd within 
himself a general will, for as Rousseau (SC II.3, 61) reminds us, a will can be 
general with respect to one’s family while being particular with respect to his 
state; it is, rather, to deny that such a will must be general at the level of politi-
cal society in order to call his education a success.
Indeed, by the time Emile and his tutor come to the study of politics, 
the proverbial heavy lifting has already been done. Th e crash course in poli-
tics does not add to Emile’s happiness so much as it secures the happiness he 
has already won. Th us, unlike “the Lacedaemonian Pedaretus”—that para-
gon of citizenship whose “sincere” love of patrie consoled him after losing an 
election—Emile knows enough not to run for offi  ce in the fi rst place: “If we 
were kings and were wise, the fi rst thing that we would want to do for our-
selves and others would be to abdicate our royal position and become again 
what we are” (E 40, 467). Attaining a position in the government would be 
harmful both for the young man and for others, and thus cannot satisfy the 
double object in the context of Emile’s education. It is therefore unsurprising 
to see Jean- Jacques give his political instruction a decidedly apolitical end: 
“Let us consecrate the two years until your return to choosing an abode in 
Europe where you can live happily with your family, sheltered from all the 
dangers of which I have just spoken to you” (457; emphasis added). Emile’s 
travels, and the political education that is their fruit, are devoted to the 
domestic purpose of fi nding a regime that will leave Emile and his beloved 
to their conjugal bliss. He wants a regime from which he can eff ectively 
“shelter” himself, not one that demands his presence in the assembly. Th e best 
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regime absolutely is thus not the best regime for Emile. He is not committed 
to the regime he chooses; rather, he chooses the regime he does because it 
requires no commitment.
To the degree that Emile is committed to his regime, one sees through 
the attenuated relation he has to his political society that the basis of that 
commitment bears little resemblance to that of “the citizen” as Rousseau 
conceives him. Th ough Jean- Jacques tells Emile to “leave everything” if 
the state calls him to service, it is still true that Emile, like Plato’s 
philosopher- king, must be compelled by others to join in the tumults of the 
assembly (E 475). Because Emile knows he will not fi nd happiness in the 
shadows of the just, his tutor gives him a very circumscribed conception of 
the common good, one that is consistent with his duties to man qua man 
but inconsistent with the requirements of “citizenship” as Rousseau under-
stands the term. Emile’s political duty is to “vivify the country and reani-
mate the zeal of the unfortunate village folk” (474). However, his benevolent 
treatment of an injured peasant he encounters on the road while traveling 
to see Sophie shows he is satisfying these requirements well before he 
knows anything about politics proper. Th e kindness Emile shows in this 
instance is certainly a kind of service to the common good, but it is moti-
vated less by the partial sentiments of citizenship than by a respect for the 
“rights of humanity” (441). Such cosmopolitan considerations are alien to 
the citizen, who is immediately motivated by his specifi cally civic duty. 
Unlike the citizen, who does good to friends and harm to enemies, Emile’s 
fi rst and most important duty is to hurt no one (39, 445). Of Emile, then, 
it seems correct to say that he will live in a political society but will not be 
constituted by it, and that he will be happy despite politics rather than 
because of them.
Our examination of the relevant scholarly literature has left us with a 
puzzle of sorts. It shows that the individualistic line of interpretation pio-
neered by Judith Shklar is defi cient in signal respects, but it also reveals that 
the more “social” readings of Tracy Strong and others suff er from no less 
serious defects. Th us the literature points to the need for connectedness, but 
it points in the wrong direction. In the next section I argue that Rousseau 
turns to romantic love in order to satisfy the double object. In doing so, he 
prepares his pupil not for a life of independence or republican politics but 
rather for a life of domestic repose, one that entails complete—and com-
pletely personal—dependence on his beloved Sophie.
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| Beyond Men and Citizens: Rousseau’s Sex Education
We have so far seen that Emile’s education is designed to incorporate the 
other in a way that is consistent with the requirements of natural self- love, 
and that neither independence nor citizenship gives answer to these dual 
requirements in a satisfactory way. So, too, have we seen in earlier chapters 
that Rousseau also rejects the instrumental approach of Hobbes and Locke, 
whose appeals to narrow self- interest generate only a mercenary virtue that 
“gives an egg to have a cow” (E 103). Th e self- serving sociability of the bour-
geois clearly will not do. But what will?
Many have found in the sexual passion a way of grounding the robust 
and enduring associations that Rousseau sought to depict in and eff ect 
through his writing. Bloom (1993, 108), for instance, has claimed that the 
sexual component of Emile’s education is reminiscent of Aristophanes’s 
characterization of eros in Plato’s Symposium: “Rousseau presents in all seri-
ousness what Aristophanes presents half- jokingly . . . that is, that love is the 
quest for one’s other half which, once found, restores the lovers to perfect 
wholeness.” Th is parallel is somewhat useful, as it both calls attention to the 
sexual- social character of Emile’s rearing and reveals the comprehensiveness 
of the communion he hoped to construct on that basis. Emile and Sophie 
are not seeking mere mates but—like the Rousseau of the Confessions—are 
looking for their “other half” (E 479, see also 377). However, Rousseau 
departs from Aristophanes’s amoral and nonhierarchical conception of eros- 
as- wholeness, arguing instead that sexuality is inherently moralizing and 
moralistic. Considerations of virtue, far from being irrelevant as they are for 
Aristophanes, are instead essential to the process of erotic recognition and 
attraction. Th us when Jean- Jacques puts an imaginary object of desire—
“Sophie”—in Emile’s mind, his purpose is to unify the processes of sexual 
and moral maturation and to show how ethical criteria are necessary to 
identify one’s “other half.” Emile’s Sophie, whoever she is, must be physically 
and morally beautiful.
Emile’s turn to sexual desire should not be at all surprising, for we have 
already seen in Rousseau’s distinction between “physical” and “moral” forms 
of love the profound psychological and moral power he gives to the phenom-
enon of exclusive romantic recognition. And it is precisely because amour- 
propre expresses itself so strongly in the romantic situation that Rousseau 
identifi es sexual desire as both the most promising and the most dangerous 
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socializing force in the human soul. Th ough the dangers of moral love are 
laid bare in the Discourse on Inequality, these are not viewed as a reason to 
consign sex education to the margins of Emile’s pedagogy. To the contrary, 
the perils of sexuality are the best reasons imaginable for putting it front and 
center. Th us Emile’s healing education is distinguished by the degree and 
the kind of attention it gives to this most fundamental want: “We are given 
treatises on education consisting of useless, pedantic, bloated verbiage . . . 
and we are not told a word about the most important and most diffi  cult part 
of the whole education—the crisis that serves as a passage from childhood to 
man’s estate. If I have been able to make these essays useful in some respect, 
it is especially by having expanded at great length on this essential part, 
omitted by all others” (E 416). Sexual education is the “most important” and 
“most diffi  cult” part of human education, and Rousseau believes his Emile 
to be “especially” useful because of the priority it assigns to this neglected 
topic. We should thus not be surprised when the narrative expands “at great 
length” about the sex education that Emile receives, or when Jean- Jacques 
makes the search for a suitable mate the end of his pupil’s education. Th is 
quest commences in Book IV, which begins with a dramatic fl ourish: “How 
rapid is our journey on this earth! Th e fi rst quarter of life has been lived 
before one knows the use of it” (211). Th e next paragraph makes it quite clear 
what the “use” of life really is: “We are, so to speak, born twice: once to exist 
and once to live; once for our species and once for our sex.” Th e onset of 
sexual passion is a “second birth” that enables the development of Emile’s 
social consciousness and makes him available (susceptible?) to the charms of 
intimacy.
Th ough the explosive compound of amour- propre and nascent sexuality 
threatens to unhinge him as an adult (E 212), these are risks that can and 
indeed must be run. If the onset of sexual passion costs Emile his childish 
felicity, it promises to compensate him with something far greater. Sexual 
desire does not just signal a transition to a new phase of life but instead 
constitutes the call to life itself: “Th is is the second birth of which I have 
spoken. It is now that man is truly born to life and now that nothing human 
is truly foreign to him” (212; emphasis added). Before he felt the pull of sexual 
attraction, Emile “breathed” but did not “live”; he had not yet “felt life” (42). 
But through exclusive romantic union with Sophie, Emile will gain access 
not only to the most intense happiness available to him (447) but also to 
knowledge of his true nature: because it is only through love that “nothing 
human [can be] foreign to him,” love is Emile’s guide in the Delphic quest 
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for self- knowledge. For Rousseau as for Plato, the erotic leads unawares to 
the point of philosophy. Rather than teach Emile to pursue philosophy as a 
way of life, however, Rousseau sexualizes the human good itself. Th e experi-
ence of romantic love therefore serves as something of a Finis Ultimus for 
Emile: through it, he might learn not only how to be good for Sophie but 
also how to be good for himself in a self- conscious and existentially enriched 
way (447). Yet Rousseau’s own conception of love problematizes the realiza-
tion of these pedagogic objectives. Th e very intensity of the sexual passions 
makes them diffi  cult to educate, and Rousseau, foreshadowing a tragic end, 
comments at several places that any small misstep could derail the entire 
education (e.g., 212, 416).
| Th e Dynamics of Romantic Love: An Erotic Tragedy?
Rousseau’s teaching on romantic love refl ects his ambiguous position within 
the history of political thought. Th ough the seriousness with which Rous-
seau treats the phenomenon of human connectedness in its various forms is 
more redolent of classical than modern thought, the psychological assump-
tions he adopts are far closer to those of his modern forebears (Strauss 1953, 
252–55). Th us, while Rousseau took the human desire for “intimate society” 
more seriously than did, say, Hobbes or Locke, his insistence on man’s natu-
ral asociability is correspondingly more trenchant. How, then, to account for 
our deepest social longings? Th e treatment of sexuality in the previous sec-
tion provides part of the answer, but it remains to elaborate more fully the 
psychology of romantic love and to assess its robustness. On this score, the 
mechanism of interest is the imagination: love, Rousseau tells us, is a “sweet 
illusion” that has its basis in the imagination rather than in nature. Th e issue 
is whether love thus understood can forge a durable bond between Emile and 
his beloved. Th ough the work’s end suggests an affi  rmative answer, Rousseau’s 
own treatment of romantic love indicates otherwise (see also Bloom 1993, 137; 
Gauthier 2006, 44–47).
Rousseau tells us repeatedly and explicitly in Emile that love is imagi-
nary rather than real. It exists only to the degree that our imaginations are 
active: “What is true love itself if it is not chimera, lie, and illusion?” (E 329). 
Even more pointedly, Rousseau observes that with love, “everything is only 
illusion. I admit it. But what is real are the sentiments for the truly beautiful 
with which love animates us and which it makes us love. Th is beauty is not 
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in the object one loves; it is the work of our errors” (391). Th e connectedness 
that love makes possible is thus founded on a kind of stupidity, but it is a 
tremendously ennobling kind of stupidity: it “suff uses our hearts with all the 
virtues” that we blindly attribute to our beloved, and refi nes that “sensual 
and coarse passion” which bewilders and tortures civilized man. Th e pros-
pect of loving and of being loved ennobles us by providing new and delicious 
inducements to self- perfection: “How many great things could be done by 
means of this [sexual] motive if one knew how to set it in motion!” (390). Th e 
connection between love and virtue is strong.
Yet treating love as a product of the imagination ultimately circum-
scribes its possibilities quite narrowly, and Rousseau discloses these limits in 
the most telling way. Emile’s natural sexual drive is indiscriminate, so his 
sex education seeks less to suppress his nascent passion than to channel it 
upward. It is about the cultivation of taste, not the repression of desire. To 
this end, Jean- Jacques infl ames Emile’s imagination by putting in his mind 
a “model of perfection” endowed with all the distinctively female virtues, 
and he attaches the name “Sophie” to it. Th is imaginary model is designed 
to fi x Emile’s desires on a single object and to make him “disgusted” with 
those who do not measure up to it: “It suffi  ces that he everywhere fi nd com-
parisons which make him prefer his chimera to the real objects which strike 
his eye” (E 329). Th e immediate purpose of providing Emile with this model 
is to protect him from the lubricious coos of salacious Parisian ladies. Rous-
seau knows how dangerous a young man’s introduction into civil society is, 
and Emile must be made to see the lascivious but empty charms of the parlor 
for what they are. Th e solution to this problem, however, seems rather too 
eff ective: won’t the real Sophie, no matter how considerable her virtue, also 
suff er by comparison with Emile’s imaginary version of her?
Anticipating the objection, Rousseau claims that “it is unimportant 
whether the object I depict for him is imaginary” because “we love the image 
we make for ourselves far more than we love the object to which we apply it” 
(E 329). Yet he reveals the importance of the fact that Emile’s “model” is 
imaginary in the very act of downplaying its signifi cance: “If we saw what we 
love exactly as it is, there would be no more love on earth. When we stop 
loving, the person we loved remains the same as before, but we no longer see 
her in the same way. Th e magic veil drops, and love disappears.” Intimacy is 
highly injurious to illusion, and a stubbornly imperfect reality erodes even 
the most powerful psychological projections. When we stop loving, it is 
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partially due to the disproportion between our perfect standard and our 
imperfect beloved.
Rousseau exposes this disproportion and its troubling implications at 
the moment Emile is introduced to Sophie: “At the name Sophie, you would 
have seen Emile shiver. Struck by so dear a name, he is wakened with a start 
and casts an avid glance at the girl who dares to bear it. ‘Sophie, O Sophie! 
Is it you whom my heart seeks? Is it you whom my heart loves?’ ” (E 414). In 
a state of deep anxiety, Emile goes on to compare Sophie’s every feature to 
those possessed by his imaginary beloved, concerned that “if my heart yields 
and I am mistaken, then I shall never recover in all my days” (415). Of course, 
Emile is and must be mistaken: Sophie is not and cannot be the Sophie who 
exists in his imagination. But he nonetheless “surrenders” as soon as he hears 
her speak: “It is Sophie. He no longer doubts it. If it were not she, it would 
be too late for him to turn back.” Emile proceeds to “swallow with deep 
draughts the poison with which she intoxicates him,” and in that instant he 
bids farewell to his naïve independence. Emile now suff ers from a new kind 
of naïveté: he is desperately in love with a girl to whom he has not even 
spoken. Th e reader, however, has been warned. We know that the Sophie 
Emile sees is patently not the one he dreamed up and that it is most assuredly 
“too late for him to turn back.” In emphasizing the importance of Emile’s 
initial encounter with Sophie I follow Rousseau himself, who cautions us not 
to regard his detailed depiction of this event as a “frivolous game.” Th ose who 
ignore his warning fail to see “that a fi rst impression as lively as that of love 
. . . has distant eff ects whose links are not perceived in the progress of the 
years but do not cease to act until death.” Read in light of Rousseau’s intima-
tion that Emile’s fi rst encounter with Sophie is more troublesome than initial 
appearances suggest, such observations give us reason to regard the appar-
ently happy ending of the Emile with some suspicion: if the “eff ects” of fi rst 
impressions can remain latent for years, then there is no good reason to 
believe that they have been fully disclosed at the end of the Emile, or that the 
marriage according to nature will proceed and grow as happily as it began.
In addition to the disproportion that exists between the perfect model 
and the imperfect beloved, we fi nd a similar gap between anticipating con-
summation and the act itself. Sex pales in comparison with the imagination 
of it: the “supreme happiness” of consummation is “a hundred times sweeter 
to hope for than to obtain. One enjoys it better when one looks forward to 
it than when one tastes it.” Indeed, during the courting phase Emile is “as 
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happy as a man can be.” Unfortunately, the pleasure of imagining consum-
mation and the pleasure of engaging in it cannot be combined: “Th e whole 
value of life is in the felicity that he tastes. What [before consummation] can 
be added to his happiness? Look, consider, imagine what he still needs that 
can accord with what he has. He enjoys all the goods that can be obtained at 
once. None can be added except at the expense of another.” Th e sexual act 
itself, then, can only come at the “expense” of the extraordinary felicity pro-
vided by imagining it. Th e consummation of a romantic relationship initi-
ates its decay. Jean- Jacques, cognizant of all this, vows not to “shorten this 
happy time in your life. I shall spin out its enchantment for you. I shall 
prolong it as much as possible. Alas, it has to end, and end soon. But I shall 
make it last forever in your memory and make you never repent having 
tasted it” (E 419; emphasis added).
Emile and Sophie, unaware of the possibility that they would ever 
“repent” anything, blissfully abandon themselves to their shared illusions. 
Jean- Jacques does not (yet) explain the nature of love to his pupil and his 
beloved, allowing them to enjoy “the most charming delirium that human 
souls have ever experienced” (E 426). He has good reasons for withholding 
this lesson: though love is an illusion, to experience it as an illusion is to 
cheapen the experience itself. To make love an abstract phenomenon to be 
dissected and apprehended through reason, rather than a sentiment to be felt 
and enjoyed, is to prematurely decrease its appeal. We must be deceived fully 
in order to love fully (see Bloom 1993, 91, 113). Jean- Jacques knows that to 
understand love is to sacrifi ce it, but yet again Rousseau the author has 
informed the reader in ways that Jean- Jacques the tutor has not informed his 
pupil (E 426). He even invites us, informed in ways that Emile and Sophie 
are not, to let our imaginations “wander without constraint” in contemplat-
ing the fate of “two young lovers who . . . are untroubled as they yield them-
selves to the sweet illusion delighting them” (424). Th e reader who does so 
carefully must surely be struck that the source of their profound delight 
cannot endure.
Jean- Jacques does eventually inform Emile that his delirium cannot last. 
Before they leave Sophie and begin their extended travels, Jean- Jacques speaks 
forcefully to him about the nature and scope of love: “Before tasting the 
pleasure of life, you have exhausted its happiness. Th ere is nothing beyond 
what you have felt. . . . You have enjoyed more from hope than you will ever 
enjoy in reality. Imagination adorns what one desires but abandons it when it 
is in one’s possession . . . if nothing changes from without, the heart changes. 
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Happiness leaves us, or we leave it” (E 447). Rousseau fi nally tells Emile what 
the reader has long known. Romantic love begins to decay the moment it is 
consummated, and nothing can reverse this process once it has begun. Jean- 
Jacques’s impassioned discourse does not take hold, however, and he fi nds it 
necessary to again inform Emile—this time very unceremoniously—of the 
unsustainability of his love for Sophie. He reminds the lovers on their wed-
ding day that their bond “can only become weaker,” and he adds that the only 
way to extend their mutual attraction over the whole course of life is to disjoin 
obligation and love (475–76). Unfairly but unavoidably, the responsibility of 
managing love’s fi rst fi res falls to Sophie, who is informed (in confi dence) that 
shared pleasure is necessary but not suffi  cient to make the marriage endure: 
since “enjoyment wears out pleasure,” the only way to extend the marriage is 
to “make her favors rare and precious.” However, not even the most artful 
coquetry can prevent the inevitable decay of love, and the resulting void must 
be fi lled with the consolations—however partial—provided by friendship 
and the “sweet habit” of conjugal solicitude (479).
Because Rousseau never enters into the psychological particulars of how 
the transition from love to friendship occurs, it is diffi  cult to know whether 
these compensations will be suffi  cient to console the young lovers in their 
loss. Yet Rousseau’s own moral psychology suggests that such a transition will 
be more diffi  cult than Jean- Jacques lets on. Rousseau grounds his conception 
of friendship in pity (DI 131; cf. Reisert 2003, 78–85), but Rousseauan pity 
possesses conceptual features that ultimately tend to work against the kind of 
connectedness that Jean- Jacques seeks to eff ect. Th ough his ultimate aim is to 
fuse Emile and Sophie into a single organic unity (E 479), Rousseauan pity 
requires the existence of two discrete persons. We pity others both because we 
know we are not exempt from the suff erer’s ills but also because we delight in 
the fact that we do not suff er (223–24). Pity thus unites us with others while 
recognizing the imperfect and attenuated nature of that union. Pity, and by 
extension friendship, would thus seem ill suited to sustain Jean- Jacques’s hope 
of uniting Emile and Sophie into a single “moral person” (377), for the indi-
viduation required by pity violates Rousseau’s own conception of a healthy 
gendered relationship. Th e transition from love to friendship—a journey 
Emile and Sophie must make in order to stay together—thus appears to be 
more diffi  cult than initial appearances suggest.
Th e work concludes with Emile informing Jean- Jacques that Sophie is 
pregnant and requesting that he be involved in the rearing of their child: 
“My master, congratulate your child. He hopes soon to have the honor of 
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being a father. . . . But remain the master of young masters. As long as I live 
I shall need you. I need you more than ever now that my functions as a man 
begin. You have fulfi lled yours. Guide me so that I can imitate you. And 
take your rest. It is time” (E 480). Emile’s curious request recalls the creation 
language in Genesis 2:2: both God and Jean- Jacques “take their rest” while 
remaining intimately involved with their respective creations. When read in 
light of Rousseau’s previous remarks about the sustainability of romantic 
love, the biblical analogy seems to hold: Rousseau’s creation story, like the 
Bible’s, suggests that a fall is imminent.
| Fallen Man (and Citizen): Th e Perils of Social Incorporation
Provided that the end of Emile does not augur well, we should not be sur-
prised that Rousseau provides an account of “the fall” consistent with his 
belief in man’s natural goodness in Emile and Sophie, the unfi nished and 
posthumously published sequel to Emile. In this work Emile and his beloved 
move to Paris following the deaths of their child and her parents, and Sophie, 
coaxed by Emile’s fl agging romantic attentions, has an aff air with another 
man and becomes pregnant with his child. Driven to hysteria by the news, 
Emile abandons his family and, following a series of bizarre, almost pica-
resque adventures, fi nds himself alone in the world. Th is tragic end was 
foreshadowed in Emile, for it was brought on by precisely what Jean- Jacques 
warned of: the waning of Emile’s sexual passions. Indeed, we fi nd in the 
sequel that not even Sophie’s virtuous coquetry could stoke the fl ames of 
imagination: “Th is was no longer the time when my heated imagination was 
looking for Sophie, and rejected everything else. I was no longer looking for 
her, I possessed her, and her charm now served to embellish these objects of 
aff ect, as much as it had disfi gured them in early youth. But soon these same 
objects dulled my desires by diff using them. Worn out little by little by all 
these frivolous pursuits, my heart was imperceptibly losing its early resilience 
and was becoming incapable of warmth and vigor” (ES 202). Th e cooling of 
Emile’s passions leads, inevitably and necessarily, to a process of decline that 
reaches its nadir in Sophie’s dramatic confession of her unfaithfulness.
Th is tragic decline was undoubtedly accelerated by the questionable 
choice to move to Paris, a decision that not only sped up the process of decay 
but also magnifi ed the severity of its eff ects. In explaining his strange choice 
to move his family to the seventh circle of Rousseau’s moral universe, Emile 
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refers vaguely to “business” he had in the capital but adds that his primary 
motive was to provide a change of scenery that might help Sophie recover. 
Th is explanation is manifestly unpersuasive, for one does not rehabilitate an 
ailing spouse by moving to Gomorrah. A more compelling alternative—one 
that explains both Emile’s decision to move to Paris as well as his diminished 
desire for Sophie—is boredom. Th ough he was under no obligation to go to 
Paris and knew from experience to stay away, he moved there anyway and, 
once there, wasted no time in making the acquaintances of “too attractive 
liaisons” that isolated him from his wife and encouraged her infi delity (ES 
202–3). Emile, it would seem, was unhappy in the country and needed sexual 
and social stimulation that his wife could no longer provide. We may blame 
Paris, but only for accelerating a process that was already well under way.
Th is interpretation of the decision to move to Paris helps point up the 
broader problems with both of the strategies of social incorporation that are 
available to Emile and Sophie. Th e strategy of isolation proves ineff ective: 
left to each other in rustic repose, life becomes intolerably boring after 
romantic illusions are undermined by the harsh realities of running a domi-
cile. However, integration into a larger political community also poses deci-
sive problems. In Paris, indeed in any large political society, the problems 
come both from within and from without: couples must worry not only 
about sustaining the fragile illusions that enable their collective happiness 
but also about protecting themselves from the chaotic swirl of social forces 
that threaten their bond. We know, of course, that the City of Light is 
especially deadly to good morals, but it is distinguished from other com-
munities not by the fact that it corrupts but rather by the speed with which 
it does so. Th e move to Paris thus leads us to the melancholy insight that 
neither the isolated nor the integrated household can endure. One cannot 
be a part or apart.
Bad luck also clearly aff ected Emile and Sophie’s prospects for a happy 
life, but the decisive role accorded to accident speaks directly to the fragility 
of Emile’s pedagogic project. In order to endure, love must descend from the 
“celestial regions” to terra fi rma, it must survive the journey from the perfect 
imagination to the imperfect real world. Surviving such a descent requires a 
robustness and solidity that Emile and Sophie possess individually without 
sharing in tandem. Th eir misfortunes—even those not directly related to 
Emile’s dwindling desires—serve to underscore the fragility of their union. 
Human love is simply too frail to survive sustained exposure to the vicissi-
tudes of fortune. Its maintenance requires either extreme good luck or the 
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perpetual interventions of an omniscient tutor. Th e happiness enjoyed by 
men of goodwill but of average abilities is never secure; the world is too great, 
too strong, and too complex formiddling natures. Th ey, or rather we, require 
a kind of assistance that cannot be reasonably expected and that, even when 
obtained, proves insuffi  cient. Th is is the teaching of Emile.
| Why Cast the Tragic Veil?
Th e disquieting conclusion I have just found in Emile is, while discernible 
from the surface teaching, nonetheless not the work’s surface teaching and 
even appears to contradict its surface teaching. Th us it is necessary to ask 
what reasons Rousseau would have for veiling the tragic character of his 
great bildungsroman. At least part of the answer is contained in his very 
choice of literary form: in choosing to write an educational novel Rousseau 
not only describes but enacts the educational process depicted in the work 
(Scott 2012). Insofar as readers are provided with an account of the develop-
ment of their own passions that reveals their own natural goodness and are 
given “models of perfection” to which they may compare themselves and one 
another, they are themselves treated to a Rousseauan education no less than 
Emile and Sophie are. Th e imaginary pupils Rousseau presents to our under-
standing do much to expose the emptiness of bourgeois social life and to 
enlarge our sense of social possibility, and in so doing they seize control of 
the reader’s moral imagination in the same way that the idea “Sophie” did 
for Emile and the fi ctional Telemachus did for Sophie.
Th e fact that such images ultimately prove problematic for both of the 
happy lovers is doubtless worrisome for the careful reader, but not decisively 
so, for he knows that the noble failure embodied by Emile and Sophie’s 
imaginary romance is more meaningful than the hollow success achieved by 
more conventional understandings of love and marriage. It is nobler because 
it points corrupt readers—and all of us are corrupt—in the direction of virtue 
and away from the morally destructive individualism of Hobbes. To this end 
Rousseau simultaneously fl atters and elevates our romantic hopes. His 
romance shows us how the desire for love arouses the desire to be lovable and 
hence the desire to be virtuous. Emile and Sophie fi nd what is best in them-
selves through each other, and their touching example—even if it fails to 
endure—is for that reason worthy of genuine admiration. Th ey are not a 
perfect template for the reformation of domestic life, but they remind us all 
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of what is highest and best in us and in so doing provide a much- needed 
form of moral guidance.
Yet after all this has been said, we must acknowledge that this is some-
thing of a consolation prize. More attentive readers—ones with “the courage 
to begin again”—also see Rousseau’s quiet confi rmation of the very individu-
alism he is criticizing (DI 98). While the experience of love is salutary because 
it is conducive to the development of individual virtue, it nonetheless fails to 
establish the aff ective basis for lasting human community; to make virtue the 
fi nal reward of love is to replace a public or shared good with a private one. 
Emile sought to establish a kind of reciprocal governance between persons 
but in the end established it within them. Neither Emile nor Sophie ever 
became fully sociable in the way that the double object required; they loved 
their perfect images, not the imperfect other. In loving thus they became 
unwitting instruments of each other’s private moral improvement, but they 
failed to ever love each other as others. Love thus emerges from Emile both as 
a futile aspiration and as our “last best hope” in the quest to preserve our 
natural wholeness. It shows that there is no going back to the state of nature, 
but also that there can be no fi nal reconciliation of the natural and the social. 
Th e decisive and even tragic diffi  culties to which romantic love is subject 
would thus appear to have serious consequences for how we understand 
Rousseau’s broader social and political theory. Th ough it will not be until 
chapter 8 that I articulate a model of domestic life that would be appropriate 
for Rousseau’s political vision, I shall anticipate the analysis to come—and 
sum up the analysis already fi nished—by considering the question of political 
obligation in the context of Emile’s education.
| Th e Household and the Polity: Conclusions
Emile teaches not only that Emile’s love for Sophie is unsustainably fragile 
but also that the romantic- marital relation is the ground of Emile’s attach-
ment to his country. Taken together, these fi ndings suggest something very 
unsettling about the extent and the robustness of Emile’s sense of civic duty: 
if aff ection for one’s regime is derived from the aff ection he has for his family 
and if aff ection for one’s family is bound to decline, then it would seem that 
connection to the state would inevitably disintegrate as well. Th is, however, 
is too quick, for since Emile’s aff ection for his family is itself the product of 
his appreciation for the good and the decent in their universal forms, then 
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perhaps these same cosmopolitan moral sensibilities should, even in the 
absence of strong family ties, connect him to his fellow countrymen and 
dispose him to take sympathetic and benefi cent action toward them. Th us, 
before concluding our discussion of Emile and his relation to political soci-
ety, it is necessary to see whether the universalistic moral commitments to 
which he subscribes are suffi  ciently strong to connect him to his political 
regime and his fellow countrymen even in the absence of domestic ties 
(Neuhouser 2008).
We can begin to see our answer by noting that the very cosmopolitan-
ism that connects Emile to his countrymen also prevents his having any 
especially strong regard for them. His concern for them is a particular 
expression of a universal concern for the species and is emblematic of the 
equal moral respect to which men qua men are entitled, but neither one’s 
fellow citizens nor his particular state deserves special preference. Th e regime 
as the regime means nothing to Emile. His universal morality makes him as 
bad a patriot as he is a good neighbor.
To fl esh out these conclusions, we need to recur to the above analysis of 
Jean- Jacques’s explanation of Emile’s political duties as well as to look briefl y 
at Emile and Sophie. On this score, recall that Emile chooses at his tutor’s 
behest to remain in his homeland not because his presence will be demanded 
in the assembly but rather because it almost certainly will not be. He subjects 
himself to the laws of his country because the “simulacra of laws” found 
there best approximates his initial wish to “live in independence” with his 
beloved Sophie. Th us the political education Emile receives does not trans-
form his aff ective fi eld or reorient his relation to the political community in 
the same way that the education of the classical citizen does. Rather, his 
cosmopolitan moral outlook leads him to view his obligations to his state as 
deriving from his obligations to humanity as a whole. And even though 
Jean- Jacques fi nds it necessary to correct the “extravagant disinterestedness” 
with which Emile initially views those obligations, he approves the cosmo-
politan attitude underneath it and encourages his pupil never to forget that 
all men—fellow countrymen or not—deserve equal moral respect.
But the universal duty of moral respect is not enough to keep Emile 
connected to his homeland, or indeed to anyone in particular, and the sec-
ond letter of Emile and Sophie shows why. Writing his tutor from a remote, 
isolated location, Emile explains why he chose to leave his homeland and 
family following his wife’s infi delity. Characterizing his feelings of isolation 
and betrayal, Emile writes, “I have drunk the waters of oblivion. Th e past is 
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fading from my memory, and the universe opens before me. Th at is what I 
said to myself when leaving my fatherland. I was ashamed of it, and I owed 
it only contempt and hatred. Happy and worthy of honor in my own right, 
my country and its vile inhabitants victimized me and plunged me into 
disgrace. By breaking the bonds that attached me to my country, my patrio-
tism extended over the whole earth, and I became more of a man by ceasing 
to be a citizen” (ES 221–22). Emile reveals here how fragile his connection to 
the state is, acknowledging the derivative character of his political identity 
by blaming his “fatherland” for rupturing the relation he had to it. He had 
no other motive to remain where he was once the possibility of happy mar-
riage had passed, and even goes so far as to blame his homeland and its “vile 
inhabitants” for Sophie’s infi delity. He left his country not indiff erently, but 
with strong feelings of victimization and indignance, in order to spread his 
patriotism “over the whole earth.” Tracy Strong (1994), eager to fi nd Emile’s 
inner citizen, claims the young man is simply deceived about his own feel-
ings, but this is precisely the conclusion his education would have led him to 
draw. Incorporation into a particular political community—even the one 
his tutor had recommended for its relative justice—had contributed to the 
undoing of the romantic relation on which happiness depended, confi rming 
Emile’s initial suspicions about subjecting himself to the chaotic swirl of 
social forces that constitute political life. Far from being compensated for 
the sacrifi ce of independence that comes with settling down in a particular 
place, Emile is punished for it; his experience shows him that the costs of 
incorporation outweigh the benefi ts. He thus decides to extend his patrio-
tism “over the whole earth” and becomes a roving, itinerant traveler—one 
without roots or settled social relations, one who treats his fellow men with 
disengaged benefi cence without being emotionally or psychologically invested 
in any of them. Emile is benevolent in order to remain independent, and if 
he extends his hand to his fellows it is only in order to keep them at arm’s 
length.
By the end of Emile and Sophie it is clear that Emile’s own self- 
understanding far more closely resembles the disengaged and asocial pose 
that Rousseau himself strikes in the Reveries than it does the robust social 
sensibility of the classical citizen. Th e quasi- Stoic posture he assumes is a 
function not just of the breakdown of his romantic relation—though this 
breakdown defi nes Emile’s life in much the same way that, as we shall soon 
see, St. Preux’s frustrated love for Julie defi nes his—but of the recognition 
of the irreconcilable tension between his own cosmopolitanism and the 
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comprehensive embeddedness of the true citizen. Emile’s universal morality 
reveals the arbitrariness of the partiality that citizens show for one another, 
and in so doing it undermines the strong identifi cation that a good political 
society requires. Citizens love those within the city’s walls and regard outsid-
ers with suspicion and contempt (E 39). Cosmopolitan universalism does not 
lead to citizenship but to disengagement, social isolation, and relative inde-
pendence. It is not the answer to the question posed by Emile.
What, then, does the failure of the social and political component of 
Emile’s education tell us about the more general question of the relationship 
between the household and the polity? We must begin to answer this ques-
tion by acknowledging that Emile appears to assert their complementarity. 
Criticizing Socrates’s attempt to eliminate the nuclear family, Rousseau holds 
that the philosopher’s error was to reason “as though it were not by means of 
the small fatherland which is the family that the heart attaches itself to the 
large one; as though it were not the good son, the good husband, and the 
good father who make the good citizen!” (E 363). Th ough this passage is 
often taken to reveal the ultimate compatibility of Rousseau’s domestic and 
political visions (Fermon 1997; Schwartz 1984, 51), it is clear that Rousseau is 
defending the general idea of the household per se and not any specifi c set of 
domestic arrangements. He says that a private household of some kind is 
necessary to the possibility of good citizenship; he does not say that a house-
hold like Emile’s is the one necessary to the realization of that possibility.
In fact, Rousseau’s other writings strongly suggest that a home like Emile 
and Sophie’s is patently not what he has in mind for the society of the Social 
Contract. In the Discourse on Political Economy, for instance, Rousseau 
praises the households of the classical world, and of ancient Rome in particu-
lar, for their politicizing capacity: in serving as “so many schools of citizens” 
they managed to underwrite rather than undermine civic virtue. But he 
quickly adds that the complementarity Rome established between the house-
hold and the polity was a “continual miracle” that “the world should not 
hope to see again” (DPE 21–22). One reason Rousseau is pessimistic about 
rediscovering the civic potential of the household is that the ascendance of 
Christianity (among other developments) has decisively undermined the 
ideal of citizenship (e.g., E 38–40; SC IV.8). Perhaps more important, how-
ever, is that the idea of the household itself has changed in ways that aff ect 
its ability to serve as a site of civic education: the classical household did not 
contain within itself a conception of the best human life but was rather the 
“realm of necessity” (e.g., Arendt 1998, 28–31). As such, its function was not 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   108 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Romantic Love in Emile 109
to instantiate the good but rather to provide the material preconditions req-
uisite to its realization in the public realm. Th e household thus existed for the 
sake of the city—not vice versa. We, however, have seen that Emile and 
Sophie’s domestic retreat embodies a compelling—albeit not unproblem-
atic—vision of the good that does not require for its fulfi llment an experience 
of citizenship in a just polity. His household is a substitute for meaningful 
political life, not a basis for it.
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In Emile and its unfi nished sequel, Rousseau articulates a 
psychological theory about the dynamics of romantic love 
that highlights love’s imaginary character and the tragic limi-
tations that such imaginariness imposes. He also shows that 
the psychological diffi  culties attending the marital relation-
ship are aggravated by the necessity of social incorporation: 
whether in the bustling salons of Paris or the suff ocating 
hush of the farmhouse, even our impeccably educated lovers 
cannot, for all their individual merits, seem to make things 
work. Th eirs is a best case, and its failure is suggestive of 
broader problems with romantic association in particular 
and, perhaps, of human association more generally. Yet Emile 
is not Rousseau’s only, or perhaps even his fi nal, word on 
romantic love. To readers of Rousseau’s own time, in fact, it 
was not Emile but Julie that cemented the great Genevan’s 
reputation as a knower of things romantic. In the wildly 
popular epistolary novel, of which Rousseau claimed only to 
be the “editor,” the same tragic dynamics seen in Emile are 
reproduced in an illicit romance that occurs between an aris-
tocratic pupil (Julie) and her bourgeois tutor (St. Preux). 
Unlike Emile and Sophie, St. Preux and Julie are not per-
fectly educated. Also unlike Emile and Sophie, they are not 
allowed to choose their own spouses and thus are never for-
mally united: learning of his daughter’s intention to wed her 
Romantic Love in Julie5
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bourgeois tutor, Julie’s staunchly aristocratic father emphatically opposes her 
plans and intervenes violently in order to prevent them from coming to frui-
tion ( J 142–43). Th is turn in the narrative, though compelling from a dra-
matic point of view, denies the reader the opportunity to directly observe 
how St. Preux and Julie would have fared in the event of their union and 
makes it more diffi  cult to generalize from Emile and Sophie’s very diff erent 
case.
In seeking to generalize, then, one must reason from a counterfactual 
and, in such cases, there are inevitably plausible arguments on either side of 
the question. On one hand, there is no denying the unique and even miracu-
lous character of St. Preux and Julie’s love for each other. Th ey seem never to 
tire of expatiating on the exceptional character of their connection, and in 
one of the more aff ecting—and prescient—passages in the novel, Julie tells 
St. Preux what all lovers long to hear and say: “Our destinies are forever 
united, and we can no longer be either happy or unhappy if not together. 
Our souls have, so to speak, touched at every point, and we have everywhere 
felt the same cohesion” ( J 44). Such grand pronunciamentoes would be easier 
to dismiss if they issued only from the lovers themselves, but one fi nds nearly 
all the principal personages in the novel deeply impressed by the intensity of 
Julie and St. Preux’s relationship. It frequently occasions jealousy in Claire 
and astonishment in Milord Edward; the latter, himself an erstwhile admirer 
of Julie, says he has “seen nothing so extraordinary” as the connection shared 
by the two lovers, and he is so moved by the depth and charm of their love 
that he off ers them romantic asylum in England (161–64). What is more, 
we fi nd at the work’s end that Julie and St. Preux never stopped loving each 
other—that in fact their love had endured despite all the obstacles that 
impeded its full growth and development. On the basis of all this, there 
is a strong temptation to conclude that St. Preux and Julie’s love is excep-
tional—that it is “outside the rules” that confi ned and ultimately undid 
Emile and Sophie—and that its indestructibility consists in its very 
distinctiveness.
After all this has been said, however, there is still plenty of room to 
question such a conclusion. Th e lovers’ self- assessments, while often insight-
ful and always earnest, are also untrustworthy. Th eir correspondence, as 
Rousseau himself acknowledges in the work’s second preface, is full of exag-
geration, self- deception, and childish rhodomontadizing ( J 11). In lucid 
moments, Julie herself wonders about the robustness of the love she and St. 
Preux share, recalling the circumspection that Rousseau expresses as his own 
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in Emile. “To me,” she tells an increasingly randy St. Preux early in their 
courtship, “the slightest alteration of our present situation can only be for 
the worse. No, even were a happy bond to unite us forever, I know not 
whether the surfeit of happiness would not soon be its demise” (42). Julie’s 
pessimism about her prospects for felicity—even in a marriage—is striking, 
especially in light of St. Preux’s naïve unwillingness or inability to conceive 
of the passing of his love for Julie (e.g., 94–95). Th e assessments of others 
prove somewhat unreliable as well: Julie’s cousin Claire believes the generous 
view that Milord Edward takes of Julie and St. Preux’s relationship is less the 
product of disinterested observation than of the passionate attachment he 
feels for his friends (167). Th is attachment—precisely because it is so passion-
ate—recommends Milord Edward’s zeal in friendship more than his acute-
ness of judgment. Rousseau himself cannot resist poking fun at the aff able 
bombast of the soi- disant sage, appending an aff ectionately derisive remark 
to some of Milord’s more aff ectedly abstract ruminations: “I like the muddle 
of this letter, in that it is totally in good Edward’s character, who is never so 
philosophical as when he behaves foolishly, and never reasons so much as 
when he does not know what he is talking about” (431n). Milord always 
means well but rarely knows how to help.
Finally and perhaps most decisively, it would seem that Julie and St. 
Preux’s love endures throughout the novel not in spite of but because of the 
obstacles that impede its development. If Rousseau is clear about anything 
in Emile, it is that love has a life cycle—it grows, matures, and dies. Applied 
to the novel, this theory suggests that the very circumstances that conspire 
to arrest the development of Julie and St. Preux’s love also keep it from 
dying. Th e image of Julie calcifi es in St. Preux’s memory because intervening 
circumstances prevent him from perceiving or coming to terms with the 
disproportion between the perfect image and the imperfect person. Had 
their relationship been given space to grow, it is diffi  cult to believe that the 
outcome would be diff erent from or preferable to what happened to Emile 
and Sophie. Th ese, to be sure, are only prima facie considerations, but they 
are compelling enough to cast suffi  cient doubt on the view that the unique-
ness of St. Preux and Julie’s attachment is suffi  cient to guarantee its long- 
term success.
I incline toward this more circumspect view and below I will give it 
more systematic and persuasive exposition. More specifi cally, I intend to 
establish two general propositions. Th e fi rst is that there is little reason to 
believe that Julie and St. Preux’s love is immune to the processes of decline 
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that undo Emile and Sophie and appear to beset all romantic relationships. 
Th e second, following from the fi rst, is that if St. Preux and Julie’s love is 
liable to break under the weight of habit—if their imaginary conceptions of 
each other are eff aced by the harsh and unfl attering lights of reality—then 
the transition from love to friendship would seem to be diffi  cult and ulti-
mately impossible for such intense lovers. Th us Julie confi rms and builds on 
the tragic teaching of Emile.
In arguing thus it will be necessary to closely examine Part I of Julie in 
light of the possibility raised by Milord Edward (called Bomston hereafter) 
early in Part II: he off ers St. Preux and Julie romantic asylum in England, 
where they can enjoy their love sheltered from the “gothic maxims” of Julie’s 
implacable and barbarous father. St. Preux is predictably enthusiastic about 
the whole aff air, but Julie—after seeking the counsel of her “inseparable” 
cousin Claire—refuses Bomston’s off er. Her rejection is grounded in her 
(and Rousseau’s) pessimism not only about the durability of love but also 
about the possibility of friendship after love has faded. Julie herself betrays a 
certain circumspection concerning the ultimate fate of their union consis-
tent with the theory announced in Emile but inconsistent with relevant 
alternative hypotheses. What is more, St. Preux’s reaction to his tryst with 
Julie more than justifi es her pessimism: as the psychological theory of Emile 
predicts, St. Preux’s aff ections for Julie begin to diminish immediately after 
consummation. Th e necessity of love’s passing requires us to consider the 
possibility of transitioning from love to friendship as well as the possibility 
of transitioning from friendship to love. Julie, however, casts doubt on both 
of these propositions: the memory of lost love creates resentment rather than 
aff ection and renders bitter the “sweet habit” of conjugal solicitude, and 
friendship cannot become love because it is characterized by a form of trans-
parency precluded by the illusions of love.
| Should I Stay or Should I Go? Julie’s Divided Loyalties
Th e fi rst movement of Julie is also its most romantic. Th e opening theme—
“I must fl ee you Mademoiselle, that I can see”—introduces a visual meta-
phor and suggests that we are blind while under love’s spell ( J 25). Th e 
coda—an angry St. Preux protesting the forced separation from his lover—
reintroduces visual language but for a diff erent and even contradictory pur-
pose: as he repeats “What! Not see her again!” in increasingly mournful 
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tones, there is a suggestion that he is blind without love and that death in the 
service of intense passional commitment is preferable to life spent under the 
anesthesia of petty pleasures (151; emphasis added). To this tension Julie joins 
many others, and a central debate among critics of the work is less about 
whether it possesses a bipolar or dialectical structure than about what spe-
cifi c opposition best explains the tensions in the text. For Schiller (1979) they 
were “intellect” and “sensitivity”; for Starobinski (1988), “transparency” and 
“obstruction”; and for Shklar (1969), “inclination” and “duty.” Starobinski, 
though he off ers a dialectical interpretation of Julie, has some reservations 
about doing so. He confesses that “some ambiguities remain” after his dia-
lecticized interpretation is complete: “Are the antithetical terms, passion and 
virtue, ever really reconciled? Is passion really transcended? Does the synthe-
sis really take place? . . . All these questions must be asked, and the diffi  culty 
of answering them points up the danger of accepting unreservedly a ‘dialec-
tical’ interpretation such as the one sketched here” (114, cf. DeMan 1979).
I join Starobinski in such concerns, and to them I add that Julie seems 
to be less about the resolution of problems than about their fundamental 
intransigence. And to be sure, one such problem is the tension between vir-
tue and happiness. But it is neither the only nor the most important problem 
the text confronts. Indeed, the diffi  culties faced by the novel’s principal 
characters—the internal contradictions, the feelings of alienation and isola-
tion, the self- deception, the crippling emotional dependence—are not pre-
sented as accidental or transient conditions that admit of synthesis or fi nal 
resolution, but rather as perennial and ineliminable features of their (and 
our) individual and collective lives. Julie teaches that these enemies must be 
fought but can never be defeated. Th ey crowd the text and animate all the 
action; they are always lurking underneath all the delusions, mistakes, errors 
in judgment, and defi ciencies in self- knowledge that propel the plot forward. 
It is to their rhythm that the tragedy marches inexorably forward, and it is 
on their terms that Julie’s symbolic sacrifi ce/suicide occurs. Her death, of 
course, is meant to remind us of Jesus’s, but in the end we fi nd that Julie’s 
desires were decidedly un- Christlike, for she loved and physically desired St. 
Preux all along. If God exists then He was either unwilling or unable to cure 
Julie’s illness. His earthly stand- in, Wolmar, tried his best but, in the end, 
could only throw up his hands. For all his machinations and foresight, not 
even he could resolve the diffi  culties that threaten and fi nally undermine the 
fragile happiness of which human beings are capable.
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But we must ask: are our diffi  culties as stubborn and severe as that? It is 
one thing to say Rousseau’s characters make things diffi  cult for themselves 
and quite another to say there is no good solution to the problems they face. 
Th ings may have turned out diff erently and, yes, perhaps even more happily. 
What, for instance, if Julie had accepted Bomston’s off er to give her and St. 
Preux an estate in England? We, of course, want to believe things might have 
been diff erent had the lovers been united; we are on their side and, as Rous-
seau’s heirs, are enlightened enough to prefer his voluntaristic theory of mar-
riage to the “gothic maxims” that prevent their union. However, Julie does 
not accept Bomston’s off er, choosing instead to stay in the Vaud with her 
parents. Th e entire novel turns on this decision and becomes incomprehen-
sible if we cannot understand why Julie did what she did. Of course, she 
off ers an account on this score and it is plausible enough: she expresses con-
cern about her mother’s health, her father’s violent temper, and their advanc-
ing age. She is, in addition, almost certainly worried about the prospect of 
her increasingly enfeebled maman receiving another beating at the hands of 
the “best of fathers” ( J 143). “Th e question,” she tells Bomston, “is not 
whether I have the right to order my life against the will of those who gave 
it to me, but whether I can do so without mortally aggrieving them, whether 
I can fl ee them without casting them deep into despair” (170). “Can I,” she 
goes on, “pitilessly desert those thanks to whom I breathe, who sustain the 
life they have given me, and make it dear to me . . . ? A father approaching 
sixty! A mother forever sickly!” To such considerations she appends the now 
foregone conclusion: “My parents will make me unhappy . . . but for me it 
will be less cruel to lament in my misfortune than to have caused theirs” 
(171). Julie would leave, but her heart bids her stay.
Such considerations are not inapposite, and they are off ered sincerely. 
Th e “shame and regret” of desertion and neglect very possibly would have 
presented an insuperable obstacle to Julie’s happiness, especially given her 
extreme susceptibility to feelings of moral guilt ( J 170). Yet her rationale 
ultimately creates as many questions as it answers, and even the most chari-
table interpretation of her account shows that it fails to resolve the concerns 
it addresses. Indeed, the arguments she off ers on behalf of staying with her 
parents cut both ways, and they might actually be advanced even more 
forcefully on the other side of the controversy. If, for instance, she is con-
cerned about “mortally” aggrieving someone, then the obvious candidate is 
St. Preux rather than her parents: his fascination with and desire for suicide 
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recur throughout the novel, and he has already threatened to kill himself 
once by the time Julie refuses Bomston (76). Does she think someone as 
sensitive as her lover will bear the bad news with more aplomb? Even a super-
fi cial familiarity with St. Preux’s character speaks rather forcibly against this 
notion: a more drastic or less dignifi ed reaction can scarce be imagined (see 
esp. 151). What requires emphasis, however, is that Julie has confl icting duties 
and is going to hurt someone—perhaps “mortally”—no matter what she 
chooses to do (165). As a consequence, we see that her vivid appeals to the 
horrors of her parents’ suff ering do not and cannot decide the matter. Julie 
herself appears to recognize this when she confesses to Bomston that she 
“cannot answer” his arguments on behalf of going to England with St. Preux 
(171). Bomston’s account on this score is compelling and Julie’s response to 
him is hardly determinative. She must, then, have other unstated reasons 
that perhaps she does not wish to disclose to Bomston.
In beginning, to give shape and coherence to these unstated reasons, we 
should begin by noting Julie’s response to Bomston appeals to the interest 
she has in her own happiness rather than to the duties she owes her parents 
as an ethical matter. She does not, as Shklar’s interpretation suggests, argue 
that her heart carries her to Kent but her duties keep her in Switzerland. Julie 
is not the deontologist she is often made out to be. Instead, she says she is 
staying because she will be less happy in England than she will be at home: 
the “shame and regret” of leaving her parents outweigh all other consider-
ations, and the remorse felt for her negligence would poison the rest of her 
life. Th e tension she feels is thus not between duty and love, but between 
competing forms of love; the relevant opposition is not between the heart 
and the mind but within the heart itself: “Such is the source of the reproaches 
of a terrifi ed conscience, and of the secret murmurs that rend my heart” 
( J 170; emphasis added). As is so often the case in Rousseau, the desires of 
the heart are couched in the language of conscience. Julie chooses her parents 
over St. Preux, and does so as a being whose primary concern is, if not exactly 
the increase of happiness, then at least the reduction of unhappiness.
Th e obvious answer is that Julie simply loves her parents more than she 
loves St. Preux and chooses to stay with them for that reason. Th is explana-
tion has the virtue of looking for Julie’s inner confl ict in more or less the 
right place: rather than search for a tension between “passion” and “duty,” 
the proponent of this view begins by looking at tensions within the passional 
realm. Th e evident tension appears to be between pity and love, and it is 
decided in favor of pity; the prospect of her parents’ suff ering is simply too 
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awful for Julie to consider, and the anticipation of their suff ering is more 
painful than the loss of her love. Th is view, however, is also problematic, for 
Julie often describes herself and her personality as defi ned by its need for 
romantic love. Julie’s interest in the sexual association is identity- constitutive—
“Love,” she tells St. Preux, “will be the major business in our lives”—and 
ceteris paribus it should take priority over her abusive father’s emotional bul-
lying ( J 89). Indeed, the posture Julie strikes in her letter to Bomston rings 
somewhat hollow because it is inconsistent with everything she has done to 
that point in the novel: were she as devoted to her parents’ happiness as she 
aff ects to be in her letter to Bomston—were she consistent in privileging 
their wishes over those of St. Preux—then she never would have gotten 
involved with her tutor in the fi rst place. In order to take seriously the propo-
sition that Julie loves her parents more than she does St. Preux, we would 
need to know why she loves her parents too much to marry St. Preux but not 
enough to have resisted his advances. Th is, I think, is a rather tough row to 
hoe, even if such a case could be made that it is more plausible to take the 
arguments Julie makes to Bomston as a sincere but incomplete statement of 
her actual view. What, then, is the unstated source of Julie’s hesitance to join 
St. Preux in England? If neither duty nor overweening guilt can all the way 
explain why Julie elects to stay home, then what does?
Tanner (1982) fi nds an answer in Julie’s class prejudice. Ever the daddy’s 
girl, Julie shares her father’s reservations about St. Preux’s social status and, 
on his interpretation, never intended to wed him in the fi rst place. St. Preux 
thus becomes a bourgeois Mandingo, a boy toy over whom Julie exercises—
often cruelly—an absolute and nonreciprocal empire. Th ough searching in 
many ways, Tanner’s interpretation is not especially convincing in this 
regard, for it is diffi  cult to see how Julie could have loved St. Preux as she did 
if she were as devoted to her father as Tanner’s interpretation makes her. 
Indeed, the very fact that Julie recognized St. Preux as a semblable and as 
worthy of aff ection speaks forcibly against the notion that her reservations 
about him are motivated by class diff erences. An interpretation that narrows 
Julie’s motives thus cannot explain why there is a love story in the fi rst place.
Th ere is, however, a more compelling possibility for explaining Julie’s 
unwillingness to run away to Kent. It is that Julie has quite reasonable reser-
vations about St. Preux in particular, and about male desire more generally, 
that look very much like Rousseau’s own. Part I of the novel gives particularly 
clear expression to Julie’s circumspection about the very love for which her 
heart is made, confi rming the tragic psychology of romantic love articulated 
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in Emile. She not only sees the unhappy fate that awaits St. Preux and her 
with stark and horrid clarity; she also perceives its fundamental cause. Like 
Rousseau, Julie sees the physicalization of romantic love as both inevitable 
and destructive, and also like Rousseau she senses that men are inconstant 
and unreliable romantic partners. Julie’s presentiments about the variability 
of male romantic passion are, Rousseau claims, known to all women but go 
unperceived by even the best- educated men. One sees this clearly at the end 
of Emile, where Jean- Jacques addresses the young couple and saves for their 
wedding day the unsettling observation that their love will die. Emile, like St. 
Preux, cannot conceive the idea: believing his Sophie to be an inexhaustible 
source of delight, he laughs to himself and at anyone who would follow Jean- 
Jacques in considering the possibility of his love for Sophie ever waning. Th e 
tutor, of course, knows his pupil is simply unable to understand the logic of 
his own desires, but the impeccably educated Emile hasn’t the slightest idea 
about the mutability of sexual passion. Even the fi nest and most refl ective 
young men have virtually no comprehension of their own drives and view the 
romantic situation with an almost shocking lack of foresight. Emile’s myopic 
focus on consummation calls immediately to mind Machiavelli’s Callimaco 
who, after so much ingenious scheming to seduce the married Lucrezia, has 
absolutely no idea what to do with her after he fi nally succeeds in doing so.
Sophie, however, cannot hide her “curiosity,” and she listens closely to 
Jean- Jacques’s discourse on how to stoke love’s fi rst fi res. Her anxiety, though 
felt obscurely, is not unfounded. “Men,” Rousseau explains, “are less constant 
than women. . . . Th e woman has a presentiment of the man’s inconstancy 
and is uneasy about it” (E 476). Julie, for her part, has a far more sophisti-
cated grasp of male inconstancy than does Sophie, and the fi rst part of the 
novel bearing her name reveals this awareness in striking ways. It tracks the 
development of Julie and St. Preux’s love and its movement, which is both an 
ascent and a descent, from the spiritual to the physical realm. And as the 
sentiments of love increasingly require corporeal expression—as the needs of 
the soul fi nd their ultimate expression in the satisfaction of the body—so, 
too, do they grow more unstable. Th e tension of interest here is thus neither 
between love and duty nor is it between paternal and romantic love; there is, 
instead, a tension within the bodily and spiritual elements—the “physical” 
and “moral” parts—of love itself. And Julie, like Emile, shows that such a 
tension is not susceptible of resolution. It is perennial and congenital, not 
provisional and reconcilable.
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| He Loves Me, He Loves Me Not: Th e Limits of Embodied Love
At the novel’s beginning, love has virtually no physical dimension. It is 
almost purely ideational and psychological; it seeks not sex so much as the 
peculiar form of recognition that attaches to sexual attraction. Th e desire for 
this kind of acknowledgment will, of course, ultimately fi nd a specifi cally 
sexual expression, but for now the desires of the body are subordinate to 
those of the psyche. In his confession to Julie, St. Preux claims that he shares 
with her a unique way of viewing the world and that their suitability for each 
other consists in this shared distinctiveness. “Not having acquired the uni-
form prejudices of the world, we have uniform ways of feeling and seeing, 
and why should I not dare imagine in our hearts the same accord I perceive 
in our opinions?” ( J 26). Here and throughout the letter, St. Preux’s primary 
concern is to create a zone of exclusivity for Julie and himself. He wants to 
keep the homogenous world and its “uniform prejudices” out of sight so he 
may feel Julie’s gaze fi xed fi rmly and exclusively on him. Being seen by Julie 
is, at least for the time being, enough for St. Preux. Bodily desire is nowhere 
in evidence, and this is, for Rousseau, as it should be: sex isn’t especially 
interesting unless it is joined to exclusive emotional commitment. “Posses-
sion,” he observes in Emile, “which is not reciprocal is nothing.” Without the 
special assurances of one’s beloved and the gratifi cation that comes with an 
intense and exclusive union, a “mule driver is closer to happiness” than a 
voluptuary (E 349). At fi rst blush, then, love seems to live its life not in the 
dimly lit boudoir (or the musty chalet) but rather in the celestial regions of 
the mind.
Yet the desires of the body, so quiet in the fi rst letter, are not long in 
making themselves known. After Julie confesses that she loves St. Preux as 
he loves her and thereby satisfi es his initial desire for recognition, he begins 
to not- so- subtly hint that a love such as theirs must be physicalized: “What, 
fair Julie, are the strange caprices of love! My heart has more than it hoped 
for, and is not content. You love me, you tell me so, and I sigh. Th is unfair 
heart dares desire still more, when it has nothing more to desire” ( J 38). His 
love for Julie, once an ideational unity, is now a violent compound made up 
of imaginary and bodily elements; it has been reduced to “warring with 
itself” and demands a pittance for its struggle. “What then,” St. Preux crassly 
inquires, “will be the reward for so pure an homage if it is not your esteem, 
and what good to me is perpetual and voluntary abstinence from all that is 
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sweetest in the world if she who demands it is wholly ungrateful to me?” (39). 
Th e paradoxical reward for abstinence is its negation. After reaffi  rming his 
determination to love Julie as she needs rather than how he likes, he stirs her 
pity and her too- developed sense of guilt by reminding her of his own needs: 
“I languish and waste away; fi re courses through my veins; nothing can 
extinguish or damp it, and I stir it up by trying to contain it. . . . I complain 
not of my fate. . . . Yet a real torment pursues me, I seek in vain to fl ee it. . . . 
I would wish to live for you, and it is you who deprive me of life” (43).
Julie’s response to St. Preux’s coaxing refl ects both her lucidity of mind 
and the depth of her circumspection. She expresses an admirable awareness 
of the dynamics of romantic love in the very act of submitting to them. She 
knows St. Preux desires her sexually and that his imagination has been 
stirred by the prospect of consummation. Indeed, her own imagination has 
been stirred, and she shares his desires. Yet she insists that the physicaliza-
tion of their love will lead to its demise:
Some sad foreboding arises in my breast and cries to me that we are enjoying the 
only happy times that Heaven may have allotted us. For the future I can glimpse 
only absence, tempests, troubles, contradictions. To me the slightest alteration of 
our present situation can only be for the worse. No, were a sweet bond to unite us 
forever, I know not whether the surfeit of happiness would not soon be its demise. Th e 
moment of possession is a crisis for love, and any change is dangerous for ours; 
from now on we can only lose by it. ( J 41–42; emphasis added)
Julie here considers love’s best case—a marriage—and can nonetheless see 
nothing but “tempests” and “contradictions.” In doing so, she does more 
than rearticulate her father’s class prejudice. Her concern is not simply politi-
cal; it is also psychological. She intuits what Rousseau explains theoretically 
in Emile, namely, that the sweetness of love consists most fully in the antici-
pation of consummation, and that the act itself is bound to disappoint the 
high expectations to which its antecedent hopes give rise. Julie and St. Preux, 
like Emile and Sophie, are happiest before consummation because they have 
everything to expect and nothing to regret. She does not want to alter the 
“present situation” because she knows that to physicalize love is to push it 
toward the grave: in saying that the “surfeit of happiness” would soon 
“become its demise,” Julie is calling attention to the limited and tragically 
compromised character of sexual love. For Julie as for Rousseau, to consum-
mate love is also to destroy it.
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She therefore seeks to defer physicalization yet again, telling St. Preux 
that “we are happy as we are; nothing makes it clearer to me than the vexa-
tion I experience at the slightest change of situation” ( J 49). Ironically, the 
letter ends with Julie conceding to St. Preux’s prodding by proposing the 
fateful meeting at the bower: “It shall not be said that [St. Preux] must ever 
show deference and I never generosity . . . I want to make him feel, in spite 
of vulgar prejudices, how greatly what the heart gives surpasses what insis-
tence seizes” (51). Th ough Julie, unlike Emile and Sophie, is undeceived 
about the nature of romantic love, she is nonetheless too susceptible to its 
sway to resist it. On the one hand, she is acutely aware of her “thirst for love” 
and of the need for “eternal attachment” that it put in her heart, and she 
seeks out the belle âme St. Preux for his distinctive qualities of mind and 
heart. Th ese qualities are, of all the virtues, the “least subject to disaff ection” 
and the most conducive to the “eternal attachment” she so desires (50). On 
the other hand, however, Julie’s own language reveals her circumspection 
about the likelihood that her need for enduring love will be satisfi ed: note 
that St. Preux’s virtues are not immune but rather are “the least subject” to 
disaff ection. In the fullness of time, everyone becomes a tiresome bore. In 
writing to her lover as she does, Julie is doing little more than yielding to the 
requirements of her own moralized sexuality. If in her letter she emphasizes 
how the “moral” elements of love direct and dictate its “physical” expression, 
the actions that follow show how the needs of the body infl uence and regu-
late the moral imagination. Th e secret of the bower is her recognition of and 
concession to the inescapably corporeal character of romantic love. If love is 
a dance between the body and soul, then it is in letter XIII that the body 
begins to lead.
Physical need, excited rather than exhausted by a kiss under the bower, 
asserts itself with ever growing strength. St. Preux becomes so unmanage-
able that Julie banishes him to the Valais country. From this mountainous 
and secluded region he whines until he is allowed to return, and even threat-
ens suicide in order to shorten the duration of his exile. Julie bears the sepa-
ration with considerably more dignity, though she is so aff ected by St. Preux’s 
absence that she becomes ill. Her sickness, of course, is representative of the 
inner turmoil that her love for St. Preux has caused; it is a physiological 
expression of the despair created not so much by his absence as by the pros-
pect of his return. Banishing him to the Valais was a temporary fi x; she 
knows he is coming back—for she cannot live without him—but she also 
knows that his reappearance is the reappearance of a bodily need whose 
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satisfaction is, so to speak, the beginning of love’s end. Despite her awareness 
of this she takes advantage of her parents’ absence by proposing to St. Preux 
a rendezvous at a nearby chalet that “serves as a shelter for hunters and 
should serve only as a sanctuary for lovers” ( J 92). Th eir tryst is delayed but 
fi nally consummated toward the end of part I.
St. Preux’s night with Julie is the signal event in his life. He spends the 
rest of the novel trying to forget it. His immediate reaction underscores this 
importance, but it also reveals an important shift in his feelings for her and 
in the dynamics of their relationship. He understands that things have 
changed between them without quite understanding what that change 
means. “Oh let us die, my sweet Friend!” he bellows ecstatically in the letter 
that follows consummation, “let us die well beloved of my heart! What use 
can we make from now on of an insipid youth of which we have exhausted 
all the delights?” ( J 120). Th ese exclamations are appealing indeed, for St. 
Preux goes on to explain that he perceives a change within himself, report-
ing that his feelings for Julie “have somehow have acquired a less impetu-
ous, but sweeter, tenderer, and more enchanting character” (121). Th is 
change, he goes out of his way to emphasize, is qualitative rather than 
quantitative: the moment after consummation, St. Preux loves Julie not 
more or less but diff erently. His feelings have been altered “in nature” and 
have become “more aff ectionate” and “more varied” as the “the frenzies of 
love” are alloyed with the “gentle pleasures of friendship” (121). St. Preux’s 
new mode of address refl ects his more diff use love for Julie, for he refers to 
her not only as his “mistress” and “wife” but also as a “sweet friend” and a 
“sister” (120, 122).
But this same letter provides reason to question the conviction that St. 
Preux off ers so sincerely. As a preliminary matter we must ask: if his love for 
Julie is undiminished, why does he want to die? If it is true that “the delights” 
of youth have been “exhausted,” it is diffi  cult to understand how St. Preux 
can tell Julie that his love for her is as intense as it was before. We can begin 
to understand St. Preux’s evolving understanding of his relationship with 
Julie by noting that, as a general matter, feelings of emptiness and even des-
peration often follow defi ning life experiences. To take a mundane example, 
children commonly enjoy unwrapping their Christmas presents far more 
than playing with them. To the parent who might say, “But now you can 
actually play with them. Th ey belong to you!” the child might retort that the 
whole point was to open them. Th ere is something of this attitude, raised to 
a higher pitch, in St. Preux’s postcoital exclamations, for what they reveal 
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above all else is an emergent awareness that there is nothing beyond what was 
just experienced; the act of possession surpasses the experience of ownership.
If we take St. Preux at his word, his claim that his feelings have not 
diminished is merely a way of protesting too much; his very need to insist 
that he does not love Julie less is itself the most telling evidence that he does. 
It might be, of course, easier to dismiss St. Preux’s wish to die with Julie as a 
peculiar form of pillow talk, an intimate disclosure that, while not exactly 
insincere, is nonetheless not to be taken literally. But this cannot be done 
without fi rst acknowledging that this is neither the fi rst nor the last time that 
St. Preux expresses a wish to die with Julie. To dismiss such language as mere 
rhetoric is also to dismiss the possibility that life after consummation will 
never attain the felicity of life before it. Rousseau himself was so alive to the 
connection between love and death that he considered ending the novel at 
the end of Part IV, with Julie and St. Preux drowning together in a storm. To 
ignore what St. Preux says on this head would be more justifi able if he 
repeated it less often. Th us it seems right to say with Shklar (1969, 138) that 
St. Preux “does not really want to live with [Julie], but to die with her.” Th is 
is precisely what the theory of love articulated in Emile would predict.
Perhaps more tellingly, the letter’s conclusion, where St. Preux acknowl-
edges that he does not love as deeply as Julie does, is a subtle form of admis-
sion that squares with a more literal interpretation of the letter’s beginning. 
When with “self- shame” and “mortifi cation” he acknowledges that she “is 
better able to love” than he, St. Preux is less praising Julie’s seemingly infi nite 
capacity for love than acknowledging that his own feelings are changed. 
Had they not diminished, he would have nothing to confess and no discern-
ible reason to be ashamed of himself. Th us it is St. Preux’s “mortifi cation” 
that ultimately exposes an ugly truth about sexual love generally but, as we 
saw earlier, of specifi cally male sexual desire. His confession is not quite 
buyer’s remorse, but it reveals the anxious conscience of a sincere though 
naïve lover who got more than he bargained for and is now trying to under-
stand—and delicately explain—why, the following day, he fi nds his feelings 
so changed.
Even one who believes St. Preux’s claims about his new and “more var-
ied” love has reason to be concerned about the stability of the sentiments he 
expresses. On this score it is very revealing that St. Preux should feel the 
need for fraternal and familial aff ection only after having consummated his 
sexual relationship with Julie, for the new variability and diff useness in his 
love for her actually indicates a kind of nascent dissatisfaction with romantic 
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love proper. Before consummation, all of St. Preux’s psychic energy was 
invested in Julie as a lover and a sex object; he had no family, no friends but 
Claire (Bomston has not yet appeared), and no evident want of either. Such 
needs come into being only after love has tried but failed to satisfy his desire 
for wholeness on its own. Th e sexual experience, for all the depth of meaning 
that Rousseau coaxes out of it, is nonetheless characterized by a persistent 
absence, a nagging dissatisfaction, an obscure but overwhelming awareness 
of its own insuffi  ciency. Th e gap between expectation and reality persists not 
because the reality of love is terribly low, but because the expectations it 
generates are so incredibly high; love would satisfy us more if it wanted less. 
But Rousseau knew that eros brooks no compromise, and it is only when St. 
Preux is confronted with the fact that love qua love cannot satisfy his want 
of wholeness that he seeks out the supplemental satisfactions of friendship 
and fraternal love. St. Preux has always wanted Julie to bridge all the divi-
sions and satisfy all the desires in his soul, and this remains true after con-
summation. Yet he now knows in some vague and inarticulable way that she 
cannot do so exclusively in her capacity as a lover; she must now also fulfi ll 
the roles of “sweet friend” and “sister.” It is the dissatisfactions produced by 
love that create the need for fraternal and familial aff ection. Rousseau hints 
at this point when he says that “from the need of a mistress is born the need 
of a friend” (E 215). Th e disappointment that sets in after consummation—
which in St. Preux’s case is almost immediate—catalyzes other social needs 
and requires their harmonious integration into our psychic lives.
We must then ask the question: can it work? Can these derivative forms 
of aff ection conjoin to or stand in eff ectively for love? St. Preux’s letter gives 
us no reason to think so, for though he seeks to supplement his already- 
fl agging romantic passion for Julie with other forms of intimacy it is evident 
his new expectations of her are entirely unreasonable. No one can sensibly be 
expected to simultaneously fulfi ll the roles she is now charged with fulfi ll-
ing: the absurdity of it all is summed up in his grotesque insistence on call-
ing her his “sister.” And yet love demands comprehensive satisfaction: feeling 
the singular mix of dissatisfaction and ecstasy that characterizes limit expe-
riences—romantic or not—St. Preux sees nothing wrong with or impossible 
about combining the roles of sex object and sibling, of terrestrial goddess 
and devoted materfamilias, of carnal seductress and chaste wife. All his 
emotional energy is still fi xed exclusively on a single person, but that energy 
has lost its some of its concentration and now seeks multiple kinds of social 
gratifi cation. He wants Julie to be the exclusive source of his consolation and 
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contentment and he seems to believe—very sincerely but very incorrectly—
that this is possible.
A less literal but more sympathetic way of interpreting St. Preux’s 
response is to note his growing awareness that the transports of love are of 
themselves insuffi  cient. For the fi rst time, he clearly sees that romantic 
 passion must be joined to—and eventually replaced by—the intimacy of 
friendship and mutual esteem in order for a relationship to endure. As we 
have already seen, this is consistent with the position taken by Jean- Jacques 
the tutor (if perhaps not by Rousseau the author) in Emile, and it is also 
consistent with what St. Preux says earlier in the text: mulling the prospect 
of eternal union with Julie, he conjectures that “a long and sweet intoxica-
tion would leave us oblivious to the passage of years: and when old age fi nally 
slakes our fi rst ardors, the habit of thinking and feeling together would put 
in the place of their transports a no less tender friendship” ( J 68). St. Preux 
believes the transition from love to friendship would be unproblematic, and 
why should he not? After all, he loves his Julie in all the ways it is possible to 
love her, and with all the intensity of which his heart is capable. He can 
imagine that such a love could change its nature but not that it could dimin-
ish or disappear. Why, then, should she not join him in Kent under Bomston’s 
protection?
Two answers suggest themselves. First, St. Preux himself appears to have 
contradictory understandings of the dynamics of romantic love. Th ough he 
initially indicates a belief that a specifi cally romantic passion will eventually 
expire and turn into something closer to friendship ( J 68), he claims later 
that romantic love builds on itself and, far from slackening over time, instead 
intensifi es: “No, Julie, I cannot see you everyday simply as I saw you the day 
before: my love is bound to increase and grow incessantly with your charms, 
and you are for me an inexhaustible source of new sentiments that I would 
not even have imagined” (94; emphasis added). St. Preux thus has contradic-
tory theoretical expectations about the eff ect time has on romantic passion: 
in one letter he claims that love is slowly replaced by friendship (68), but 
just a few letters later (94) he insists that love is susceptible of infi nite 
expansion and growth. For all his speechifying about the nature of love, 
St. Preux does not appear to have a clear idea about whether—or how 
long—it can last. Even if we are inclined to attribute this latter view to a 
temporary lack of intellectual lucidity, for St. Preux is not thinking clearly 
at all at this point in the novel, we are also obliged to note that this is 
neither the fi rst nor the only time that St. Preux’s reason deserts him. His 
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emotional instability is a constituent part of his moral personality. One can 
certainly imagine that Julie might have concerns about running away with 
such a person.
Second, and assuming that a lucid St. Preux would recognize the neces-
sity of some type of transition from love to friendship, we fi nd that Julie 
does not view such a transition with the same optimism that St. Preux does. 
In fact, she indicates that the memory of expired love would make such a 
transition unbearable. “I see, my friend,” she tells St. Preux, “from the tem-
per of our souls . . . that love will be the major business of our lives . . . for 
us, the slightest cooling would soon become the languor of death; an invin-
cible distaste, a perpetual tedium, would follow the extinction of love, and 
we would scarcely survive long once we had ceased to love” ( J 89; emphasis 
added). To this she later adds, “A love such as ours inspires and sustains the 
soul as long as it burns; as soon as it goes out the soul lapses into languor 
and a worn- out heart is no longer good for anything” (185). On Julie’s 
understanding the passing of love, far from being a smooth and natural 
transition, is instead an acid that erodes the very foundations of the marital 
union. When one confronts the necessary disproportion between the per-
fect imaginary model and the decidedly imperfect lover, the present is poi-
soned by the memory of what the beloved used to be. Memory, or rather 
nostalgia, induces despair and casts both present and future in a harsh and 
unfl attering light. In so doing, it does for spent love what the imagination 
does for romantic passion: the one exaggerates the virtue of the beloved and 
the other his vices.
Lovers never see each other as they are. From Julie’s perspective, then, 
the transition from love to friendship is a dreadful and insoluble problem. It 
is a source of inevitable disappointments and undignifi ed compromises. Our 
love for what once was overwhelms and fi nally crushes our attachment to 
what is. Shklar (1969, 86) is therefore correct to say that marriage “illustrates 
the network of insuperable diffi  culties that society puts in the way of human 
contentment,” but it must be added that it is not simply “society” or the 
“empire of opinion” that blocks the path to shared happiness. It is, rather, 
the very structure of romantic desiring that poses the fi nal and decisive dif-
fi culty. Love’s peculiar psychological dynamics are thus what give true force 
to Shklar’s accurate conclusion that “Julie would not have been happy with 
Saint Preux, and she was miserable with the excellent Wolmar” (86). Mar-
riage without love is intolerable, and love within marriage is impossible. Julie 
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had already scaled Olympus and walked with the gods. How could the view 
from Kent hold her interest?
| From Friendship to Love? Th e Marriage Th at Never Was
Having revealed the diffi  culties that memory poses for the transition from 
love to friendship, Julie investigates a fi nal possibility: if love does not easily 
give way to friendship, perhaps friendship might evolve into love. Th is pos-
sibility is explored in the form of Julie’s eff orts to unite St. Preux and her 
cousin Claire, but there are at least two compelling prima facie reasons to 
think her plan would fail. First, we saw in chapter 3 that Rousseau clearly 
demarcates the psychological foundations of friendship from those of sexual 
love, and thus builds a relatively impermeable wall of separation between 
these two largely discrete associational types. Transitioning from one to the 
other is thus a diffi  cult process fraught with uncertainty; it involves a com-
prehensive psychic reorientation, a transformation in the way that we “see” 
the other person. Th e form of forgetting that this transformation embodies 
is especially problematic in Julie, where the characters have diffi  culty re- 
cognizing each other because they remain so strongly connected to their past 
experiences and former lives. Second, relationships are for Rousseau path- 
dependent phenomena. Th e initial stages of an association are, as Rousseau’s 
emphasis on Emile and Sophie’s “fi rst encounter” suggests, decisive for 
determining the course of its development. One does not simply change the 
nature of a relationship that, like Claire and St. Preux’s, is twelve years in the 
making (see J 629). Love, unlike friendship, tends to arise quickly and spon-
taneously or not at all; one recognizes a lover immediately but a true friend 
only over time. Th ese reasons notwithstanding, St. Preux and Claire have 
developed an intimate and even fl irtatious relationship over the course of St. 
Preux’s exile and return, and both confess to having developed a strong 
physical attraction to the other. Everything, including Julie’s blessing, seems 
to gather in favor of their union. Th us we would seem to have reason to 
question our initial pessimism about the transition from love to friendship. 
Yet St. Preux ultimately balks at the prospect (555), and Claire accepts the 
idea only after expressing some serious reservations (532).
St. Preux’s rejection of the idea is unequivocal. His heart, he tells Julie, 
is spent for love, and though he is physically attracted to Claire he lacks the 
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energy and the disposition necessary for loving her. His reasons are com-
plex—residual feelings for Julie clearly remain—but among the most impor-
tant is that she does not stir his imagination as Julie did (and continues to 
do): “Content with her charms, my heart does not lend them its illusion; she 
is lovelier to my eyes than to my imagination, and I am more apprehensive 
when she is nearby than when she is far away” ( J 556). Th e disturbances 
Claire introduces are physical but they do not populate the imagination with 
the illusions love creates. “For all that,” St. Preux asks his former lover, “does 
[attraction] become love? Julie, ah, what a diff erence! Where is the enthusi-
asm? Where is the idolatry? Where are those divine distractions of reason, 
more brilliant, more sublime, more powerful, a hundred times better than 
reason itself?” (556). Illusion is the source of romantic enthusiasm, and 
Claire—as her name suggests—cannot inspire it because she does not stir 
the imagination. St. Preux cannot idolize what he knows to be fl awed, and 
he is too acquainted with Claire to think her perfect in any way. Because no 
veil hides her there is no temptation to see what the veil hides; her very 
transparency keeps his imagination quiet. St. Preux goes on to explain that, 
having experienced the full transports of love, he could never be happy in a 
relationship that lacked the emotional intensity that seemingly only love can 
supply: “Grace, beauty, merit, attachment, fortune, all would conspire to my 
felicity; my heart, my heart alone would poison it all, and make me miserable 
in the bosom of my happiness” (558). St. Preux’s misery would create an 
intolerable situation both for himself and for Claire. Th us he makes his dec-
laration: “I love [Claire] too well to marry her” (558).
Claire shares many of St. Preux’s reservations, and like him she reports 
that her heart is not capable of the sort of attachment that love requires. 
Th ough she confesses she is quite in love with St. Preux, she adds that she 
would have “driven him crazy” and that she has always thought about a 
marriage with him “with disdain.” Her love for St. Preux ultimately amounts 
to little more than a refracted form of her love for Julie: Claire tells her 
cousin, “I derived all my sentiments from you; you alone were everything to 
me, and I lived only to be your friend” ( J 526; see Disch 1994). Th e chief 
advantage of marrying St. Preux would thus not be the union itself so much 
as what it would procure for Claire—namely, more and more intimate access 
to her Julie. Claire’s erotic attraction to her cousin is most evident when she 
defers to her cousin’s judgment in the matter of marriage: “Take . . . the 
responsibility of my conduct, I confi de its direction entirely to you. Let us 
return to our natural state and exchange callings, it will be better for us 
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both. Govern, I will be docile; it is for you to will what I must do. . . . Keep 
my soul enclosed in yours, why should inseparables have two?” ( J 532). Pru-
dential concerns and the simulacrum of love make Claire willing to marry 
St. Preux, but only on the condition that her soul remain in Julie’s custody. 
Friends like Claire and St. Preux may get married, but they will never live for 
one another.
Th e concerns voiced both by St. Preux and by Claire speak directly to 
the paradoxical and ultimately tragic role Rousseau assigns to love. It is 
man’s greatest and most powerful desire, and as such it creates new and 
exciting social and psychological possibilities that would not otherwise exist. 
Absent love, there can be no restoration of the Golden Age (see Shklar 1969) 
or any real happiness in domestic society; life without marriage is undefi ned 
and incomplete, and marriage without love is cramped and suff ocating. Yet 
when love expires—as it most assuredly does—it casts a long and dark 
shadow in the memory; the remembrance of lost love poisons lovers, facili-
tates resentment between them, and erodes the bonds of esteem that keep a 
marriage alive once love itself begins to slacken. Th us love forecloses on the 
very possibilities it creates. We are no more happy with love than we are 
without it. Th is is the teaching of Julie.
| Th e Horizon in Every Direction: Th e Citizens of Clarens
In problematizing the romantic rituals on which the household is based 
Rousseau also problematizes the idea of the happy household and, with it, 
the idea of the household as such. Th is problematization clearly has conse-
quences that extend beyond the domestic sphere, but exactly what those 
consequences are depends on how the relationship between the domestic 
and political worlds is theorized. On one understanding of this relation-
ship, the family cultivates our basic moral and social dispositions and, in 
so doing, serves as an important catalyst of political socialization. Politics 
requires sociability and sociability requires families. Hence the family’s 
role as a socializing agent is on the whole continuous with the needs of the 
state and not viewed as essentially threatening to its continued health. 
Were Rousseau to view the relation between the domicile and the polis in 
this way—as it sometimes appears—then the destabilization of private 
spaces we have seen in Emile and Julie would seem to have grave conse-
quences for his political vision, for to the degree that the family structure 
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fails to provide a stable site of moral training the state is robbed of good 
citizens.
Th ere is, however, a second way of conceiving the relation of household 
and state, one more typical of classical thought and most fully embodied in 
Plato’s claim that perfect justice requires the abolition of the nuclear family 
(Rep. 449c–d, 457d–61c). Th e Socratic view posits that the family is not an 
agent of but rather a rival to the state; far from cultivating strong civic dis-
positions and ordering the soul in accordance with justice, domestic life 
encourages an undue attachment to one’s own and distracts citizens from 
the higher and nobler calling of civic engagement. To the degree that Rous-
seau follows Socrates in viewing the domicile as in some way competing with 
the state for the scarce psychological and emotional resources that human 
beings have, the political consequences are less grave, for the instability of 
the family unit—far from bringing the polity down with it—instead creates 
a new and bigger space for politics that was not available before.
Th ough the interpretation of Emile and Julie advanced in the previous 
two chapters inclines toward the latter alternative, many readers of Julie 
favor the former, compatibilist view. We have, for instance, already seen that 
Tony Tanner’s politicized reading emphasizes questions of social class and, 
in so doing, makes it possible to read Julie both as an indictment of feudal 
inequality and as a critique of the emerging bourgeois family and its rigid 
insistence on sexual monogamy. Nicole Fermon (1997) has also sought to 
understand the domestic community of Clarens in terms of its social and 
political importance but argues that Julie has not just a negative or critical 
function but also represents a model of private life that resolves a series of 
thorny political problems posed by the Social Contract. She argues that Julie 
presents a “vision of the ‘private worlds’ of citizens” that “fl eshes out human 
aspects of the common life left out of Th e Social Contract” and that the 
presentation of the household in Julie helps to mitigate the confl icts that can 
arise between political society and the various “partial societies” that exist 
within it. To this she adds that the moral training one receives in a healthy 
household will prove politically salutary: the “autarkic nature of the house-
hold provides the citizens with the material possibilities for free choice while 
creating an institution that will educate his heart and provide him with 
sound habits” (119; cf. SC II.3, 61–62). Th e household described in Julie is 
thus precisely the kind required by the regime of the Social Contract.
Our analyses of Emile and Julie, without denying Rousseau’s rejection of 
Socrates’s radical collectivism, nonetheless cast serious doubt on arguments 
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like Fermon’s for at least three reasons. First, it is rather diffi  cult to see how 
the stringent demands of the just regime can be unproblematically inte-
grated into the private, introspective, and leisurely lifestyle depicted in the 
novel. If there is no confl ict between politics and the household in Julie, it is 
not because the problem has been resolved but rather because it does not 
arise: politics make no demands on anyone’s time or attention, with Julie’s 
feckless uncle, who is constantly reading the papers and talking about inter-
national aff airs, being the exception that proves the rule (e.g., J 168, 250). 
And Fermon’s characterization of the household as an autarkic social unit 
only makes things worse, for if the household is truly autarkic then the 
superaddition of the political is at best gratuitous and at worst harmful to 
domestic society and the well- being of its members. Clarens is a closed and 
self- suffi  cient social system that does nothing to motivate those who live 
there to engage those who do not. Wolmar’s decision to charge St. Preux 
with the education of his children is telling (to say nothing of its irony), for 
he is the furthest thing from a citizen and is incapable of providing a public 
or political education. To the contrary, Wolmar’s children will be raised 
much as Emile was—at a distance from political society and its tumults—
and will know Clarens not as a “waystation” to political justice but as a 
substitute for it. It is their true fatherland, their horizon in every direction.
Th e uncombinability of the political and domestic solutions are indica-
tive of deeper fi ssures in Rousseau’s moral universe, for there seems to be 
something about the goods themselves that resist joint realization in a space 
of a single life. Th e philosopher may comprehend the whole good, but he does 
so at the cost of enjoying it in the normal fashion. Th e inward St. Preux will 
never know the pure “public joy” relished by citizens of Geneva (LD n. 136). 
Th e Spartan Pedaretus will never feel the individualistic pleasures of deep 
introspection or the happiness of discovering himself a part of a universal 
cosmopolitan brotherhood. Our experience with the good we seek is frag-
mentary, disintegrated, incomplete. Refl ections like these are what led Rous-
seau to say that the educations of “men” and “citizens” must be diff erent and 
incommensurable, and why he characterizes the process of citizen- craft as a 
kind of “denaturing.” Unlike Socrates, however, Rousseau does not explicitly 
prioritize political over domestic life. It is not at all clear that he views the way 
of life embodied by the household as a self- suffi  cient social unit as lower than 
or subordinate to the higher calling of political life. For all its drawbacks and 
diffi  culties, the vision of the good represented in private society—whether at 
Clarens, Emile and Sophie’s farmhouse, or Rousseau’s own fascinating reverie 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   131 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations132
at the end of Book IV of Emile—emerges from Rousseau’s work as a worthy 
albeit problematic alternative to its political counterpart.
Second, there is among les belles âmes a culture of servility quite at odds 
with the spirit of self- command characteristic of the Rousseauan citizen. St. 
Preux is simply unable to give himself direction and wishes only to be gov-
erned, fi rst by Julie and later by Wolmar. He is hopelessly and eternally 
dependent on the powers of others. Claire, as Lisa Disch (1994) has nicely 
shown, displays a degree of independence not exhibited by St. Preux in her 
willingness to question the characteristically “masculine” form of power 
embodied by Wolmar, but in the end she is every bit as subject to Julie’s femi-
nine “empire” as is St. Preux. And though Julie undoubtedly displays extraor-
dinary self- command in her heroic struggle against temptation, it must be 
admitted that her struggle itself is in part a function of an excessive emotional 
dependence on her father. Julie herself is under the sway of the maison pater-
nelle and unable to fully see or act out eff ectively against its injustice. Her 
father, the dupe of his own prejudices, knows his daughter well and—like all 
despots—is more than willing to resort to both emotional and physical abuse 
in order to impose his will. However, Julie is either unable or unwilling to 
identify her father’s cruelty for what it is, preferring either to make excuses for 
his behavior or to unfairly condemn her own. Exercising neither voice nor 
exit, she docilely accepts the husband chosen for her even though she under-
stands all too well that the consequences will quite literally be fatal. Her 
moral posture toward earthly authority—whether it be her father’s despotic 
rage or Wolmar’s distant sangfroid—more closely resembles the gentle resig-
nation of the “true Christian” than it does the proud defi ance of the citizen: 
where the former “knows how to die” but not how to win a battle, the latter 
seeks victory because informed with “a burning love of glory and homeland” 
(SC IV.8, 129). Julie’s submissiveness before her father is thus rather diff erent 
from the submissiveness of a good citizen before the law. From the perspective 
of a would- be lawgiver seeking to instill civic- spiritedness through education, 
the kind of moral instruction utilized at Clarens simply does not fi t the bill.
Th ird, and relatedly, we should hope for the sake of citizens themselves—
whoever they turn out to be—that the unstable and unhappy domestic life 
depicted in Julie does not “fl esh out” the private lives of citizens, for a quick 
inventory reveals that there is hardly a single character in the novel who is 
well- adjusted or content with his lot. We cannot avoid the conclusion that 
Clarens, for all its virtues as an estate, was nonetheless a failure. It did not 
succeed in curing either Julie or St. Preux of the psychic devastation wrought 
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by their tragic love: Julie, crushed by the weight of her obligations, is so 
miserable that she commits suicide as soon it is possible for her to do so, and 
Claire and St. Preux are ready to follow suit when they learn of Julie’s fate. 
People so invested in their private lives and associations are far better than are 
the average bourgeois, who does not care about anything enough to contem-
plate suicide. But they are not to be compared to Cato who, as Bomston 
reminds St. Preux, killed himself for the sake of his lost republic rather than 
for the sake of his lost love ( J 322). Th ere is nothing “civic”—and indeed, 
something rather uncivic—about the virtue exhibited by the novel’s principal 
characters.
| Love’s Failure: Implications and Conclusions
In both Emile and Julie we fi nd that elaborate, artifi cial, and unsustainably 
fragile imaginative constructions are imposed in order to generate the psy-
chic energy necessary to maintain social aff ection. Rousseau’s turn to the 
imagination, however questionable prima facie, is made necessary by his 
insistence on man’s natural asociability. He seizes on the promise of the 
imagination because the act of imagining, whatever else it may be, is a pri-
vate or solitary activity. If we prefer our imaginings to the objects they rep-
resent, we do so not only because images are perfect and people are not but 
also because our images are ours in a way that another person never could be. 
Th ey, and not others, are immediate expressions of our moral personalities; 
they create and control us even as we create and control them. Th e pedagogic 
project of Emile and, to a lesser extent, the romance of Julie explore the 
possibility of establishing this process of reciprocal governance between per-
sons; we have seen, however, that the best it can hope to do is establish it 
within them. In the fi nal analysis, then, it is the imagination—not the incor-
porated other—that is regulative.
An implication of the privateness of imaginary activity is that even when 
we dream of others we have a tendency to forget them, and to fashion in 
their stead imaginative re- creations that, by their very perfection, are inac-
curate depictions of the fl awed objects they represent. Both Emile and St. 
Preux engage in this process with ultimately unsuccessful results: where the 
former has diffi  culty coping with the disappearance of his perfect Sophie 
and seeks solace in the “too attractive liaisons” of Paris, the latter is denied 
the opportunity to wed his beloved and is haunted by his perfect image of 
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her for the rest of his life. We are thus led to the somewhat melancholy 
conclusion that the imaginative re- creations to which Rousseau turns in 
order to catalyze romantic love mediate and disrupt the relation between I 
and thou even as they make that relation possible. Imaginary embellish-
ments help to bridge the gap between self and other, but we must remember 
that Rousseau’s purpose was not to bridge this gap but to shorten its distance. 
Judged by this standard, the educational project of Emile cannot be consid-
ered a success, and St. Preux’s turbulent romance with Julie becomes even 
more fl awed than it appears to be.
Of course, it is necessary to wonder what these failures suggest about 
Rousseau’s more general social and political concerns. Th ough I will take 
this question up more thoroughly in the fi nal chapter, I will anticipate that 
analysis here by simply suggesting that what Emile and Julie tell us about the 
attenuated nature of human connectedness has important implications for 
how we read the Social Contract and Rousseau’s other political works. For 
instance, the failure of Emile’s education tends to vitiate Frederick Neu-
houser’s (2008, 23) claim that it is best understood as a blueprint for a new 
form of “modern” citizenship that supplants and even surpasses the classical 
conception. If Emile’s education is as unsuccessful and his connection to 
political society as attenuated as my analysis has shown, then it would have 
been very odd indeed for Rousseau to make it the pedagogic basis for the 
political project outlined in the Social Contract. Any hope of bringing a just 
and durable regime into being, far from relying on a conception of citizen-
ship as unstable as the “modern” alternative embodied by Emile, would seem 
to require at least a partial recovery of something like the classical concep-
tion of the citizen.
Julie, too, discloses the basic discontinuities between the requirements 
of the domestic and political spheres. Hardly a word about politics is spoken 
by any of the novel’s hero(in)es, and the virtues and vices on display are not 
“civic” in any identifi able way. Th eir identities are formed and expressed by 
the domestic context in which they subsist and from which they draw their 
happiness (or lack thereof); their hopes are confi ned by the horizons of Cla-
rens and carry them back there, at least in St. Preux’s case, from the ends of 
the earth; their emotional and intellectual needs are created and satisfi ed by 
each other and do not require the stimulation of the outside world. Th eir 
social world is closed and self- suffi  cient. Th e family, far from simply being a 
site of moral habituation that is continuous with state purposes, is instead a 
site of identity- construction that rivals state purposes. Put another way, the 
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family as depicted in Julie is precisely the kind of “partial society” that Rous-
seau seeks to delimit in the regime described in the Social Contract; its claim 
on our identities and as the source of our deepest satisfactions must be neu-
tralized if the sociological preconditions for genuine political justice are to 
be achieved.
Th ough the above analyses of Emile and Julie reveal the domestic solu-
tion to the problem of human dividedness to be problematic in decisive 
respects, they also do much to point up the diffi  culties with the “political” 
solution as well. Indeed, the psychological diffi  culties that attend the realiza-
tion of the double object in the context of Emile’s education would appear to 
be even more severe in the case of the classical citizen. Public education of 
the classical sort requires that citizens make virtually no distinction between 
themselves and the political whole of which they are parts. To eff ect this 
unnatural union, the state substitutes the illusions of nationalism for the 
those of love—patriotism replaces gallantry at the core of human identity. 
Yet nationalistic fi ctions would seem even more diffi  cult to sustain than 
romantic ones because of their remoteness from natural self- love: public 
education involves not just the redirection and extension of natural desires, 
as in Emile’s education, but a wholesale transformation of human nature 
(E 39; SC II.7, 68). If one could imagine a pedagogic enterprise more radical, 
more ambitious, more diffi  cult, or less likely to succeed than Emile’s domes-
tic education, the public education that Rousseau recommends for the citi-
zen is a plausible candidate.
Th at Rousseau sees decay as inevitable in the domestic world is, it seems, 
a function of an extraordinarily deep circumspection about the durability of 
healthy human association. His pessimism refl ects a peculiarly modern con-
cern, one in which he participates more reluctantly but perhaps more fully 
than do any of his predecessors. Rousseau saw clearly that previous modern 
thinkers had failed to explain the distinctively human desire for wholeness 
through social connectedness, but his own attempt to generate such an 
explanation is beset by similar limitations. He thus ultimately distinguishes 
himself from other moderns less by his successful resolution of the problem 
of human connectedness than by his acute awareness of and fruitful engage-
ment with it. Th e eff ort to reconstruct eros with the materials furnished by 
modern philosophy is something like trying to build a palace from mud and 
twigs. Rousseau knew this from the very beginning, and both Emile and 
Julie disclose this awareness subtly but unmistakably.
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Th e previous two chapters have sought to locate the limita-
tions of Rousseauan romantic love and, taken together, sug-
gest a somewhat pessimistic vision of social relations. But for 
all his circumspection, Rousseau was no fatalist, and the 
tragic teaching concerning love disclosed in his novelistic 
works does not close but rather opens the question of human 
connectedness in at least two new ways. First, it helps clarify 
the meaning of unhappily vague terms like “wholeness” and 
“dividedness,” terms sometimes used by Rousseau and his 
interpreters with a looseness that betrays their importance. 
On this head, we see that Rousseau’s eff ort to recapture human 
wholeness in a social context involves the joint realization of 
two central human goods: emotional intimacy and moral 
virtue. Love was attractive to Rousseau in part because he 
saw in it a unifi ed solution to these distinct but related theo-
retical problems, for his account shows that exclusive roman-
tic connection gives human beings their greatest experience 
of intimacy and helps sharpen the aesthetic and ethical crite-
ria relevant to moral decision- making. Th at it fails in its 
attempt to realize these goods in an enduring way is certainly 
disillusioning, but the way in which its failure clarifi es the 
nature of the goods necessary to our happiness is instructive, 
and perhaps even edifying. Second, the failure of love, while 
suggestive of deeper problems with human connectedness 
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more generally, nonetheless does not foreclose on the possibility that human 
wholeness might be preserved more eff ectively in other kinds of associational 
contexts. Indeed, if we momentarily turn our gaze from Rousseau and toward 
the classical tradition, we will immediately see an alternative form of associa-
tion through which the twin goods of intimacy and virtue might be realized: 
friendship.
Friendship has a much longer and more distinguished career in the his-
tory of political thought than does love; it was celebrated by Aristotle, Cicero, 
and Montaigne—thinkers Rousseau knew well—as more rewarding than 
romantic liaisons. Rousseau himself frequently writes of friendship’s emo-
tional importance, characterizing himself as having been “born for friend-
ship” and claiming it to have been one of the “twin idols of [his] heart” 
(C 308, 361). He also puts several extended paeans to friendship in the mouths 
of the principal characters of Julie, providing them with ample space to wax 
eloquent about the indissoluble bonds that unite them. What is more, 
friendship appears to be important not only at the domestic but also at the 
political level, for Rousseau hints at its broader social relevance in both Emile 
and the First Discourse: in the former, he calls it “the most sacred” of social 
exchanges, and in the latter he suggests that the loss of “sincere friendships” 
is a cause of political instability (E 233fn; DSA 38). Such remarks at least 
suggest that friendship might succeed where romantic love failed.
However, it must be conceded that Rousseau never provides the system-
atic discussion of friendship his own statements invite us to expect, thus 
forcing scholars to reconstruct his fertile (if scattered) refl ections into a uni-
fi ed theory. Th e surprisingly small number of studies that have undertaken 
this task focus on Rousseau’s curious claim that friendship is a modifi ed 
expression of pity and seek to understand the degree to which friendship, 
thus understood, might inculcate virtue (DI 131). Critics like Allan Bloom 
(1993), Cliff ord Orwin (1997a, 1997b), and Richard Boyd (2004) have charged 
that pity diminishes moral possibility because it inspires a pessimistic and 
world- weary outlook, and thus imply that friendship—to the degree it 
derives from pity—is not a viable catalyst of moral improvement. More 
recently, however, Jonathan Marks (2007) and Joseph Reisert (2003) have 
sought to defend Rousseauan friendship by decoupling it from pity and by 
arguing that it involves a wide range of aff ective impulses that help counter-
act the passivity to which compassion might give rise. In his searching analy-
sis, Reisert gives special emphasis to the connection between friendship and 
moral learning, persuasively arguing that friendship “is the sole relationship 
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within which education to virtue can take place” (80). Such an interpreta-
tion ties Rousseau’s conception of friendship to the classical tradition deriv-
ing from Aristotle, which comprehends the relation between friends as a 
catalyst of virtue and places it at the very center of man’s moral and emo-
tional life.
Below I shall develop an interpretation of Rousseauan friendship that 
emphasizes its close connection to pity and points to its limitations concern-
ing both the realization of deep intimacy and the inculcation of virtue, but 
that also identifi es for it a new and potentially fruitful, albeit narrower, role. 
Rousseau’s new, aim- inhibited conception of friendship forecloses on the 
more ambitious possibilities explored by Aristotle and others, but it proves 
useful in a supporting role: though unable to return us to wholeness, our 
friends can join and hence console us in our dividedness, thereby softening 
the inevitable disappointments attending moral and social life.
In bringing out what I take to be the novelty in Rousseau’s theory of 
friendship, it will be necessary to put him into dialog with the tradition in 
(and against) which he is working. Th us I shall begin by contrasting Rous-
seauan friendship with relevant competing conceptions (i.e., those of Aristo-
tle, Cicero, and Montaigne) and show that it diff ers importantly from them 
in both its psychological origin and its fi nal social function. Against the 
backdrop provided by Rousseau’s engagement with the tradition, I analyze 
his novelistic portraits of friendship with two central aims: fi rst, to show that, 
since the form of identifi cation embodied by pity introduces elements both of 
sameness but also of diff erence, grounding friendship in pity compromises 
the emotional intimacy possible between friends; and second, to demonstrate 
that Rousseauan friendship does not catalyze virtue but is rather designed to 
provide consolation in the face of life’s inevitable disappointments. In fact, we 
fi nd that Rousseau’s model friends turn out to be rather inept counselors and 
that eff ective moral guidance occurs in hierarchical associations Rousseau 
himself does not identify as friendships. Th ough friendship thus conceived 
proves unable to perform the strong socializing and moralizing functions to 
which it is assigned by Aristotle and Rousseau’s other predecessors, it none-
theless has potentially salutary political applications. I will conclude, then, by 
seeking to partially rehabilitate Rousseauan friendship, arguing that the ethos 
of pity on which it is based helps to temper the spirit of impetuosity to which 
politicized amour- propre gives rise, and also that it counteracts the rashness 
conservative critics often associate with Rousseauan democracy. Once viewed 
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as a supplemental motivation rather than the sole spring of political identifi ca-
tion, it is possible to view pity as an important psychological support for a 
genuinely “compassionate conservatism.”
I add two provisos in order to clarify what I am—and am not—argu-
ing. First, for expositional reasons I use the terms “pity” and “compassion” 
somewhat interchangeably. Such usage is already common in the relevant 
literature, but it is not universally accepted and thus bears explicit mention. 
Second, Rousseau (much like us) uses the term “friendship” in both broad 
and narrow senses; the word sometimes comprehends any form of sympa-
thetic association (e.g., a marriage can be a “friendship” in this broad sense) 
and other times denotes a particular kind of sympathetic association. Of 
interest here is the latter, more specifi c meaning Rousseau gives to friend-
ship, for it is on this register that he corrects the tradition that preceded him 
and discloses what he believes its genuine function in human life to be.
| Rousseauan Friendship: Revisiting and Revising the Classical Tradition
In approaching the question of friendship, Rousseau inherits a distinguished 
literary tradition that derives primarily from Aristotle’s extended discussion 
of the topic in the Nicomachean Ethics and runs, most notably, through 
Cicero’s De Amicitia and Montaigne’s “Of Friendship.” Th is tradition views 
human beings as naturally sociable by way of shared reason, treating friend-
ship in its highest form as a rational partnership dedicated to moral develop-
ment. It gives to the relation between friends two central characteristics: (1) 
it views intimacy between friends as a product of a comprehensive similarity 
of character, and (2) it posits the end of friendship is the pursuit of virtue. 
Because Rousseau amends the classical theory on both these counts, a brief 
look at how the most infl uential expositors of the tradition characterize friend-
ship along these crucial dimensions will help bring the novelty of his theory 
of friendship into sharper relief.
Classical treatments of friendship emphasize the importance of similar-
ity of character in catalyzing bonds between friends. Friends qua friends are 
drawn to each other through the apprehension of shared interests and tastes, 
and perfect friends hold so much in common that they are able to see in each 
other idealized versions of themselves. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
celebrates this kind of comprehensive identifi cation as a guiding ideal, 
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claiming that friendship is all the more perfect as “both parties get the same 
things from each other and delight in each other or in the same things” and 
that friends of the best kind are like second selves (NE 1155a20, 1158b1). Cicero 
follows Aristotle on this point, making Laelius call friendship “an accord in all 
things” and say that “he who looks upon a true friend looks, as it were, upon a 
sort of image of himself” (DA §§ 5, 7). Montaigne also celebrates the pro-
found similarity he shared with La Boétie in “Of Friendship,” albeit in a 
slightly diff erent way. He uses the language of erotic fusion to characterize the 
best friendships: friends “mingle and unite one with the other in a blend so 
perfect that the seam which has joined them together is eff aced and can never 
be found again” (Es. 166). Th e ideal of friendship presupposes and in turn 
produces such profound similarity in moral disposition that friends may even 
lose their identities as discrete beings.
Of course, similarity of character by itself is hardly suffi  cient to produce 
perfect friendship, for it is easy to imagine that those who share vices (e.g., 
stubbornness or selfi shness) would fi nd it more rather than less diffi  cult to 
bond as friends. Th us the tradition is also united in theorizing friendship in 
its highest sense as a rational partnership animated by a very specifi c shared 
commitment: love of virtue. On this score Aristotle’s analysis of friendship is 
once again foundational, for it treats the relation between friends as one that 
“stimulates noble actions,” encourages joint rational refl ection, and catalyzes 
superior habits of thought and behavior (NE 1155a10). Cicero follows Aristo-
tle in linking friendship to the perfection of character, arguing that a shared 
concern for moral development is a necessary condition for friendship. He 
emphasizes in particular the role of practical virtue, claiming through Lae-
lius that the civically oriented virtues of fairness, liberality, and self- control 
ground friendship more eff ectively than does wisdom (DA §5). Montaigne 
joins his classical predecessors in linking friendship to the pursuit of 
human excellence, though in marked contrast to Cicero he gives pride of 
place to intellectual virtue. Rejecting as incomplete both the civic and the 
sexual association, Montaigne argues that “truth” is the “nurse of the 
sacred tie” connecting the best of friends and that its shared pursuit—
though unavailable to most—is nonetheless the highest and best thing two 
human beings can do together (Es. 164–65). “Perfect” friendships are per-
fect because they provide the context in which the conditions for philo-
sophic activity—candor, good faith, and intellectual seriousness—are best 
realized.
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Friends are friends, then, not simply because they share certain charac-
ter traits but rather because the traits they share are endearing and enno-
bling, because they seek to strike out together in an ongoing and 
forward- looking process of moral improvement. Friendship thus understood 
has a fundamentally prospective or aspirational character—it “casts a bright 
ray of hope into the future” because it encourages friends to share in the 
process of becoming, to improve each other’s characters, to mutually strive 
toward common purposes (DA §7). Friends, whatever else they may do, 
undertake enterprises and seek good things together; their relation is thus 
defi ned by shared hopes.
Rousseau’s theory of friendship seeks to correct the classical tradition 
along both these dimensions, though in order to see why he makes these 
corrections it is necessary to note a more fundamental disagreement he has 
with the classical account of human association. Whereas both Cicero and 
Montaigne follow Aristotle in believing human beings to be naturally social 
by virtue of common reason or logos, Rousseau begins the Discourse on 
Inequality by forcefully rejecting this assumption. Accusing the Peripatetics 
of wandering in circles, Rousseau tunnels under Aristotle’s account of social 
identifi cation and, meditating on the “fi rst and simplest principles” of the 
human soul, fi nds not a capacity for reason but rather a sentiment that allows 
human beings to identify sympathetically with unfortunate or suff ering 
beings. Rousseau speaks, of course, of pity, which he claims is “anterior to 
reason” and indeed at the very basis of social identifi cation.
Replacing reason with pity at the ground of sociability leads Rousseau 
to seek to understand friendship as an expression of pity. Th is reinterpreta-
tion begins in the Second Discourse, where Rousseau holds that “all the social 
virtues” and “even friendship” can be understood as modifi cations of pity 
and goes on to defi ne friendship as “constant pity fi xed on a particular 
object” (DI 131–32). Th e intimate if enigmatic connection between pity and 
friendship is reiterated in Emile, where the desire for friendship is described 
as growing out of the adolescent subject’s nascent sense of compassion 
(E 220–22). Rousseau, then, is consistent in emphasizing the psychological 
importance of pity broadly as well as its special relevance for friendship.
But what sort of friendship does pity make possible? Rousseau’s grounding 
of friendship in pity produces two important changes to the tradition’s con-
ception of the relation between friends as a rational partnership devoted to the 
pursuit of virtue. First, because pity presupposes both likeness and dissimilarity 
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of character, Rousseau denies the possibility (and desirability) of compre-
hensive identifi cation between friends. Second, since friendship is rooted 
in the capacity to identify especially well with suff ering beings, its primary 
end in human life is not the pursuit of virtue but rather consolation in 
disappointment.
With respect to pity presupposing both likeness and diff erence, Rous-
seau’s conception of friendship- as- pity prefi gures Derrida’s critique of the 
“narcissism” of traditional conceptions (e.g., C 361–62). Th us, to the degree 
that friendship enacts the complex and somewhat paradoxical dynamics 
embodied by pity—and we shall soon see that it does—it precludes the type 
of thoroughgoing similarity of character celebrated by the tradition. Now, 
insofar as pity presupposes some similarity between the observer and the 
suff ering being, it is concordant with traditional accounts of friendship, and 
indeed Rousseau claims that pity is felt more intensely for our semblables—
beings who are similar to us in relevant respects—than it is for others (DI 
95). Th is idea is more thoroughly articulated in Emile, where Rousseau posits 
that “one pities in others only those ills from which one does not feel oneself 
exempt” (E 221). We are able to share in another’s sadness only because we 
recognize that we, too, are subject to the ills that caused it. Th e sight of an 
affl  icted other is especially moving if we recognize ourselves as susceptible to 
the sources of his suff ering, if we identify with his plight and view it as 
something that might have been ours. Th e common vulnerability to the 
stings of life thus creates a universal community of mutual consolation. But 
it also makes possible particularly intimate associations centered on the 
shared awareness of life’s hardships, and these associations are what Rous-
seau calls friendships. In viewing the apprehension of likeness or similitude 
as a necessary condition for pity and thus for friendship, then, Rousseau is at 
one with the tradition.
However, pity—as we saw in chapter 3—presupposes not only likeness 
but also diff erence between the suff erer and the observer, and the emotional 
distance built into the pitying relation bounds the kind of emotional inti-
macy friends may enjoy. Suff ering in another and suff ering as another are 
very diff erent things, and it is the disproportion between the two that makes 
Rousseauan pity such a rewarding psychic experience: pity is “sweet” because 
“in putting ourselves in the place of the one who suff ers, we nevertheless feel 
the pleasure of not suff ering as he does” (E 221). Th e experience of compas-
sion, then, is pleasant precisely because our identifi cation with the suff ering 
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other is attenuated, and our happiness relies on the fact that the eff ort to put 
“ourselves in [his] place” must fall short. We can never fully think or feel as 
another does, and our best eff orts to do so have the paradoxical result of 
leading us back to ourselves. Th us we share in another’s pain as much by 
choice as by necessity: we elect to “descend” to his condition because it is 
delightful to do so; our own lot is more bearable when measured against that 
of the less fortunate (223). To the degree that the estrangement built into pity 
is refl ected in the associations that emerge out of it, the relation between 
friends is necessarily attenuated.
Because pity makes possible only an incomplete kind of human con-
nection, the Second Discourse’s grounding of friendship in pity would seem 
to preclude the comprehensive identifi cation between friends celebrated by 
the classical tradition. However, both Joseph Reisert and Jonathan Marks 
deny the Second Discourse’s claim that friendship is strongly informed by 
pity, arguing instead that Rousseauan friendship is rooted in “a more com-
prehensive attraction” grounded in shared “moral taste” (Reisert 2003, 90). 
Th ough pity enables men to recognize each other as semblables primarily 
through the shared experience of suff ering, Marks approvingly cites Rei-
sert’s claim that this very specifi c kind of identifi cation is only “one step on 
the road” toward friendship, and that pity and friendship are alike only 
insofar as they “rest on the apprehension of similarities among men” and 
are “sentiments that draw us out of ourselves” (Reisert 2003, 88; Marks 
2007, 732n24). On this view, pity enables only one among many forms of 
similarity that friends share, but it has no special role in creating the bonds 
of aff ection between them.
Th e eff ort to distance friendship from pity allows both Reisert and Marks 
to view Rousseauan friendship as a catalyst for more ambitious moral possi-
bilities and, hence, as far closer to the classical ideal than appearances suggest. 
Marks, for instance, not only argues that friendship is not derivative of pity 
but also that it is an antidote to the moral “passivity” pity can encourage. 
Whereas pity encourages resignation and inaction in the face of life’s inevi-
table diffi  culties, friendship encourages “an uplifting understanding of the 
world” that promotes virtuous action (Marks 2007, 732). Reisert also fi nds in 
Rousseauan friendship a strong moralizing impetus, and on that basis argues 
that it more closely resembles the tradition deriving from Aristotle than at fi rst 
may be apparent. Claiming that friendship is for Rousseau “the sole relation-
ship within which education to virtue can take place” and that Rousseauan 
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friends enjoy a comprehensive similarity of moral taste and feeling, Reisert 
concludes that “Rousseau’s account of the friendship of decent people . . . 
resembles Aristotle’s conception of complete friendship” (Reisert 2003, 80, 
90, 84).
Th ough Reisert and Marks both downplay the role of pity, Rousseau 
himself puts special emphasis on the identity of interests built into the act of 
shared suff ering. In fact, Emile develops the Second Discourse’s novel sugges-
tion that friendship emerges out of the ability to identify with another’s 
misfortune by more thoroughly explaining the psychological context in 
which the desire for friendship fi rst develops: “Men are not naturally kings, 
or lords, or courtiers, or rich men. All are born naked and poor; all are sub-
ject to the miseries of life, to sorrows, ills, needs, and pains of every kind. 
Finally, all are condemned to death. Th is is what truly belongs to man. Th is 
is what no mortal is exempt from. Begin, therefore, by studying in human 
nature what is most inseparable from it, what best characterizes humanity” 
(E 222). Being human is hard, and this realization lies at the very basis of 
social identifi cation. Th e fi rst bonds that unite human beings do not connect 
them as competitors in a race for preeminence (as malignant amour- propre 
would have it) or as aspirants to virtue (as the classical tradition holds), but 
rather as victims who require consolation and care. It is on the basis of this 
particular form of identifi cation that both the capacity and the desire for 
friendship emerge: once we are able to identify with the needfulness of oth-
ers, we are prepared to meet them as fellow suff erers and, hence, as friends. 
Th is, of course, is not to deny that forms of similarity not underwritten by 
pity (e.g., aesthetic and moral taste) contribute to Rousseauan friendship. It 
is, rather, to follow Rousseau himself in emphasizing the importance of the 
initial conditions in which friendship comes to be: Rousseau views human 
association as a path- dependent phenomenon and is consistent in arguing 
that a relationship’s beginning has a disproportionate impact on the course 
of its development. With this in mind, we may easily see how signifi cant it is 
that the conditions in which friendship emerges are characterized primarily 
by privation, for if bonds between friends are forged by the recognition of 
the other’s misfortune, then the centrality of consolation for friendship 
becomes clear.
Rousseau discloses the connection between friendship and suff ering 
even more directly in his epistolary novel Julie, where he has multiple char-
acters identify not virtue but consolation as the chief function of friendship. 
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“Are you not aware,” the novel’s eponymous heroine asks her “inseparable” 
cousin Claire, “that the communion of hearts imbues sadness with a sweet 
and touching something that contentment does not know? And was friend-
ship not specially given to the unhappy to relieve their woes and comfort their 
sorrows?” ( J 332; emphasis added). Echoing Julie is the aff ably bumbling 
Englishman Edward Bomston, who gravely intones, “Sadness and silence are 
the true language of friendship” (157). Th ough Rousseau does not make these 
claims in his own voice, they are nonetheless consistent with what he himself 
says about both the human condition and friendship’s place within it. Across 
his philosophical and novelistic works, then, Rousseau consistently main-
tains that there is a close connection between pity and friendship and points 
to consolation—not the pursuit of virtue—as the end of friendship. Th us, 
without denying the presence of “traditional elements” in Rousseau’s por-
trayals of friendship, it appears reasonable to deny their salience for his theory 
as a whole.
| Rousseau’s Novel Th eory of Friendship
Th ough questions of friendship fi gure prominently in Emile and the Discourse 
on Inequality, Rousseau himself regarded his epistolary novel Julie as an 
important and even defi nitive statement of his theory. He reports in his Con-
fessions that the work’s thorough and varied depictions of the lives of friends 
are central both to its internal meaning and to his broader understanding of 
the phenomenon of friendship: Julie, according to Rousseau, is fi rst and fore-
most an elegy to love and friendship, those “twin idols of [his] heart” (C 361). 
Th e thematic importance of friendship for Julie is evinced further by the fact 
that, as Rousseau began sketching his “plan” for what would become one of 
the best- selling books of the eighteenth century, the fi rst letters he wrote were 
not between the two lovers but rather between two friends (C 365–67). Th us, 
though the serene transports of friendship are at times obscured by the Sturm 
und Drang of the romance, Rousseau himself persisted in believing that Julie 
contained portraits of friendship that were, however imperfect, nonetheless 
worthy of admiration and attention ( J 9).
Among the scenes contained in the novel, perhaps none reveals the activ-
ity most characteristic of friendship more eff ectively than an event St. Preux 
describes to his friend Edward Bomston as a “morning spent in the English 
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manner” ( J 456). Th is episode, which depicts St. Preux sharing a leisurely 
breakfast with his former lover Julie and her husband and children, would at 
fi rst glance seem fairly unremarkable. Yet Reisert perceptively notes that it 
depicts a limit experience in the kind of intimacy that belongs especially to 
friends, and adds that it contains importantly novel elements of Rousseau’s 
teaching on friendship (Reisert 2003, 94–95). Rousseau himself signals the 
importance of this particular episode by having St. Preux react in an extraor-
dinarily enthusiastic (even for him) way to the seemingly pedestrian morning. 
“But friendship, Milord, friendship!” he exclaims, “powerful and heavenly 
sentiment, what words are worthy of thee? . . . Oh God! How many things 
a clasped hand, a spirited look, a warm embrace, the sigh that follows it say” 
( J 456). Something, it seems, has happened during this breakfast that has 
turned St. Preux’s mind toward friendship. It is not only the substance but 
also the placement of his exclamations that underscores their importance: St. 
Preux begins the letter—the novel’s longest—by recounting the details of his 
morning with Julie and Wolmar, thus suggesting its priority over the other 
matters he discusses. Still more important, this letter is written late in the 
novel and by an increasingly self- aware St. Preux, who at the ripe age of thirty- 
one is fi nally beginning to comprehend the requirements of adult friendship. 
His mature refl ections, born of hard and humiliating experience, are among 
the novel’s most serious, and are certainly worthy of close attention in the 
attempt to understand Rousseauan friendship.
Unsurprisingly, this discussion both invokes and inverts elements of the 
classical tradition. St. Preux—like Cicero and Montaigne—seeks to distin-
guish the aff ection he feels for friends from the “mediocre attachments” so 
common to social life. However, the temperamental Swiss reforms the tradi-
tional conception by claiming that true friendship reveals itself not through 
speech but rather through silence. Whereas Montaigne in particular empha-
sized the role of logos in eff ecting intimacy, the prolix St. Preux sees in the 
shared silence of friendship a way to combine the solitary satisfaction of 
“daydreaming” with the social pleasure of passing the time with like- minded 
persons. In downplaying the role of reason in the creation of sympathetic 
community, St. Preux is seeking to understand and be understood by others 
without needing recourse to the cold mediation of speech. Words, for all 
their usefulness, can be a kind of insult to genuine friends, for to use them 
presupposes they cannot understand other and more natural eff orts to make 
one’s needs and feelings known. Th e very need to resort to words thus implies 
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that the relation between I and thou is compromised (DI 122–23). Shared 
understandings, and the shared ways of perceiving and feeling on which 
they are built, are limited as much as they are empowered by language. Th ey 
are all the deeper for their being understood by everyone without having to 
be explained by anyone.
If silence is the language of friendship, then it is well equipped to com-
municate the sentiment of pity. On this score we see that the shared silence to 
which St. Preux refers is induced, ironically, by a revealing bit of speech: 
Wolmar brings conversation to a screeching halt by telling his wife not to 
envy kings their absolute power because “we have all long been your subjects.” 
Th e “we” in question is, of course, St. Preux and himself, and the subjection 
he mentions refers to Julie’s having inspired intense feelings of love in both 
men. Th is remark seems insensitive, as it calls to mind St. Preux’s failed eff orts 
to wed Julie and forces the former lovers to revisit a past full of heartache. It 
is, however, precisely this shared remembrance of misfortune that serves as 
the aff ective basis for community among the three friends. Wolmar’s remark, 
as St. Preux explains, did not off end or embarrass the former lovers so much 
as unite them all the more closely through the bonds of pity: he notes the 
“touching” and “tender” look Julie gave her husband, and he goes on to claim 
that all three friends were “caught up in the same emotion” ( J 457). Friends 
qua friends suff er together.
Because Rousseauan pity presupposes similarity of character, it may be 
wondered how two men as diff erent as the composed Wolmar and the mer-
curial St. Preux could make claims on each other’s sympathy. Wolmar’s use 
of the word “subject,” however, points to something the two men share and 
thus establishes the ground for mutual sympathy. To be a “subject” is to be 
an instrument of an external will and an agent of alien designs. It is to vacate 
one’s powers of self- determination and to employ one’s capacities with the 
aim of benefi ting an outside other. In becoming Julie’s “subjects,” then, 
Wolmar and St. Preux have both ceded to her some portion of the capacity 
for free and rational self- creation. Th is similarity points to a still deeper one, 
for the experience of subjection is all the more costly for men like St. Preux 
and Wolmar, who both view detachment from the world and its tumults as 
a condition of their freedom. Th eir relation to Julie embeds them in and 
subjects them to the infl uence of the social world and its potentially corrupt-
ing structures. Th e transformation of identity Wolmar and St. Preux have 
undergone in order to love and be loved by Julie is therefore fraught with 
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danger, and the happiness they consequently enjoy is fragile. Th e two men 
are united, then, by a shared awareness of the costs and risks of intimacy as 
well as a shared willingness to pay those costs and run those risks.
Yet, if an awareness of the transformative impact of love unites Wolmar 
and St. Preux, then diff erent degrees of success with love itself place neces-
sary limits on that union. Indeed, Wolmar’s eff orts to empathize with St. 
Preux are and must be incomplete, for underneath the shared awareness of 
love’s power is the knowledge that St. Preux has suff ered deeply for that 
understanding while Wolmar has benefi ted from it. Th e “living eye” sees 
that he has been spared the pains of frustrated love while St. Preux suff ers 
under them every day. Th us Wolmar makes himself St. Preux’s superior in 
the very act of claiming an equality with him, for though both have suff ered 
for Julie, there can be no question about who has suff ered more. Wolmar is 
Julie’s “subject” but he is also her husband, which means that the process of 
subjection is reciprocal and even empowering. St. Preux, on the other hand, 
is caught in an asymmetric and nonreciprocal form of dependence, for, 
though he loves Julie, fate has forced him to cede to Wolmar the much- 
desired dual standing of lover/beloved. It is therefore possible for Wolmar to 
imagine the diffi  culty of being Julie’s subject without also being her husband, 
but the extent of his identifi cation is necessarily limited (and indeed even 
sweetened) by the simultaneous awareness that he himself does not suff er 
such bad luck. Wolmar’s comment thus simultaneously assuages and magni-
fi es St. Preux’s unhappiness, for while it shows him that others identify with 
his suff ering it also magnifi es that suff ering by forcing him to recall a dis-
appointing past and face a hopeless present. Wolmar’s remark thus enacts 
the complex and somewhat paradoxical interplay of conceptual opposites 
embodied by pity.
Indeed, the dramatic context of Wolmar’s remark suggests that its 
immediate emotional eff ect would be to reinforce rather than ameliorate St. 
Preux’s feelings of isolation and inferiority, for when he claims to be Julie’s 
subject he is surrounded by countless reminders of his own power. He has no 
need to assert that power explicitly, for the setting in which he makes his 
remark—in his well- run estate, surrounded by his well- behaved children 
and doted on by his ravishing wife—says everything for him. Th us, though 
Wolmar’s comment about subjection establishes a sympathetic connection 
between himself and St. Preux, the dramatic setting in which the remark is 
made weakens that connection. It is therefore unsurprising that though St. 
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Preux describes his morning with Julie and her husband in an enthusiastic 
tone, the letter as a whole shows that Wolmar’s comment deeply wounded 
his pride: he confesses that the sight of his former lover raising another man’s 
children induced in him an “indolence,” one that he attributes to the appar-
ent lack of attention that Julie and Wolmar paid their children ( J 460). But 
this is subterfuge, and it is easy to see that St. Preux is upset because, having 
just been reminded of his romantic interest in Julie and of everything he has 
suff ered for its sake, he now must look on the children his former lover bore 
another man. Such a humbling experience could well dispose anyone to 
resentment and petty faultfi nding, so it is unsurprising to fi nd the touchy St. 
Preux, who has just suff ered a dreadful blow to his amour- propre, looking for 
fl aws in Wolmar and Julie’s domestic procedures.
Th e “morning spent in the English manner” thus depicts in narrative 
action the deep conceptual affi  nity between friendship and pity established 
in both the Second Discourse and Emile by (1) highlighting the distinctive 
and central role that consolation plays in the activity of friendship, and (2) 
underscoring the emotional separation that exists between friends united 
primarily through shared suff ering. Taken together, these summary consid-
erations reveal an attempt on Rousseau’s behalf to reinterpret the function of 
friendship in human life and help to point up the distance between his 
conception of friendship and that found in the classical tradition.
| Th e Sound of Silence: Memory and Illusion
If analysis of the events of the “morning spent in the English manner” helps 
illustrate the emotional distance between friends, then closer examination of 
the “language of shared silence” mentioned there only reinforces the point. 
Th e language that the friends use to communicate that morning, far from 
showing how well they understand each other, instead shows quite the oppo-
site. We can begin to see how Rousseau’s friends diff erently interpret the 
silence they share by recalling St. Preux’s claim that he, Julie, and Wolmar 
were all “caught up in the same emotion” after Wolmar says that he and St. 
Preux had long been Julie’s “subjects” ( J 456). Th ough the analysis above 
makes clear that all three friends recalled the same events—St. Preux’s failed 
attempt to wed Julie, and so on—it also makes clear that they did not have 
the same feelings about those events. Th ough we can only speculate about the 
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specifi cs of Julie and Wolmar’s emotional reactions to Wolmar’s curious 
remark, it is clear enough they did not share the “indolence” it occasioned in 
St. Preux who, quietly brooding on his past failures, seeks to even the score 
with Wolmar by questioning his parenting strategies. Th e language of shared 
silence, then, seems to say diff erent things to each.
Th e unhappy ambiguity in the language of friendship rears its ugly head 
yet again in the same letter, where St. Preux—warmed by the prospect of 
emotional togetherness—is reminded of other instances in which shared 
silence seemed to catalyze intimacy. Writing to Bomston, he reminds his 
friend of the time immediately following his intensely painful separation 
from Julie, wherein Milord Edward took him away to Besançon and watched 
over him while he grieved. Th ere, the two men spent several nights in a 
pregnant silence comparable to that enjoyed over breakfast with Julie and 
Wolmar. “O the late evenings of Besançon!” bellows an ecstatic St. Preux. 
“Moments devoted to silence and treasured up by friendship! O Bomston! 
Great soul, sublime friend! No, I have not belittled what you did for me, and 
my lips have never said a word of it to you” ( J 456). Bomston, too, refers to 
their shared silences earlier in the novel and, like St. Preux in the later letter, 
thinks them evidence of a strong connection between the two men. He 
attributes St. Preux’s unwillingness to speak as a function of compromised 
pride, an unwillingness to risk the esteem of a friend by disclosing the extent 
of his emotional injury. “He is ashamed of his condition,” Bomston writes to 
Claire, “and controls himself carefully in my presence” (157). He goes on to 
explain that St. Preux “was quite downcast on the fi rst day [of traveling]” 
and that both men stayed silent out of unspoken mutual respect. “He did 
not speak to me, nor I to him; indiscreet consolations can only irritate vio-
lent affl  ictions. Indiff erence and reserve easily fi nd words; but sadness and 
silence are the true language of friendship.” It would appear, then, that in the 
registers of Bomston and St. Preux’s respective memories lie experiences—
once again, experiences of misfortune—that serve to maintain and intensify 
their aff ection for each other. Consistent, then, with St. Preux’s ex post pan-
egyrics, Bomston assumes that considerations of respect and a deep familiar-
ity with each other’s characters formed the foundation for the shared silences 
at Besançon.
Yet St. Preux’s recollection of his quiet nights with Bomston at Besançon 
is a self- serving misremembrance of what actually happened there. In fact, he 
remembers those days, and his feelings toward Bomston, very inaccurately 
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indeed. Earlier in the novel St. Preux gives a very diff erent account of his reti-
cence to speak to Bomston, telling Claire that the reason for his own silence 
was his distrust of the Englishman, whom he suspected of trying to wed Julie 
himself. “I thought,” he confesses, “I detected a premeditated design, and I 
had the gall to impute it to the most virtuous of men” ( J 179). St. Preux dis-
covered that Bomston was writing Julie in secret, concluded that he was seek-
ing to ingratiate himself with her and her family in the hopes of marrying her, 
and fell into sullen silence. Believing he had caught Bomston with his hand 
in the cookie jar, St. Preux burst into his study and accused him of betrayal. 
Th us it was deep distrust—not deep aff ection—that motivated St. Preux’s 
silence; he did not speak because he was too angry, too depressed, and too 
concerned that his friend sought to deceive him. Upon learning that Bomston 
had been working in secret to reunite his friend with Julie, St. Preux was 
predictably contrite. But it was then that he began to develop genuine feelings 
of trust and aff ection for Bomston, feelings he proceeded to retroactively and 
inaccurately project on their entire time at Besançon. St. Preux, who spends 
the entire novel trying to forget his lover, has no diffi  culty forgetting that he 
ever mistrusted as good a friend as Milord Edward. Yet again, the unspoken 
language of friendship leads to misunderstanding rather than to deep under-
standing. Th e two men do not know each other nearly as well as their shared 
silences permit them to believe.
St. Preux’s eff usive praise of the peculiar language of friendship thus 
discloses some of the diffi  culties to which that language is subject, for the 
friends who employ this language often misunderstand each other because 
of it. Th e shared recollections that enable intimacy between friends often 
turn out, upon close examination to be falsely nostalgic, self- serving, or 
simply inaccurate accounts of the events being remembered. Friendship, too, 
has its illusions, and these illusions show the ways in which men—however 
much they seek unity—remain estranged.
| Bad Education: Moral Learning and the Virtue of Friendship
Rousseau’s emphasis on the importance of consolation certainly distinguishes 
his view of friendship from classical conceptions, but it does not preclude 
the possibility of Rousseauan friends helping each other become more 
virtuous. Indeed, because consolation might prove useful as one among many 
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techniques that friends deploy in order to inspire each other to reach for 
ever- greater moral heights, it may appear that Reisert is correct to say Rous-
seauan friendship remains “traditional” at least insofar as it an association in 
which human beings raise each other to virtue. Yet a revisitation of Rous-
seau’s novelistic portrayals of what friends do as friends shows that they, for 
all their sensitivity, are distinguished not by their ability to catalyze morality 
but rather by their tendency to re- create the conditions under which ethical 
failure is inevitable. Th ey exhort each other to virtue without knowing what 
it is or how it best expresses itself in common life. Th us their intercourse 
proves to be a study in unintended consequences: the counsel les belles âmes 
off er one another, while always well- intentioned and often perceptive, none-
theless proves ineff ective and sometimes quite destructive. Th us they per-
petuate and even magnify the sense of moral confusion they seek to resolve.
If Rousseauan friends were eff ective stewards of one another’s moral 
development then they should show gradual improvement under one anoth-
er’s tutelage. Julie, however, shows precisely the opposite: when the omni-
scient Wolmar weds Julie in Part III, he inherits a moral community in 
complete disarray. His new wife has suff ered a nasty bout with smallpox, has 
endured at least one vicious beating (and an equally vicious shaming) from 
her despotic father, and continues to grieve the death of her mother and her 
forced separation from St. Preux. Th is physical and emotional exhaustion 
results in moral exhaustion. She continues to carry on an illicit correspon-
dence she had promised to break off , and she strongly considers resuming a 
secret relationship with her former lover. “Nature, O sweet nature,” a resigned 
Julie exclaims in inviting St. Preux to reprise his previous role, “take back all 
thy rights! I abjure the heartless virtues that obliterate thee” ( J 275). A dis-
consolate and desperate St. Preux heartily commends his lover’s resolution: 
“Why should we alone . . . subscribe with childlike simplicity to illusory 
virtues that everyone talks about and no one practices?” After all, examples 
of adultery “are not scandalous; they cannot even be criticized, and all the 
honorable people here [in Paris] would chuckle at the man who out of respect 
for marriage resisted his heart’s penchant” (277). St. Preux’s time in Paris has 
compromised both his resolve to do the right thing and his understanding of 
what that right thing is, and his transparently self- serving appeal to Parisian 
moeurs reveals just how far he and Julie have fallen. We must ask: how did it 
get to this point?
While the exhaustion affl  icting the two lovers is partially a product of a 
necessarily diffi  cult situation, it is clear their friends do not make matters 
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easier. Neither Bomston nor Claire exhibits a satisfactory awareness of what 
the good is or of how to eff ect it in their friends’ lives, and absent this aware-
ness they magnify the very problems they seek to alleviate. Bomston, the 
putative sage of the group, proves a zealous but injudicious advocate of St. 
Preux’s best interests. By the time he intercedes on St. Preux’s behalf—fi rst 
to propose the marriage to Julie and then to assist his friend after Julie’s 
father rejected that proposal—we have good reason to question the extent of 
his self- knowledge and moral vision (e.g., J 103, 135, 167). Bomston’s limita-
tions show themselves in the way he looks to rehabilitate his friend: follow-
ing his separation from Julie, Bomston takes a wounded St. Preux to Paris 
and sets him up with a generous annuity. Any reader of Rousseau knows the 
City of Light is the last place a depressed and vulnerable St. Preux needs to 
go, and the eff ects on his weary soul are predictably destructive: after repeat-
edly expressing concern about the kind of person he is becoming in Paris, St. 
Preux’s moral decline is consummated by his solicitation of a prostitute. Th e 
choice to bring his morally exhausted friend to a city distinguished for its 
capacity to corrupt refl ects Bomston’s incomplete understanding of how to 
help, and this lack of knowledge has direct and serious consequences for St. 
Preux’s moral fate. He does not understand the conditions under which his 
friend might be rehabilitated, and his ignorance leads him to put St. Preux 
in an environment that, in the context of Rousseau’s moral universe, is sin-
gularly destructive to moral health.
Claire, too, fails to provide helpful moral counsel either to Julie or to St. 
Preux. She imprudently puts herself in the diffi  cult position of serving as a 
sounding board for both her cousin and her friend, but like Bomston she 
does not know the good or how to best eff ect it in her friends’ lives. To be 
sure, she occasionally provides thoughtful and even searching advice, but 
her indiscretion harms the very friends she seeks to assist. Her incomplete 
grasp on the principles of human character show themselves most readily 
when she advises St. Preux to terminate his correspondence with Julie: “Th e 
sacrifi ce you have made to Julie’s honor by leaving the country is a token to 
me of the one you will make to her peace of mind by breaking off  a pointless 
relationship” ( J 253–54). Th is is sound counsel. Yet she undoes her own work 
in her very next letter by implying that Julie’s mother wishes to see St. Preux 
and Julie married: “Th is tender mother . . . is beginning to understand 
thanks to everything she sees how greatly your two hearts surpass the com-
mon rule, and how much your love bears the natural character of sympathy 
that neither time nor human eff orts could ever destroy. She who has such 
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need of comfort would gladly comfort her daughter if propriety did not hold 
her back. . . . She forgot herself yesterday to the point of saying in her pres-
ence, perhaps somewhat indiscreetly, ‘Ah if it were only up to me’ ” (257). If 
Julie’s mother is guilty of indiscretion in telling the truth to her aggrieved 
daughter then Claire is doubly guilty for communicating the story to the 
desperate St. Preux, who is all too willing to believe in any possibility that 
keeps him connected to his lover and all too eager to interpret any gesture of 
sympathy from Julie’s family as evidence of a willingness to accept him as a 
son- in- law. Claire’s telling St. Preux that he has gained the favor of Julie’s 
mother, of course, has the eff ect of encouraging him to believe in precisely 
the possibility of which she sought to disabuse him. How can St. Preux be 
expected to follow Claire’s advice and forget Julie when Claire herself con-
tinues to remind him of her?
Rousseau, in his editorial capacity, cannot resist calling attention to 
Claire’s failure to understand the impact her letter will have on the desper-
ately credulous St. Preux. “Claire,” he says, “are you less indiscreet here? Is 
this the last time you will be?” ( J 257n). Rousseau thus notes in his own voice 
that Claire’s mistake is not an isolated error in judgment but rather a refl ec-
tion of her general habit of saying things she should keep to herself. Claire’s 
failure to understand what St. Preux is (and is not) in a condition to hear 
multiplies rather than reduces the diffi  culties he faces in attempting to honor 
his responsibility to Julie. Th e fi rst half of the novel thus presents us with a 
picture of friends who love virtue but who clearly lack the necessary knowl-
edge to give eff ective expression to their moral energy. Left to their own 
clumsy devices, they lead each other in circles rather than forward. It will 
take the appearance of an authoritative moral guide—the puppet master 
Wolmar—to provide some semblance of moral order.
| Moral Marionettes: Equality, Hierarchy, and Ethical Learning
Th e moral incapacity of Rousseauan friends is refl ected not only by their 
inability to independently create conditions conducive to moral growth but 
also by their need of a strong moral guide. In an important letter to St. 
Preux, Julie speaks to the need for an authoritative fi gure by sounding a 
familiar Rousseauan theme, namely, the fragility of human happiness: “One 
strays for a single moment in life, deviates by a single step from the straight 
path. At once an ineluctable slope drags him down to his ruin” ( J 291). 
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Because friends lack the judgment to protect each other from this sad fate, 
the search for virtue remains unsuccessful until Wolmar appears to guide it. 
His emergence is key for the moral stability of the entire group, for he is the 
only fi gure in the novel with the knowledge required of an eff ective moral 
counselor. Wolmar gives form to matter; he reinvigorates and then redirects 
the will to be good, which had exhausted itself in the culture of moral failure 
les belles âmes had created. He does so by claiming control both of his new 
wife and her friends, because he knows the entire social context in which his 
wife exists must be shaped anew if she is to be cured of her self- destructive 
attraction to St. Preux. Th e inseparables are knotted together so closely that 
the sickness of one is inevitably the sickness of all.
Th us Wolmar, as Claire explains to St. Preux early in Book IV, seeks not 
only to rehabilitate his wife but his wife’s friends as well. “Monsieur de Wol-
mar wishes to see you,” she tells her world- weary friend. “He goes farther, he 
means to cure you, and says that neither Julie, nor he, nor you, nor I, can be 
perfectly happy failing that.” Th e health of the entire group depends on St. 
Preux’s return and rehabilitation. With her invitation to return to Clarens, 
however, Claire sounds a note of circumspection about Wolmar’s plan: 
“Although I expect much from his wisdom and more from your virtue, I do 
not know how this undertaking will turn out” ( J 342). Th ough this is not the 
last time Claire will challenge Wolmar’s new power over the group, Wolmar 
is undoubtedly more successful in his eff orts to rehabilitate St. Preux and his 
wife than Claire or Bomston were (cf. Disch 1994). His foresightedness, 
knowledge of human nature, and capacity for environmental manipulation 
make him an excellent manager of the domestic economy at Clarens and an 
eff ective steward of the group’s interests. Under Wolmar’s paternalistic 
authority St. Preux reports some decisive progress in his quest to understand 
himself and his illness. Explaining the circumstances under which he and 
Julie were able to resist the temptation they posed to each other, St. Preux 
tells Bomston that “the scene at Meillerie was the crisis of my folly and my 
ills” but adds that “Monsieur de Wolmar’s explanations have entirely reas-
sured me as to my heart’s true condition. Th is too frail heart is cured insofar 
as it can be.” Th ough St. Preux pronounces himself cured several times in 
the novel, we see here a reasonable circumspection not present in previous 
self- diagnoses: he does not say he is cured simply but that he is cured “insofar 
as [he] can be.” St. Preux’s new measure is owing to “Monsieur de Wolmar’s 
explanations,” which have given him the strength to resist “the terror of 
being constantly besieged by crime.” He feels himself “the child of the 
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house” and, fi nding his place within the harmonious whole that Wolmar has 
constructed at Clarens, reports that it is in a child’s capacity that his “heart 
is gradually coming into unison with theirs” (432). St. Preux’s voluntary 
submission to Wolmar has given him peace, unity, and increased moral 
fortitude. If it has not made him “perfectly happy,” then it has reduced his 
suff ering considerably by showing him his place within the whole. Paradoxi-
cally, it is in his role as the “child” of Clarens that St. Preux begins to learn 
the requirements of adult friendship. Before being taken in by Wolmar, St. 
Preux was undoubtedly a “high maintenance” friend: he dwelled constantly 
on the fact of his own misfortune, and his attempts to console others inevi-
tably led him back to a consideration of his own pain. It is only under Wol-
mar’s careful guidance that St. Preux is able to dissuade Bomston from a 
dishonorable marriage and thus give active expression to the sentiments of 
friendship he eulogizes throughout the novel.
As Judith Shklar (1969) has shown, the distinctive social world depicted 
in Julie is hardly the only context in which the emergence of “fi gures of 
authority” proves necessary for ethical growth. Indeed, the education 
described in Emile also requires the existence of an authoritative moral 
guide who can negotiate the many hidden pitfalls in Rousseau’s moral uni-
verse. Joseph Reisert (2003), however, does not view this as evidence that 
friends do not learn from each other, arguing instead that the relationship 
between Emile and his tutor is a qualifi ed kind of friendship. Insofar as 
Rousseau—much as we do—uses the term “friendship” in both wide and 
narrow senses, such a suggestion is perfectly plausible, but it is very diffi  cult 
to see how Emile and Jean- Jacques’s relationship satisfi es Rousseau’s techni-
cal defi nition of the term: “Attachment can exist without being returned, 
but friendship never can. It is an exchange or contract like others, but it is 
the most sacred of all. Th e word friend has no correlative other than itself. 
Any man who is not his friend’s friend is most assuredly a cheat, for it is 
only in returning or feigning to return friendship that one can obtain it” 
(E 233n). Friendship is an “exchange” or “contract,” and as such it is a vol-
untary association into which rational persons freely select. Friends do not 
hold each other hostage or employ deceptive tactics in order to win aff ec-
tion and regard. Indeed, one who only pretends to return the honest good-
will and concern characteristic of friendship is a “cheat” rather than a true 
friend. Friendship, then, is not something imposed on us or that we are 
tricked into, but rather something that requires our free and reasonably 
informed consent.
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Friendship is also a reciprocal institution, which means friends must 
share the pleasures and burdens of their association in a roughly equal way. 
Th is does not mean friends must be equal along every dimension of life, for 
Rousseau’s own examples show that friends may have diff erent aims and 
excellences: Bomston’s immense personal fortune does not undermine his 
friendship with St. Preux, nor does Claire’s jealousy of Julie’s superior beauty 
and magnetism prevent genuine love and aff ection. It would, however, be 
quite unusual for the overall distribution of excellences between friends to 
be profoundly inegalitarian, since the mutual respect necessary for friend-
ship is satisfi ed only where both friends are capable of giving to and receiving 
from each other. One who needs little or nothing from others might be a 
benefactor, but he cannot be a friend on Rousseau’s understanding of the 
term. Th us, though friends may possess distinct excellences, those excel-
lences must be distributed in at least a roughly egalitarian way.
When, however, we look at Emile’s relationship with his tutor, we see an 
association that fails to satisfy both the conditions of voluntariness and reci-
procity. Th ese conditions begin to hold when Emile reaches sexual maturity, 
for at this “critical moment” it becomes essential to recognize him not as a 
child but as a friend and an equal: “He is still your disciple but he is no 
longer your pupil. He is your friend, he is a man. From now on treat him as 
such” (E 316). Emile now shares with his species and his tutor that desire that 
will give him access to distinctively human pleasures. After its birth all the 
aspects of his being will be active: he possesses will, judgment, reason, and a 
libido, and it is by way of these possessions that he acquires the right to 
decide how to live his own life. Th e fi rst decision he must make as “a man” 
is whether to continue living under his tutor’s watchful eye.
Jean- Jacques recognizes Emile’s new moral status and knows that his 
own authority must be explicitly authorized by his pupil in order to be legiti-
mate. To force an adult Emile to continue in an education he believes to be 
onerous is to deny him the use of the very capacities he is now entitled to 
employ, and if Emile is to make an informed decision about whether to stay 
under Jean- Jacques’s tutelage he must know the truth about how he has been 
raised. Jean- Jacques therefore discloses to his pupil the unique nature of his 
education, for part of what it is to be respected as a friend and equal is to be 
treated with honesty. Indeed, if complete candor were ever called for, it 
would be in a situation in which a presumptive equal asks another to consent 
to be governed by him. Yet Jean- Jacques continues to interfere with the exer-
cise of the very freedom that Rousseau himself has insisted Emile is entitled 
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to employ, for when he comes to ask his pupil to remain under his tutelage 
he utilizes all his old tricks. He manipulates all the circumstances around 
the choice situation in order to elicit Emile’s consent, and harangues the 
young man with a guilt trip worthy of the Dominican Order: “You are my 
property, my child, my work. It is from your happiness that I expect my 
own. If you frustrate my hopes you are robbing me of twenty years of my 
life, and you are causing the unhappiness of my old age” (E 323). Jean- Jacques 
is laying it on thick. We might expect such manipulative talk from Julie’s 
father, but is this the way that one deals with a friend?
I submit that it is not, and for reasons Rousseau himself recognized. 
First, the tutor’s mode of address—my property, my child, my work—is not 
only inegalitarian but also demeaningly proprietary. Th e choice to address 
Emile in this way is clearly calculated to remind the boy of his continued 
dependence on the tutor and to make him feel like a child at the very moment 
he is to choose like a man. To be sure, the tutor does what he does because 
he desires what is best for his Emile, because he suspects (and is right to 
suspect) that his pupil lacks the wherewithal to preserve his fragile happiness 
and that he will make destructive choices if left to his own devices. It might 
be reasonably urged that such lack of faith is itself inconsistent with the spirit 
of friendship itself—especially if we select our friends because we respect not 
only their right to choose but also their ability to choose rightly—but the 
point here is not about the validity of Jean- Jacques’s concerns but rather 
about the underhanded way in which he resolves them. Th e manipulative 
measures he takes, coupled with the sense of distrust that motivates them, 
seem manifestly inconsistent with the respect Rousseau himself claims 
friends owe each other.
It is, however, fair to wonder whether respect always entails perfect hon-
esty. Bomston and St. Preux—friends if there ever were any—intercede on 
each other’s behalf without explicit permission, and Rousseau seems to think 
that such behavior is the mark of an especially distinguished kind of friend-
ship. It is hasty, then, to conclude that Jean- Jacques’s unsolicited interven-
tions are somehow necessarily at odds with the requirements of adult 
friendship. It is, however, essential to remember that St. Preux and Bomston 
are both engaged in such behavior. Th ey intercede on each other’s behalf 
because both lack self- command; it is, in fact, this common character defi -
ciency that opens the emotional space in which the bonds of their friendship 
are strengthened. Far from disproving the rule, then, St. Preux and Bomston’s 
example instead confi rms it, for they show us that unrequested interventions 
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must be mutual in order to be consistent with the requirements of Rous-
seauan friendship. One sees immediately that this mutuality fails to obtain 
between Jean- Jacques and Emile. Th e pupil simply does not have occasion to 
assist the self- suffi  cient and quasi- divine tutor, who is needed by others with-
out ever needing others himself. Th e student- teacher relationship is for Rous-
seau many wonderful things, but it is not a friendship in the strict sense.
| Conclusions: Rousseau’s Compassionate Conservatism?
Th ough friendship has a long and distinguished history in the history of 
political thought, and though Rousseau is undoubtedly a canonical political 
thinker, very little work has been done to understand Rousseau’s treatment 
of friendship. Th e work that does exist obscures the originality of his concep-
tion and moors him to a classical tradition he sought to correct as much as 
to follow. Far from cleaving to the traditional understanding of friendship 
as a catalyst of ethical perfection between same selves, Rousseau instead 
emphasizes the contrast between remedial pedagogic relationships, which 
can inculcate virtue because they are hierarchical, and friendship proper, 
which cannot inculcate virtue because it is not. Th is central fi nding is signifi -
cant in its own right, for it not only draws attention to an interesting and 
neglected aspect of Rousseau’s thinking but also advances an original and 
somewhat subversive interpretation of it. Yet because it raises questions about 
friendship’s ability to both catalyze comprehensive intimacy and inculcate 
virtue—matters central to Rousseau’s broader social and political con-
cerns—it may be helpful to conclude by touching on Rousseau’s understand-
ing of the relationship between friendship and politics.
On this head, I should like to suggest that Rousseau’s theory of friend-
ship is for at least two reasons unpromising as a template for civic concord. 
Th e fi rst is that Rousseau’s portraits of friendship emphasize features of 
human connection that would seem especially problematic in the context of 
his own political project. Whereas Rousseau’s ideal political society requires 
thick community founded on an egalitarian ethos, his theory of friendship- 
as- pity shows the association between friends to be an attenuated and even 
hierarchical relation in which a fortunate observer consoles a suff ering other. 
Th e distancing, inegalitarian features built into the experience of pity strain 
emotional bonds between friends even as they make those bonds possible; to 
the degree that civic connection is grounded in compassion, we should expect 
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to see the same troubling dynamics at work between citizens. Th e point 
deserves special emphasis because many infl uential interpreters of Rousseau 
have claimed that his theory of political identifi cation is based on compas-
sion: John Charvet (1973, 19) calls pity “the solution to the social problem,” 
Allan Bloom (1979, 19) “the glue binding men together,” and Martha Nuss-
baum (2001, 385) “the basis for . . . democratic- egalitarian thinking.” Th e 
present analysis problematizes that line of interpretation, for it points up the 
diffi  culty of making a sentiment so deeply imbued with inegalitarian ele-
ments be the psychological basis for egalitarian fraternity.
Th ere is still another reason to wonder about the political eff ectiveness of 
Rousseauan friendship, namely, its manifest inability to inculcate virtue. 
Th ough Joseph Reisert and Jonathan Marks have both emphasized the mor-
alizing potential of friendship, we have seen that the problems on this head 
are both cognitive and conative: Rousseau’s friends not only lack the wis-
dom—both practical and theoretical—required to serve as eff ective moral 
counselors for one another, but they are also united through a pessimistic 
view of the moral world that emphasizes the limits of the human condition 
and the ineliminability of suff ering. Th e spirit of resignation that helps unite 
friends, as both Rousseau and his critics have noted, can be politically destruc-
tive: Cliff ord Orwin (1997a, 7) and Richard Boyd (2004) have both argued 
that the melancholy ethos attached to Rousseauan compassion promotes ethi-
cal fatalism, and Rousseau himself worries in the Preface to Narcisse (25) that 
“so many refl ections on the weakness of our nature” might be so dispiriting 
as to “turn us away from generous undertakings.”
It is therefore unsurprising that Rousseau’s citizens, far from displaying 
the gloominess and spirit of inaction so often exhibited by his friends, 
instead exhibit the moral enthusiasm and active, engaged habits of mind 
that help them fulfi ll their moral and civic duties. Among the most telling 
examples Rousseau provides on this score is found in the Letter to D’Alembert, 
where Rousseau opposes the institution of a theater in Republican Geneva 
because he believes it would inculcate the very moral passivity so prevalent 
in his own models of friendship: the “affl  icting images of servitude” required 
by dramatic performance induce in theatergoers a “gloomy” mentality that, 
in its turn, inspires narcissism and habits of “inaction” (LD 124–25). Such 
habits are uniquely inappropriate for the citizens of a free republic, who 
must be enthusiastic and active in the discharge of their civic obligations. 
Th us Rousseau rejects the dour self- absorption of the theater in favor of 
public events—balls, festivals, and civic competitions—designed to pro-
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mote cheerful fraternization among citizens. Of these events, the various 
forms of public competition appear to be especially important in catalyzing 
civic virtue, for they provide strong incentives for citizens to develop and dis-
play those forms of individual excellence that best facilitate social concord.
Th ough the preceding analysis points up the political limitations and 
potential dangers of Rousseauan friendship, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that its eff ects on the polity need not be entirely damaging. On this score, it 
is easy to imagine how the spirit of inaction and the resigned, almost tragic 
view of the social world exhibited by Rousseau’s friends could actually play 
a salutary preventive role in a political society, restraining some of the nastier 
expressions of self- love and helping prevent healthy amour- propre from slid-
ing into delusional forms of antisociability—forms that range from the disil-
lusioned drift of the bourgeois to the domineering cruelty of the tyrant. Th e 
somewhat resigned spirit of Rousseauan friendship might also help counter-
act the impulsiveness many critics associate with both democratic decision- 
making generally and Rousseau’s political philosophy in particular, for it 
expresses an ethos that encourages circumspection about the human capac-
ity to eliminate contingency and counsels inaction in the face of uncertainty 
(E 445). Such a worldview, though not unproblematic, is also not without its 
advantages, for it facilitates a generalized awareness of the human suscepti-
bility to error and, in so doing, provides reminders about the limits of politi-
cal action. Insofar, then, as Rousseau’s theory of friendship facilitates a spirit 
of restraint, it may also provide some resources for responding to a criticism 
of his political thought dating back to Burke, namely, that it encourages 
rash, radical, and detrimental forms of political change.
With that said, it is diffi  cult to view Rousseau’s retheorization of friend-
ship as anything other than a signifi cant diminution of its power. Indeed, 
Rousseau consigns what was once viewed to be the highest and best human 
relationship to the margins of man’s moral life, showing it to be an ameliora-
tive rather than a remedial association. It may console us in our dividedness, 
but it cannot return us to wholeness.
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   161 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Everything that destroys social unity is worthless. All institutions that 
put man in contradiction with himself are worthless.
—rousseau, Social Contract
In the previous three chapters we have looked at romantic 
love and friendship and have seen that neither succeeds in 
preserving human wholeness. Th ough the failure of each is 
due to a combination of psychological and environmental 
conditions, the explanatory emphasis thus far has been on 
the former: the shortcomings of love and friendship are 
attributable to limitations inherent in the imagination and in 
pity, respectively. Yet it is time to acknowledge that Rous-
seau’s heroes and heroines do not pursue their respective 
goods in a social or political vacuum. Th eir actions and inter-
actions are embedded in particular sociopolitical contexts 
which exert an inevitable and a destructive infl uence on the 
course of their lives. In Julie, the eponymous heroine and her 
lover take the fi rst and most decisive steps down their tragic 
path in the profoundly dysfunctional social world shaped by 
the “gothic maxims” of her violent and despotic father. In 
Emile and its sequel, the happy couple must preserve their 
union in a city teeming with infi delity and moral corruption. 
In both cases Rousseau’s heroes complain of the external 
Th e Ecology of Justice7
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world’s corrupting forces, which punish sympathy, undermine trust, and 
frustrate the desire for transparent human relations. Such considerations 
tempt us to pronounce the “domestic” healing strategy explored in Emile and 
Julie—namely, the eff ort to be in society without also being of it—a failure.
Th ough the socially embedded character of human action problema-
tizes the rehabilitative possibilities explored thus far, so, too, might it allow 
us to explore new and more promising ones, for, though those seeking to 
heal themselves from within a corrupt social environment cannot reason-
ably expect to succeed, they might still fi nd the satisfaction they seek in a 
well- ordered society. It is, then, not as lovers or friends but rather as citizens 
of a just political community that we may at last fi nd the comprehensive 
satisfaction we seek.
In order to fi nd this comprehensive satisfaction, however, we must answer 
a number of diffi  cult questions about what Rousseau’s well- ordered society 
looks like and what ends it seeks to realize. I interpret Rousseau’s political 
works as an attempt to identify the general institutional and sociological situ-
ation in which man’s inner unity is most eff ectively realized and make two 
broad arguments in support of this general claim. Th e fi rst is that the funda-
mental standard for assessing social institutions is not freedom—as so many 
interpreters have argued—but unity. Th e inner unity that characterizes man’s 
life in the state of nature is predicated on a harmonious relationship to the 
natural environment in which he is embedded, and it is the disruption of 
this harmonious relation that generates all the ruinous psychological conse-
quences about which Rousseau complains. At its most basic level, then, Rous-
seau’s political philosophy is about creating a social environment in which 
humans might live in harmony with themselves and with one another. To the 
degree this is true, freedom, however conceived, cannot serve as the end either 
of human nature or of social institutions; it is valuable, then, because it con-
tributes to social and psychological unity and not because it provides an evalu-
ative standard somehow beyond it.
Th e second argument is about the particular type of harmony that must 
obtain between man and his environment. On this head, I use the metaphor 
of an ecology to identify the key features of the unity Rousseau seeks to eff ect 
between citizen and society. Th ough unavailable to Rousseau, ecological 
systems theory (Bronfenbrenner 1979) helps bring into focus how deeply one’s 
identity is infl uenced by surrounding structures and provides a useful frame-
work for understanding how unity within is predicated on unity without. So, 
too, does it clarify how fragile the unity between self and environment is, for 
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in conceiving of political society as a set of nested social structures and of 
citizens as the possessors of multiple social roles, it highlights the possibility 
of identity confl ict. As conceived here, then, citizens are not just bearers of 
specifi cally political rights and responsibilities—they are also friends, lovers, 
parents, producers, consumers, and the like. Yet these various social roles are 
not always consistent with one another, and in the absence of a principle of 
identity that resolves role confl icts citizens inevitably fall into the passive drift 
of bourgeois dividedness.
Th e interpretation I shall develop in this chapter and the next has at least 
three controversial implications. Th e fi rst is its privileging of unity or har-
mony over freedom as the basis of Rousseau’s political thought. Th ough 
freedom in some form is widely considered to be the central concern motivat-
ing Rousseau in the Social Contract and perhaps beyond (e.g., Levine 1976; 
Cassirer 1989; Cullen 1993; Simpson 2006), I argue that freedom is only one 
of many characteristics of human nature, and that it deserves protection in a 
just regime only because it is contributory to the still more fundamental end 
of wholeness. Second, though I reject eff orts to turn Rousseau into a liberal 
individualist, I will also show the “totalitarian” readings of Isaiah Berlin and 
Lester Crocker (among others) to be decisively fl awed. Finally, and consistent 
with the argumentation provided in chapters 4 and 5, I emphasize the basic 
disjuncture between the respective educations of “men” and “citizens” and 
resist the temptation to read the individualistic educational program of Emile 
into the social and political context of the Social Contract. I do so by showing 
that the sociological supports necessary to the regime in the Social Contract 
are supportive of a public- spirited ethos quite at odds with the domestic indi-
vidualism cultivated in Emile.
| To Be or Not to Be Free? Is Th at Rousseau’s Question?
Th e literature on Rousseau’s political theory in general and on the Social 
Contract in particular is as fragmented as it is vast. Scholars have long dis-
puted whether Rousseau’s analysis of the principles of political right is coher-
ent or confused, classical or modern, liberal or authoritarian, progressive or 
conservative, nostalgic or foresighted, utopian or fatalistic. Despite such dis-
agreements, however, many scholars do seem able to agree on the work’s 
central theme: freedom. Th is is not without reason. Indeed, it is almost 
indecently obvious to say that a concern for freedom fi gures prominently in 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   164 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Th e Ecology of Justice 165
Rousseau’s political and social theory. It was his treatment of this theme—by 
turns illuminating and obscure—that drew both the admiration and the ire 
of his earliest readers: Robespierre was said to have kept a dog- eared copy of 
the Social Contract with him at all times, but Constant—mindful of all the 
trouble caused by Robespierre’s love of Rousseau—famously criticized the 
great Genevan for misunderstanding the true character of modern liberty. 
Burke (RRF 270) was especially violent in his denunciation of that “insane 
Socrates of the National Assembly,” believing his radical conception of free-
dom to be utterly at odds with the demands of civilization itself.
Such controversies were rehearsed anew in the twentieth century, with 
critics fi nding in Rousseau’s oeuvre either many of the necessary resources 
for combating the rise of “totalitarianism” (e.g., Kateb 1961; Shklar 1969) or, 
alternatively, one of its most appalling theoretical instantiations (e.g., Nisbet 
1943; Talmon 1952; Crocker 1995). Th e broad disputes concerning Rousseau’s 
liberal credentials began to take more specifi c shape in Isaiah Berlin’s famous 
“Two Concepts of Liberty” essay, in which he distinguishes “negative” and 
“positive” forms of freedom and claims that Rousseau’s “positive” concep-
tion gives his political thought an illiberal character. Implicit in the assimila-
tion of liberty and sovereignty, Berlin argues, is a perfectionistic moral 
doctrine that imposes on citizens a conception of a “higher” or “autonomous” 
self to be realized in and through the activity of self- governance. Th e under-
standing of freedom as “self- mastery” denies citizens the right “not to be 
interfered with in a defi ned area” and thus represents a “monstrous imperson-
ation” of true political liberty (Berlin 1990, 133). More recently, contemporary 
democratic theorists like Cohen (1986, 2010) and Rawls (2007) have followed 
Berlin in characterizing Rousseauan freedom as “positive” but have forcefully 
disputed the claim that there is anything authoritarian in it. Cohen’s (2010, 
11) revealingly titled “social autonomy” interpretation claims on Rousseau’s 
behalf that “freedom is the basis of humanity’s special worth, and is the basis 
of our standing as responsible, moral agents,” and Rawls (2007, 247–48) 
argues that the regime of the Social Contract eff ectively cultivates the indi-
viduality of citizens through the provision of self- respect.
Both Rawls’s and Cohen’s accounts show that the authoritarian regimes 
of the twentieth century have little if anything in common with Rousseau’s 
republican model and that the exercise of Rousseauan sovereignty is limited 
in ways that Berlin and others fail to grasp (see also Strong 1994, 79–85; 
Simpson 2006, 52–56). While they, like Berlin, emphasize the importance 
of Rousseau’s claim that submission to the state involves the exchange of 
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“natural freedom” for “moral freedom” and thus implicates the emergence 
of a “higher self,” they also argue that this exchange is not disrespectful to 
individuality but is rather the basis for its preservation. Th e acceptance of 
the terms of the social compact is nothing but the renunciation of “the right 
to everything that tempts [you]” and the realization that submission to the 
general will makes sense only because it is ultimately more empowering and 
possibility enhancing than the freedom of the state of nature (SC I.8, 56). 
Citizens deliberately realize their sense of self and the capacities that attach 
to that realization through the exercise of political sovereignty. And since the 
act of replacing natural freedom with moral freedom and its subjectivity- 
enhancing tendencies is “the most voluntary thing in the world”—because 
free and informed consent is an ongoing condition of membership in a just 
political society—it is inaccurate and unfair to say with Berlin that Rous-
seau’s positive conception of liberty produces institutional arrangements 
unfriendly to liberty.
Neither Cohen nor Rawls stops here, however. Both follow Ernst Cas-
sirer (1989) in fi nding embodied in Rousseau’s concept of “moral freedom” 
an uncommonly deep commitment to and productive way of thinking about 
individual liberty. Rousseau defi nes moral freedom as “obedience to the law 
one has prescribed for oneself” and claims that it alone “makes man truly the 
master of himself.” It is contrasted with “the impulse of appetite alone” 
(l’ impulsion de seul appétit), which is characterized as a form of “slavery” that 
is transcended once we learn to act not just in accordance with the law but 
out of respect for it and it alone (SC I.8, 56). Th e passage clearly evokes the 
shade of Kant, and Rawls in particular views the form of self- legislation 
embodied by moral freedom as both central to Rousseau’s political project 
and as a prefi guration of Kantian autonomy: “Th e society of the social com-
pact achieves in its basic political and social institutions both civil and moral 
freedom” (Rawls 2007, 235).
Th ough neither Rawls nor Cohen emphasizes Rousseau’s proto- Kantianism 
quite so much as Cassirer does, their assimilation of “civil” and “moral” free-
dom nonetheless generates a highly individualistic interpretation of Rous-
seauan citizenship, one in which the morally free citizen views himself as a 
self- originating source of valid claims, and the laws he authors as expressions 
of his individual identity. On their view, the legislative impulse emerges 
from the deepest recesses of the self qua self, is the unifying force in the 
moral personality, and is an immediate motivation for lawfulness. Th e law as 
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such requires respect because it is an articulation of one’s own deepest ratio-
nal commitments and an expression of each citizen’s capacity to create—
rather than be created by—his surrounding environment. To disrespect the 
law is therefore to disrespect oneself, and to obey it is to understand that 
lawfulness and moral dignity are mutually constitutive and complementary 
concepts. Citizens of a just regime must therefore develop their capacity for 
moral freedom both in order to realize their nature as free beings as well as 
to eff ectively discharge their civic duty. Connection to the state is established 
not at the cost of individuality, as Nisbet or Berlin would have it, but rather 
is premised precisely on its proper development.
Th ough correct to locate a kind of developmental imperative in Rous-
seau’s political thought and useful as a corrective to the superfi cial authori-
tarian view, the “social autonomy” interpretation exaggerates Rousseau’s 
concern for the development of autonomy in the civil sphere and, in so 
doing, misunderstands the relationship between moral freedom and the 
just regime. Indeed, it is clear that the privileged status given to moral free-
dom by Rawls and others is based on an inaccurate reading of the passage 
in which the concept is introduced. Th e fi rst indication of this is Rousseau’s 
paragraphing: after contrasting “natural” and “civil” freedom in the same 
paragraph, Rousseau breaks his discussion off  and introduces his treatment 
of moral freedom in a new paragraph, thus indicating its distinctness from 
the concepts that came before. Moreover, the way moral freedom is intro-
duced hardly suggests that its emergence is necessary (cf. Simpson 2006, 
94–100). After noting that civil freedom and property are gained only in 
society, Rousseau claims that “to the foregoing acquisitions could be added 
moral freedom, which alone makes man truly the master of himself” (SC I.8, 
56; emphasis added). Th e distinctness of moral and civil freedom is under-
scored not only by the fact that the former “could be” (on pourrait)—and thus 
need not be—attached to the latter, but also by Rousseau’s use of the verb 
ajouter (to add), which suggests that civil and moral freedom are distinct but 
related, as icing is distinct from cake or sauce from meat. Perhaps most reveal-
ingly, after defi ning moral freedom in a brief two sentences Rousseau simply 
drops the matter entirely, claiming that he has “already said too much about 
this topic” and stating fl atly that “the philosophical meaning of the word 
freedom is not my subject” (I.8, 56). Th e character of moral freedom is patently 
not the subject of the Social Contract, and Rousseau raises the topic not to 
show its importance but instead to point to its marginality.
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If the priority that Rawls and Cohen give to moral freedom is not estab-
lished on the basis of the very passage in which the concept is introduced, 
then it is made even more questionable when viewed in light of Rousseau’s 
other remarks about civic education. We have already seen Emile sternly 
insist that the education most appropriate for citizens is a form of “denatur-
ing” in which the political subject’s sense of self, far from being the psycho-
logical ground of his love of the state, is instead compromised by it. We have 
also seen that the hero of that work, who supposedly establishes the histori-
cal possibility of an individualistic form of modern citizenship based on 
something like moral freedom—has far too attenuated a relation to his 
country to be called a “citizen” of any particular community. But Rousseau 
reiterates the basic incommensurability of the individualistic educative pro-
gram of “men” and the desubjectivizing civic pedagogy of “citizens” in 
Considerations on the Government of Poland, where he claims that every Pol-
ish child, upon opening his eyes, “should see the fatherland, and see only it 
until his dying day” (CGP 189; emphasis added). “Th is love [of fatherland],” 
Rousseau continues, “makes up his whole existence; he sees only his father-
land, he lives only for it; when he is alone, he is nothing: when he no longer 
has a fatherland, he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead” 
(emphasis added). In the Polish context, incorporation into the social union 
comes at the cost of developing anything resembling an autonomous self. 
Th e moi, far from the establishing the ground of robust citizenship, is instead 
sacrifi ced to the patrie, which becomes the source of being. Th e contrast to 
the modern individual Emile, who can leave his home country without los-
ing his identity, is stark: the citizen of Poland, once removed from his home-
land, is not only no longer a citizen—he no longer is.
Such advice is not specifi c to the nonideal circumstances of Poland. 
Indeed, Rousseau anticipates the advice he gives to Count Wielhorski in his 
Discourse on Political Economy, where he avers that if citizens “are taught 
from suffi  ciently early on never to look upon their individual [self] except in 
its relations with the body of the State, and to perceive their own existence 
as, so to speak, only a part of its existence, they will at last succeed in some-
how identifying with this larger whole, to feel themselves members of the 
fatherland” (DPE 20). Once again, love of the fatherland does not emerge 
out of selfhood but is rather purchased at the cost of selfhood. Th e precondi-
tion and initial purpose of public education—the task to which it sets itself 
“from the fi rst moments of life”—is to replace the sense we have of ourselves 
as selves with the “exquisite sentiment” that attaches to love of the fatherland 
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(20–21). One’s self- understanding is at its deepest level informed and even 
constituted by the association to the political community. Utterances like 
this occur far too frequently in Rousseau’s political works to simply be set to 
the side. If there is any interesting developmental dynamic in Rousseau’s 
political thought, it would not appear to have much to do with the sense of 
moral freedom.
Seizing on these and other arguments, a diff erent group of scholars have 
rescued Rousseau from Berlin’s association of positive liberty and authori-
tarianism by simply denying that his conception of freedom is “positive” in 
any meaningful way. Shklar (1969, 165, 182) provides the classical exposition 
of this view, characterizing Rousseauan politics as a “politics of prevention” 
and claiming that sovereignty “is a condition free from personal oppression, 
but it is not self- determination in a politically active sense.” On her account-
ing, the general will is fundamentally negative and has as its aim not the 
advancement of some developmental imperative but rather the prevention of 
those forms of inequality that would systematically subject some citizens to 
others (185). Consistent with Shklar, Cullen (1993, 8) argues that Rousseauan 
“freedom consists in avoiding the domination, even the assistance, of oth-
ers.” Th is negative interpretation corresponds more closely to Rousseau’s 
own language, for in his characterization of the social compact Rousseau 
indicates that members must remain “as free as before” but does not make 
any strong claims about enlarging the sphere of freedom through the devel-
opment of rational autonomy (SC I.6, 53; emphasis added). Contractors need 
not be and indeed are not more free than they would have been in the state 
of nature, for all it means to be free in the political or civil sense is to remain 
unsubjected to the whims of another’s private will or—what amounts to the 
same thing—to a law that is not general in its “object” and its “essence” 
(II.4, 62). It is, then, to be free from the scourge of specifi cally personal 
dependence. Each citizen must will the law to which he is bound less because 
such activity expresses and deepens the sense he has of himself as an autono-
mous being than because his presence in the assembly is necessary to prevent 
the incursions of others. Indeed, Cullen (1993, 61–64) has decisively shown 
that the exchange of “natural” for “civil” and “moral” forms of freedom does 
not undermine but instead supports the authoritative status of the original, 
natural standard.
Th ough the more restricted or “negative” understanding of Rousseauan 
liberty improves on the “social autonomy” interpretation in important 
respects, it does so at the cost of obscuring the active, identity- constitutive 
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element of Rousseau’s political thought. To say that a citizen is free in the 
negative sense is to say he is protected from a whole series of destructive 
social forces. But this is to defi ne him by what he is not rather than by what, 
exactly, he is. However helpful this may be as a point of departure, it is not 
an adequately precise description of the end of political life or of the subject’s 
relation to his political community. Th e nonexistence of destructive social 
forces implies the existence of nondestructive social forces, and the eff ect of 
these latter forces on the human personality is not just negative or preserva-
tive but also positive and developmental. As a way of beginning to see how 
public life requires the activation and extension of human capacities, we 
should remember that the subject does not enter the polity as a fi nished 
moral and social product but rather “just as he currently is—both himself 
and all his force” (SC I.9, 56). Underneath politics, then, is a self in the pos-
session of certain natural interests and “forces.” However, political life does 
quite a bit more than protect its native integrity from others. Indeed, this 
integrity must be taken away and reconstituted anew from the materials and 
forces created by human interdependence: every political community takes 
“away man’s own forces in order to give him forces that are foreign to him 
and that he cannot make use of without the help of others” (SC II.7, 68). It is 
important to note that the forms of power to which we gain access upon 
entrance into the civil state require deep interdependence for their emer-
gence and useful application. Th e right kind of social cooperation assuredly 
prevents the onset of destructive and malignant forms of personal depen-
dence, but it activates new psychic capacities that enrich and deepen the lives 
of individual citizens. What is at stake in the creation of political commu-
nity, then, is not simply the avoidance of the pernicious and mutually 
destructive forms of interdependence described in the Discourse on Inequality 
but also the realization of an alternative and more salutary form of depen-
dence—dependence on the law and all the sociological structures that make 
law possible.
If the new form of dependence engendered by the social compact has 
transformative consequences that remain unexplained by proponents of the 
“negative freedom” thesis but are mischaracterized by the theorists of “posi-
tive freedom,” then in light of what end or aim can we understand the Rous-
seauan polis? Th e alternative I shall argue for is already familiar to, though 
often deemphasized by, those who attribute to Rousseau a negative concep-
tion of liberty: it is unity or wholeness. For instance, while Cullen’s central 
theoretical interest is freedom he nonetheless notes (1993, 8) that its realiza-
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tion “depends on a carefully structured environment, for which the pure 
state of nature constitutes the paradigm. By associating freedom with the 
natural condition, Rousseau ends up with a conception of freedom that is as 
stripped bare as his notion of natural man.” We should note an important 
gloss here, namely, that freedom is “associated” with the natural condition 
but is not defi nitive of it. To say man is naturally free is not to say that he is 
not also other things as well (e.g., self- loving, pitying, perfectible). Freedom 
is thus one among many native human traits. But it is the harmonious coex-
istence of all these traits—not the special importance of one in particular—
that truly defi nes the state of nature and makes it morally and politically 
meaningful. Indeed, a freedom that is “stripped bare” is an existential vac-
uum, not an end. Th us, though Cullen’s own chief concern is freedom, his 
analysis here points to the still more fundamental importance of the “care-
fully structured environment” that makes freedom possible in the fi rst place. 
Shklar, too, occasionally vacillates between freedom and unity in her char-
acterizations of the basis of Rousseau’s political theory: though calling Rous-
seauan politics a “politics of prevention,” she declares that its “end” is much 
more than prevention—it is the establishment of “unity . . . within each 
man. Social peace,” she adds, “is merely the refl ection of that inner harmony 
which had marked natural men in contrast to the civilized” (1969, 167). 
Once again, then, it would seem that the truly fundamental natural standard 
to be reproduced by good social institutions is not freedom per se but har-
mony within one’s soul and with one’s environment.
| Dividedness Revisited
Th ough it is now clear that freedom points beyond itself and toward unity as 
the end of social institutions, it remains less than obvious how Rousseau 
conceived of unity or why he believed it had priority over other and perhaps 
more familiar goods (e.g., civil liberty or material prosperity). Intuition sup-
plies part of the answer, for when we describe others as having a “unity of 
purpose” or as being “centered” we generally intend to commend them, and 
when we call them “divided” we mean quite the opposite. Yet Rousseau does 
not say that dividedness is merely undesirable; he says that it is the condition 
to be avoided at all costs (E 38–40; SC IV.8). To understand why he says this 
is to take a big step toward understanding the problem that politics is 
intended to solve; it is also, however, to go well beyond what our intuitions 
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suggest. It may, then, be helpful to return to the question of dividedness and 
to recall why Rousseau believed that condition so singularly destructive to 
human well- being.
As a way of beginning this analysis, we would do well to note that the 
language of dividedness is Rousseau’s way of talking about a general internal 
condition, not the occurrence of particular psychological events. Th ough we 
might describe ourselves as “divided” if we experience the co- presence of 
two uncombinable desires (coff ee or tea? Mexican or Th ai?), or—perhaps 
more signifi cantly—if we feel desire and duty pulling in diff erent directions, 
Rousseau has something else in mind. What defi nes a life as divided for 
Rousseau is not isolated experiences of internal confl ict, for these are inevi-
table, but rather the lack of a principle of identity that can resolve such con-
fl icts when they emerge. To be a unity is to have an identity, and to have an 
identity is to have a principle that generates coherent patterns of thought and 
behavior. Human life is full of diffi  cult choices about who and what matters 
most, and in order to resolve them in a psychologically tolerable and reason-
ably consistent way we need regulative principles that govern our choices. 
Such principles help us set priorities, distinguish permissible from impermis-
sible behaviors, and select a particular plan of life; in so doing, they stabilize 
our moral and social lives, giving them a continuity and consistency through 
time they would otherwise lack. Th ose who exhibit such continuity can be 
said to have a moral identity.
Rousseau’s discussion of unity early in Emile is in fact about unity in the 
sense explained above, and the diagnosis of the modern bourgeois as the 
exemplar of “dividedness” does not—as the reader of the Discourse on Inequal-
ity might expect—emphasize his avariciousness or insatiable greed but rather 
his passivity, his aimlessness and basic lack of purpose. On this score, Rous-
seau contrasts the bourgeois with those who are “something” and “one” on 
the ground that, whereas the former spends his life “in confl ict and fl oating” 
between unrealized possibilities, the latter follows a set of coherent impulses 
that give his life continuity. Unifi ed beings make decisions “in a lofty style” 
and stick to them, but the bourgeois is defi ned by his lack of sound principles 
in accordance with which he can organize a rewarding life. He does not 
think any diffi  cult choices have to be made, preferring instead to persist in 
the erroneous belief that the human good is realized most fully through the 
successful pursuit of narrow self- interest. He accepts in some vague way the 
view that all or even most goods are jointly realizable, that simply by consult-
ing his own interest he may reconcile the perennial tensions between private 
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passion and public good, wealth and taste, science and virtue, liberty and 
equality, citizenship and cosmopolitanism. Th is attitude is summed up by 
D’Alembert’s belief that Geneva could unite “the prudence of Lacedaemon” 
with “the urbanity of Athens” through the institution of a theater (in LD 4).
For Rousseau such a view is not only deluded but also destructive. 
Human goods are not laid out buff et- style, to be mixed and matched at the 
whim of the chooser, and the platitudinous belief in a unity of goods realiz-
able by raw self- interest does not lead to comprehensive satisfaction but 
rather to a kind of developmental purgatory. Th e attempt to have everything 
prevents one from being anything. We exist wholly in life’s interstices, and 
our perpetual in- betweenness—our inability to commit to the requirements 
of any particular plan of life—culminates in the halfhearted pursuit of a 
series of disjointed pleasures. Th e condition of dividedness is, in the precise 
sense, a condition of nothingness—hence Rousseau’s profoundly damning 
characterization of the bourgeois as a rien. To be a bourgeois is to be a non-
entity, a site of undeveloped possibility (E 40–41).
Th e costs of bourgeois dividedness are not just psychological but also 
social and political. Th e complacent selfi shness, cowardly obsession with 
self- preservation, and blithe disregard for virtue that characterize the empty 
life of the modern bourgeois are damaging to the city as well as the soul. Th e 
culprit, once again, is self- interest badly understood: Rousseau notes in Emile 
that modern social institutions reduce all sentiment and social aff ection to a 
“secret egoism” that “prevents [men] from being born by . . . detaching them 
from their species” (312n), and in the Social Contract he adds that this “secret 
egoism” prompts us to systematically neglect our public obligations. Th e pas-
sive and indiff erent selfi shness of the bourgeois leads to free- riding, making 
“him view what he owes the common cause as a free contribution, the loss of 
which will harm others less than its payment burdens him” (I.7, 55). Th us the 
political evils of apathy and disengagement are a direct consequence of our 
internal dividedness, our inability to fully commit ourselves to the require-
ments of social and political life.
In order to ameliorate the internal and external tensions that defi ne 
bourgeois life, it is important to recall that Rousseau views the phenomenon 
of dividedness not as a natural fact but an institutional consequence, a 
mutable product of an anemic political sociology rather than an expression 
of ineliminable human tendencies. How, then, to remedy the disease? If the 
bourgeois is divided because he cannot accept the tradeoff s that moral and 
social life require, then the path to unity begins, perhaps paradoxically, by 
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accepting the incommensurability of human goods. One must squarely face 
contradictions in order to avoid becoming one. Th us Rousseau’s insistence 
that it is possible to make a “man”—a private self who is a “numerical unity” 
and an “absolute whole” unto himself—or a “citizen”—who has a “relative” 
existence defi ned by his participation “within the whole” political commu-
nity—but that it is impossible to make both at the same time. For, from 
“these necessarily opposed objects,” there emerge “two contrary forms of 
instruction—the one, public and common; the other, individual and domes-
tic” (E 39–40; emphasis added). Th us, in our quest to create a healthy human 
type, we are faced with a diffi  cult decision. We can make a man or a citizen, 
but we cannot make both at the same time. We have a choice, but not a 
choice of choices.
Th e tragic choice between making a man and a citizen is not a false 
dichotomy but is rather is forced on us by the incommensurability of human 
goods. Th is reading gains plausibility when we see that the choice between 
citizenship and cosmopolitanism is far from the only costly decision we must 
make in Rousseau’s moral universe, which constantly confronts us with the 
tough reality that the enjoyment of one good precludes the enjoyment of 
others. Th ere is doubtless a rhetorical component to Rousseau’s presentations 
of moral confl ict, which often lend seemingly cosmic signifi cance to the 
everyday diffi  culties faced by everyday people. But the rather grandiose pre-
sentation he gives to familiar problems is not mere rhetorical posturing. 
Rousseau’s intellectual career is marked by his tendency to point out value 
confl icts and his inability to accept cheap resolutions. Where others saw 
complementarity and continuity, Rousseau saw contradiction and incoher-
ence in germinal form. It is therefore not surprising that in both the private 
and public contexts, Rousseau’s moral exemplars are exemplary largely 
because of their willingness to face and resolve precisely the kinds of tragic 
choices the bourgeois spends his life avoiding.
In the private realm, Julie’s example springs immediately to mind, for 
her personal fate—indeed, the fate of all her friends and intimates—turns 
on her decision to obey her father rather than wed St. Preux. Her life is 
defi ned by role confl ict, by the choice she must make between being a good 
daughter and being a good lover. Th is choice, it is worth adding, has social—
or if one likes, “political”—eff ects, for it ultimately determines the shape of 
the social structure at Clarens. Later in the novel she must decide between 
honoring her marital commitment to Wolmar and following her heart back 
to St. Preux. Th ough it is perhaps fair to wonder whether Julie is perhaps too 
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willing to suff er, whether her eagerness on this head is as much a cautionary 
tale as an example to be imitated, there is no denying the intrinsic diffi  culty 
of her situation. She is caught in and crushed by the crosscutting demands 
of contradictory social obligations, defi ned and destroyed by her perpetual 
in- betweenness. However, she does not act as a rien. To the contrary, she is 
obedient to the logic of identity: she makes her choice and sticks to it in a 
“lofty” style. Th at her struggles are never rewarded with happiness is discon-
certing but not fatal to the theory, for Rousseau’s claim is that maintaining 
unity is a necessary but not a suffi  cient condition for attaining the happiness 
that is the end of human life.
Emile’s example also points up the inevitable presence of value confl icts 
and the importance of decisively resolving them. After learning of Sophie’s 
infi delity Emile, like Julie, is faced with a diffi  cult choice. He is a cuckolded 
husband but also a father; thus he must decide whether to raise his child or 
leave his wife. To stay with Sophie is to demean himself, but to abandon his 
off spring is surely to do the same, as well as to neglect his paternal and civic 
obligations. Emile’s obligations do not confl ict as dramatically as Julie’s, but 
neither are they immediately continuous with each other: what he owes his 
child as a father is care and concern, but what he owes his unfaithful spouse 
is, strictly speaking, nothing at all. Th e choice he makes—sneaking out in 
the middle of the night and abandoning his family—may fairly be ques-
tioned, but only after acknowledging that he, like Julie, must choose between 
two decidedly imperfect options. Being a something is hard.
Rousseau’s domestic heroes are not the only fi gures who understand that 
the best and most human—that is, the most unifi ed—life is full of confl icts 
that must be stared down. Indeed, the ideal of citizenship provides a very 
diff erent principle for resolving the diffi  cult choices social life forces on us. 
Of the many exemplars of classical citizenship that Rousseau wields in order 
to humiliate modern readers, perhaps none better points up the confl ict 
between private and public attachments than that “tender father” Junius 
Brutus, who presided over the trial and execution of his own sons in order to 
save a fragile Roman Republic. Rousseau treats Brutus’s example at some 
length in his Final Reply to the critics of the First Discourse, in which he 
enters into dialogue with a hypothetical interlocutor who confesses to admir-
ing Brutus but would nonetheless “admire even more a powerful and well- 
governed state” where “citizens would not be condemned to such cruel virtues” 
(123). Th e objection, important because characteristic of Rousseau’s century, 
is that Brutus’s sacrifi ce, however noble, was made necessary only by the 
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Romans’ primitive political culture and inadequate understanding of insti-
tutional design. A “powerful and well- governed state” would have kept 
Brutus from having to make such a terrible choice in the fi rst place. Th e 
modern interlocutor in eff ect denies the necessity of tragic tradeoff s; he 
believes it would have been possible to reason one’s way out of Brutus’s prob-
lem and that it would not have been prejudicial to civic virtue to do so. 
Freedom does not require the “cruel virtues,” and it is only the ignorance of 
the ancients that led them to insist on their necessity.
Th ough Rousseau does not entirely disagree with the objection he has 
his interlocutor raise—the ancients were defi cient in their understanding of 
political institutions—his initial response points up the inescapability of 
moral confl ict and the necessity of Brutus’s actions. For Rousseau it is “cer-
tain” the Republic would not have survived long had he pardoned his sons’ 
crimes against the state, for such partiality would have created a very trouble-
some precedent and fatally undermined the idea of the rule of law. Th e 
structure of the social situation required that Brutus make a choice, and he 
made the choice most in keeping with his identity as a citizen. If being a 
good citizen is anything, it is putting the good of the polity before every-
thing else and accepting the consequences, even and indeed especially when 
they are onerous. It is, then, wrong to simply assume with Rousseau’s inter-
locutor that Brutus’s public and private obligations could be reconciled: 
“Th ere is no middle ground. Either Brutus had to be an infamous person or 
the heads of Titus and Tiberinus had to fall by his order to the axe of the 
Lictors” (123). Th ere is no other way to slice it: Brutus had to choose between 
the death of the Republic and the death of his sons, and he made the choice 
most befi tting a citizen.
Brutus’s is not the only case in which profound love of state is accompa-
nied by astounding hardness toward one’s own off spring. In Emile, Rousseau 
relates from Plutarch the story of a Spartan woman who, upon being informed 
that her fi ve sons were killed in war, ran to the temple to thank the gods for 
the military victory rather than collapsing in agony for the loss of her chil-
dren. “Th is,” he exclaims with evident relish, “is the female citizen” (40). 
Th ough this anonymous Spartan woman was not, like Brutus, forced by an 
external necessity to undertake active violence against her own progeny, note 
that Rousseau takes her willingness to suff er almost unthinkable personal 
losses on behalf of the state to be exemplary of citizenship as such. Th e con-
fl icts that arise in our associational lives are inevitable, requiring some form 
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of resolution, and what defi nes the citizen is a disposition to resolve them on 
behalf of the state. For citizens, the public good becomes internalized and 
serves as the unifying principle by which they organize moral and social 
life. Th e example of the anonymous Spartan woman is particularly telling 
when compared to Sophie, her modern counterpart and wife of the pre-
sumptive “man- citizen” Emile. Sophie, far from bearing the death of her 
off spring with such chilling aplomb, sinks into deep depression. Her 
response is that of a mother who loves her family more than anything else; 
the Spartan woman’s response is that of a citizen who loves the state even 
more than her own children. If more evidence of the enormous psychologi-
cal distance between “men” and “citizens” were needed, surely this example 
provides it.
Th is, however, is only half the argument. As even a casual reader of the 
Social Contract knows, Rousseau is not an unqualifi ed admirer of the ancients 
nor does he simply demand that citizens sacrifi ce everything to the state 
without being compensated. Indeed, there are limits to human nature that 
good regimes are obliged to respect, and Rousseau would be among the fi rst 
to censure a regime that exacted needless sacrifi ces from citizens or perpetu-
ated itself at the expense of its inhabitants. Just societies acculturate citizens 
to the necessity of sacrifi cing for the common good, but they are organized 
to prevent the need for gratuitous privation: “[A] citizen owes the State all 
the services he can render it as soon as the sovereign requests them. But the 
sovereign, for its part, cannot impose on the subjects any burden that is 
useless to the community” (SC II.4, 62). Th ough even the best regime can-
not eliminate all the sources of confl ict and contradiction in human life—to 
suff er is our estate—it can at the very least be expected not to multiply them 
and, to the degree possible, be responsible for neutralizing them. So, while it 
is incumbent on the citizen to discharge his public obligations even when he 
fi nds them onerous, it is nonetheless true that such obedience is justifi ed if 
and only if political institutions are basically consistent with the demands of 
human nature, rightly developed. All citizens have “duties . . . as subjects,” 
but they are only obligated to fulfi ll them if the environment in which they 
are embedded is conformable to their nature (II.5, 62). Th us conceiving of 
the political problem in terms of “unity,” far from authorizing states to exact 
limitless sacrifi ces from citizens, in fact provides a way of distinguishing 
between modes of social organization that create unnecessary burdens for 
citizens and those that do not.
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| Le Tout Est Bien: “A Complete Return to Political Unity”
Th ough Rousseau’s account of dividedness is in many ways the center of his 
critique of modern political thought and the impoverished human type it 
brought into being, he is one with other modern thinkers in believing Chris-
tianity to be an important institutional cause of that dividedness. Rousseau 
was concerned that the “true religion” had destroyed the psychology neces-
sary for political freedom by encouraging a disengaged political quietism, 
introducing profoundly destructive contradictions into social life by insist-
ing on a division of spiritual and temporal powers. In addressing himself to 
the social friction caused by institutions answering to diff erent authorities, 
Rousseau follows Machiavelli, Spinoza, Locke, and many others in seeking 
to weaken the political infl uence of the church. Yet he credits Hobbes with 
being the sole “Christian author” to see that the only way to solve the 
problem of divided allegiances is to grant to the sovereign fi nal authority 
on all matters of fundamental import, including and especially those con-
cerning religion. Th us he follows his bête noire in insisting that the union 
of church and state—or rather the subordination of church to state—is 
the indispensable condition of a much- needed “return to political unity” 
(SC IV.8, 127).
It is in this context that Levine (1976, 54) emphasizes Rousseau’s debt to 
Hobbes, claiming that the Hobbesian thesis of “complete alienation” is 
“taken for granted” by Rousseau and that it is adopted in the Social Contract 
“virtually without argument.” Yet the account of human dividedness pro-
vided above shows that Rousseau has his own theoretical reasons for empha-
sizing the theme of unity, reasons that, far from their being a product of an 
uncritical acceptance of Hobbes, are instead suggestive of a deep disagree-
ment with Hobbes’s understanding of the social problem. If Rousseau not 
only disagrees with Hobbes about what “dividedness” means but also 
believes Hobbes’s philosophy to be a primary cause of that dividedness, then 
it is highly unlikely that the kind of institutional unity he seeks will have 
much in common with Hobbes’s theory. Th e unity Rousseau sought was far 
diff erent, and far deeper, than that posited by Hobbes. It is therefore neces-
sary to tunnel under Levine’s claim and to articulate a more satisfying 
account of the theoretical features of unity.
On this head, I would like to suggest that the particular form of institu-
tional unity Rousseau sought is best comprehended by way of naturalistic 
metaphor: an ecology. Ecosystems are self- sustaining and self- regulating envi-
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ronments in which all living beings are embedded, and the concept has 
recently been applied to social and political institutions in order to under-
stand both how those institutions fi t together as well as how their fi t (or lack 
of fi t) aff ects the individuals within the system (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 1979). 
Th ough unavailable to Rousseau—who uses the traditional metaphor of a 
“body politic” in order to talk about the interdependence of social systems—
ecological systems theory provides at least three considerable advantages in 
seeking to understand Rousseau’s political thought. Th e fi rst is its emphasis 
on the idea of embeddedness. Individual subjects are conceived not as autono-
mous, free- fl oating units but rather as necessarily situated in a series of 
nested structures. Th ough such a conception may initially appear unpromis-
ing as a way of explaining a theory like Rousseau’s, it helps reveal the way in 
which the subject’s internal or psychological unity relies on the structure of 
the environment. Harmony within is predicated on harmony without. Sec-
ond, an “ecological” interpretation allows us to attain a comprehensiveness 
of explanation that eludes many alternative approaches. While we shall be 
able to account for both Rousseau’s philosophical and sociological commit-
ments, we have already seen that other approaches tend to explain the one at 
the expense of the other. Th e “social autonomy” interpretation, for instance, 
provides a sophisticated analysis of Rousseau’s philosophy of freedom but 
rejects as distasteful the political sociology attached to it; “totalitarian” read-
ings, on the other hand, often focus so intently on the ugliest sociological 
particulars of Rousseau’s theory that one forgets “liberty” was even of inter-
est to Rousseau. Our approach, however, is able to account for both sides of 
the coin. Finally, the dynamic unity exemplifi ed by ecological systems pos-
sesses three structural features—harmoniousness, comprehensiveness, and 
fragility—that are refl ected in and help explain Rousseau’s political thought. 
In what follows, I shall show how these three features map onto both the 
natural order depicted in the Discourse on Inequality and the social order 
envisioned in the Social Contract.
Th e unity of any system is manifested in the equilibrium it produces, 
and the equilibria that emerge within ecological systems have a harmonious 
character. Th is, of course, is not to say there is no confl ict within the system 
but rather to say that the continued life of each species is predicated on the 
health of the system itself. An example may clarify. Let us assume a simply 
ecological system in which antelope (A) graze on grass (G) and lions (L) prey 
on antelope. Th ese patterned interactions produce a system- level equilibrium 
that facilitates the continued life of all three species: (1) the presence of G 
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contributes to the survival of A, (2) the presence of A contributes to the 
survival of L, and (3) the presence of L contributes to the survival of G by 
thinning out the population of A, thus allowing G to replenish. Th e web of 
interdependence linking these three life forms is far from frictionless, but it 
can nonetheless be broadly characterized as harmonious because the emer-
gent ecological equilibrium preserves the continued life and development of 
all the organisms within it. Th e isolated particulars may be ugly, but le tout 
est bien.
Embeddedness in an environment ordered to be broadly conducive to the 
requirements of self- preservation is an essential element in Rousseau’s argu-
ment for natural goodness. Indeed, though man in the state of nature is said 
to be good because his two most basic passions—self- love and pity—are orga-
nized in a salutary way, it is clear that this salutary organization owes much to 
the environment in which the passions express themselves. We see this with 
especial clarity in the Discourse on Inequality’s famous depiction of natural 
man, whom Rousseau sees “satisfying his hunger under an oak, quenching his 
thirst at the fi rst stream, fi nding his bed at the foot of the same tree that fur-
nished his meal; and therewith his needs are satisfi ed” (DI 105). Th e autarchic 
contentment described here is predicated on both psychological and environ-
mental factors. Th e psychological claim is that human beings have very limited 
natural needs and that nothing could disturb the equilibrium between power 
and desire so long as food, shelter, protection, and sexual partners are suffi  -
ciently plentiful. But what if the environment in which we were embedded 
were less hospitable to us? What if food were scare? It is when the environment 
ceases to meet our natural needs that we begin to have to refl ect on how to 
meet those needs ourselves (116). No longer able to thoughtlessly rely for our 
subsistence on our surroundings, we fi nd it necessary to attempt to shape those 
surroundings in accordance with our needs. In so doing, however, we acquire 
new needs, and once this happens the spontaneous and prediscursive harmony 
between self and environment that characterized life in the pure state of nature 
is gone forever. When the environment changes, our passions follow.
Th is becomes still more clear once Rousseau sets himself to explaining 
why human beings would have ever left a condition so hospitable as the state 
of nature for one so deplorable as civil society. At a early but important 
juncture in Rousseau’s account man fi nds himself back under a tree—per-
haps the very one under which he had contentedly lived for so long—but 
suddenly fi nds it too tall to reach its fruit. Th e scarcity this new condition 
imposes—in conjunction with droughts, fl oods, and other natural disasters 
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Rousseau imagines to have been inevitable—brings natural man into com-
petition with other animals and quickly teaches him the use of tools, which 
in turn produce in him “the fi rst stirrings of pride” (DI 143–44). Man’s 
environment, then, is decisive in determining both what passions he has and 
how they are able to express themselves. Th us the unity that characterizes his 
life in the state of nature owes as much to the broadly hospitable environ-
ment in which he is embedded as to his native disposition.
Th ough the type of dependence required by the civil association is 
“moral” as well as “physical,” and is thus diff erent from that which exists in 
an actual ecological system, citizens of the just regime must nonetheless be 
embedded in a harmonious and self- sustaining environment that allows for 
the preservation and extension of being. Good social institutions are like 
laws of nature insofar as they do not work at cross- purposes or embody 
uncombinable visions of the good, since to do so would be to disrupt the 
equilibrium of the moral and social environment and thus to undermine the 
health of those who exist within it. We have already glimpsed the impor-
tance Rousseau places on inducing through institutional design the harmony 
inherent in the state of nature—of rendering harmonious and hospitable the 
environment in which citizens act and interact—in his praise of Hobbes’s 
eff ort to eliminate the confl ict between church and state.
But church and state are not the only social institutions that must exist 
harmoniously, and if we wish to understand the harmony Rousseau sought 
for each citizen it is perhaps best to consider things from the citizen’s point 
of view. In so doing we immediately see that citizens in the context of Rous-
seau’s political project are sovereign- subjects, bearers of particular entitle-
ments and obligations that attach to the “citizen” role. But the citizen is and 
must be more than that. He occupies other roles and serves other functions: 
in addition to being a citizen he is also a parent, a friend, a lover, a spouse, 
a churchgoer, a consumer, a producer, and so on. He is embedded in a com-
plex of nested social structures. Th is is his inescapable condition. Th e prob-
lem that emerges from this multiplicity is that these structures are in an 
ongoing struggle for his scarce psychological and emotional resources, and 
when they make diff erent and contradictory claims on his identity he falls 
into identity confl ict and all the trappings of dividedness. In order to create 
a social environment in which psychic unity can be achieved and main-
tained, the citizen’s various confl icting social obligations must be somehow 
reconciled. His needs are more numerous and more complex than are natu-
ral man’s; their reconciliation is therefore a more diffi  cult problem.
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Second, Rousseauan social institutions mimic ecosystems in their 
identity- constitutive character. In ecosystems, the interdependence of one 
species on another, and of every species on the shared environment, is com-
plete and comprehensive. Strict ecologists like Charles Darwin maintain 
that everything about the natures of living beings—their physical appear-
ances, needs, habits, instincts, and drives—is ultimately explicable in terms 
of the physical environment in which they act and interact. While Rousseau 
at least seems to reject this radical view in his disavowal of the proto- 
evolutionary notion that “man’s elongated nails were at fi rst hooked claws”—
a thesis he rather strangely attributes to Aristotle—he is quite clear that the 
change in man’s environment had produced fundamental changes in the 
nature of his being (DI 104).
Th ese changes, as every reader of Rousseau knows, had been ruinous, 
and the Social Contract is Rousseau’s attempt to set things aright by specify-
ing the social and moral conditions in which human beings can through 
self- conscious rational refl ection recapture the harmony they had with the 
natural world. Th e Rousseauan citizen’s dependence on the moral environ-
ment of the just regime mirrors the comprehensive dependence that living 
beings in an ecological system have on their physical environment: in order 
to be protected from the alienating and mutually destructive forms of per-
sonal dependence embodied by the bourgeois, the citizen must divest him-
self of all his natural rights and give his entire self to the political community 
as a whole. Indeed, the complete identifi cation with and dependence on the 
state is underscored by Rousseau’s description of the social compact, which 
involves “the total alienation of each associate, with all his rights, to the 
whole community.” Only a complete divestiture of rights—a giving of one’s 
“entire self”—will suffi  ce, since “if some rights were left to private individu-
als, there would be no common superior who could judge between them and 
the public,” and thus “the association would necessarily become tyrannical 
or ineff ectual” (SC I.6, 53; emphasis added). Human identity is utterly trans-
formed by the new moral and social environment in which it is embedded. 
Th e political subject must adapt to the logic of his new environment, and 
this adaptation requires a reconception of his fundamental interests and, 
hence, his basic identity.
Th e comprehensive dependence of the citizen on his environment is 
refl ected again, and with especial clarity, in the Social Contract (II.4), where 
Rousseau treats the vexed question of the limits of sovereign power. In this 
chapter he stakes out a radicalized version of the Hobbesian view that the 
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establishment of genuine sovereignty requires a divestiture of all the subject’s 
rights, save the “right of nature,” which allows subjects to resist in the event 
that they are sentenced to death (Lev. XIV, 79–80). Th e crucial point about 
the Hobbesian covenant is that no transformation of moral identity or fun-
damental reinterpretation of self- interest is required; contracting agents will 
seek within the context of the association the same goods they sought outside 
of it. Th us, because individuals consent to social order primarily in order to 
enhance the likelihood of preserving themselves, and because the sovereign 
can do nothing to make them divest themselves of this overriding natural 
imperative, they may fairly resist the sovereign if it seeks to destroy them. 
Even the “absolutist” Hobbes allows the political subject to carry into civil 
society a portion of his natural powers.
Th e reconciliation between self and society that Rousseau seeks is far 
deeper than that sought by Hobbes, and this is refl ected in his insistence that 
a citizen may not reasonably resist the sovereign even when his individual 
preservation is threatened. Consenting to the terms of the social compact 
means handing control over everything—even a right as deeply particular-
ized as that to self- preservation—to the sovereign: “When the prince has 
said to him, ‘It is expedient to the State that you should die,’ he ought to die. 
Because it is only under this condition that he has lived in safety up to that 
point, and because his life is no longer only a favor of nature, but a condi-
tional gift of the State” (SC II.V, 64). Here as elsewhere, Rousseau has radi-
calized the already radical Hobbesian view: rather than follow Locke in 
expanding the set of rights that subjects bring with them into political life 
and thereby circumscribing the sphere of sovereign action, Rousseau responds 
to Hobbes by insisting even more sternly on the discontinuity of the natural 
and civil states and by requiring an even more complete divestiture of the 
contracting agent’s natural powers. Th is utter divestiture is necessary because 
in order to harmonize man’s relation to his environment, he must be funda-
mentally reshaped to exist entirely within and depend entirely on an envi-
ronment for which he is not naturally suited. Th is harmonization requires an 
exchange of “natural freedom” for “civil freedom,” which in its turn requires 
the “total alienation” of all one’s natural rights and the attendant reorienta-
tion of the motivational fi eld: politicized man is “forced to act upon other 
principles [than private desire] and to consult his reason before heeding his 
inclinations” (I.8, 55–56; I.6, 53). Th us are the moral identities and interests 
of citizens made and remade in the polity in the same way that the habits, 
drives, and instincts of living organisms are shaped by their ecological systems. 
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From a moral point of view, the citizen’s identity is solely a function of his 
environment.
Finally, ecological equilibria—like so many of the goods Rousseau 
describes—are often characterized by their fragility. Th ough the emergent 
balance of forces in ecological systems have self- regulating and self- correcting 
mechanisms that can absorb some degree of disruption, they can be thrown 
into disequilibrium by even slight alterations. Scientists have, for instance, 
called attention to how the introduction of even a single non- native species 
into an ecosystem—for example, kudzu in the American South or Asian 
carp in the Mississippi River—can have drastic and destructive eff ects on 
the habitats of hundreds of other life forms and on the stability of the system 
as a whole (e.g., Hickman et al. 2010; Freedman, Butler, and Wahl 2012). 
What is more, the eff ects of these environmental disturbances are often 
irreversible; once done, they cannot be undone. We have in the previous 
chapters seen just how fragile human happiness is for Rousseau, how diffi  -
cult it is to establish and maintain the delicate balance of environmental 
forces necessary for its realization. To see the signifi cance of this in the pres-
ent context we need only recall what Julie tells St. Preux when refl ecting on 
their star- crossed relationship. “One strays for a single moment in life, devi-
ates by a single step from the straight path,” she tells her lover. “At once an 
ineluctable slope drags him down to his ruin” ( J 291). Th e unanticipated 
consequences of even the most seemingly insignifi cant mistakes can have 
ruinous psychological and social consequences. Goodness and happiness are 
delicate; their enabling conditions are nearly impossible to create and even 
more diffi  cult to sustain. Th is is evinced by the fact that even Wolmar and 
Jean- Jacques—the most authoritative remedial fi gures that could be imag-
ined—had in their remedial endeavors only a partial and limited form of 
success.
Th e fragility of human things makes the presence of authoritative moral 
teachers as necessary in the political realm as in the domestic. Th us we 
should not be surprised to see Rousseau introduce Wolmar’s and Jean- 
Jacques’ political equivalent—the “Legislator”—who is charged with the 
task of creating a people by persuading them to accept good social institu-
tions (SC II.7, 67–70). It is at present impossible to say whether his institu-
tional creation will endure longer or meet with any more success than 
Wolmar’s or Jean- Jacques’ pedagogic projects, but the crucial role he plays at 
the founding points up the extreme delicacy of the social enterprise by 
revealing a people’s incapacity to assemble and constitute itself. Rousseau 
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took it for granted that common people were unable to independently fash-
ion their own environment or provide the institutional conditions for their 
own happiness. He asked not whether a people may raise itself up through a 
process of organic historical development, but rather whether it was capable 
of operating with tolerable eff ectiveness the machine constructed by a 
benefi cent wise man. Th e present purpose is not to answer the question so 
much as to show that we cannot answer it in a serious way without remem-
bering Julie’s warning about the tenuous position of virtue or Rousseau’s 
belief in the fragility of even the best human institutions. Th is fragility is 
glimpsed yet again in Rousseau’s formulation of the social compact, whose 
terms are “so completely determined by the nature of the act” of consenting 
to be governed that even “the slightest modifi cation” would destabilize the 
civil association to the point of nullifying the original agreement (SC I.6, 53). 
Even the slightest deviation from the strictest terms of justice would seem to 
explode the entire social and political enterprise. Here and everywhere in 
Rousseau’s moral universe, the margin for error is razor thin.
| Conclusions
Rousseauan man requires unity, and unity of a particular—and particularly 
deep—kind with his environment. Yet life in political society is necessarily 
something complex and diff erentiated; it forces us into roles that can and do 
confl ict and, thereby, exerts a centrifugal, decentering eff ect on the human 
personality. Modern social institutions unnecessarily magnify this destruc-
tive tendency by imposing on men obligations that are not only diff erent but 
inconsistent: by instantiating in the soul confl icts between public and private 
forms of life and between spiritual and temporal forms of power, modernity 
had put us at odds with ourselves and one another. So long as we live within 
an institutional order at odds with itself, we are doomed to dividedness and 
its aimless, disempowered drift. Rousseau seeks to correct this situation by 
organizing social institutions in such a way as to mimic the ordered harmony 
of the state of nature and, in so doing, to mitigate the destructive eff ects of 
the confl icts that characterize social life.
But what, practically speaking, does this solution look like? Th is preced-
ing discussion has tried to identify the broad contours of the problem Rous-
seau seeks to solve through politics, but it has not given us a sense of how or 
to what extent Rousseau believed that problem could be resolved. We need, 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   185 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations186
then, to look more closely at what life looks like in a Rousseauan regime, at 
how society’s basic institutions ought to fi t together and how living within a 
coherent institutional order empowers the human soul. After having done 
so, we will be in a better position to see whether the political path to whole-
ness is any more satisfactory than the domestic alternatives we have exam-
ined in previous chapters. If Rousseau is critical of modernity for imposing 
contradictory obligations on men, then his constructive alternative ought to 
prove successful where modernity failed. It is therefore necessary to look 
more closely at Rousseau’s analysis of society’s basic institutions and the way 
they ought to fi t with one another.
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   186 1/25/16   11:01 AM
In the previous chapter we saw that social life is complex and 
comprehends multiple forms of obligation. We also saw that, 
in order to have the wholeness Rousseau seeks, these obliga-
tions must be in harmony with one another. Because this 
harmony cannot be expected to spontaneously emerge, it is 
the job of political institutions to create and sustain it. How 
and to what extent they do so is the subject of this chapter.
Among the structural social confl icts Rousseau diag-
nosed as damaging to human wholeness, he identifi ed those 
obtaining among state, household, and church to be espe-
cially destructive and hence most in need of resolution. He 
believed this to be true because all three institutions make 
incommensurable claims on the identities of individuals and, 
taken together, create a social environment in which it is 
impossible to fulfi ll any of our obligations. We have, for 
instance, already seen that the model of the domestic society 
Rousseau develops in Emile and Julie, far from catalyzing 
citizenship, is instead developed at the cost of citizenship. 
Christianity, too, is ultimately inconsistent with the require-
ments of political freedom, both because it insists on the 
church being recognized as the state’s equal and because it 
cultivates an ethos of passivity and meekness at odds with the 
proactive spirit of the republican citizen. Th ese institutional 
confl icts reproduce themselves in the soul and are the root 
Th e Sociology of Wholeness8
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cause of the dividedness that both defi nes and destroys modern life. In order, 
then, to bring the citizen into a lasting harmony with himself and with 
others, these tensions must be resolved.
Setting out to create a social environment in which occasions for insti-
tutional and psychological confl ict are minimized, Rousseau unifi es all 
major social institutions and forms of association under the aegis of the one 
authority that is able to provide a basis for a legitimate and enduring union: 
the sovereign. A social union grounded on the doctrine of popular sover-
eignty gathers power in a single source—the people—and confers on it the 
authority to make authoritative and binding decrees about the basic terms of 
social cooperation. In its capacity as the sovereign, the people trumps the 
rights of fathers and of the church; it draws the boundaries between the 
private and public domains and is the court of fi nal appeal. Th e claims that 
our private associations and beliefs make on our identities must therefore be 
consistent with the requirements of citizenship.
In arguing thus I shall show that Rousseau’s solution to the problem of 
political unity is a kind of halfway point between the extreme collectivism 
of Socrates and the extreme individualism of Hobbes and Locke. Socrates, 
of course, seeks to resolve the political problems created by the existence of 
religion and the family by eliminating the private realm altogether and insti-
tuting a collectivistic program of civic education that unites all citizens 
through devotion to the common good. Hobbes and Locke, on the other 
hand, insist on the ineliminability of narrow selfi shness and make it the 
basis for a politics of private acquisition. Rousseau rejects both the Socratic 
attempt to annihilate the private self and the Hobbesian eff ort to understand 
political life in terms of narrow private interest. He must chart a course 
between these two unacceptable alternatives and show that the claims of the 
individuated self can be accommodated without also being exaggerated.
Th ough this may sound reasonably uncontroversial as a characterization 
of Rousseau’s political project, I believe that at least two contestable proposi-
tions follow from it. Th e fi rst concerns the relationship of Rousseau’s domes-
tic theory and his political theory. If, as I will argue, the household’s crucial 
function in the just regime is political socialization, it must diff er fundamen-
tally in its priorities and structure from the households depicted in Emile 
and Julie. Friendship, too, undergoes a kind of redefi nition intended to cul-
tivate good civic habits. Th ese should hardly be unexpected results—since 
both love and friendship have been shown to be intrinsically unstable and 
generally ineff ective as catalysts of civic identity—but they may nonetheless 
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continue to meet with resistance from a number of quarters. Th e second 
regards the vexed question of Rousseau’s relationship to Christianity. Th ough 
I shall not follow some interpreters in insisting on Rousseau’s complete irre-
ligiosity, I will argue that his analysis of civil religion in the Social Contract 
more than demonstrates his infi delity to some rather basic points of Chris-
tian doctrine.
In focusing primarily on public, domestic, and religious associations, I 
exclude others (e.g., economic relations) that are no less a part of the basic 
structure of society and about which Rousseau has much to say. However, the 
forms of association I have selected for analysis are both necessary to and 
suffi  cient for our limited purposes: they are necessary insofar as they are 
clearly central sources of human identity, and suffi  cient insofar as their recon-
ciliation would provide the social conditions necessary for the preservation 
of psychological unity. In addition, though Rousseau clearly recognizes the 
importance of industry and material abundance (indeed, he praises Geneva 
for both) and is—despite some rhetorical posturing to the contrary—sup-
portive of private property rights, he is also suspicious of commercial activity 
and does not view economic activity as directly contributory to the preserva-
tion of human wholeness. Th us, for the time being, it is enough to say that 
markets may operate freely in a Rousseauan society subject to the constraints 
imposed by those relations that do contribute directly to wholeness.
| Public Assemblies and Citizen Identity
Rousseau does not believe that his much sought- after “complete return to 
political unity” could develop spontaneously, or that it could emerge as the 
unplanned result of self- interested behavior. Social equilibria are too fragile 
to entrust to an invisible hand. Th e harmonious coexistence of society’s basic 
institutions requires a structural center that gives all social bodies specifi c 
shape and direction. Th is center is the locus of authority in any political 
society; it is the seat of power and the institutional core around which the 
other parts revolve. It provides citizens with the most fundamental principles 
they need for resolving confl icts both between and within themselves. Rous-
seau believes that the structural center of every political society is the offi  ce 
of sovereignty, and that society’s other institutions must fulfi ll their distinct 
purposes in ways consistent with the sovereign’s requirements. Th ese 
“requirements” go beyond the demand for mere lawfulness, for though all 
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political societies require that private aims be pursued within the constraints 
of law Rousseau demands further that the citizen’s role as a sovereign/subject 
take psychological precedence over his other social roles and responsibilities. 
Th e political dimension of identity must have priority in the minds of citi-
zens, and the institutional and sociological structures in which citizens are 
embedded must be supportive of that priority.
Th e fi rst and most important of these structures is the public institution 
par excellence: the sovereign assembly. Rousseau emphasizes the identity- 
constitutive importance of public assemblies by electing to place his dis-
cussion of them in Book III’s extended treatment of political decline and 
regeneration, where he seeks to identify those forces that may forestall or at 
least delay the inevitable death of the state. He begins his consideration of 
political stability by identifying the fundamental obstacle to it, namely, that 
the private will acts “incessantly” (sans cesse) against the general will until the 
former extinguishes the latter (III.10, 96). States degenerate, Rousseau 
claims, either when the government shrinks (e.g., from an aristocracy to a 
monarchy) or when the sovereign authority is usurped, either by an indi-
vidual or by a group (III.10, 97–98). Th is process of decline is described as 
“natural” and “inevitable” in the following chapter, but we are not told why 
this is so until Rousseau essays to show how the forces of degeneration might 
be combated. In these chapters (III.12–15, 99–104) he emphasizes the impor-
tance of “regular, periodical” popular assemblies that are established by law 
and that “nothing can abolish or postpone” (III.13, 100). Such assemblies 
stabilize just institutions in two ways. First, they establish a mechanism of 
accountability that tends to restrain the prince from usurping the sovereign 
authority. Popular assemblies “have always terrifi ed” the established govern-
ment because its continued existence is often at stake. Th e existence of such 
assemblies, then, encourages responsible governance by providing the gov-
ernment with predictable and powerful reminders that it is the sovereign’s 
subordinate and will be unseated if it reaches beyond its trust. An agent 
accountable to its principal in this way is far less likely to attempt to usurp 
the sovereign power of lawmaking (III.14, 101).
Second, and for our purposes more important, popular assemblies pro-
vide powerful reminders of the people’s sovereignty not only to overreaching 
magistrates but also to the people itself. After pointing to the concerns that 
incumbent governments have with the congress of whole peoples (SC III.14), 
Rousseau goes on to explain how assemblies reinforce the psychological 
salience of citizen identity as well as how the maintenance of that identity is 
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necessary to social stability. He begins the chapter by drawing the connec-
tion between good citizens and good institutions: “As soon as public service 
ceases to be the main business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with 
their pocketbooks rather than with their persons, the State is already close to 
ruin” (III.15, 101). He elaborates on this connection by explaining that the 
attentions of citizens in a well- constituted state must be attuned to public 
rather than private aff airs: “Th e better constituted the State, the more public 
aff airs dominate the minds of the citizens. Th ere is even less private business, 
because since the sum of the common happiness furnishes a larger portion 
of each individual’s happiness, the individual has less to seek through private 
eff orts” (III.15, 102; emphasis added). In order for a good state to survive, 
then, individuals must think of themselves preeminently as citizens and have 
“public rather than private aff airs” at the forefronts of their minds. Th e asso-
ciational life conducive to the construction and the maintenance of citizen 
identity, and the self- conception that is its consequence, is correspondingly 
public and political. And though Rousseau believes it impossible to formu-
late precise rules about exactly how often such assemblies should be called, 
he is clear about their identity- constitutive function. Th e more we gather 
and associate as citizens qua citizens, the more likely it is that we will place 
a high subjective value on the fulfi llment of our public obligations and that 
their discharge will inform our identity in meaningful ways. Neither com-
merce nor contemplation nor domestic life should furnish the “larger por-
tion of each individual’s happiness” in a just society, for good citizens live for 
and through one another more than for themselves. No citizen of the just 
regime should join Emile in saying “Give me Sophie and my fi eld, and I shall 
be rich” (E 457). Rather, the opportunities they have to gather as equal citi-
zens and act in a legislative capacity are those for which citizens qua citizens 
live. When the people gathers in its specifi cally legislative capacity, the psy-
chological eff ect on each citizen ought to be profound. All should be reminded 
of the salience of public aff airs, of the importance of subordinating the moi 
particulière to the moi commun. Th e legislative assembly, then, is not impor-
tant only because it enables an institutionalized expression of a people’s cor-
porate will but also because it is an agent of political socialization and a 
catalyst of citizen identity. It, above all, maintains a people as a people.
It is, of course, not the mere fact but also the purpose of the people’s con-
gress that sustains political identity in the appropriate mode, for it is easy 
to imagine a people assembled under circumstances Rousseau would fi nd 
distasteful (e.g., under Mussolini’s balcony). It is essential that such assemblies 
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reinforce each citizen’s idea of himself as a free and equal participant in the 
lawmaking process. Th e condition of political equality deserves special emphasis 
in this connection, both because it is the defi ning feature of Rousseau’s social 
compact and because the structure of the assemblies themselves provide much- 
needed reminders to citizens of their equal moral worth. On this head, Rousseau 
concludes Book I by emphasizing how important the equal distribution of rights 
and obligations is in any healthy society, claiming that the substitution of “a 
moral and legitimate equality for . . . physical inequality” that makes all citizens 
“equal through convention and right” is so crucial that it “ought to serve as the 
basis for the whole social system” (SC I.9, 58). By giving to each citizen the same 
rights and obligations, by making no one demand of another what he would not 
do himself, Rousseau makes mutual respect the condition of self- respect.
Equality is the essence of the social compact because it connects the 
individual citizen’s pride to political participation without inspiring in him 
the tyrannical ambitions and delusions of grandeur to which malignant 
amour- propre is so susceptible. All civil- social men have a fundamental inter-
est in attaining rewarding forms of social recognition, and the political 
process in a Rousseauan republic gratifi es this wish by indicating at every 
point the equal importance of all citizens. In formal public assemblies, for 
instance, each may justly feel he is a part (indeed, an important part) of a 
grand spectacle—so important, in fact, that if he and he alone is excluded 
from public deliberations then the results of those deliberations are not gen-
eral and therefore illegitimate (SC II.4, 62). Each, then, becomes indispens-
able without becoming more important than anyone else.
Th is rather extreme case not only illustrates how an institutional com-
mitment to equality can reinforce one’s own sense of importance and power, 
but also how each citizen’s sense of self- worth is predicated on and hence 
constrained by his profound dependence on the social body. Th is is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, it tightens the identifi cation between the citizen 
and his regime, for one is far more likely to be civic- spirited where political 
practices affi  rm his dignity by giving him equal voice. Maintaining the 
closeness of this identifi cation, as we have already seen, is absolutely essential 
to Rousseau’s political program. Second, the institution of political equality 
contributes to social stability by discouraging the onset of malignant forms of 
amour- propre. On this head, it is important to remember that citizens ennoble 
and are in turn ennobled by their roles as citizens, as members of an egalitar-
ian brotherhood. And because one’s sense of self- worth is so closely tied to 
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the discharge of civic duty, the individual and collective good tend to con-
verge. Th ose, however, who choose to follow the misguided path of malig-
nant amour- propre and seek preeminence over others also choose to leave 
that social position from which one’s dignity and moral standing derive. 
Th at form of self- destructive striving, far from winning approbation, will 
instead be frowned on and, in extreme cases (e.g., an aspiring tyrant), will be 
punishable by law. An egalitarian social compact thus stimulates amour- 
propre by making the discharge of civic duty a point of personal pride, but it 
also delimits some of the problems to which this problematic passion gives 
rise by encouraging citizens to view the state as the source of their equality 
and hence of their dignity. To attack the social body is to attack the ground 
of one’s own worth.
| Private Lives, Public Ends: Friends and Factions in Rousseau’s Geneva
Given Rousseau’s strong emphasis on the importance of constructing a 
robust sense of patriotism, it is hardly surprising to see him emphasize the 
identity- constitutive eff ects of legislative assemblies or other specifi cally 
civic gatherings. However, he knows that the associational life in a political 
community is complex and multidimensional. Citizens act and interact in 
subpolitical as well as political capacities, and such associations have a 
unique pull on our hearts. Indeed, it is precisely this tendency that is so 
concerning from the “the political point of view,” for since time and emo-
tional resources are scarce, devotion to one’s family and friends often comes 
at the expense of devotion to the common good. If the particularistic con-
cern for one’s own takes regular priority over the general concern for the 
good of the social whole, Rousseau’s moral ecology collapses. He must 
therefore fi nd a way to resolve the tension between the devotion to the 
common good that public life requires with the particularistic attachments 
that private desire necessarily seeks.
In the Social Contract this problem manifests itself most clearly at II.3, 
which treats the question of whether the general will could err in its pro-
nouncements regarding a political community’s common good. In seeking 
to determine the conditions under which citizens might correctly identify 
the common good, Rousseau notes the singularly corrupting infl uence of 
“partial societies,” which lead us to identify our fundamental interests with 
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subpolitical groups (our “particular wills”) rather than with the political soci-
ety as a whole:
But when factions, partial associations formed at the expense of the whole, are 
formed, the will of each of these associations becomes general with reference to 
its members and particular with reference to the State. One can say, then, that 
there are no longer as many voters as there are men, but merely as many as there 
are associations. Th e diff erences become less numerous and produce a result that 
is less general. Finally, when one of these associations is so big that it prevails 
over all the others, the result is no longer a sum of small diff erences, but a single 
diff erence. Th en there is no longer a general will, and the opinion that prevails 
is merely a private opinion. In order for the general will to be well expressed, it 
is therefore important that there be no partial society in the State, and that each 
citizen give only his own opinion. (II.3, 61)
Th is passage speaks to many but says diff erent things to each. Plamenatz (see 
Gildin 1983, 55) simply fi nds it incomprehensible; Parry (1995) sees its empha-
sis on “expressing one’s own opinion” as evidence of a commitment to a form 
of autonomy; Crocker (1995) interprets its suspicion of private groups as a 
manifestation of Rousseau’s authoritarian tendencies; Grofman and Feld 
(1988) view its misgivings about reducing the number of voters as suffi  cient 
to support a proto- Condorcetian reading.
Th is last interpretation is of particular interest, for it draws on Con-
dorcet’s “jury theorem” in order to identify the conditions under which the 
general will and the will of a legislative majority might coincide. Condorcet 
demonstrated that, under the right circumstances, the likelihood of a major-
ity opinion being correct increases as a function of the number of voters. 
What is more, according to Grofman and Feld (1988, 570), these arguments 
were known to Rousseau: “It seems virtually certain that ideas similar to 
those later to be formally developed by Condorcet were ‘in the wind,’ and 
infl uenced both Rousseau and, later, Condorcet.” If a large pool of voters is 
more likely to make correct judgments than a small one is, Grofman and 
Feld reason, then Rousseau could well be concerned about “partial societies” 
because their emergence shrinks the number of voters and, thereby, decreases 
the likelihood that the will of the majority will be expressive the true general 
will: “As the eff ective size of the assembly is reduced—because people vote as 
a herd (part of a faction) and not as separately thinking and independently 
acting individuals—the Condorcet jury theorem tells us that group accuracy 
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will be reduced” (571). Grofman and Feld’s reading of Rousseau’s analysis of 
“partial societies” thus seems to capture at least part of what is at issue in this 
puzzling passage.
Th ough the Condorcetian interpretation helpfully shows that the emer-
gence of bloc voting drives down average voter competence by decreasing the 
number of voters, it fails to explain the emergence of bloc voting itself. Why 
would citizens be disposed to make political decisions based on their subpo-
litical group affi  liations in the fi rst place? One explanation is that—due to a 
host of psychological, pedagogic, and institutional factors—citizens identify 
more closely with their private affi  liations than with the public good. Th ough 
Grofman and Feld are far from denying this possibility, it is clear that once 
we explicitly acknowledge its plausibility, the nature of the problem posed by 
partial societies changes from one about sustaining a suffi  ciently large pool 
of voters into one about identifying the cultural and institutional catalysts of 
citizen identity. If civic competence varies primarily as a function of individual 
citizens caring enough about public aff airs to inform themselves about issues 
and participate in public assemblies, then the emergence of partial societies is 
alarming not simply because they reduce the eff ective size of the sovereign 
assembly but also because they cultivate in citizens attitudes and priorities 
that are inconsistent with the requirements of civic life. Without denying the 
usefulness of the Condorcetian interpretation of the Social Contract, then, 
we must remember both that there are many other determinants of civic 
competence beside the sheer number of voters and that Rousseau devoted far 
more time to discussing these other determinants than to formal probabilis-
tic analysis.
Indeed, when we read the passage concerning “partial associations” in 
light of others from the Social Contract it becomes clear that Rousseau dis-
likes the mediation of private groups between individual and state not simply 
because it decreases the eff ective size of the assembly but also because it sub-
stitutes a narrow and particularizing form of self- love—the moi particulière—
for the appropriately generalized and expanded moi commun. We see this 
more traditional republican concern at work particularly in Book III’s treat-
ment of political decline and regeneration, where Rousseau again discusses 
the obstacles impeding the eff ective expression of the general will. Here, 
however, his concern is not the sheer number of voters but rather that citizens 
give their personal interests priority over public aff airs: when social conditions 
have reached a point when it is predictable “that the general will won’t pre-
dominate,” the reason given for this decline is that “domestic concerns absorb 
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everything” rather than because the pool of voters has shrunk. Rousseau goes 
on to claim that good regimes depend decisively on citizens having politically 
centered self- conceptions, on their tendency to think of themselves fi rst and 
foremost as citizens: “Th e better constituted the State, the more public aff airs 
dominate the minds of citizens. Th ere is even less private business because 
since the sum of common happiness furnishes a larger portion of each indi-
vidual’s happiness, the individual has less to seek through private eff orts. In a 
well- run City, everyone rushes to assemblies” (SC III.15, 102). In a good regime 
men can and do have both private and public obligations, but are disposed to 
view their public obligations as having priority. Th e role of citizen is and must 
be central to the self- conceptions of the inhabitants of a free regime.
Against this backdrop we gain a fuller sense of Rousseau’s concern about 
“partial societies” than the Condorcetian reading allows, for we see that the 
existence of factions prevents the expression of the general will not only 
because they shrink the pool of voters but also (and primarily) because they 
undermine the citizen- centered self- conceptions necessary to civic life. Th ose 
who cast votes on the basis of their private group affi  liations do so because 
they view those affi  liations as more rewarding and more central to their 
self- concepts than they do political life, because their identity interest in 
being a “citizen”—in being the kind of person who cares preeminently about 
the good of the city—contradicts the private identity interest they have in 
representing the corporate wills of their respective “partial societies.” Th e 
problem posed by factions, then, is more psychological than aggregative. 
Th ey erode civic competence by eroding citizen identity.
Rousseau’s solution to this problem is a kind of halfway point between 
the radical collectivism of Socrates and the radical individualism of Hobbes. 
Like Socrates, Rousseau denies that narrow self- love can solve the political 
problems it creates and thus affi  rms the necessity of a robust, deindividual-
izing form of civic education. Like Hobbes, however, Rousseau makes (a 
certain form of) self- love the basis of the political association and rejects as 
both unrealistic and undesirable Socrates’s proscription of the private realm. 
He neither annihilates the domain of particularity nor gives it complete 
priority. Instead, he recruits that domain and the associations within it into 
the process of citizen identity formation, arguing that properly structured 
private associations can catalyze connection to the regime by instilling in 
citizens aff ective habits that facilitate mutual respect and fraternity.
Th is may sound somewhat surprising since I have heretofore emphasized 
the discontinuities between the domestic and political realms, but it is impor-
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tant to add that the isolated households depicted in Emile and Julie are 
patently not the ones Rousseau has in mind when he identifi es the domicile 
as a site of politicization. Th ose households, as was argued in chapters 4 and 
5, remain largely independent from the tumults of the public world and do 
not generate the habits of mind appropriate to good citizenship. We need, 
then, a fully politicized conception of the household and the private realm. 
Rousseau’s attempt to fl esh out the private lives of good citizens is seen less 
in Emile or Julie than in Letter to D’Alembert, in which the great Genevan 
seeks to protect his fatherland from the scourge of the theater. Rousseau’s 
Letter gives the most detailed picture of the kind of social life appropriate to 
a good political society and, in so doing, fi lls in many of the sociological 
details that the Social Contract can and must leave out. What we fi nd there 
are models of marriage and friendship very diff erent from those we examined 
in earlier chapters. Th ey are diff erent insofar as they are not direct instantia-
tions of the human good but are instead provisional and preparatory—they 
ready men for the good of citizenship and for the particular kind of social 
connectedness that good requires.
Unsurprisingly, Rousseau emphasizes the civic unity of Genevan soci-
ety, and chief among the intentions of the Letter is to show how the intro-
duction of the theater will upset the complex and fragile equilibrium on 
which that unity is based. In arguing that the introduction of the theater is 
inappropriate for his homeland, Rousseau claims that the act of joint obser-
vation is intrinsically divisive and that sharing the shared spectacle of a play 
does not unite but rather separates viewers from one another. Rousseau’s 
highly interesting discussion of the eff ects of drama on the emotions acknowl-
edges that the theater inevitably stirs in the audience feelings that in other 
circumstances might catalyze social togetherness, but it also claims that the-
atergoers are led to a consideration of their own troubles rather than those of 
others. Far, then, from being led by sympathetic feelings to the actual prac-
tice of benefi cence, they instead leave the play feeling self- satisfi ed and emo-
tionally exhausted.
Th e theater, Rousseau explains by interrogating the emotional responses 
of a hypothetical theatergoer, indulges our cheapest moral instincts: “Is he 
not satisfi ed with himself? Does he not applaud his fi ne soul? Has he not 
acquitted himself of all that owes to virtue by the homage he has just ren-
dered it? What more could one want of him? Th at he practice it himself? 
He has no role to play; he is no actor” (LD 25). Th e theater does not catalyze 
virtue but rather encourages moral escape; like the philosophers who love 
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the Tartars in order to ignore his neighbors, we weep over the ills of fi ctional 
characters so that we may forget the unfortunate who surround us in real 
life. Th e “fl eeting and vain” form of pity produced by the drama thus fails to 
generate virtuous action, but it also encourages a type of isolating inward-
ness that is anathema to a good republic. Disunited by the dramatic spectacle, 
citizens turn inward after seeing depicted before the world the confl icts they 
feel within themselves. Th e result for self- loving beings is predictable: they 
learn to pity themselves rather than to assist their fellows. Th us, those who 
come together to share in theatrical performances will leave all the more 
divided, for though each “loves virtue” as it is presented in the drama, so, 
too, is it loved for the least virtuous of reasons: “He wants none of [virtue] 
for himself because it would be costly to him. What then does he go to see 
at the theater? Precisely what he wants to fi nd everywhere: lessons of virtue 
for the public, from which he excepts himself, and people sacrifi cing every-
thing to their duty while nothing is exacted from him” (24). We scrupulously 
fail to practice all the virtues we preach. In observing actors we become 
them, and all the destructive internal and external confl icts characteristic of 
modernity attend this fateful development. And thus does the argument 
from virtue collapse: the theater does not contribute to good public morality 
but rather destroys it by encouraging each citizen to view himself as separate 
from and more unfortunate than his fellows.
Th ough observing spectacles inspires neither virtue nor unity, citizens of 
a good regime may cultivate both by enacting them. Republican perfor-
mances catalyze citizen identity, and thereby allay the confl icts between the 
public and private world, far more eff ectively than does the cold isolation of 
a dark theater. Indeed, Rousseau concludes his Letter by recommending that 
Geneva eschew the theater in favor of public festivals, games, and events that 
would feature the citizens themselves. He makes the civic usefulness of such 
spectacles clear from the outset: “What! Ought there to be no entertain-
ments in a republic? On the contrary, there ought to be many. It is in repub-
lics that they were born, it is in their bosom that they are seen to fl ourish 
with a truly festive air. To what peoples is it more fi tting to assemble often 
and form among themselves sweet bonds of pleasure and joy than to those 
who have so many reasons to like one another remain forever united?” (LD 
125). Republics above all regimes require shared diversions, for common 
pleasures help to forge the thick civic ties necessary to sustain political free-
dom. Th e politicized and politicizing character of republican divertissements 
becomes more explicit in the following paragraph, where Rousseau argues 
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that theaters are unnecessary in a city where citizens are free to “plant a stake 
crowned with fl owers in the middle of the square” and enjoy an impromptu 
festival. Th e happy result, in direct contrast to the isolation of the theater, is 
that “each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united” 
(126). Here as elsewhere the model is Sparta, for it was there “that the citizens, 
constantly assembled, consecrated the whole of life to amusements which were 
the great business of the state and to games from which they relaxed only for 
war” (133; emphasis added). Formal legislative assemblies are, then, not the 
only way that citizens qua citizens may gather. Indeed, it would seem that citi-
zen identity is constituted best when citizens themselves do not realize that 
their identities are being constituted.
Rousseau does not stop at public games and festivals in his attempt to 
mold sub- political associations in a way that reinforces the salience of citi-
zen identity. He also brings friendship into accord with the demands of 
civic life by vigorously defending “the circles” (cercles)—informal social 
groups with no explicitly political aims or ends—from critics both within 
and outside of Geneva. Th ese nominally private associations, though per-
haps not friendships in the specifi c, technical sense which we gave the term 
in chapter 6, nonetheless surely qualify as friendships in the broad sense, 
for membership in a cercle allows men to enjoy intimate association through 
the shared activities and values of the group. Th at some of these activities 
(e.g., drinking and gambling) are rather unsavory is of less concern to 
Rousseau than the crucial identity- constitutive function these institutions 
serve. Th e cercles are a bulwark against the destructive “revolution in mor-
als [moeurs]” that the establishment of a theater would bring about in a 
“simple and innocent” republic like Geneva, for they shape the associa-
tional life of citizens in ways that reinforce the public dimension of identity 
(LD 100).
Rousseau begins his account of the political importance of the cercles by 
announcing that he is writing to a new audience: rather than address 
D’Alembert and other “philosophers”—whose interests are not implicated—
he directly addresses “the people” as the people, for it is the entire civic way 
of life that is at stake in this discussion (LD 100). Despite their undesirable 
consequences, the cercles ought to be preserved because they have two related 
sociological eff ects that help preserve the civic identity of Genevans. Th e fi rst 
benefi t is negative: by separating men and women into diff erent social groups 
the cercles prevent a too- frequent intermingling of the sexes, which in its turn 
would lead to an increase in adulterous practices and would make men too 
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soft to fulfi ll their martial duties (100–104). Th ough inter- gender social mix-
ing is perfectly appropriate for, even necessary to, the gentle domestic societ-
ies of Clarens or Emile and Sophie’s farmhouse, it is entirely unsuitable for a 
free republic that needs men to be citizen- soldiers. Such men cannot be what 
they must be if they are constantly among women, whose company softens 
and intoxicates. Th e cercles are therefore an excellent republican substitute 
for the delicate social charms of private retreat, for through them men can 
enjoy meaningful social companionship but in a way that reinforces rather 
than undermines their civic identity. Th e good republic is and must be gen-
dered, and the cercles’ segregation of men and women both protects conjugal 
fi delity and prevents male citizen- soldiers from acquiring a politically destruc-
tive “feminine” softness.
Th e cercles do more than prevent the onset of social evils. Indeed, they 
remind both men and women of their respective social roles and thus help to 
reinforce the connection between personal identity and politics. On this 
score, Rousseau notes that the cercles have a largely political origin: they grew 
out of the celebrations that followed military festivals and drilling exercises 
and were purifi ed by “civil discords” that led their members out of raucous 
taverns and into places more suited to reasoned discussion of public aff airs 
(LD 99). It is, he says, in the cercles as much as the agora that members 
learned not only how to fulfi ll their civic duties but also how to be the kinds 
of people who care about such duties in the fi rst place: “Th ese decent and 
innocent institutions combine everything which can contribute to making 
friends, citizens, and soldiers out of the same men, and, in consequence, 
everything which is most appropriate for a free people” (105). Th us the cercles, 
though nominally private associations, nonetheless turn individuals toward 
their role as citizens and reinforce the salience of that role. Th ey have been 
recruited into the process of citizen- craft.
With this in mind, it is easy to see that the cercles Rousseau celebrates in 
the Letter to D’Alembert are not the kind of private groups that would be disal-
lowed even under ideal conditions, as they do not narrow the boundaries of 
the self or invite the kind of identity confusion that such narrowing inevitably 
involves. Indeed, they reinforce rather than weaken the subjective importance 
of public aff airs by providing reminders of the state’s unifying power even in 
the context of our private associational life. Th e members of cercles are not 
defi ned by their association with that group; to the contrary, both the indi-
vidual member and the private group to which he belongs are defi ned in 
important ways by their integration into the larger political community.
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Th ough the cercles institutionalize friendship in a civically salutary way, 
perhaps the more serious threat to citizen identity is the household. And 
since Rousseau rejects the Socratic attempt to eliminate the nuclear family, 
he must provide a model of the household suitable for his political society. 
We have already seen, of course, that the models of the family life developed 
in Emile and Julie are inappropriate to a good political society for at least two 
reasons. First, they both prove entirely too unstable to serve as a basis for a 
sound political project. Second, they shape the identities of their inhabitants 
in ways that are inconsistent with the requirements of civic life. Th erefore we 
need an alternative conception of the family, one that more eff ectively cata-
lyzes good civic habits and dispositions.
Rousseau provides at least the beginnings of such a conception in the 
Letter, which through the proposal of a series of dances and balls for persons 
of marrying age specifi es the conditions under which properly politicized 
family life is best inaugurated. Th ese dances introduce young men and 
women to one another and to the mysteries of sexual experience, and do so in 
a way that politicizes the sexual relationship from the outset. Before descend-
ing into the particulars of Rousseau’s account of these balls, however, it is 
important to recall the extreme importance he places on the earliest stages of 
a romantic relationship: Emile teaches the circumstances under which young 
people are introduced have “distant eff ects whose links are not perceived in 
the progress of the years but do not cease to act until death” (415). We saw in 
chapter 4 how the specifi c circumstances under which Emile and Sophie met 
foretold their tragic end. Rousseau himself, then, gives us especially good 
reason to look closely at the conditions in which civically salutary marriages 
are inaugurated, for he has already told us that these conditions have a dispro-
portionate impact on the development of a relationship.
With this in mind, it is clear that Rousseau has the preservation of 
republican freedom in mind while recommending these balls. Th e institu-
tion of state- sponsored dances, he holds, would forestall political corrup-
tion by combating economic inequality and would give an important assist 
to public festivals and legislative assemblies in the constitution of citizen 
identity. Th is argument is predicated on the assumption that they would be 
open to all marriageable young people, and on the belief that exposure to 
more suitors than parents might permit would allow young people to follow 
the dispositions of their hearts rather than the directives of their parents. 
Left to mingle freely with one another, Geneva’s next generation of citizens 
would form attachments which their fathers—often more concerned about 
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dowries than compatibility—could never have envisaged. Whereas arranged 
marriages tend to centralize economic and political infl uence in ways that 
vitiate political liberty, voluntary unions strengthen republican values: 
young people, Rousseau reasons, will consult their moral tastes rather than 
their pocketbooks, and thus would tend to form unions “less circumscribed 
by rank.” Chosen attachments are also said to “prevent the emergence of 
parties, temper excessive inequality, and maintain the body of the people 
better in the spirit of its constitution” (LD 131). Here, and here alone, the 
marriages of citizens resemble that of Emile and Sophie, for in both cases 
Rousseau makes the union voluntary. Political freedom is inaugurated 
through the choice of a spouse.
In arguing thus, Rousseau departs from rather than reiterates the con-
ventional wisdom of his homeland, for many Genevans believed the dances 
Rousseau recommended would undermine the authority of fathers and give 
public sanction to the untoward desires of youth. Rousseau, however, 
answers that there is nothing untoward about sexual desire itself, and he 
adds that it becomes socially dangerous only when consigned to the private 
realm. Th e political recognition of emergent sexual desire does not corrupt 
society; rather, it purifi es sexuality. It does so by transforming that most 
intimately private of things into a social performance, a republican spectacle 
that, well executed, would serve as “an important component of the train-
ing in law and order and good morals” (LD 130). Rousseau’s mise- en- scène is 
striking: young people dance under the proud and watchful gaze of their 
parents, with parent and child alike watched from above by Geneva’s oldest 
and most distinguished citizens, who are to be saluted by all those entering 
or exiting the hall. Of all the things that might be said about the observa-
tional situation and its eff ects on the nascent amour- propre of the dancers, 
perhaps the most important is the way in which the grand and gallant set-
ting reinforces and even helps to constitute the political identities of the 
young. It is easy to imagine the eff ect of Rousseau’s proposed surroundings 
on the anxious young dancers, whose fi rst tentative steps in the sexual realm 
are made under the gaze not only of parents but also of the city’s great citi-
zens. And it should be noted that it is in a specifi cally political capacity that 
the elders seated in the panoptic spectators’ box preside over the ball. It is 
thus in a politically charged atmosphere, with reminders of the homeland 
everywhere, that young people experience their sexual awakening.
It is tempting to say that these events are structured to make young 
people think of everything but the inclinations of their own hearts, and that, 
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though many may leave the dance without romantic prospects, no one will go 
home without a fatherland. But we may certainly say that the household to be 
created through marriage, far from the independent retreat sought by Emile 
and Sophie, is from its very inception thoroughly political and politicized. Its 
primary function is not to instantiate the human good, for this would make 
the household a rival to the state and turn it into a “partial society,” but rather 
to serve the state—much as Roman households did—through the produc-
tion of virtuous citizens. Th e household in a just or approximately just politi-
cal community cannot itself embody the good; it must orient young citizens 
toward the good to be found in the public realm.
| Religion and Social Unity
Th e Letter to D’Alembert seeks to show that the theater is a poor fi t within the 
institutional and social framework of Genevan society, for drama requires 
taste that Geneva does not have and undermines the virtue that it needs. Yet, 
in the thorough analysis of Genevan social life that occupies him for a full 
third of the work, Rousseau devotes very little attention to the role of specifi -
cally religious customs and practices. He does not provide the vivid portraits 
of religious ceremonies that he does of state- sponsored dances and festivals, 
and he chooses to not discuss directly the civic eff ects of state- sponsored 
Calvinism. Th us we are left to wonder whether Genevan freedom fl ourishes 
because or in spite of its offi  cial religious doctrine.
What Rousseau does say about religion in the Letter redoubles rather 
than resolves this ambiguity, for though he thinks the question of the rela-
tionship of religion to politics so important that he begins the work by 
addressing it, what he says raises more questions than it answers. Before 
addressing the merits of D’Alembert’s case for the institution of a theater 
Rousseau fi nds it necessary to correct his adversary’s claim that many of 
Geneva’s religious ministers privately profess Socinianism. Reminding 
D’Alembert that to attribute to civil authorities a belief in an offi  cially con-
demned albeit intellectually serious doctrine is quite literally to damn 
through faint praise, Rousseau takes the posture of a traditionalist pushing 
back against the foolish indiscretions of a book- learned outsider: he claims 
to “not know what [Socinianism] is,” that he has a “disinclination” for what 
he does understand of it, and that he has nothing but “love and respect” for 
the revealed truth of the Gospel (LD 11–13). In arguing thus he allies himself 
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with religious conservative opposition to the theater and indicates that the 
city’s traditional Calvinism needs no help from some newfangled natural 
religion to sustain Genevan freedom.
But this is hardly Rousseau’s last word on the matter, for though respect-
ful of Geneva’s religious authorities and careful not to put heretical dogmas 
in their mouths he makes pronouncements in his own voice radical enough 
to suggest he may be further away from his homeland’s offi  cial religion than 
from D’Alembert. For instance, he steadfastly declines to follow Geneva’s 
church fathers in condemning the Socinian dogma, denies that reason can 
justify belief in an afterlife or in extra- temporal consequences, and—though 
claiming to “love and respect” holy scripture—refuses to affi  rm its inerrancy. 
After confessing so much he is understandably eager to drop the topic of 
religion altogether, and he does so satisfi ed he has said “nothing in general 
that is not honorable to the church of Geneva and useful to men in all lands” 
(LD n. 14).
Much more might be said about Rousseau’s extraordinary caginess in 
the fi rst section of the Letter, but for our purposes it suffi  ces to show that the 
analysis there is far from the philosopher’s last word on the question of the 
relationship of religion and politics. To the contrary, the topic fi gured promi-
nently into the most important works he wrote afterward and is related 
directly to his analysis of modern man’s dividedness. Emile somewhat sur-
reptitiously implicates Christianity in this analysis by claiming that political 
freedom and the unifying “public education” necessary to it are no longer 
possible in modern times: “Public instruction no longer exists and can no 
longer exist, because where there is no longer fatherland, there can no longer 
be citizens. Th ese two words, fatherland and citizen, should be eff aced from 
modern languages. I know well the reason why this is so, but I do not want 
to tell it. It has nothing to do with my subject” (E 40). Because Emile’s own 
education bears little resemblance to that of the “citizen” there is a limited 
sense in which a full treatment of public education has “nothing to do” with 
the specifi cs of the prescriptive agenda of Emile. However, to the degree that 
the anonymous force that had crushed the possibility of civic education had 
also helped create the world in which fragmented modern man and his 
“laughable” education emerged, then it is far from irrelevant to Rousseau’s 
broader philosophic enterprise to disclose “the reason” why the language of 
citizenship is no longer understood (40).
Rousseau’s refusal to name the enemy is itself a fairly strong hint about 
what it is. In a footnote to his translation of Emile, Allan Bloom directs the 
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reader to chapter 8 of Book IV of the Social Contract, believing that it identi-
fi es the cause Emile demurely elects not to name: Christianity. And indeed, 
Rousseau argues there that Christianity has divided man’s allegiances 
between heaven and earth in a way that undermined human relations both 
within and between political communities: the separation of “the theologi-
cal system and the political system” brought about “the end of the Unity of 
the State, and caused internal divisions that have never ceased to stir up 
Christian peoples” (SC IV.8, 126). It is, of course, not obvious that Rousseau 
blames Christianity per se for the disunity and unsociability characteristic of 
modern regimes, for he distinguishes between “the religion of man”—which 
he associates with the religion of the Gospel or Christianity rightly under-
stood—and “the religion of the priest,” which gives men “two legislative 
systems, two leaders, and two homelands” and thus “subjects them to con-
tradictory duties” and obligations. Where the former “is the pure and simple 
religion of the Gospel” that is “devoted to the eternal duties of morality,” the 
latter is “a mixed and unsocial” doctrine that “is so manifestly bad that it is 
a waste of time to amuse oneself by proving it” (IV.8, 127–28). Th us Rous-
seau, like his republican predecessor Machiavelli, distinguishes between 
Christianity and its institutionalized expression, seeming to blame the latter 
for its grotesque interpretation of the former.
Also like Machiavelli, however, Rousseau makes a distinction between 
Christianity and “the priests” only in order to drain it of any real signifi cance. 
After calling the Christianity of the Gospel “saintly” and “true religion,” he 
goes on to analyze it from a “political point of view” and fi nds that it does not 
have the salutary civil eff ects so many attribute to it. Viewed from the appro-
priate perspective, one sees that Christianity fails to catalyze allegiance to the 
political regime, for it has “no particular relation to the body politic” and thus 
“leaves laws only with their intrinsic force, without adding any force to them.” 
Because the true church neither derives its authority from the state nor relies 
on state power for enforcement of its commands, it is unable to aff ect the 
content of the laws or directly motivate citizens to love and endorse them. It 
would seem, then, that the neutrality of the church with respect to the polis 
is guaranteed by its institutional independence from it and that Christianity 
in its purest form has a null eff ect on the political identities of citizens.
Th is alone would be suffi  cient for Rousseau to reject the Christian 
teaching concerning the relation of church and state, since any religion that 
does not actively aid in cultivating civic virtue is failing in its essential func-
tion, but Rousseau goes a good deal further. In fact, the apparently null 
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eff ect created by an institutional separation of church and state undermines 
the sovereign’s authority in precisely the same way that the pernicious “reli-
gion of the priests” does, for its very insistence on institutional autonomy is 
the functional equivalent of refusing to cede its spiritual authority to the 
sovereign. Th is refusal is enough to make Christianity unworkable as a civil 
religion, for in seeking to establish its own independent domain of authority 
within a political community that must be absolute in order to be anything 
at all, it necessarily sets itself up in opposition to the political community: to 
allow the kind of independence sought by the Christian church is to restrict 
the sovereign’s ability to act within its rightful sphere. Th e church becomes, 
in Locke’s phrase, a kind of “foreign Jurisdiction” within a political com-
munity that undermines sovereignty by claiming to be exempt from it (LCT 
52). If the church may claim in the name of God an exemption from politi-
cal authority, what would prevent any private person from doing the same?
Th ough no genuine sovereign could countenance the introduction of any 
independent “spiritual” authority into the political community, Rousseau 
insists with astonishing explicitness that the substantive specifi cs of Christian 
doctrine make it a peculiarly destructive social force in a republic. All reli-
gions make claims on the moral identities of believers, and Christianity is no 
exception. However, Rousseau makes clear that the individualistic and tran-
scendental vision of the good expressed in the Gospel is discontinuous with 
the civic sociability required by a free way of life. Indeed, he charges that “far 
from attaching the citizens’ hearts to the State, [Christianity] detaches them 
from it as from all worldly things. I know of nothing more contrary to the 
social spirit” (SC IV.8, 128). Th e ultimate eff ect of Christianity on civic engage-
ment is thus not null—as Rousseau initially suggested—but negative. Its oth-
erworldliness makes it politically pernicious, for it creates a psychology of 
quietistic disengagement that is simply inconsistent with “the social spirit” 
of republicanism. Th e indiff erent obedience the good Christian owes to the 
regime in which he happens to live cannot be combined with the enthusias-
tic partiality the citizen qua citizen has for his patrie. Christianity thus not 
only claims to be exempt from sovereign control but also introduces into the 
republic a particular conception of the good that is harmful to its continued 
preservation. So, too, does it sap civic engagement by orienting the identities 
of citizens away from the polis and toward individual salvation. In its politi-
cal eff ects, then, there is no meaningful diff erence between “the religion of 
the priests” and “true” Christianity. Both necessarily divide the allegiances 
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of citizens and create all the social and psychological disorders that attach to 
that dividedness.
Rousseau’s concern with Christianity’s eff ect on “the social spirit” is 
telling, for the unfi tness of the religion of man as a civil creed stems not 
only from its tendency to divide the moral allegiances of citizens but also 
because of its contemplative and unsocial nature. Indeed, Rousseau 
believes that the transcendental individualism of Christianity militates 
against the thick social unity needed in a republic and that reconciliation 
between the two will prove impossible (SC IV.8, 129). On his analysis even 
a “society of true Christians” existing “in all its perfection” would “be 
neither the strongest nor the longest lasting” because it would “lack cohe-
sion” (IV.8, 128–29). Th e lack of social togetherness is a function of the true 
Christian’s indiff erence to worldly things and the preeminent care he 
places on the salvation of his individual soul: “Christianity is a purely spiri-
tual religion, uniquely concerned with heavenly matters” such as one’s 
eternal salvation. Th us the “Christian’s homeland is not of this world” and 
the attachment he has to his fellows is in the fi nal analysis a matter of 
“profound indiff erence.” Th e “essential thing” is to worry about the condi-
tion of one’s own soul and “to go to heaven,” not to love and glory in one’s 
political community, befriend one’s fellows, or enact the “sentiments of 
sociability” without which freedom cannot subsist (IV.8, 129). Citizens of 
a republic must be at home in the world, and Christians must view it as a 
way station.
Doubtless the contemplative individualism of the true Christian is at 
the individual level more salutary than the alienated selfi shness of the bour-
geois, but it nonetheless creates serious political and social problems that 
cannot be dismissed as mere inconveniences. Rousseau is especially con-
cerned that the true Christian’s ultimate indiff erence to temporal authority 
will leave his state susceptible to the domineering impulses of tyrants: “If 
there is a single ambitious man, a single hypocrite . . . he will very certainly 
get the best of his pious neighbors” (SC IV.8, 129). He goes on to say not only 
that Christian societies are vulnerable to tyrannical persons but also that 
Christianity itself is inimical to the cause of political freedom. His discussion 
is shockingly candid: “Suppose that your Christian republic is face to face 
with Sparta or Rome. Th e pious Christians will be beaten, crushed, destroyed 
before they have had time to look around, or they will owe their salvation 
only to the scorn their enemies will conceive for them” (IV.8, 129). He 
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 continues: “But I am mistaken when I speak of a Christian republic; these 
two words are mutually exclusive. Christianity preaches nothing but servi-
tude and dependence. Its spirit is so favorable to tyranny that tyranny always 
profi ts from it. True Christians are made to be slaves” (IV.8, 130). “Th e reli-
gion of man” sacrifi ces freedom and unity in this life for salvation in the 
next. No citizen can tolerate this contradiction, and no good regime would 
ask him to do so.
It may be fairly wondered why Rousseau, if his reservations concerning 
Christianity are this strong, might not turn away from transcendental appeal 
altogether and seek to found a regime on a purely rational, secular basis. We, 
however, have already seen at least two reasons why he rejected this alterna-
tive as impracticable. First, he believed men on the whole too credulous and 
prone to superstition to ever do away completely with their need for religion. 
We crave consolations that reason cannot provide, and the Enlightenment 
promise to deliver salvation through reason was based on an irrational faith 
in rationality itself. Second, and more centrally, religion is a singularly pow-
erful catalyst of those expansive passions necessary to civic virtue. Only in 
the rarest cases does reason move men to virtue, and its simulacrum more 
commonly directs them to vice. Religion, properly constrained, makes vir-
tue the object of the passions; it inspires a passionate love of the standards of 
morality and bids us treat others with the good faith, mutual respect, and 
sympathy those standards enjoin.
What, then, might religion properly constrained look like? A full answer 
is, I fear, a book to itself, but if Christianity’s lack of fi tness as a civil religion 
stems from its (1) insistence on dividing the allegiances of citizens, (2) gen-
eral inability to discipline the fanatical passions it foments, and (3) tendency 
to encourage social disengagement, then a more salutary alternative must 
succeed on all these scores. With regard to the fi rst, we have already seen that 
Rousseau solves this problem as Hobbes did, by putting religious forms of 
social control under the aegis of the sovereign and making religious and 
political duties more or less synonymous. He believes that a salutary civil 
religion cannot follow Jesus’s imperative to separate the theological and 
political systems, and must instead combine “the divine cult and the love of 
the laws” (IV.8, 125–26). Success on this point will have removed one of the 
great sources of contradiction in human life and have taken a large step 
toward making men more at home in the world.
Th ough the idea of political control over religious belief quite justifi ably 
conjures the specter of authoritarianism, Rousseau understands—perhaps bet-
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ter than we do—how destructive the combination of religious fervor and state 
power can be and seeks to avoid its terrible excesses. Th us, though he argues 
for the union of religious and political systems, he also insists that union can 
reach no further than “the limits of public utility.” Consequently, the “dogmas 
of civil religion” that all citizens must profess are extremely limited. Th e posi-
tive articles of faith give divine sanction to a few simple, precise, and reason-
able beliefs centered on those “sentiments of sociability without which it is 
impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject” (SC IV.8, 130). Christian-
ity’s demand for anything more has proven both philosophically misguided 
and practically destructive: because reason is incapable of determining the 
truth or falsity of many questions of dogma, only that portion of belief that 
bears directly on the ability to discharge civic duty should be susceptible to 
social control. Everything else is left to the domain of private conscience, 
and since “the sovereign has no competence in the [transcendental] world” it 
is obliged to tolerate what it is not competent to judge (IV.8, 130).
In addition to demanding that subjects believe what their reason resists, 
Christianity had on Rousseau’s accounting inculcated a socially destructive 
ethos of disengagement that led subjects to devalue worldly things and focus 
on the private goal of individual salvation. Civic duty may be discharged but 
it is done without relish or joy, and this is much the same as saying that it is 
done badly. Citizens who march into battle with the enthusiasm of a child 
eating his broccoli are not likely to return victorious. So, although the civil 
religion Rousseau proposes does posit an afterlife and hence in some way 
calls on a realm beyond, it makes extra- temporal rewards contingent on love 
of country and of one’s fellows. Far from devaluing this life by comparing it 
to the eternal felicity that awaits in the next, it makes that eternal felicity 
available only to those who value their relations to and within the state above 
all else.
| Can the Center Hold? Th e Fragility of the Moi Commun
Th rough the last two chapters we have sought to understand Rousseau’s politi-
cal philosophy as a particular manifestation of his generalized philosophical 
quest for human unity. It has the character of a balancing act, one intended to 
reconcile the seemingly competing demands of justice and utility, of private 
and public, of self and other. Th is balancing act is indicative of Rousseau’s 
hybridized solution to the political problem: rather than follow Socrates in 
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attempting to destroy the domain of particularity altogether, Rousseau seeks 
to recruit it into the process of citizen- craft, for it is through this process that 
members of a political community learn to associate their own fi rst- order 
interests with the good of the state. Of course, given Rousseau’s understanding 
of the human soul and his insistence on the centrality of self- love, it should 
hardly be a surprise that he would reject the Socratic route and seek to strike 
some kind of balance between the public and private worlds. Political life must 
realize the unity it seeks without imposing a false unidimensionality on the 
lives of citizens; it must respect and accommodate the existence of private 
associations (e.g., marriage and friendship) without compromising the politi-
cal association.
However, the balance of forces Rousseau provides for is as fragile as it is 
essential: like Machiavelli, he knows that all the things of men are in motion, 
that it is one thing to persuade men to become citizens and quite another to 
keep them in that persuasion. Th e political problem thus conceived is not—
as a social contract framework sometimes implies—static or essentially 
captured in a particular moment, but rather is inherently dynamic and con-
cerned with the psychological tendencies that multiple institutions, working 
in conjunction, create in and over time. Th us, in seeking to understand just 
how stable Rousseau believes his own solution to the social problem to be, 
we must look beyond the Social Contract and to his portrayals of political life 
in action. Th e Letter to D’Alembert has proved helpful in this regard, as it 
depicts in idealized form the daily life of Genevan citizens and, in so doing, 
points to the way in which an approximately just regime might ameliorate 
those tensions that aff ect all regimes.
Rousseau is, of course, quite explicit (SC III.11, 98) that political unions 
cannot sustain themselves in perpetuity: “Th e body politic, like the human 
body, begins to die at the moment of its birth, and carries within itself the 
causes of its destruction.” Th e question, then, is not if but when good regimes 
devolve, and Rousseau’s analysis of the Genevan case suggests that he believes 
the equilibrium of forces required in a just society is intrinsically unstable. 
At least three reasons gather in support of this conclusion. First, the strength 
of his opposition to the institution of a theater in Geneva is telling: that he 
would think the introduction of a single playhouse could have such drastic 
cascading social and psychological consequences indicates just how delicate 
he believed social harmony is. One might attribute Rousseau’s stern critique 
of the theater to other causes (e.g., to a generalized social paranoia or his 
dislike of Voltaire’s meddling with his homeland), but it seems that his sus-
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picions are motivated by a more comprehensive pessimism about the stabil-
ity of social unity. On this head it is instructive to note that Rousseau 
opposes the institution of a theater on a specifi cally republican basis. He 
might have built a very diff erent case, for instance, arguing on the classical 
liberal basis that publicly funded entertainments are an illegitimate use of 
the state apparatus. But Rousseau prioritizes institutional and social unity 
over the claims of individual liberty: without forgetting the short- term fi scal 
consequences—a decline in industry, an increase in public expenditure, and 
the introduction of luxury are among the most serious—Rousseau focuses 
on the long- term moral and social eff ects a theater will have. Th e introduc-
tion of refi ned entertainments will not only empty Geneva’s treasury but 
also destroy the city’s institutional integrity, disrupt its social equilibria, and 
undermine the civic- mindedness of its citizens. Ever sensitive to the pro-
found eff ects produced by the smallest changes, Rousseau claims that by the 
time the subterranean eff ects of a theater are felt, it will be too late to control 
them: men will have already turned into sycophants and wits, women into 
temptresses or worse, and all will have acquired “a soft disposition and a 
spirit of inaction” at odds with both the commercial industriousness and the 
martial discipline that characterize Geneva (LD 64–65).
Second, Rousseau points to the fragility of Genevan social order by not-
ing it is based on a peculiar balance of martial spirit and commercial activity 
that relies for its continuance on the moderation of its inhabitants and the 
existence of sumptuary laws. Geneva is neither Sparta nor England, neither 
the small military republic of the classical world valorized by Rousseau nor 
the extended commercial republic preferred by Montesquieu. It is itself a 
hybrid. Its distinctiveness lies in its ability to fuse the public spirit of the 
former to the bustling industriousness and ingenuity of the latter. Th e fragil-
ity of this balance is signaled by the very existence of sumptuary laws, made 
necessary to temper the greediness that attends commercialism but which 
Rousseau recognizes in Poland as a sign not of political health but rather of 
corruption: “Luxury does not get rooted out with sumptuary laws,” which 
stimulate rather than extinguish the desire for wealth (CGP 189). Th ough 
Rousseau is conspicuously silent in the Letter on the conditions that make 
sumptuary laws necessary, what he says in Poland suggests that Geneva is in 
a more advanced state of decline than initial appearances suggest.
Finally, Rousseau includes in a footnote late in the Letter an image of a 
“dance” that suggests the intrinsically unstable balance between the public 
and private realms. In it, he recalls having as a young boy witnessed “a simple 
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entertainment” enjoyed by a regiment of Genevan troops after drilling exer-
cises. Th ese troops, cheered by wine and a long supper, gathered in the town 
square and began playing music and dancing together. Such a spectacle 
struck the young Rousseau, who was moved by “the harmony of fi ve or six 
hundred men in uniform, holding one another by the hand and forming a 
long ribbon which wound around, serpent- like, in cadence and without 
confusion.” Th e display stirred Rousseau’s passionate father, Isaac, to address 
his young son. “Do you see,” he intoned, “these good Genevans? Th ey are all 
friends, they are all brothers; joy and concord reign in their midst” (LD 135n). 
Th e basis of this “joy and concord” is, as Rousseau’s depiction attests, a 
shared vision of the human good as realized through political and martial 
solidarity, and the dance refl ects and reinforces that solidarity through its 
total inclusiveness and its unity of purpose. It exists in contrast to the exclu-
sive and romantically charged form of dancing that takes place at Rousseau’s 
public balls, for in this case all the soldiers were joined together in a “single 
ribbon” that spontaneously negotiated a series of complex maneuvers and 
refl ected their oneness of mind. Warmed by the memory of his Genevan 
fellows in the town square both expressing and reproducing their unity, 
Rousseau exclaims, “Th e only pure joy is public joy.”
Like its private counterpart, however, “public joy” can and must expire, 
and the way in which Rousseau explains the termination of the spontaneous 
dance points up the ineliminable contradiction between the private and 
public realms. After emphasizing the unity of mind and heart with which 
the dancing was animated, Rousseau notes that city’s women were awoken 
by the noisy men and came down to join them: “Th e wives came to their 
husbands, the servants brought wine; even the children, awakened by the 
noise, ran half- clothed amidst their mothers and fathers.” Th e gathering of 
citizens qua citizens has now become a gathering of fathers, mothers, chil-
dren, and servants; the “pure joy” of the civic association has been admixed 
with the particularistic pleasures of the household. Th e disruptive eff ect on 
the “dance” is clear, for when the men tried “to pick up the dance again” 
they found it “impossible; they did not know what they were doing anymore; 
all heads were spinning with a drunkenness sweeter than that of wine” (LD 
135–36n; emphasis added). After some friendly chatting, each citizen “with-
drew peaceably with his family,” retired to his home, and resumed his private 
domestic life. Th e eff ort to combine the rapture of citizenship with the plea-
sures of the household results not in successful reconciliation but in disruption 
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and confusion. Even in the favorable sociological circumstances of Geneva, 
the roles of father, husband, and citizen are diffi  cult to integrate and, assuming 
this integration achieved, even more diffi  cult to sustain.
| Conclusions
Rousseau’s political theory has a peculiar dynamic. It invokes as its basis a 
self in the possession of particular interests that require special protection. 
Indeed, the protection of these interests is the foundation of political legiti-
macy, and the theory of sovereignty for which Rousseau is so (in)famous 
only embodies and expresses his more fundamental concern to protect the 
integrity of the selves that make up the sovereign body. Yet the very self that 
serves as the foundation of Rousseau’s theory is simultaneously transformed 
by it, and transformed in such a way that the sense one has of himself as 
himself is obscured by the comprehensive way in which he identifi es with the 
social institutions that constitute his personhood. Th e integrity of the moral 
person is imperiled by the very theory that claims to secure it. In the just 
regime, the particularized self is both coming into and falling out of being 
at the very same time. It is Rousseau’s belief in the necessity of circumscrib-
ing the domain of particularity that allowed him to admire regimes as insti-
tutionally and culturally diverse as commercial Geneva, expansionist Rome, 
and virtuous Sparta. Th ese political societies not only were able to direct the 
psychic forces of individual citizens toward the good of the community, but 
all did so with the understanding that creating citizens comes at the cost 
creating individuals with robust self- conceptions. Th e tension between the 
embeddedness and the discreteness of the self is managed and controlled 
through a strategy of mutual accommodation, but it is never resolved at a 
theoretical level. Th is, I think, means at least two things.
First, both the radically collectivistic and radically individualistic inter-
pretations of Rousseau are mistaken. Th e claims that Berlin, Talmon, Nisbet, 
and Crocker make concerning the “totalitarian” character of Rousseau’s 
thought ignore his rejection of Socratic communism, his recognition of formal 
limitations on the exercise of sovereign power, and his constant affi  rmations of 
the need to balance the claims of the private and public domains. Th is authori-
tarian reading shows—rightly enough—that for Rousseau individual identity 
must be shaped in accord with the needs of social institutions, but it neglects 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   213 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations214
to add that social institutions must be shaped in accord with the needs of 
individual citizens. Such interpretations exaggerate the authoritarian appear-
ance of Rousseau’s theory not only by omitting its essentials but also by sub-
jecting it to an impossibly exacting standard of scrutiny. Crocker is especially 
guilty on this score: he argues that the techniques of social control utilized by 
Rousseau—the greatest off enses are deliberate manipulation of the people by 
elites and the attempt to establish social regimentation “through inevitable 
punishment and reward”—reveal the authoritarian character of his political 
theory (Crocker 1995, 250–53). Rousseau did indeed believe that these and 
other techniques were necessary, but his novelty consists not in his acknowl-
edging the utility of subterranean methods of psychological control—in this 
he is like virtually every political philosopher who came before and many who 
came after him—but rather in his discovery that such practices are embedded 
in all existing and all possible forms of social control. Th is discovery, far from 
being intrinsically authoritarian, has instead been very useful for liberals seek-
ing to protect freedom, for it points up both the fragility of human liberty and 
the cost of sustaining it in the face of social forces that seem determined to 
undermine it. So, too, does it show that the question of freedom cannot be 
resolved by simply eliminating social control in some defi ned sphere of indi-
vidual action, for since freedom and social power emerge coterminously the 
eff ort to eliminate social control in some defi ned sphere of private action will 
prove only to be a reassertion of it. Th e very creation of privacy is itself a social 
act. To recognize this—which Rousseau surely did—is not to be an “authori-
tarian,” which Rousseau surely was not.
Second, the tensions the self must face in the social and political world 
prevent the realization of the harmony it seeks. Rousseau’s moral universe is 
an eternally disjointed place full of contradictory duties, desires, and expec-
tations. We act and interact in all diff erent kinds of capacities, and in the 
fi nal analysis there is no way to reconcile the various responsibilities to which 
a complex social life gives rise. Th e unity the self requires would in principle 
be satisfi ed by the radical collectivism of Plato’s Republic, but Rousseau’s 
belief in the primacy of self- love leads him to reject this way of life as unnat-
ural and endorse a mode of social organization that has (reasonably) distinct 
private and public spheres.
And yet the tension that inevitably emerges between these spheres vio-
lates the unity required by the self; its need for coherence is overcome by the 
perplexing multiplicity of social life. If this is right, then there can be no 
fi nal synthesis of civic spirit and subjectivity, as Frederick Neuhouser has 
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argued. Th ere can be no stable solution to the tension between love of self 
and love of society, as Joshua Cohen and John Rawls have claimed. Th ere 
can be no meaningful continuities between the public life of the just regime 
and the domestic life depicted in Emile and Julie, as Nicole Fermon and 
Elizabeth Wingrove have held. Th e tensions Rousseau thought into existence 
are held together not by their fi nal complementarity but by their ultimate 
antagonism.
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Rousseau, if he is anything, is polarizing. At once a revolu-
tionary and a reactionary, a rationalist and a romantic, a lib-
eral and a totalitarian, a solitary and a citizen, Rousseau has 
been blamed both for the excesses of the French Revolution 
and the conservative backlash it caused. He has been mocked 
for his Christianity and decried for his atheism. He has been 
attacked for his misogyny and chastised for his eff eminacy. 
He has been extolled for his diagnosis of modern man’s 
unfortunate condition and excoriated for his failure to allevi-
ate it. Robespierre likened him to a deity and Edmund Burke 
to a beast.
It is no surprise that opinion on Rousseau is so divided or 
that we care so deeply about our disagreements, for in both 
his manner and his matter Rousseau invites controversy: 
questions of human happiness were his central preoccupation, 
and he speaks directly to his readers about these most personal 
aff airs. He brings us into his most intimate confi dences and 
makes us feel less like students than confi dantes; he makes us 
believe that we understand him as well as he understands us. 
But if he speaks directly to all, he says diff erent things to each: 
his intimate style makes us all feel as though we have special 
access to his intentions, but his studied indirection gives us 
very diff erent ideas about what those intentions are. Th e heat 
of his prose warms the heart but blisters the mind.
Epilogue
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In the previous eight chapters I have sought to bring into focus a vision 
of Rousseau which centers on the development of social relations and 
emphasizes the complications that attend that process. More specifi cally, I 
have sought to show that Rousseau’s theory of human association is best 
understood to have two distinct but interlocking aims: fi rst, to raise our 
hopes with respect to what may be hoped for from our associational life and, 
second, to subtly undermine the very hopes which he himself has encour-
aged us to entertain. Th ese aims, understood together, show that full human 
redemption is on his accounting both necessary and impossible in the con-
text of civil society, and do much to point up Rousseau’s curious tendency to 
disclose the failure of his own projects. Insofar, however, as the “tragic” 
interpretation I have developed is a reasonable approximation of Rousseau’s 
own view, serious questions remain—questions about what we, as readers, 
should take away from Rousseau’s work, and about what kind of impact 
Rousseau, as author, sought to have on his audience. I would like to conclude 
by briefl y taking these up.
| Living in the Light of the Silver Lining: Th e Consolations of Tragedy
Th ough the tragic interpretation developed above seems to be exegetically 
plausible, its ultimate meaning and signifi cance remain somewhat unclear. 
How are we to understand a theory that subtly undermines the very possi-
bilities that it encourages readers to explore? And, perhaps more important, 
what are we to do once confronted with the futility of our own social desires? 
One possibility, ultimately embodied by Rousseau himself, is to withdraw 
from society and seek to recapture natural wholeness through solitude and, 
by extension, philosophic refl ection. Th is possibility is held out by Cooper 
(2008, 76) as Rousseau’s fi nal and most satisfactory resolution to the prob-
lem of human dividedness: the “most exalted life in Rousseau’s corpus,” he 
claims, “is not Emile’s but rather his own, that is, the life of a philosopher, as 
depicted in the late autobiographical writings.” Cooper’s claim has consider-
able force, as Rousseau’s own words suggest that solitude gave him not only 
peace and lucidity but also a purity of feeling and expansiveness of soul that 
eluded him in society. In the fi fth walk of the Reveries, Rousseau reports that 
the time he spent fl oating aimlessly in a small boat on the “limpid waters” of 
Lake Bienne were the best of his life. Unlike the “short moments of delirium 
and passion” which dotted his social (and most especially his romantic) life 
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and which caused him more pain than satisfaction, the time he spent in soli-
tude on the banks of St. Peter’s Island gave him the “simple and permanent” 
sentiment of enduring happiness that has no equal and “for which [his] heart 
longs” (RSW 45). Exiled from society, Rousseau found peace by becoming 
invisible to others: “I know that the only good which might henceforth be in 
my power is to abstain from acting, from fear of doing evil without wanting 
to and without knowing it” (50). Rousseau’s own peculiar virtue, then, con-
sists in inaction; the condition of his being good for himself is being nothing 
for others. In living thus, he satisfi es the requirements of natural goodness, 
reconciles himself to himself and to the world, and makes himself an exem-
plar of his own thought. Reports like these do much to point up the choice-
worthiness of the solitary life.
However, it is important to note that withdrawal from society and the 
concomitant embrace of philosophy is neither the only nor, perhaps, the 
most eff ective way of coping with the disappointments to which social life 
gives rise. Such a strategy is, in the fi rst place, potentially more problematic 
than it at fi rst seems, for when we ask whether the Rousseau of the Reveries 
can be said to be happy, the sense that that term acquires in the fi fth walk is 
enough to give the careful reader concerned pause. Th ere, he explains that 
complete absorption in the sole sentiment of one’s own existence—a state 
completely undisturbed by thoughts of past or future or sensations of pain 
or pleasure—is the only feeling that carries with it a “suffi  cient, perfect, and 
full happiness which leaves in the soul no emptiness it might feel a need to 
fulfi ll” (RSW 46). In this state, fully realized only in solitude, we “are like 
God” and “enjoy nothing external to ourselves.” But after having abstracted 
away from everything external to us, after having removed all those distrac-
tions that compromise the pure experience of oneself as himself, it is fair to 
ask: what, if anything, is left? Th e existence that Rousseau describes as most 
perfect is dangerously close to nonexistence; it appears closer to death than 
to life. Todorov (2001, 47) elaborates on this concern:
After having eliminated everything, by a remarkable labor of subtraction and 
introspection, man plumbs his depths. But these depths are, strictly speaking, 
nothing; the subject coincides with the predicate in a perfect tautology. Th e self 
is precisely the very existence of the self—nothing more. We thereby attain 
repose and peace. Rousseau . . . ends up discovering that his nature consists 
precisely of searching for himself. Th e destination is the journey itself. So the 
quest becomes intransitive and is transformed into reverie; the self- suffi  cient 
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   218 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Epilogue 219
man is similar to God, but his existence is now equivalent to nonexistence, to 
radical repose. Now, nothing separates him from death.
I raise this concern less to demonstrate the unsatisfactoriness of solitude than 
to suggest that it, at least as embodied in Rousseau’s self- presentation, is not 
an obviously unproblematic alternative to social life as a means of attaining 
wholeness. It remains unclear whether the path to wholeness that Rousseau 
himself walked actually led him there, or whether philosophy, as Rousseau 
wrote to his onetime friend Mme d’Epinay, leads instead to sorrow.
Even if it is conceded that the alternative embodied by Rousseau is 
sound on its own terms, the Reveries do not establish its absolute priority 
over social life quite as clearly as Cooper would have it. Rousseau says as 
much in the sixth walk, where he confesses that the pleasures of the solitary 
life lack the intensity and emotional expansiveness of the joy of togetherness. 
Th e feeling of making “another heart content,” Rousseau explains, is “sweeter 
than any other,” but it proved intolerable for him because of its fragility. 
Social life, he explains, carries with it obligations that destroy spontaneity 
and, over time, sour the pleasure of associating with others: recounting his 
interactions with a crippled boy to whom he would occasionally give alms, 
Rousseau—sounding much like Emile explaining why he had cooled toward 
Sophie—recalls that their daily interaction was initially “a pleasure” but 
eventually transformed into “a habit” and, fi nally, into an “annoying” duty 
(RSW 49–50). Th e pleasures of solitude are preferable not because they are 
deeper, more expansive, or more rewarding than those of social life—indeed, 
Rousseau suggests that they are less so—but rather because they are more 
durable. Th e fullness of feeling felt through social connectedness still seems 
to be the existential limit point with reference to which Rousseau interprets 
the wholeness of isolation. Solitude is for Rousseau a kind of consolation prize, 
a good to be enjoyed by a singular man singularly unable to sacrifi ce personal 
pleasure to duty and, thus, unable bear the commitments that human associa-
tion entails.
Rousseau’s singularity raises yet another concern about the satisfactori-
ness of the solution to the problem of dividedness that he himself embodied: 
can his experiment in living be replicated? Rousseau’s belief in his own dis-
tinctiveness—expressed repeatedly throughout his autobiographical works—
seems to belie the notion that any and all could strike out and discover repose 
in solitude. Th e problem is especially acute if we take philosophic activity to 
be solitary man’s primary consolation, for since Rousseau consistently reserved 
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the privilege of philosophizing to a select few and actively discouraged every-
one else from its pursuit, it would seem that the very activity that makes soli-
tude rewarding would also be inaccessible to virtually everyone who would 
seek it. Now, it must be admitted that Emile, an Everyman who lacks Rous-
seau’s unique gifts, nonetheless appears capable of fi nding peace in solitude, 
for in Emile and Sophie he tells his tutor that he has found satisfaction despite 
being isolated. But if this is true, we are entitled to wonder why, fi rst, Emile 
was educated for society at all and, second, why he felt the need to communi-
cate his self- discovery with someone else; absent an answer, we may reason-
ably view his claim to have found peace in solitude to be rather unreliable—a 
form of protesting too much. It would certainly not be the only instance in 
which Emile proved to be self- deceived.
Insofar as the individualist, philosophic path to wholeness trod by Rous-
seau is not a viable alternative to social life—either because it replicates the 
failures of social life or because it is inaccessible to most people—we are 
obligated to return to society and search for consolations within it. But 
what, if any, consolations does Rousseau make available to us? We can begin 
to answer this question by noting from Rousseau’s point of view that wres-
tling with the question of human relations as a question is part of what it 
means to be human. Th e development of self- consciousness and social feel-
ing eff ect irreversible changes in the structure of human being—changes 
that lead us to seek the greater part of our happiness through social recogni-
tion—and insofar as we wish to live in accord with our nature we cannot 
remain in ignorance of the diffi  culties that attend such changes. One who 
concerns himself with the question of what may be hoped for from his 
associations, far from indulging the “vain curiosity” Rousseau so violently 
declaims in the First Discourse, instead follows Rousseau’s own example in 
considering a matter that bears directly and immediately on the character 
of the human good.
Because our prospects for happiness are aff ected so powerfully by the 
way we are connected to others, it seems clear that we cannot aff ord not to 
think and feel through these connections. Indeed, to retreat from sustained 
and honest consideration of social possibility is to retreat from the burdens 
of genuinely human life; it is to leave our natural capacities for social feeling 
underdeveloped, to quit our estate as human beings and try futilely—with 
kings and beggars—to be something that we are not (E 446). With this in 
mind, we can see that the failure to seriously inquire after the character of 
human association would appear to magnify rather than ameliorate the dif-
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fi culties to which social life gives rise, for such a failure precludes real engage-
ment with the intransigently diffi  cult question of self- knowledge, and leads 
to moral blindness, breakdowns of self- awareness, a diminished feeling of 
the sentiment of existence, and the very psychological dividedness Rousseau 
was so concerned to mend. Social beings that are unwilling or unable to 
think through the possibilities and limitations of their associational lives 
owe their obscure feelings of dissatisfaction, their “confl ict and drifting,” to 
their incuriosity. Salutary ignorance is not an option.
If social beings must refl ect on their relations, and if (proper) refl ection 
leads inevitably to an awareness of the limits of human connection, then 
what prevents this awareness from engendering despair and moral paralysis? 
I believe that Rousseau provides at least three consolations that compensate 
us for the disappointments inherent in social life and, thereby, also keep us 
from slipping into disillusioned drift. Th e fi rst, most evident in chapter 6’s 
analysis of friendship, is that connectedness of a less ambitious but perhaps 
no less comforting kind becomes possible once our divided condition is 
exposed for all to see. Th e public disclosure of our various failings—be they 
of mind, body, or soul—may weaken the esteem others feel for us, but it 
simultaneously creates a new emotional space in which social bonds, albeit 
of an aim- attenuated kind, are consummated and strengthened. Friends like 
Bomston and St. Preux, to say nothing of well- educated persons like Emile, 
fi nd in their failures and imperfections a ground for community, for they 
know the sting of disappointment and that no one is exempt from humilia-
tion. Emile’s example, and its eff ect on the reader, is especially instructive in 
this regard, for though Emile is ultimately unsuccessful in his quest to fi nd 
wholeness through marriage, we do not begrudge him his failure but rather 
admire his eff ort. It is, in fact, his very failure that allows readers to identify 
with him: in the end, we no longer see a “model of perfection” whose excel-
lence we could never hope to approximate, but rather a victim of fate whose 
diffi  culties we have lived out. His grizzled refl ections on the trials of life, won 
by hard experience, excite our sympathy without inspiring our disgust. Th ey 
also command our moral attention: the courage that he and Sophie exhibit 
through their hardships attracts us in spite—or because—of the fact that it 
does not shrink from but rather partakes in the imperfections of the world. 
Th e shared awareness that such imperfections attach to everything, that the 
human condition is one of weakness and travail, that life is too strong, too 
great, and too confounding for even the best and brightest, creates a ground 
for sympathetic community among all human beings and allows us to identify 
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with—and, importantly, to approach—the everyday heroism of fi gures like 
Emile and his beloved.
Th e second, borne out most fully in chapters 2 and 3, has to do with how 
the development of social sentiment activates and sharpens the sentiment of 
existence. Th e experience of this sentiment is not only a vindication of life 
itself (and hence an answer to Camus, who histrionically wondered two 
hundred years after Rousseau whether death was preferable to life) but also 
a standard for determining the choiceworthiness of our own lives. To live a 
good life, Rousseau avers, “is not to breathe; it is to act; it is to make use of 
our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves that give us 
the sentiment of our existence.” He goes on: “Th e man who has lived most 
is not he who has counted the most years but he who has most felt life” 
(E 42). Th e mere absence of pain is thus not the appropriate standard for a 
fi nal assessment of human life (cf. DI 132); that standard is supplied, rather, 
by the quotient of felt life that we are able to enjoy, by the richness of experi-
ence and range of emotional and intellectual sensitivity through which we 
are able to make use of all our capacities, to press the boundaries of being, 
and to acquire knowledge of ourselves by acquiring knowledge of our limita-
tions. Even with all its disappointments, then, a genuinely human—that is 
to say, social—life is, on Rousseau’s accounting, far preferable to the delu-
sively grandiose aspirations of a tyrant or the petty, mechanical pleasures of 
an honest bourgeois because it gives expression to the full range of human 
powers while providing consolations when those powers, as they are so often, 
are insuffi  cient for their task.
Th e third and fi nal consolation that emerges from Rousseau’s tragic 
theory of social relations is the acquisition of virtue. Th is acquisition is sig-
nifi cant, for Rousseau himself heaped so much praise on virtue that many 
commentators have ultimately concluded, with Reisert (2003, 10), that virtue 
is the “central lesson of Rousseau’s constructive works.” While this “lesson” 
has hardly been our central preoccupation, we have nonetheless seen how it 
fi gures into Rousseau’s mission: he has shown us how public and domestic 
forms of virtue emerge from diff erent kinds of social arrangements and, in 
many cases, endure beyond the social structures that help to produce them. 
Emile’s example most clearly illustrates not only how the desire to be virtu-
ous grows out of the eroticized desire to be social but also how the consola-
tions of virtue help to soothe the wounds infl icted by frustrated eros. After 
the breakdown of his marriage to Sophie, Emile fi nds solace in his resolve 
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to be virtuous and in “fi nding his daily duties” around him. Th ough he had 
abandoned the hope of exclusive and enduring sexual love, he kept the moral 
discipline that that hope had cultivated in his youth. Trying to discourage his 
pupil from marrying Sophie simply because cold weather will make it more 
diffi  cult to travel to see her, Jean- Jacques tells Emile that the marriage will 
outlive the snow (E 447). He leaves it for Emile to discover that virtue would 
remain after the marriage disappeared.
| Reforming the Reader: Rousseau’s Mission as a Writer
We have now seen that Rousseau’s veiled social tragedy holds out important 
consolations for readers who might otherwise become disillusioned by his 
skepticism concerning human relations. But in continuing to tease out the 
implications of the “tragic” interpretation it is necessary to shift our gaze from 
reader to author, and to seek to understand a bit more about the kind of writer 
that would develop a teaching like the one I have found in Rousseau. It is 
worth mentioning at the outset that throughout the twentieth century Rous-
seau has been often interpreted, both by his defenders and his detractors, as a 
preeminently political thinker who wrote in order to eff ect practical political 
change. Th e criticisms of Karl Popper, Robert Nisbet, and J. L. Talmon all 
presuppose that Rousseau wrote the Social Contract animated by the hope 
that the regime depicted there would one day be realized, and John Rawls 
(2007, 207–8)—seeking to save Rousseau from those very criticisms—char-
acterizes him as a reasonable optimist seeking social progress through institu-
tional reform. If, as I have argued above, Rousseau is too circumspect about 
the limits of social connection to believe that the possibilities he explores 
could be fully realized in the world—especially in the modern world—then 
this “practical” interpretation of his work will not do. Why, then, did he 
write? What did he hope to achieve, if not practical political reform?
Th e question is a good one, and for guidance I turn to an eminently 
qualifi ed, albeit somewhat unsympathetic, source: Voltaire. Writing to Gene-
van pastor Jacob Vernes, the arch philosophe complained of Rousseau’s 
obscurantism and unwillingness to address himself directly to the concrete 
problems of his day. “Jean- Jacques writes only in order to write,” sneered the 
lord of Ferney, “and I write in order to act” (Adams 1991, 162n46). Th ough 
wrong to dismiss Rousseau’s work as mere armchair speculation, Voltaire’s 
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frustration with his onetime friend is nonetheless instructive, for it reveals 
important diff erences in the two thinkers’ respective conceptions of how 
philosophic writers ought to engage with their readers and, more broadly, 
with world they inhabit. For Voltaire and his fellow philosophes, to be 
engaged in philosophy is to seek to bring the world into conformity with 
reason; it is, therefore, to be necessarily engaged in a political program of 
reform. And since philosophy qua philosophy is a tool of social change, phi-
losophers themselves have an obligation to improve society by bringing both 
its design and its customs into accord with reason. Assuming this obligation 
meant, among other things, taking strong stances on a variety of concrete 
social questions: Voltaire had his Calas aff air, Diderot his Encyclopedia, and 
D’Alembert the vaccination debate. Th ey united under the slogan Ecrasez 
l’ infâme! and univocally cried for toleration, liberation from superstition, and 
rational institutional design.
Rousseau, by contrast, could never fi nd harmony with the heavenly 
chorus or bring himself to fully endorse its understanding of the philoso-
pher’s role in society. To the degree that he felt compelled to address current 
events or the questions of the day, the views he expressed were, because of 
their complexity, far less amenable to policy prescription than were those of 
his contemporaries: he supported toleration but defended a well- educated 
fanaticism; he depicted a virtuous atheist but insisted that religion was nec-
essary to a healthy political society; he inveighed against medicine but had 
very little to say about vaccination; he pioneered a new educational theory 
but discouraged eff orts to institutionalize it. Th is, of course, is not to deny 
that Rousseau contributed meaningfully to the debates that surrounded him 
(see, e.g., Hulliung 1994; Mostefai and Scott 2009), but rather to say that his 
intellectual mission was not defi ned by his contribution to those debates. To 
the contrary, when Rousseau raised the questions of his day, he did so not to 
resolve but rather to problematize them, and in so doing he invited his readers 
to think about them more deeply and more productively. Th is more nuanced 
and individualistic authorial mission emerged most clearly in the aftermath 
of the publication of the Second Discourse: by the spring of 1756 Rousseau 
had grown so weary of the philosophes’ intrigues, and so skeptical of their 
radical activism, that he found it necessary to leave the bustle of Paris for the 
quiet of Montmorency. Th ere he would dispense with eff orts to reform soci-
ety and focus instead on reforming himself—he sought the country in order 
to escape the distractions of the capital and embark on a personal program 
of moral “reform” that would coincide with a period of astounding literary 
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productivity (Cranston 1991, 100). Th us it would seem that Rousseau’s deci-
sion to leave Paris was not motivated simply by a need for a change of scen-
ery; it was, rather, an essential condition for living out his distinctive vision 
of what it meant to be a philosopher. In order to live and philosophize as he 
thought appropriate, it was as necessary for Rousseau to leave Paris as it was 
for the philosophes to stay there.
Rousseau’s extreme inwardness and attendant need to distance himself 
from the other “opinion makers” of his day point, I think, to the distinctive 
way he viewed his mission as an author. In this respect, he shared a great deal 
more with the French moralists of the seventeenth century than with the 
social reformers of the Enlightenment era, for it was not the reform of large- 
scale social institutions—but the moral improvement and transformation of 
individual readers—that Rousseau sought to eff ect through his writing. He 
wanted fi rst and foremost to produce a revolution in the understanding, and 
it was in the service of this goal that his eff orts as an author, including his 
occasional forays into practical politics, were largely devoted. Indeed, it is in 
light of this goal that we can understand Rousseau’s “tragic” theory of human 
relations, for insofar as the romantic, fraternal, and political ideals he evokes 
may be understood not as templates or blueprints to be replicated in the world 
but rather as pedagogic tools intended to help readers better understand 
themselves, their aspirations, and their condition, we have a sense of why he 
would invite us to explore possibilities that he himself ultimately fi nds it nec-
essary to undermine. Th ese possibilities, however unrealizable, are themselves 
part of the structure of social life, and it is only in their light that a properly 
human happiness may be approached and approximated.
Rousseau’s concern for the salvation of individual readers is evident even 
before his symbolic move from Paris, for he begins the preface to the Dis-
course on Inequality (91) by invoking the famous inscription at the temple of 
the oracle at Delphi and claiming that “the most useful and least advanced 
of all human sciences seems to me to be that of man.” Modern man’s com-
plete lack of self- knowledge becomes the principle theme in the Discourse’s 
preface and exordium, with Rousseau taking up the actual question asked by 
the Academy at Dijon only insofar as he thought it might help his fellows 
better understand themselves and one another. Th e Second Discourse was, of 
course, only the fi rst of many eff orts to get readers to view themselves in a 
new way and in light of new possibilities. Th us we fi nd Shklar (1969, 2) 
claiming that Rousseau wrote not to alter government policy but rather to 
“induce moral recognition in the reader,” to shake him out of his dogmatic 
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slumber and awaken in him an “outraged awareness” at his condition. “Th e 
object of [Rousseau’s] models,” she avers, “was not to set up the perfect com-
munity, but simply to bring moral judgment to bear on the social misery to 
which men have so unnecessarily reduced themselves.”
Lest we think this goal too modest for a writer of Rousseau’s range and 
power, Scott (2012; 2014, 533) has shown how diffi  cult it is to get readers to 
view the world with new eyes. He identifi es a series of rhetorical techniques 
that Rousseau utilized in order to persuade others of his new and radically 
diff erent interpretation of human experience, and on that basis argues that 
“Rousseau’s mission as an author . . . is to make his readers see what he saw” 
and, in so doing, to “transform [their] perspective.” Th is reading of Rous-
seau’s intention both underscores the Shklarian view that Rousseau was more 
interested in helping individual readers with their personal salvation than 
with institutional or policy change, and it shows Rousseau to be an intention-
ally diffi  cult writer rather than, as has so often been claimed, a muddleheaded 
obscurantist. Scott deftly reveals how Rousseau strategically and deliberately 
utilizes obscurity, indirection, and paradox as ways of helping readers see the 
limitations of their own understandings of reality and envisage social possi-
bilities previously blocked from view by the ossifi ed telos of Aristotle, the 
antisocial hypocrisy of Christianity, and the reductive bilge of Hobbes. 
Insofar, then, as we can understand Rousseau as deliberately sowing confu-
sion for the pedagogic purpose of helping readers interpret their experiences 
more productively, we may conclude with Zaretsky and Scott (2009, 100) 
that in Rousseau, “paradoxes were not mere extravagances; they were critical 
to his philosophical enterprise.”
Both the style and substance of Rousseau’s work tend, I think, to sup-
port the view that he wrote less to eff ect programmatic social change than to 
show individual readers the limitations of their old ideas and conceptions. 
Rousseau’s tone, for one, is not that of a reformer but of a confi dante. It is 
intimate, confessional, immediate, and highly personal; he directly addresses 
his reader with great frequency and spends an unusual amount of time 
anticipating their criticisms, undermining their presuppositions, disclosing 
his own sincerity, and ingratiating himself into their confi dences. Even when 
he addresses the entire species, as he does in the Discourse on Inequality, he 
manages to speak in an immediate way to each member of his audience. 
Th us we fi nd Reisert (2003, ix) saying what so many readers of Rousseau 
have felt: “Whenever I read Rousseau, I feel that he is speaking directly to 
me—not in the way that all great thinkers who address universal human 
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concerns necessarily speak to each reader because they speak to all—but in 
a more personal way.” Th e “personal” tone to which Reisert refers has an 
important eff ect: it helps soften the skeptical reader and prepare him to 
accept Rousseau’s authority as a knower and a teacher. To be sure, the tone 
that Rousseau adopts does not preclude a separate intention to reform soci-
ety’s basic institutions, but surely it is better suited to an individualized 
pedagogic intention than a reformist, “political” one.
It is, however, not just the intimacy but also the indirection of Rous-
seau’s style that distinguishes his work from that of a more practically 
minded reformer. Rousseau combines his highly intimate and confessional 
tone with a love for jarring paradoxes, and his distinctive blend of emotional 
immediacy and philosophic ambiguity is designed to generate deep uncer-
tainty in individual readers—uncertainty not only about Rousseau’s mean-
ing but also about the reader’s own interpretation of reality. Th e paradoxical 
and somewhat obscure nature of Rousseau’s work has, of course, been noted 
by many, but the response it elicited from one his earliest and most distin-
guished readers—David Hume—is particularly instructive. Writing to a 
mutual friend of his and Rousseau’s, Hume noted that though Rousseau’s 
works were “admirable, particularly on the head of eloquence,” so, too, were 
they inevitably “intermingled [with] some degree of extravagance.” To this 
he added that even a reader as attentive as he did not quite know what to 
make of Rousseau: his writings were less texts than “performances” that, it 
seemed to Hume, had been undertaken not to demonstrate truth but rather 
“from the pleasure of showing his invention and surprising the reader with 
his paradoxes” (in Zaretsky and Scott 2009, 100). A writer as practical as 
Hume saw that Rousseau’s peculiar, aporia- inducing manner was ill suited 
to the task of concrete political reform. What he failed to see, however, is 
that Rousseau had a diff erent understanding of how a writer ought to engage 
in the world, and that the paradoxes he deployed were essential to this alter-
native vision. At least part of the reason Hume failed in this regard is that he 
made very diff erent assumptions about his reading public than did Rous-
seau: serving in his self- appointed role of ambassador between the learned 
and the layman, Hume wrote to and for a world that he believed to be 
 fundamentally sensible or, at the very least, not in need of complete moral 
and intellectual transformation. Rousseau, on the other hand, believed his 
readers so corrupt, and the world they inhabited so rotten and irredeemable, 
that nothing short of complete moral transformation would be at all useful. 
Hume could be content with informing and edifying his public, but Rousseau 
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had to fundamentally reorient his, and his ingratiatingly indirect style was 
one of the many ways he got readers invested in his reformation project.
None of this, of course, is to deny that Rousseau believed the modern 
world could be better than it was, or to say that he was simply uninterested 
in the realm of practical politics. Poland, the Constitution Project for Corsica, 
and the Letter to D’Alembert all suggest otherwise: they address themselves to 
concrete political problems, make reasonably specifi c suggestions for reform, 
and, on the whole, suggest that more sensibly designed institutions could 
play an important role in ameliorating human misery. It is, however, to say 
that Rousseau’s signifi cance as an author does not lie in his having made this 
or that policy prescription, but rather in the novel way that he interrogates—
and thereby remakes—his readers. It is in light of this aim, and no other, that 
both his tragic theory of human relations and his success or failure as a 
writer must be judged.
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chapter 1
1. For expositional convenience I 
occasionally use the gender- specifi c “man” 
instead of “human beings” or “humanity.”
2. DI page numbers refer to Rousseau 
(1964).
3. Th is martyrdom is underscored by 
the date of the tenth walk, which Rousseau 
records as Palm Sunday. Rousseau makes 
himself the Christ fi gure in his own pas-
sion play: his metaphorical return to Les 
Charmettes, the only place where he was 
loved for who he was, evokes Jesus’s return 
to Jerusalem. And much like Jesus, 
Rousseau’s love of others was rewarded 
with betrayal: having set out to save Mme 
de Warens, he was promptly sacrifi ced by 
his enemies.
4. Lev. refers to Hobbes (1994).
5. 2Tr. refers to Locke (1980).
6. ECHU refers to Locke (1975).
7. Page numbers for DSA refer to 
Rousseau (1964).
8. Rousseau is very particular about 
the use of the term citoyen, and he chastised 
his contemporaries as well as Bodin for fail-
ing to understand the signifi cance of the 
word. Besides D’Alembert, Rousseau 
claims in a footnote to the Social Contract 
that “no other French author, to my knowl-
edge, has understood the true meaning of 
the word citizen” (SC Vn54).
9. GM refers to the Geneva 
Manuscript. All passages quoted from 
Rousseau (1978).
chapter 2
1. Compare with Lev. X, 51: “Th e 
value or worth of a man is, as of all other 
things, his prices, that is to say, so much as 
would be given for the use of his power; 
and therefore is not absolute, but a thing 
dependent on the need and judgment of 
another.”
2. Rousseau, like many sentimental-
ists, expressed a belief that facial features 
revealed the disposition of the soul: “It is 
believed that the face is only a simple 
development of features already drawn by 
nature. I, however, think that beyond this 
development the features of a man’s visage 
are imperceptibly formed and take on a 
typical cast as a result of the frequent and 
habitual impression of certain aff ections of 
the soul” (E 230).
3. ML refers to the Moral Letters. All 
citations from Rousseau (2007).
n o t e s
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4. Rousseau is aware that pity for the 
rich and for the poor can quickly degener-
ate into contempt. He thus recommends 
that Emile be publicly humiliated as a way 
of staying in touch with his own vulnera-
bility (E 245). See also E 172–75, where 
Rousseau provides an example of how this 
might be done.
chapter 3
1. Translator Judith Masters some-
what misleadingly renders amour- propre as 
the pejorative term “vanity.”
2. Rousseau also replaces his judges, 
claiming that Plato and Xenocrates are bet-
ter able to assess his work than are the 
readers at the Academy of Dijon. His 
explicit disregard of the Academy’s ability 
to properly judge his Discourse is likely 
among the reasons why the milquetoast 
Abbé Talbert won the essay competition 
instead of Rousseau.
3. All Preface to Narcisse citations refer 
to Rousseau (2007).
4. BGE refers to Nietzsche (2002).
5. Cranston (1991, 36) reports that 
Diderot was displeased with Deleyre’s ini-
tial entry and made him extensively revise 
it before agreeing to publish it in the 
Encyclopedia.
6. See Neuhouser (2008, 376n) for a 
diff erent account of the relationship of 
amour- propre to the principle of reciprocity. 
Rawls (2007, 198n) endorses Neuhouser’s 
account.
7. On the distinctness of love and 
friendship, see Reisert (2003, chap. 4). Per 
usual, however, Rousseau is himself the 
exception to his own rule, for he reports in 
the Confessions that his relationship to Mme 
de Warens was something between love and 
friendship.
chapter 5
1. It is unclear exactly how much time 
has passed between letters I and VIII, but 
Rousseau indicates in an editorial note 
placed at the beginning of letter VIII that 
there is a “lacuna” between it and the previ-
ous letters.
2. Th is letter is never posted; instead, 
it is delivered by hand to an unsuspecting 
St. Preux, who was given a brief note that 
informed him to meet Julie and Claire at 
the bower.
3. Some attention to context is neces-
sary. St. Preux is not thinking clearly at all 
as he writes letter XXXVIII: he is anticipat-
ing his tryst with Julie and is overcome by 
his illusions. Th is would tend to militate 
against taking seriously the passage I have 
cited above, but it should be noted that St. 
Preux’s mental stability as he writes letter 
XXIII is questionable as well: he is insecure 
and even hysterical in the Valais country, 
believing himself to be forgotten by Julie 
and then threatening suicide in order to 
bring an end to his exile.
chapter 6
1. Cicero and Montaigne were very 
infl uential in Rousseau’s age and known to 
Rousseau himself. Th us I treat their theo-
ries of friendship as important parts of the 
intellectual context Rousseau seeks to 
reshape. On Cicero see Wood (1988, 3); 
and Garsten (2006, 60). On Montaigne 
see Marchi (1994); and Fontana (2008, 
24–25).
2. DI 95. How critical Rousseau’s 
engagement is, though, is a matter of some 
debate. Sorenson (1990) occupies a middle 
ground between Plattner (1979), who views 
Rousseau as breaking radically with tradi-
tional teleology, and Lemos (1977), who 
believes that Rousseau’s providentialist lan-
guage moors him to a broadly teleological 
view of the world.
3. Th ough the tutor calls Emile 
“friend” several times, Emile responds in 
kind only once, preferring the hierarchical 
“father” or “master.” Th e disproportion 
here suggests either that the two are cogniz-
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ing their relationship in very diff erent ways 
or, more likely, that Jean- Jacques is calling 
the pubescent Emile his “friend” as part of 
a pedagogic strategy designed to win his 
pupil’s consent. More on this below. Cf. 
Reisert (2003, 104–5).
chapter 7
1. RRF refers to Burke (1993).
2. Rousseau’s French reads, “On 
pourrait, sur ce qui précède, ajouter a 
l’acquis a l’état civil la liberté morale qui 
seul rend l’homme vraiment maître de lui.”
3. CGP refers to Rousseau (1997c).
4. DPE refers to Rousseau (1997a).
5. Rousseau’s Final Reply refers to 
Rousseau (1992).
6. I cannot fi nd this hypothesis in 
Aristotle, and it would—as Rousseau 
knew—have been a very odd position to 
take for a philosopher who insisted on the 
distinctness of all animal species. Th ough 
Rousseau, too, affi  rms the eternality of spe-
cies, it is he and not Aristotle who provides 
many of the resources for thinking through 
the question of whether human beings 
evolved from some quadrupedal species 
(e.g., DI 183–86).
chapter 8
1. For an excellent, and nontechnical, 
introduction, see Riker (1988).
2. Condorcet actually presupposed a 
relatively high degree of voter competence: 
the probability of each individual voter 
reaching a correct independent decision 
must be at least 0.5 in order for the law of 
large numbers to work. If the probability of 
a correct evaluation is less than 0.5 then 
average voter competence actually decreases. 
See, for example, Waldron, in Estlund et al. 
(1989, 1322–23).
3. Rousseau singles out as his oppo-
nent William Warburton, bishop of 
Gloucester (1668–1779), who penned Th e 
Alliance between Church and State and 
Divine Legation of Moses.
4. LCT refers to Locke (2010).
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   231 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Adams, Geoff rey. 1991. Th e Huguenots and 
French Opinion, 1685–1787: Th e 
Enlightenment Debate on 
Toleration. Waterloo, Ont.: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
Arendt, Hannah. 1998. Th e Human 
Condition. Introduction by 
Margaret Canovan. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Aristotle. 1984. Th e Politics. Translated by 
Carnes Lord. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
———. 1998. Nicomachean Ethics. 
Translated by David Ross, 
revised by J. L. Ackrill and 
J. O. Urmson. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Bellah, Robert, Richard Marsden, William 
M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and 
Steven M. Tipton. 1985. Habits of 
the Heart: Individualism and 
Commitment in American Life. 
Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1990. Four Essays on Liberty. 
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press.
Bloom, Allan. 1979. “Introduction.” In 
Emile, by Jean- Jacques Rousseau. 
New York: Basic Books.
———. 1993. Love and Friendship. New 
York: Simon and Schuster.
Boyd, Richard. 2004. “Pity’s Pathologies 
Portrayed: Rousseau and the 
Limits of Democratic 
Compassion.” Political Th eory 32 
(4): 519–46.
Bronfenbrenner, Urie. 1981. Th e Ecology 
of Human Development. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
Burke, Edmund. 1993. Refl ections on 
the Revolution in France. 
Introduction and notes by 
L. G. Mitchell. Oxford, 
U.K.: Oxford University 
Press.
Camus, Albert. 1991. Th e Myth of Sisyphus, 
and Other Essays. Translated by 
Justin O’Brien. New York: 
Vintage.
Cassirer, Ernst. 1989. Th e Question of Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau. New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press.
Charvet, John. 1973. Th e Social Problem in 
the Philosophy of Rousseau. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press.
Cicero. 1923. On Old Age. On Friendship. 
On Divination. Translated by 
b i b l i o g r a p h y
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   232 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Bibliography 233
W. A. Falconer. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 1986. “Refl ections on 
Rousseau: Autonomy and 
Democracy.” Philosophy and 
Public Aff airs 15 (3): 275–97.
———. 2010. Rousseau: A Free Community 
of Equals. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press.
Cooper, Laurence. 1999. Rousseau, Nature, 
and the Problem of the Good Life. 
University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press.
———. 2004. “Between Eros and the Will 
to Power: Rousseau and ‘Th e 
Desire to Extend Our Being.’ ” 
American Political Science Review 
98 (1): 105–19.
———. 2008. Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and 
Nietzsche: Th e Politics of Infi nity. 
University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press.
Cranston, Maurice. 1991. Th e Noble Savage: 
Jean- Jacques Rousseau, 1754–1762. 
Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Crocker, Lester. 1995. “Rousseau’s Soi- 
Disant Liberty.” In Rousseau and 
Liberty, edited by Robert Wokler, 
244–66. Manchester, U.K.: 
Manchester University Press.
Cullen, Daniel. 1993. Freedom in Rousseau’s 
Political Philosophy. DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University 
Press.
Dagger, Richard. 1997. Civic Virtues: Rights, 
Citizenship, and Republican 
Liberalism. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
DeMan, Paul. 1979. Allegories of Reading: 
Figural Language in Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press.
Dent, N. J. H. 1988. Rousseau: An 
Introduction to His Psychological, 
Social, and Political Th eory. 
Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Press.
Diderot, Denis. 1956. Rameau’s Nephew, 
and Other Works. Edited by 
Ralph Bowen, translated by 
Ralph Bowen and Jacques 
Barzun. Indianapolis: Hackett.
———. 1967. Encyclopédie ou 
Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, 
des arts et des métiers, Tome 
Sixieme (Et–Fn). Stuttgart: Bad 
Cannstatt.
Disch, Lisa. 1994. “Claire Loves Julie: 
Reading the Story of Women’s 
Friendship in La Nouvelle 
Héloïse.” Hypatia 9 (3): 19–45.
Estlund, David, Jeremy Waldron, Bernard 
Grofman, and Scott L. Feld. 
1989. “Democratic Th eory and 
the Public Interest: Condorcet 
and Rousseau Revisited.” 
American Political Science Review 
83 (4): 1317–40.
Fermon, Nicole. 1997. Domesticating 
Passions: Rousseau, Woman, and 
the Nation. Hanover, N.H.: 
Wesleyan University Press.
Fontana, Biancamaria. 2008. Montaigne’s 
Politics: Authority and Governance 
in the “Essais.” Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press.
Forster, E. M. 2007. Howards End. New 
York: Bantam Dell.
Freedman, Jonathan A., Steven E. Butler, 
and David H. Wahl. 2012. 
“Impacts of Invasive Asian Carps 




Garsten, Bryan. 2006. Saving Persuasion: A 
Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
Garver, Eugene. 1994. Aristotle’s Rhetoric: 
An Art of Character. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Gauthier, David. 2006. Rousseau: Th e 
Sentiment of Existence. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   233 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Bibliography234
Gildin, Hilail. 1983. Rousseau’s Social 
Contract: Th e Design of the 
Argument. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Grofman, Bernard, and Scott Feld. 1988. 
“Rousseau’s General Will: 
A Condorcetian Perspective.” 
American Political Science Review 
82 (2): 567–76.
Hickman, Jonathan, Shiliang Wu, Loretta 
J. Mickley, and Manuel T. 
Lerdau. 2010. “Kudzu (Pueraria 
montana) Invasion Doubles 
Emissions of Nitric Oxide and 
Increases Ozone Pollution.” 
Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 107 (22): 
10115–19.
Hobbes, Th omas. 1994. Leviathan. Edited 
by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: 
Hackett.
———. 1998. On the Citizen. Edited by 
Richard Tuck and Michael 
Silverthorne. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press.
Hulliung, Mark. 1994. Th e Autocritique of 
Enlightenment: Rousseau and the 
Philosophes. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press.
Johnston, Steven. 1999. Encountering 
Tragedy: Rousseau and the 
Project of Democratic Order. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press.
Kateb, George. 1961. “Rousseau’s Political 
Th ought.” Political Science 
Quarterly 76 (4): 519–43.
Kelly, Christopher. 1999. “Taking Readers 
as Th ey Are: Rousseau’s Turn 
from Discourses to Novels.” 
Eighteenth Century Studies 33 (1): 
85–101.
———. 2003. Rousseau as Author: 
Consecrating One’s Life to the 
Truth. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Lemos, Ramon M. 1977. Rousseau’s Political 
Philosophy: An Exposition and 
Interpretation. Athens: University 
of Georgia Press.
Levine, Alan. 1976. Th e Politics of 
Autonomy: A Kantian Reading of 
Rousseau’s Social Contract. 
Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press.
Locke, John. 1975. An Essay concerning 
Human Understanding. Edited 
by Peter Nidditch. Oxford, 
U.K.: Clarendon Press.
———. 1980. Second Treatise of Civil 
Government. Edited by C. B. 
MacPherson. Indianapolis: 
Hackett.
———. 1996. Some Th oughts concerning 
Education. Edited by Ruth 
Weissbourd Grant and Nathan 
Tarcov. Indianapolis: Hackett.
———. 2010. A Letter concerning 
Toleration, and Other Writings. 
Edited by Mark Goldie. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1981. La Mandragola. 
Translated by Mera Flaumenhaft. 
Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland 
Press.
Macpherson, C. B. 1964. Th e Political 
Th eory of Possessive Individualism: 
Hobbes to Locke. Oxford, U.K.: 
Clarendon Press.
Marchi, Dudley M. 1994. Montaigne among 
the Moderns: Receptions of the 
“Essais.” Providence, R.I.: 
Berghahn Books.
Marks, Jonathan. 2007. “Rousseau’s 
Discriminating Defense of 
Compassion.” American Political 
Science Review 101 (4): 727–40.
Marshall, David. 2005. Th e Frame of Art: 
Fictions of Aesthetic Experience, 
1750–1815. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Melzer, Arthur M. 1983. “Rousseau’s Moral 
Realism: Replacing Natural Law 
with the General Will.” American 
Political Science Review 77 (3): 
633–51.
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   234 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Bibliography 235
———. 1990. Th e Natural Goodness of 
Man: On the System of Rousseau’s 
Th ought. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Montaigne, Michel de. 1958. Th e Complete 
Essays. Translated by Donald 
Frame. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press.
Mostefai, Ourida, and John T. Scott. 2009. 
Rousseau and l’Infâme: Religion, 
Toleration, and Fanaticism in the 
Age of Enlightenment. Leiden: 
Rodopi Press.
Neuhouser, Frederick. 2008. Rousseau’s 
Th eodicy of Self- Love: Evil, 
Rationality, and the Drive for 
Recognition. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Nichols, Mary. 1985. “Rousseau’s Novel 
Education in Emile.” Political 
Th eory 13 (4): 535–58.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2002. Beyond Good 
and Evil. Edited by Rolf- Peter 
Horstmann and Judith Norman, 
translated by Judith Norman. 
New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Nisbet, Robert. 1943. “Rousseau and 
Totalitarianism.” Journal of 
Politics 5 (2): 93–114.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2001. Upheavals of 
Th ought. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press.
O’Hagan, Timothy. 1999. Rousseau. 
London: Routledge.
Okin, Susan Moller. 1979. “Th e Education 
of Rousseau’s Natural Woman.” 
Journal of Politics 41 (2): 393–416.
Orwin, Cliff ord. 1997a. “Moist Eyes: From 
Rousseau to Clinton.” Public 
Interest 128 (Summer): 3–20.
———. 1997b. “Rousseau and the 
Discovery of Political 
Compassion.” In Th e Legacy of 
Rousseau, edited by Cliff ord 
Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, 296–
320. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Parry, Gereint. 1995. “Th inking One’s Own 
Th oughts: Autonomy and the 
Citizen.” In Rousseau and Liberty, 
edited by Robert Wokler, 
99–120. Manchester, U.K.: 
Manchester University Press.
Plato. 1968. Republic. Translated by Allan 
David Bloom. New York: Basic 
Books.
———. 2001. Plato’s “Symposium.” 
Translated by Seth Benardete, 
with commentaries by Allan 
Bloom and Seth Benardete. 
Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Plattner, Marc F. 1979. Rousseau’s State of 
Nature: An Interpretation of the 
Discourse on Inequality. DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University 
Press.
Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History 
of Political Philosophy. Edited by 
Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press.
Reisert, Joseph R. 2003. Jean- Jacques 
Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press.
Riker, William. 1988. Liberalism against 
Populism: A Confrontation 
between the Th eory of Democracy 
and the Th eory of Social Choice. 
Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland 
Press.
Rousseau, Jean- Jacques. 1960. Politics and 
the Arts: Th e Letter to M. 
D’Alembert on the Th eatre. Edited 
and translated by Allan Bloom. 
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
———. 1964. Th e First and Second 
Discourses. Translated by Roger 
and Judith Masters. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press.
———. 1978. On the Social Contract, with 
Geneva Manuscript and Political 
Economy. Translated by Roger 
and Judith Masters. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press.
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   235 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Bibliography236
———. 1979. Emile: or, On Education. 
Translated by Allan Bloom. New 
York: Basic Books.
———. 1992. Discourse on the Sciences and 
Arts (First Discourse) and 
Polemics. Edited by Christopher 
Kelly and Roger D. Masters, 
translated by Judith D. Bush, 
Christopher Kelly, and Roger D. 
Masters. Hanover, N.H.: 
University Press of New England.
———. 1995. Th e Confessions and 
Correspondence, Including the 
Letters to Malesherbes. Edited by 
Christopher Kelly, Roger D. 
Masters, and Peter G. Stillman, 
translated by Christopher Kelly. 
Hanover, N.H.: University Press 
of New England.
———. 1996. “Emile et Sophie, ou Les 
Solitaires.” In Finding a New 
Feminism: Rethinking the Woman 
Question for Liberal Democracy, 
edited by Pamela Grande Jensen. 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefi eld.
———. 1997a. Th e Discourses, and Other 
Political Writings. Edited and 
translated by Victor Gourevitch. 
New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
———. 1997b. Julie; or, Th e New Heloise: 
Letters of Two Lovers Who Live in 
a Small Town at the Foot of the 
Alps. Translated by Phillip 
Stewart and Jean Vaché, edited 
by Roger D. Masters and 
Christopher Kelly. Hanover, 
N.H.: University Press of New 
England.
———. 1997c. Th e Social Contract, and 
Other Later Political Writings. 
Edited and translated by Victor 
Gourevitch. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
———. 2000. Th e Reveries of the Solitary 
Walker, Botanical Writings, and 
Letter to Franquières. Edited by 
Christopher Kelly, translated and 
annotated by Charles 
Butterworth, Alexandra Clark, 
and Terence E. Marshall. 
Hanover, N.H.: University Press 
of New England.
———. 2007. On Philosophy, Morality, and 
Religion. Edited and translated 
by Christopher Kelly. Hanover, 
N.H.: University Press of New 
England.
Schaeff er, Denise. 1998. “Reconsidering 
the Role of Sophie in Rousseau’s 
‘Emile.’ ” Polity 30 (4): 607–26.
Schiller, Friedrich. 1979. Naive and 
Sentimental Poetry. New York: 
Frederick Unger.
Schwartz, Joel. 1984. Th e Sexual Politics of 
Jean- Jacques Rousseau. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Scott, John T. 2002. “Re- presenting 
Achilles in Rousseau’s Emile.” 
Presented at UCLA Clark 
Memorial Library, Los Angeles.
———. 2012. “Do You See What I See? 
Th e Education of the Reader in 
Rousseau’s Emile.” Review of 
Politics 74 (3): 443–64.
———. 2014. “Th e Illustrative Education 
of Rousseau’s Emile.” American 
Political Science Review 108 
(August): 533–46.
Shklar, Judith N. 1969. Men and Citizens: A 
Study of Rousseau’s Social Th eory. 
London: Cambridge University 
Press.
Simpson, Matthew. 2006. Rousseau’s Th eory 
of Freedom. New York: 
Continuum.
Sorenson, Leonard. 1990. “Natural 
Inequality and Rousseau’s 
Political Philosophy in His 
Discourse on Inequality.” Western 
Political Quarterly 43 (4): 763–88.
Starobinski, Jean. 1988. Jean- Jacques 
Rousseau, Transparency, and 
Obstruction. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   236 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Bibliography 237
Strauss, Leo. 1953. Natural Right and 
History. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Strong, Tracy B. 1994. Jean- Jacques 
Rousseau: Th e Politics of the 
Ordinary. Th ousand Oaks, 
Calif.: Sage.
Talmon, J. L. 1952. Th e Origins of 
Totalitarian Democracy. New 
York: Norton.
Tanner, Tony. 1982. “Julie and ‘La Maison 
Paternelle’: Another Look at 
Rousseau’s La Nouvelle Héloïse.” 
In Th e Family in Political 
Th ought, edited by Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, 96–124. Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts 
Press.
Todorov, Tzvetan. 2001. Frail Happiness: An 
Essay on Rousseau. University 
Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press.
Trachtenberg, Zev. 2009. “Civic Fanaticism 
and the Dynamics of Pity.” In 
Rousseau and l’Infâme: Religion, 
Toleration, and Fanaticism in the 
Age of Enlightenment, edited by 
Ourida Mostefai and John T. 
Scott, 203–26. Leiden: Rodopi 
Press.
Velkley, Richard L. 2002. Being after 
Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture 
in Question. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Voltaire, François. 1972. Philosophical 
Dictionary. Edited and translated 
by Th eodore Besterman. New 
York: Penguin.
Williams, David. 2007. Rousseau’s Platonic 
Enlightenment. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University 
Press.
Wingrove, Elizabeth Rose. 2000. 
Rousseau’s Republican Romance. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. Philosophical 
Investigations: Th e English Text of 
the Th ird Edition. Translated by 
G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: 
Prentice Hall.
Wood, Neal. 1988. Cicero’s Social and 
Political Th ought. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Yenor, Scott. 2011. Family Politics: Th e Idea 
of Marriage in Modern Political 
Th ought. Waco, Tex.: Baylor 
University Press.
Zaretsky, Robert, and John Scott. 2009. 
Th e Philosophers’ Quarrel: 
Rousseau, Hume, and the Limit 
of Human Understanding. New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press.
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   237 1/25/16   11:01 AM
adolescents. See also children
awakening of sexuality in, 52–55
compassion in, 141
desires of (Emile), 42–43
in Emile, 53
friendship versus sexual desire in, 
56–57
processing willfulness of others by, 
48
aesthetics
criteria for moral love, 24, 51, 136
in friendship context, 144
infl uence of, 43, 53
aff ection, 6, 12
alienation. See also dividedness
of bourgeois, 207




between husband and wife, 25
in Julie, 114
of politicized man, 183
of rights of humanity, 182–83
Rousseau’s, 6
self-centered, 28, 178
in the social compact, 182
in Social Contract, 28
total, 183
allegiances, divided, 178, 205, 207–8
ambition, 43–52, 63, 192
amour-propre
confusion caused by, 35
corrupt, 76–77
destructiveness of, 44, 47
development of, 85
in Emile, 20, 91
expressions of, 58–59
healthy forms of, 161
interaction between sexual desire and, 
24
longings of, 53
love versus friendship, 55–59
malignant form of, 21, 31, 46–47, 
72–73, 144, 192
materialization of anger with, 46–47
moral ambition and, 43–52, 63
moralized, 78–79
pity and ordered development of, 
72–76
politicized, 138–39
problems of malignant, 47–48
reciprocity principle and, 230 n. 6 
(ch. 3)
in romantic situations, 95–96
Rousseau’s theory of, 19–23, 58
self-assessment and, 72
and sexuality in Emile, 96–97
sexual passion as expression of, 
24–26
I n d e x
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   238 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 239
stimulation of, by social compact, 193
understanding, 22




pity as counteraction to, 3–4
Seneca on, 45–46
solving danger of, 49
animal desires and instincts, 22–23
antisocial tendencies, 47–48, 72
anxiety, 38, 59
approval, desire for, 48–49
argument, structure and character of, 2–4
Aristotle
on complete friendship, 143–44
mentioned, 14, 137, 182, 231 n. 6 
(ch. 7)
on natural sociability, 60
Nichomachean Ethics, 139–40
on relation between friends, 141
assemblies, public, 190–92, 201–2
associational life/associations. See also soci-
etal good
capture of unity through, 13
dependence and, 181
embeddedness in, 22, 32–34, 58, 162
Hobbes on, 15, 35
in Julie, 148–49
Locke on, 15, 38
partial societies, 193–94
political (See political association[s])
possibilities and limitations of, 221
private associations, 31, 188, 199–200, 
210
purpose and functions of, 9–10
role of pity and sexual passion in, 
63–64
Rousseau’s forms of, 4
Rousseau’s theory of, 217
sub-political, 199
sympathetic associations, 26, 71, 
148–49
understanding of, 37







sexual/erotic, 51, 95–96, 119, 128
subjective, 14
authoritarianism, 164–65, 169, 194, 209, 
214
authority, 178, 189, 205–8
autonomy, 166–67, 169–70
behavior(s)
ambiguity of impulses, 42–43
habits of thought and action, 50
Hobbes on sources of, 34
moral, 36–37
moral and social, 36–37
motivations for, 47
unsociable, 76
beliefs, 78, 209, 227–28
benevolence, 26, 47–48, 60–61
Berlin, Isaiah, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 
165
betrayal, 106–7, 150–51
Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche), 75
biological equipment, operation of our, 
23
body politic metaphor, 180
boundaries, 12–13, 82
bourgeois
dividedness of, 14–19, 173–74
domestic community of emerging, 
130
in Emile, 41, 173
sociability of, 95
social recognition, 36–39
state of being of, 18
Brutus, Junius, 175–76
C. See Confessions, Th e (Rousseau)
cercles (social groups), 199–201
CGP. See Considerations on the Government 
of Poland (Rousseau)
character defi ciencies, 158–59
children, 45–47. See also adolescents
Christianity. See also religion
Christian allusions in Julie, 114
citizenship and, 108
as civil religion, 208–9
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   239 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index240
Christianity (continued)
eff ect on civic engagement of, 206–7
martyrdom in, 229 n. 3
political infl uence of the Church, 178
priests as distinct from, 205–6
requirements of political freedom and, 
187
scrutiny of Christian sect in Emile, 78
in Th e Social Contract, 205
transcendental individuals of, 207
vulnerability of Christian societies, 
207
church and state, 178, 181, 206
Church authority and infl uence, 178, 
205–6. See also religion
Cicero, De Amicitia, 137, 139, 230 n. 1 (ch. 6)
Citizen, Th e (Hobbes), 37
citizens
of Clarens (in Julie), 129–34
conception of, in Emile, 134





Emile in contrast to, 93
ennoblement of, 192–93
fallen, 102–3
freedoms of, 167, 170
harmonious existence for, 181
individual identifi cation as, 191
individuality of, 165
men versus, 88–89, 174
private business, 194–95
relationship between State and, 
168–69
roles of, 190, 200
young, 202–3
citizenship
in Emile, 30–31, 90–94, 107
in Geneva Manuscript and Political 
Economy, 30–31
ideal of classical, 175–76
patriotism and, 92, 106–7, 135, 193
requirements of, 94
Rousseau’s defi nition of, 29–30, 92–93
Rousseau’s model of domestic society 
and, 187–88
sexual union as preparation for, 89
Spartan woman story on, 176–77
universalism in, 108
citoyen, 229 n. 8




civil freedom, 166–67, 183
civil man, 65, 73
civil society, 180–81
confl icts of interest in, 16–17
embeddedness in, 22, 32–34, 58, 162
motivations for formation of, 15–16
requirements for, 37
Clarens community (in Julie), 129–34
class prejudice, in Julie (Rousseau), 117
commiseration, 63, 74–75
common good. See societal good




Condorcet jury theorem, 194–95, 231 n. 2 
(ch. 8)
Confessions, Th e (Rousseau), 12–13, 15, 145
confl ict. See also tension
between discreteness of self and 
embeddedness, 213
between duty and love, 116





between private passion and public 
good, 172–73, 198




confl ict between public good and 
 private passions, 172–73
political confl ict, 14
religious confl ict, 14
conjugal society, 15–16
connectedness, 6. See also associational 
life/associations
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   240 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 241
as consolation for disappointment, 
221
forms of, 91–92
in human relations theory, 11–13
of love, 98
Rousseau’s teachings on, 10
to the state, 167
through political associations, 9
conscience, 116, 123, 209
Considerations on the Government of 
Poland (Rousseau), 168–69, 
211–12, 228
consolations, 10, 151–52
Constitution Project for Corsica (Rousseau), 
228
contexts, for self-understanding, 8
corrupting forces, 162–63
DA. See De Amicitia (Cicero)
D’Alembert, Jean Le Rond, 199–200. See 
also Letter to D’Alembert on the 
Th eater (Rousseau)
L’Encyclopédie, 76
De Amicitia (Cicero), 139–40
death, 114, 122–23, 144, 176–77, 201, 218, 234
Deleyre, Alexandre, 77–78
dependence
of civil association, 181
dangers of personal, 91
forms of, 170
freedom from, 169
on moral environment, 182
transformative consequences of, 
170–71
desire(s). See also longing(s); love (eros); 
sexual passion/desire
ambiguity in, 38
to be lovable, 49
to be loved, 47
causes versus consequences of, 8
companionship, 57
dependence on things and, 41–42
extended being, 36
fanatical, 81
Hobbes’s phenomenology of, 38
intimate society, 97
Locke on, 38–39
love and esteem, 35
possession of goods, 47







DI. See Discourse on Inequality (Second 
Discourse) (Rousseau)
disappointments, 221–23




animal desires and instincts in, 22–23
applied science on disease/health in, 
67–68
changes in environment and man, 182
connection to others through pity, 
25–26
dangers of moral love in, 96
desire for social approval in, 21
dividedness in, 172
ecosystem metaphor in, 179–82
emergence of friendship in, 144
friendship as product of pity in, 84, 
140, 149
grounding of friendship in pity in, 
143
identity creation in, 23
individualism in, 105
interdependence in, 170
merit and beauty in, 51
model of human community in, 16
moral and social possibility in, 62
natural man in, 180–81
natural versus civil man in, 65, 73





sexual desire and love in, 24, 50
social motivations in, 34–35
state of nature and account of pity in, 
65–66
Voltaire on, 44
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   241 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index242
Discourse on Political Economy 
(Rousseau), 108, 168–69
Discourse on the Origin and Basis of 
Inequality Among Men. See 
Discourse on Inequality (Second 
Discourse) (Rousseau)




hopes for associations in, 220
Junius Brutus example in, 175–76
model of human community in, 16





distrust/trust, 16, 83, 111, 129, 151, 158, 163, 
189–90
divided allegiance(s), 178, 205, 207–8
dividedness, 2






domestic solution to, 135
healing of, 7
Hobbes on, 178
language of, 17, 172
in Th e Letter to D’Alembert on the 
Th eater, 204–5
of personality, 6–7
Rousseau’s account of, 178
of social life, 28
solutions to problem of, 219–20
domestic healing strategy, in Emile and 
Julie, 163
domestic relations. See family; 
household(s); marriage
domestic theory, 188–89
double object, 90–94, 135
DPE. See Discourse on the Sciences and 
Arts (First Discourse) 
(Rousseau)
duck-rabbit image, 82–83
E. See Emile (Rousseau)
ECHU. See Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, An (Locke)




creating a man through, 88–89
debates over civic, 28–29
in Emile (See Emile (Rousseau))
within friendship, 140–41
in Julie, 156
moral learning, 137–38, 151–54, 
184–85
moral learning and friendship, 
151–54
political, 28–29
public, 28–31, 135, 204–5
Rousseau’s theory of, 224
through friendship, 137–38
embeddedness, 179
in associational contexts, 22, 32–34, 
58, 162
in environment, 28, 61, 163, 177, 
179–82
tension between discreteness of self 
and, 213
of the true citizen, 108, 190
embodied love, 119–27
Emile (Rousseau), 4, 20, 22, 76–77
adolescence in, 42–43
amour-propre in, 73–74, 78–79
analysis of pity in, 84–85
bourgeois in, 173
characterizing human nature in, 70
citizenship in, 30–31, 94, 191
comparing self to others, 49–50
compassion in, 143
creation of passion in, 45
dependence on things in, 41–42
depiction of household in, 188
dividedness in, 171–72
education issues in, 28–30, 74, 88–89, 
92, 108, 135, 168, 204–5
emergence of friendship in, 144
Emile’s psychology, 41
eros in, 135
exclusive romantic attachment in, 24
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   242 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 243
the fallen man in, 102–3
family structure in, 129–30, 201
fatherland in, 29–30, 93, 106–8, 131, 
168–69, 197, 203–5
friendship versus sex in, 55
harmony and dissatisfaction in, 13
household concept in, 197
human struggle in, 69–70
idea of love dying in, 118
importance of friendship in, 137
on Julie in, 80
just regime in, 191
lives of citizens in, 197
loss of love in, 219
man’s estate in, 21
marriage in, 87–88, 223
meaning of friendship in, 156–57
pity in, 72
political instability and friendship in, 
140
political interpretations of, 92–93
politics in, 134–35
protection of children in, 46
psychic forces in, 36
psychological mechanics of liberality 
in, 40–41
psycho-sexual character of education 
of, 89
puberty and amour-propre in, 73
reason for tragic veil in, 104–5
retreat from social possibility in, 
220–21
role of nascent sexuality in, 52–55
romantic love in, 25, 97–102
Rousseau on usefulness of, 96
Rousseau’s domestic and political 
visions in, 27
Rousseau’s psychological theory in, 
110–11
scholarly interpretations of man and 
citizen in, 90–91
scrutiny of Christian sect in, 78
second birth metaphor in, 21
seeing our own errors in, 80
self-understanding in, 41
sex education in, 95–97
sexual desire and love in, 99–100
sexual maturity in, 56–57
sociability in, 105
social approval in, 49
Spartan woman story in, 176–77
study of politics by, 93–94
teacher/pupil relationship in, 157–58
theory of love in, 123
true love in, 51–52
understanding of love in, 89–90
unity in, 172–73
values confl icts in, 175
worthiness of life in, 222
Emile and Sophie (Rousseau), 102–3, 107–8, 
110–11, 140, 220
L’Encyclopédie, D’Alembert, Jean Le Rond, 
77
entertainment, 160–61, 197–98, 210–12
environment
citizen’s ability to create, 167
eff ects on passion with change in, 
180
embeddedness in, 28, 61, 163, 177, 
179–82




equality. See Discourse on Inequality 
(Second Discourse) (Rousseau)
equilibrium, 210–11, 214
eros. See love (eros)
ES. See Emile and Sophie (Rousseau)
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
An (Locke), 16, 38–39
esteem, self-. See amour-propre
ethical disgust, 80
ethical impulses, 63, 79
ethical learning, 154–59
ethics, 51, 139
evil, sources of, 47–48
false pride, 64, 72, 74, 76
family. See also household(s); marriage
development of modern, 7
in Emile, 129–30, 201
in Julie, 129–30, 134–35, 201
in Letter to D’Alembert on the Th eater, 
201–2
nuclear, 201





Socratic view of, 130, 201
fanaticism, 15, 64, 76–82, 208, 224
fatherland
in Emile, 29–30, 93, 107–8, 131, 197, 
203–4
love of, 168
relationship between citizens and, 
168–69
felicity, 37–38
Final Reply to critics of First Discourse 
(Rousseau), 175–76
Finis Ultimus, 15
First Discourse. See Discourse on the 
Sciences and Arts (First Discourse) 
(Rousseau)
fragility, 184–85
frail happiness, 63, 71, 184
freedom (liberty)
Burke’s denunciation of radical, 165
claims of individual, 211
dividedness and unity in, 171–77
exchange of natural for moral, 
165–66





Rousseau’s conception of, 165, 169
as self-mastery, 165
in Social Contract, 164–71
unity in, 170–77
friendship, 3
activity characteristic of, 83
of adolescents, 56
character of, 141
classical tradition of, 139–47
connection between moral learning 
and, 137–38
connection between suff ering and, 
145
as consolation for disappointment, 
221
defenders of Rousseauan, 140–41
defi nition/description of, 156–57
distancing of pity from, 143–44
enmity and hate and, 48
forms of, 7, 9
Hobbes’s interpretation of, 15
ideal of, 140
initial conditions for, 144
instability of, 188–89
language of silence in, 8, 145, 147, 
149–51
limitations and dangers of, 161
loss of, 16
love versus, 42, 55–59, 230 n. 7 (ch. 3)
moralizing functions of, 138
moral learning and, 151–54
pity as basis for, 60–61
political eff ectiveness of, 160
in political thought, 137
as private phenomenon, 15, 26
as product of pity, 26
recognition attached to, 49
role of, 4
Rousseau’s portraits of, 10, 26
Rousseau’s theory of, 86, 138, 141–42, 
145–49, 159–61





citizens/society of, 131, 160, 189, 
197–99, 203
daily life of citizens in, 210
family structure in, 202
in Th e Letter to D’Alembert on the 
Th eater, 203–4
republican, 160, 199
social order in, 211–12
Socinianism in, 203–4
Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy 
(Rousseau), 30–31, 193–203
GM. See Geneva Manuscript and Political 
Economy (Rousseau)
Golden Age, 7
good, societal. See societal good
happiness, 7
common, 191
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   244 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 245
controversy over Rousseau’s questions 
of, 216
frail, 63, 71, 184





obstacles to, in Julie, 114–16
prospects for, 220–21
restructuring of social forces for, 
26–27
security of, 104
and suff ering of others, 76
unhappiness, 72, 83
harmony
among humans, 163, 189
between church and state, 181
between desire and power, 7
in dynamic unity, 180
lack of, 18
between man and environment, 4, 
163–64
of natural man, 65
psychological and social, 28
resolution of tensions for, 189
for Rousseau, 224
within the self, 13, 179–82, 188, 214
social, 13, 28, 211
of social institutions, 185–86
of the soul and environment, 171
of state of nature, 185
hate, 16, 45, 48–49, 80
health/illness, 66–68
healthy form of amour-propre, 31–32, 35, 
48, 161
Hobbes, Th omas
on ambiguity in human desire, 38
Th e Citizen, 37
defi nition of felicity, 37–38
on disputes about science, 14
empiricism of, 23
establishment of sovereignty, 182–83
on human behavior and self-interest, 
60–61
on human desire, 37–38
Leviathan, 15, 34, 38, 183
mentioned, 95
philosophy of dividedness of, 178
on political life and human associa-
tion, 15
on rational self-interest, 14–15
Rousseau’s radicalization of, 20
on selfi shness and private interest, 
188
self versus other, 20
serving of interests, 17
on social and political order, 19
theories of, 36, 39
view of relations with Locke of, 8
household(s)
creation of, 203
domestic and political, 196–97
in Emile, 89, 108–9
function in just regime of, 188–89
idea of happy, 129–30
institution of the, 26–27
as metaphor for political life, 109
private, 108
relation of state and, 129–30
romantic rituals of, 129
Howard’s End (Forster), 5–6
human community model, 15–16, 41, 64, 
105
human condition. See also man
fragility of, 184–85
freedom as trait of, 171
friendship and social identifi cation, 
144
pity’s place within the, 62–63
as prey species, 66–67
Rousseau’s characterization of, 61–63
sociability of, 139
sympathy, society and the, 69–72
human development, 7, 56
humanity, 44, 62. See also rights of 
humanity
human nature, 14–15, 34
human relations theory. See also See also 
associational life/associations; 
relationships
analysis of Rousseau’s, 2
integrative impulse in, 11–13
judgment of, 228
the just regime in, 26–28
nature of Rousseau’s, 8
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   245 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index246
human relations theory (continued)
overview, 5–10
political aspects of, 28–31
questions of, 220
rational performances, 14–19
reimagining self-love and human 
 relations in, 19–23
understanding of, 225




friendship and social, 144
of individuals as citizens, 191
with others, 71–72, 142











in a unity, 172
illness/disease, 66–68
imperfections, 63, 79–80
inaction as virtue, 218
indecisiveness, 17–18
indeterminacy, social feeling and, 40–43
inequality. See Discourse on Inequality 
(Second Discourse) (Rousseau)
institutions. See social institutions
intentionality, 21, 45–47, 60
interdependence, 3, 13, 29, 91, 170, 179–80, 
182
interdependent impulses, 63–64
interpretations of Rousseau, 213–14
intimacy, avoidance of, 6
invulnerability, 46
isolation, 6, 106–7, 220
J. See Julie (Rousseau)
Julie (Rousseau), 110–11
bonds of pity in friendship in, 147
as bridge between domestic and 
 political spheres, 27
Christian allusions/metaphors in, 114
class prejudice in, 117
compared to Emile on romantic love, 
110–13
connection between friendship and 
suff ering in, 145
consequences of mistakes in, 184
context of letters in, 230 n. 3 (ch. 5)
decision making by, 174–75
depiction of household in, 188
dialectical interpretations of, 114
divided loyalties in, 113–18
domestic community of Clarens in, 
129–34
eros in, 135
family structure in, 129–30, 201
fragility of humans in, 185
friendship as product of pity in, 149
household concept in, 197
importance of friendship in, 137
limits of embodied love in, 119–27
lives of citizens in, 197
love and friendship in, 82–83
meaning of friendship in, 156–57
memory of events in, 149–50
moral development in, 152, 154
nature of love in, 125–27
need for romantic love in, 117–18
parents in, 114, 116–17
politics in, 134
portraits of friendship in, 145–46
relationships after sexual consumma-
tion in, 122–23
resolution of problems in, 114–15
sympathetic associations in, 148–49
transition from love to friendship in, 
127–29
virtue in, 80–82
wish for death in, 122–23
jury theorem, 194–95
just regime, 191
demands of the, 131
dependence required by the, 181
in Emile, 191
function of household in, 188–89
in human relations theory, 26–28
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   246 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 247
in Letter to D’Alembert, 210
moral environment of, 182
particularized self in, 213
protection for freedom from the, 164
public versus private life in the, 215
Kantian autonomy, 166




LD. See Letter to D’Alembert on the Th eater 
(Rousseau)
learning, moral, 137–38, 151–54, 184–85
legislation, self-, 166–67
Letter to D’Alembert on the Th eater 
(Rousseau), 76, 160–61, 210, 228
associational life in, 199–200
concept of family in, 201
emotional responses of theater-goers, 
197–98
gatherings of families in, 212–13
on Geneva, 131, 173
image of dance in, 212
law and morals in, 202
lives of citizens in, 197
martial discipline in Geneva in, 211
unity in, 173
Leviathan (Hobbes), 15, 34, 38, 183
liberality, 40–41, 140
liberty. See freedom (liberty)
life
balance in, 210, 214
enrichment of, 23
perfect existence, 218–19
sentiment of existence, 222





on disputes about science, 14
An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, 16, 38
on human association, 38
mentioned, 76, 95, 183
model of human community of, 16
on political life and human associa-
tion, 15
on psychological mechanics of liberal-
ity, 40–41
on rational self-interest, 14–15
Rousseau’s radicalization of, 20
Second Treatise of Civil Government, 
15–16
on selfi shness and private interest, 188
serving of interests, 17
on social and political order, 19
on social life and development, 35
Some Th oughts concerning Education, 
40
theories of, 36, 39
understanding of human community, 
15–16
view of relations with Hobbes of, 8




confusion caused by, 43
dangerous and illusory, 15, 38
depth of, 8
erotic, 8 (See also sexual passion/
desire)
experience of social, 53
moral, 3–4
for perfection, 44, 52
for self-protection, 42
social, 4, 57 (See also friendship)
for unity, 6
love (eros), 7, 36, 95, 135, 222
as abstract phenomenon, 100
demise of, 99, 120
embodied, 119–27
enmity and hate and, 48
failure of, 136–37
friendship versus, 42, 55–59, 230 n. 7 
(ch. 3)
Hobbes’s interpretation of, 15
imaginary/real, 97–98
instability of, 188–89
moral, 24, 51–52, 88, 96
physical dimensions of, 119
private and public acts of, 25
recognition attached to, 49
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   247 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index248
love (eros) (continued)
romantic (See romantic love)
Rousseau’s views of, 18, 26, 97, 129
self- (See amour-propre; self-love)
sexual (See sexual passion/desire)
tension between duty and, 116
theory of, 123
through marriage, in Emile, 89–90




M. See Moral Letters (Rousseau)
malignant form of amour-propre, 21, 31, 47, 
72–73, 144, 192
man. See also human condition
alienation of politicized, 183
changes in environment and, 182




harmony between environment and, 
4, 163–64, 171
moral experience of modern, 18
natural, 180–81
natural versus civil, 65, 73
political association of, 20
savage, 68–70
scholarly interpretations of man and 
citizen in, 90–91
value/worth of, 229 n. 1 (ch. 2)
visage of, 229 n. 2 (ch. 2)
man’s estate, 21
marriage. See also family
duties of men in, 199–200
eff ects of social forces on, 26–27
in Emile, 87–90, 110–11
in Julie, 110–11, 128–29
Locke on, 15–16
mate selection for, 24–25
romantic-marital relation, 105–6
wholeness in, 221





meaning, crisis of, 14–19
memory(ies), 112–13, 126–27, 129, 149–50, 
212
Men and Citizens (Shklar), 10
men versus citizens, 88–89, 174
mistakes, consequences of, 184
Molière, 76
Montaigne, Michel de, 137, 230 n. 1 
(ch. 6)
“Of Friendship,” 139–40
moral ambition, amour-propre and, 43–52, 
63










moral identity, 23, 172, 183–84
morality, universal, 106, 108
moral learning, 137–38, 151–54, 184–85
Moral Letters (Rousseau), 44
moral longings, 3
moral love, 24, 51–52, 88, 96
moral perfection, desire for, 52
moral personality, 6–7, 74
moral personhood, 23, 43–44
moral persons, 213
moral-psychological theory, 85–86
moral psychology, 36, 52, 101, 136
moral universe, Rousseau’s, 2–3
mortality, 66–67, 78, 82
motivation(s)
explanations of social, 8
for harming others, 47
human desire (See desire[s])
for lawfulness, 166–67
love, 37
moral and social, 63
passions as, 45
pity as supplemental, 139
social, 33–35
utility-based, 35
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   248 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 249
mutually benefi cial exchange system, 15, 
158–59
narcissism, 142
natural freedom, 166–67, 171, 183
natural man, 65, 73, 180–81
nature. See also human nature
laws of, 181
right of, 183
state of, 65, 166
NE. See Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle)





psychological and social, 63
recognition, 55, 63




Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 139–40
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 75–76
Nouvelle Heloise; or, Julie (Rousseau). See 
Julie (Rousseau)
obedience, 79, 166–67, 175, 177, 206
“Of Anger” (Seneca), 45–46
“Of Friendship” (Montaigne), 139–40
others
aff ection for, 84–85
awareness of, 58
boundaries between self and, 12–13
comparing self to, 49–50, 72–73





happiness and suff ering of, 76
hurting, 114–15
identifi cation with less fortunate, 
71–72
intentionality of, 46–47
loving others as, 105
motivations for harming, 47
pity for unfortunate, 72
recognizing otherness of, 63
self versus, 20
sense of superiority over, 75
sensitivity to distress of, 60–61
sympathetic/benefi cent actions 
toward, 106
value of company of, 42–43






confl ict between public good and pri-
vate, 172–73





sexual (See sexual passion/desire)




in Emile, 104, 221
moral, 52
in Moral Letters (Rousseau), 44
mutual perfection, 15
pity and, 76–82, 85
in romantic love, 99–100
Rousseau’s commitment to mutual, 12
performances, 14–19, 160, 197–98, 202, 
227. See also entertainment
persecution, religious, 14
person, conceptions of, 14
personality
eff ects of amour-propre on, 21
forces aff ecting, 185
infl uences on, 50, 1170
moral, 6–7, 74, 80, 167
unity of parts of, 6
personhood, 43–44
philosophist party, 78
philosophy, point of, 97
physical sexuality. See sexual passion/
desire






as catalyst for togetherness, 63
character of, 63
communication of, 147
conceptual opposites in, 148
connection to others through, 24–26, 
138
contempt and, 230 n. 4 (ch. 2)
development of, 85
distancing of friendship from, 
143–44
eff ects of, 62
ethos of, 138–39
friendship as modifi ed expression of, 
140
in human condition, 69–72
lack of, 71
mediation of diff erence and, 82–85
moral force of, 63–64
naturalness of, 68
negative character of, 63
for others’ ills, 74
perversity in, 75
perversity in experience of, 75
role of, 144
in romantic love, 101
Rousseau’s view of, 65
for semblables, 142
sexual passion and, 86
tension between love and, 116–17
through sympathetic identifi cation, 
79–80





Poland. See Considerations on the 
Government of Poland 
(Rousseau)





family relation to, 129–30
as natural to man, 20
privileging of, 9–10
political confl ict, 14
political freedom, 202
political identifi cation theory, 114, 160
political life
character of, 28
Hobbes on, 15, 34
hybrid character of, 28
Rousseau’s portrayals of, 210–12
unity in, 210
political order, 19





obstacles to stability of, 190
problems of, 103
psychic forces of individuals in, 213–14
political theory, 2, 114
concern for freedom in, 165
dynamics of Rousseau’s, 213–15
identity-constitutive element in, 
169–70
Rousseau on, 14, 28–31
political unity, 178–85, 188–90
political visions, 27, 108
politicizing functions of Rousseau’s 
works, Emile and Social 
Contract, 27
positive freedom, 170–71
Preface to Narcisse (Rousseau), 62, 160
prey/predator condition, 66–67
pride, false, 64, 72, 74, 76
private aff airs, 193, 195, 202, 212, 214
private associations, 31, 188, 199–200, 210
private beliefs, 78
private conscience, 209
private desires, 8, 13, 24, 183
private life, 130–33, 197
private purposes, 40–41
private self, 4, 28, 37, 174–76
private spaces, 129–30
privilege, 9–10, 167
problem resolution, in Julie (Rousseau), 
114–15
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   250 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 251
psychic economies, 3
psychic forces, 36, 44
psychological control, 214
psychological unity, 13, 20–21
puberty, 43, 45, 73
public assemblies, 190–92
public good, 172–73



















Socrates’ error of, 108
understanding of, 40–41
recognition
dangers of seeking, 49
denial of, 47
desire for, 9, 47
erotic, 95
indiscriminate seeking for, 48
kinds of, 22
and need for unity, 63
sexual form of seeking, 51–52
refl ection, self-, 182
Refl ections on the Revolution in France 
(Burke), 165
relationships
associational contexts of, 32
boundaries in, 82
changing the nature of, 127–29
decay of romantic, 100
in Emile, 230–31 n. 3 (ch. 6)
expectations for, 33–34
infl uence of, 43
intrinsic value of, 35
modern view of, 8
natural bases for, 24–26
purposes of kinds of, 58
reimagining, 19–23
in Rousseau’s oeuvre, 9
religion. See also Christianity; church and 
state; Church authority and 
infl uence
civil, 208–9
political control over beliefs in, 209
in Th e Social Contract, 78, 189
social unity and, 203–9





moral tastes and values in, 202
politics of, 30–31, 165–66, 200
religion in, 207
republics, character of, 198–99
respect, 49, 79, 158, 165
Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Th e 
(Rousseau), 11, 13, 217–19
rights of humanity, 94
freedom and, 165
public/private, 182
of social compact, 166
social compact and alienation of, 
182–83
romantic love, 2–3, 9, 88. See also love 
(eros)
character of, 121
corporeal character of, 121
dissatisfaction with, 123–24
dynamics of, 97–102
in Emile (See Emile [Rousseau])
exclusive attachment in, 24
individuation in, 101
insuffi  ciencies of, 125
in Julie (See Julie [Rousseau])
marital relation aspect of, 105–6
nature of, 125–27
psychology of, 25, 97, 117, 126–27
sexuality and, 92
tragic aspects of, 105
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   251 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index252
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. See also specifi c 
works by name
alienation of, 6
amour-propre theory of, 19–23, 58
beliefs of, about his readers, 
227–28
conception of unity, 19
critics of, 18, 175, 223
desires of, 13
interpretations of, 217




philosophic life and exile of, 11–12
private meditations of, 61
quest for unity by, 209–10
radicalization of Hobbes and Locke 
by, 20
on self-love, 19–26, 214
signifi cance of, as an author, 228
social vision of, 10
as thinker, 1
understanding of psyche by, 35–36
views of love, 18, 26, 97, 129
worldview of, 230 n. 2 (ch. 6)








SC. See Social Contract, Th e (Rousseau)
“Schlegel, Margaret,” 5–6
Second Discourse. See Discourse on 
Inequality (Second Discourse) 
(Rousseau)
Second Treatise of Civil Government (Locke), 
15–16
self
comparing others to, 49–50, 72–73




self-interest, 8, 14–15, 19–20




self-love, 192–93. See also amour-propre
centrality of, 40, 210
development of, by Hobbes and 
Locke, 78
extending our, 73
fostering of, in children, 45
healthy, 31–32, 35, 48, 161
importance of, 44–45
malignant, 31–32
pity’s function in, 63, 198
Rousseau’s reimagining of, 19–26, 
214
self-mastery, 165







Seneca, “Of Anger,” 45–46
sensory experience, 23
sentiment of existence, 222
sexual identity, 55
sexual passion/desire, 3–4. See also love 
(eros)
abstinence and, 119–21
as connection to others, 24
development of, 85
discriminatory factors in, 51
in Emile (See Emile [Rousseau])
infl uence on personality of, 50
male versus female, 118–19, 123–24
moralized, 52
moral love and amour-propre related 
to, 51
as motivation in human connections, 
35
natural structure of, 56
onset of, 96
pity as coequal role with, 63–64, 86
role of nascent, 52–55
Rousseau’s views of, 202
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   252 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index 253
sexual/erotic attraction, 51, 95–96, 119, 
128
waning of, 102–3
sharing, 51, 105, 197
shelter, 93
silence, 8, 145, 147, 149–51
similarity of character, 139, 147–48





desire for meaningful, 6
development of, 217
eff ect on human ends of, 8
halfway, 14
as natural to man, 20
reasons for needs for, 35
Rousseau’s understanding of, 37
sexuality and, 52–55
value of company of others, 42–43
social change, 226
social compact, 166, 169–70, 182–83, 185, 
192–93
Social Contract, Th e (Rousseau), 29, 89, 
108, 210
alienated self-centeredness in, 28, 178
analysis of civil religion in, 189
Christianity in, 205, 207–9
citizenship in, 177
civil religion in, 78
dividedness in, 171–72
equal distribution of rights and obli-
gations in, 192
freedom in, 166, 169
interpretations of, 194–95
limits of sovereign power in, 182–83
marriage and friendship models in, 
197
moral teachers in, 184–85
political life in, 170
political program of, 92, 134
principles of political right in, 164–65
private desire/common good in, 
193–94
public assemblies in, 190–91
Rousseau’s domestic and political 
visions in, 27
social and moral conditions for 
humans in, 182–84




connection between good citizens and 
good, 191
harmony of, 185–86




development of social passions, 36
harmony, 13, 28
indeterminacy and feeling, 40–43
interdependence, 13
motivation, 24, 64
need for recognition, 36–39, 55
perils of social incorporation, 30, 
102–3
protection from destructive forces, 
170
restructuring of social forces, 26–27
Rousseau on social organization, 6–7
social anxiety, 59
social consciousness in Emile, 29–30
social phenomena, 1
social sentiment, 35, 53
solution to problems of, 8
stability, 190–91
socialization, eff ects of, 7
social life, 2–3, 9, 20, 76–77




aims and motivations of, 19
character of, 10
concern for freedom in, 165
pessimistic character of, 10
social unity, 203–9, 211
societal good, 14, 136, 198




in Julie and Emile, 162
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   253 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Index254
societies, partial, 193–95
society, 14–16, 69–72, 217–18
Socinianism, 203–4
Socrates, 108, 188, 210
solitude/solitary life, 37, 217–19
Some Th oughts concerning Education 
(Locke), 40
soul, development of, 72–73
sovereignty
allegiance to/authority of, 178, 206
citizens’ autonomous self and, 165, 
195
citizen’s role in, 181
control over religion by, 206–7
description of, 169
imposition on subjects by, 177
limits of, 181–83, 213–14
purpose and capacity of, 188
religious forms of social control 
under, 208–9
role in society of, 189–90
Rousseau’s theory of, 213
Sparta, as model for assembly, 199
spiritual authority/power, 186, 206
state of nature, 65–69, 166, 180–81
state of weakness, 65–69
submission to the state, 165–66
suff ering
commiseration for, 74
connection between friendship and, 
145
from frustration of desires, 63
identifi cation with others’, 142
of parents, in Julie, 116–17
Rousseauan pity for, 76
Summun Bonum, 15–16
sympathetic associations, 26, 71, 148–49









tension. See also confl ict
between duty and love, 116
between love and pity, 116–17
between private passion and public 
good, 172–73, 198
sexual, 118
between social and political worlds, 
214–15
between social passions, 4





ecological systems theory, 163–64
education, 224
friendship theory, 86, 138, 141–42, 
145–49, 159–61
Hobbes’s, 34, 36, 39




political identifi cation theory, 114, 
160
psychological, 110–11
Rousseau’s theory of amour-propre, 
21–22, 58
social (See social theory)
of sovereignty, 213
tragedy, 102–3, 217–23
tragic (skeptical) characterization of 
 argument, 2–3
tragic interpretations of Rousseau, 217, 
223–28
transcendence, over humanity, 44
trust/distrust, 16, 83, 111, 129, 151, 158, 163, 
190
“Two Concepts of Liberty” (Berlin), 165
two minds concept, 17
unhappiness, 72, 83
unity, 2–3, 12–13





of the moral person, 175




in political society, 185
as precondition for healthy life, 19
psychological, 13, 20–21
Rousseau’s conception of, 19
Rousseau’s quest for, 209–10
social, 203–9
through associational life, 13
through citizenship, 92
wholeness versus, 170–71
universal morality, 106, 108
utopian visions, 3, 19





basis for social, 25–26, 60–61
capacity for civic, 15
as consolation for disappointment, 
222–23
cruel, 176
energy that produces, 78–79
for erotic recognition and attraction, 
95
friendship, 151–54
in Letter to D’Alembert on the Th eater, 
198
pity’s eff ect on, 80
pursuit of, 139
Rousseau’s disregard or, 18
search for, 155
sources of, 63
Voltaire, François, 40, 44, 77, 211, 223–24
vulnerability. See also weakness
awareness of, 69–70, 72
of Christian societies, 207
eff ects of, 62, 64
in Emile, 230 n. 4 (ch. 2)
forms of, 66
invulnerability, 46
in Julie, 81, 153
to nature’s dangers, 68
Rousseau’s characterization of, 85
sense of pity as, 85
shared, 71, 142
wants. See desire(s)
Warburton, William, 231 n. 3 (ch. 8)
Warens, Mme de, 12
weakness. See also vulnerability
in Emile, 70–72
in Julie, 81–82




attraction to factors in, 45
conditions destructive to, 172
Hobbes on, 60
of members of society, 131
of others, 20, 40, 75
wholeness. See also unity
as alternative to social life, 220
in associational contexts, 137
development of, 88
Emile’s quest for, 221
freedom as, 170–71
in human relations theory, 11–13
individual, 6, 179
Rousseau’s clarifi cation of, 136
social confl icts that damage, 187–88
unity versus, 170–71
will, 45–46, 190
willfulness of others, 47–49
Will to action, 39
Xenocrates, 230 n. 2 (ch. 3)
18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   255 1/25/16   11:01 AM
Typeset by
coghill composition company








18801-Warner_Rousseau.indd   256 1/25/16   11:01 AM
“John Warner is among the few scholars 
to have carefully analyzed Rousseau’s 
understanding of human relationships, 
and in Rousseau and the Problem of 
Human Relations he has done so with 
great sensitivity and keen intelligence. 
Warner reveals with admirable clarity how 
Rousseau both inspires his readers to long 
for wholeness in harmonious relationships 
with others but also intimates the tragic 
impossibility of ever truly satisfying such 
longings.”
 —Joseph ReiseRt, Colby College
“Rousseau combines two positions that 
seem to be at odds with each other: he 
insists that by nature humans are asocial, 
but he claims that—precisely because of 
this—politics is radically important. The 
issue of how humans relate to each other is 
central to his thought. Warner investigates 
different relations (pity, family, friendship, 
etc.) and how each contributes to political 
life. He has defined his issue clearly and 
executes his plan well. He has a fine 
sense of when scholars have gone astray 
by emphasizing one side of Rousseau’s 
thought at the expense of the other. He 
demonstrates that, for Rousseau, political 
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 mong Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s chief preoccupations was the 
problem of self-interest implicit in all 
social relationships. A person with divid-
ed loyalties (i.e., to both himself and his 
cohorts) was, in Rousseau’s thinking, a di-
vided person. According to John Warner’s 
Rousseau and the Problem of Human Rela-
tions, not only did Rousseau never solve 
this problem, but he also believed it was 
fundamentally unsolvable: social relation-
ships could never restore wholeness to a 
self-interested human being. Warner traces 
his argument through the contours of 
Rousseau’s thought on three distinct types 
of relationships—sexual love, friendship, 
and civil or political association. Warner 
concludes that none of these, whether ex-
amined individually or together, provides 
a satisfactory resolution to the problem of 
human dividedness located at the center 
of Rousseau’s thought. In fact, concludes 
Warner, Rousseau’s failure to obtain any-
thing hopeful from human associations is 
deliberate, self-conscious, and revelatory 
of a tragic conception of human relations. 
Thus Rousseau raises our hopes only to 
dash them.
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